Archive for the ‘Apologetics’ Category

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Francis Cardinal George on Sowing the Gospel on American Soil

January 14, 2010

Francis Cardinal George Arrives At The Funeral of Henry Hyde, 2007

Francis Cardinal George has a gift of being able to view his country as an outsider. As one who grew to manhood in Japan and lived there for 23 years, I think I experienced more of a wrenching adjustment to American life than I ever did to living in Japan. I’ve also wondered how much this played into my conversion to Catholicism, as it has allowed me to maintain a sense of being a cultural outsider.

Here Cardinal George is able to trace the effects of Protestantism on the United States and to view his own country as an object for the evangelization of the gospel by the Catholic Church. I think that is especially helpful to Americans who are not able to see their country in such a critical light. Sometimes as I debate atheists and others on the Internet I find myself thinking: where do these aliens come from? Of course the answer is right here in my home country. They are my neighbors and yet I feel separated from them by a huge gulf.

If you have ever felt that way (remember Paul Newman in Butch Cassidy & The Sundance Kid looking at the posse in their pursuit repeating over and over again “Who are those guys?”), this exposition on the United States will answer some of that question. For the Catholic Church is being pursued, make no mistake about it. The Church stands in many ways as the only defender of the weakest and most needful members (the elderly, the unborn, the economically unproductive, the mentally and physically disabled) of American society. And the secular left is in full throated opposition to any who express their faith on public issues, claiming it is culturally inappropriate to express “privately held” religious views in the public square.

The Distinctive Contribution of Theology
WHAT ARE YOU DOING to affect the culture in the United States?” Pope John Paul II asked me this question directly when I was in Rome in the late 1990s for an ad limina visit. John Paul often spoke of the Church’s mission as including culture-engagement or culture-transformation. “The faith creates culture” was a frequent refrain of his.

There are, of course, many ways that the Church shapes culture, but one of the most significant means to this end is the intelligent and faithful practice of theology Even in its most technical academic expression, Catholic theology is essentially evangelical in nature and purpose, since its task is to explore the full meaning of the story of God’s love for the world in Jesus Christ, crucified and risen from the dead.

When theologians are no longer taught by the Church and fired by her evangelical enthusiasm, they may become cultural critics or philosophers of religion, but they cannot carry out the full culture-forming task envisioned by the Church. When theologians speak from within the household of the faith, however, their words can create a culture open to Catholicism. How can authentically Catholic theology help announce the Good News to and within a culture shaped by a complex and uniquely American set of assumptions, values, symbols, practices, and convictions?

The Evangelically Ambiguous Quality of Every Culture
Since we have recognized that every culture is a human artifact and since human beings are both made in the image of God and also fallen, we can assume, on strictly theological grounds, that every culture is evangelically ambiguous — that is to say, both fertile soil and rocky ground for sowing the seed of the Gospel. Accordingly, we may search, with Paul Tillich, for the religious ground of the artistic, political, and institutional life of any society; and we may notice, with Karl Barth and John Milbank, the various spiritual distortions evident in those same cultural expressions.

With Ongen and the bishops of Vatican II, we may discern the semina verbi [the seeds of the word] that are present in non-Christian philosophies and religions; and with Augustine, we may craft an appropriate critique of even a great culture grown decadent. Thus it is in a spirit neither optimistic nor pessimistic, neither overly enthusiastic nor excessively censorious, that we look, with Gospel eyes, at our American culture. Since this is our culture, all of us can look at trends and values and past history to understand who we are collectively; but each of us can also look within and seek for identity and self-understanding as individuals. Our culture is a locus theologicus, a privileged source for theological reflection.

American Culture as Rocky Ground
What are some of the qualities of our culture that make it hostile, or at least unreceptive, to the proclamation of the Good News? The United States is a nation that has been shaped decisively by Protestantism, with its stress on the power of inner experience. For Martin Luther and other great reformers, justification is mediated less through an external system of sacraments and ecclesial institutions than through the deeply subjective intuition of faith. When this Lutheran insight passed into the thought-world of Calvinism, it became the inner conviction that one had been predestined to salvation.

A particularly powerful insight into the psychological dynamics of this Calvinist feeling of being saved is given by John Henry Newman in his Apologia Pro Vita Sua. He recounts there the story of his embrace of evangelical Christianity at the age of fifteen. By an “inward conversion” of great intensity; Newman became aware of two “luminously self-evident beings,” himself and his Creator, and of the fact of his final perseverance in grace. At the beginning of the modern age, such subjective certitude had come to replace the objective givenness of participation in Church and sacramental rites as assurance of salvation.

The Emphasis on Experience in American Theology
When, in the seventeenth century the Reform became more rationalized through the efforts of the Protestant scholastics, the focus on interiority and experience was preserved on the continent in such groups as the Hutterites, the Anabaptists, and the Moravians and in England by the Puritans and the Quakers. Many of the earliest settlers of colonial America were members of these more radical and marginalized Protestant groups. An already subjective Protestantism was expressed in a more markedly inward and experiential form.

Think, for instance, of the Quaker emphasis on the inner light and the Puritan — and later Wesleyan concern for tracking the movement of the divine spirit within one’s soul. And in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, during the various “Awakenings” that swept the country, preachers confirmed these tendencies by encouraging their listeners to feel their conversion to Christ in an intensely emotional way and to express it vividly and physically. This is the ground of our contemporary search for what might be called spiritualities without faith.

Experiential Protestantism assumed a new and more intellectual form at the beginning of the nineteenth century in the thought of the founder of theological liberalism, Friedrich Schleiermacher. Trained in a Moravian community; Schleiermacher never lost his fascination with the subjective ground of faith. He simply transposed it, in line with the romanticism of his time, into the “feeling of absolute dependency,” claiming that intuition as the self-verifying foundation for Christian dogma. This Schleiermacherian liberalism profoundly shaped the religious thought of both Europe and America, helping to give theological legitimacy here to Unitarianism (Schleiermacher placed the Trinity beyond the range of what could be verified through religious experience) and Emersonian transcendentalism (in his early writings, Schleiermacher spoke of a mystical union with the Universe). Though these more liberal forms of religion strayed far from the classical Christianity of the sixteenth-century reformers, they retained the powerful subjectivism and experientialism of the Reformation.

Paul Tillich, the twentieth-century Protestant theologian standing most clearly in the tradition of Schleiermacher, found a receptive audience among American intellectuals for his correlational version of Christian theology; Tillich understood religion, subjectively enough, as “ultimate concern”; as he saw it, the task of the theologian was to relate the anguished questions of finitude to the answers of the biblical tradition. Through a kind of trickle-down effect, the thought of Tillich has found its way into much of popular narrative theology and into many forms of theological reflection done in pastoral contexts.

And even as our Protestant-formed culture shades today into a post-Christian secularism, the emphasis on subjectivity and experience remains. It can be seen, for instance, in the numberless talk shows, those public confessionals where people discuss their deepest feelings and anxieties and are urged to act them out, sometimes histrionically. And it can be discerned in the myriad forms of New Age spirituality most of which are grounded in a mysticism of the divinized self.

The Challenge to Revelation and Authority in American Culture
All of this, quite obviously, renders extremely difficult the proclamation of a revealed and doctrinally developed faith. For classical Catholic Christianity, the truths of faith do not arise from common human experience; they come to us through God’s gracious self-revelation. More to the point, they cannot be verified, measured, or contained by our subjectivity. In the very first question of the first part of the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas Aquinas argues that a revealed sacra doctrina is required beyond the philosophical discipline of metaphysics because human beings are oriented to an end beyond what they could in principle grasp through their own powers. Revealed doctrine, and its theological elaboration, are necessary, in other words, because God has not intended that we rest in ourselves, trapped, as it were, in our own experience.

In his critique of Tillich’s correlational method, Barth said that the “answers” of Scripture are so surprising and strange that they confound any and all questions that we ask. And in his critique of Karl Rahner’s more experiential approach, Hans Urs von Balthasar compares Jesus to a mountain torrent. The torrent cannot be exhausted by the various human channels made to receive its water. What Aquinas, Barth, and von Balthasar suggest is this: experience and subjectivity are most themselves when they are graciously overthrown by the revelation that surpasses them. The exaggerated subjectivism of American culture renders this overthrow problematic.

A related difficulty is that of authority especially religious authority. When subjective experience is the source, measure, and criterion of truth, any and all authority is seen as arbitrary and invasive. But a doctrinal tradition that is grounded in objective revelation must be preserved and monitored by an authority that transcends subjectivity and is thus capable of real judgment. Newman argued, throughout his career, that the existence of a developing and historically situated dogmatic faith requires an infallible authority in order to discriminate between legitimate evolutions and corruptions. As even a casual survey of American religious culture reveals, acknowledgment of such an authority is problematic.

Another theologically negative dimension of our American culture is what could be called its fundamentally antagonistic social ontology. In addition to John Calvin’s influence in America, we have to recognize the presence of Hobbes. As noted earlier, at the heart of the medieval Catholic theological worldview was a metaphysics of participatio. God was seen, not so much as a supreme being, but the sheer act of to-be itself (Thomas’s ipsum esse subsistens), in which and through which all created things exist. This analogical conception of being allowed the medievals to see God in creation and thus to appreciate the essential connectedness of all things to God and, through God, to one another. Because human beings participate in God, they are, willy-nilly, linked to each other in the deepest ground of their existence. This powerful underlying metaphysical account led medieval Christians to appreciate the connectedness of social/political life as natural to human beings and, consequently, to see violence as not only ethically improper but ontologically inconsistent.

This vision began to break down under the influence of Duns Scotus’s univocal conception of being (which turned God into a supreme instance of being, set over and against finite realities) and Nominalism (which radically individualized and hence separated God and creatures). Pope Benedict XVI laid great emphasis on this problem in his 2006 address at the University of Regensburg, where he spoke of the relation between social violence and a God totally transcendent to His creation. As we saw in an earlier chapter, the total dissolution of the medieval ontology was realized only in the early modern metaphysical and political thought of Hobbes. Having bracketed the creator God, Hobbes saw, consequently, that the basic form of human existence must be antagonistic and individualistic. If there is no universal ground in the divine being, the war of all against all is the natural state of affairs, and sociality; an artificial contrivance for the preservation of life, is no reflection of ontology. On this Hobbesian reading, the purpose of government is no longer — as it was in classical and Christian thought — civic virtue and social justice, but rather the protection of each individual from the potential threat posed by every other individual. A social ontology of peace gives way to one of violence. “Ought” can find no foundation in “is”; and metaphysics no longer functions as meta-ethics.

This basic Hobbesian view goes through various shadings and permutations in Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and the other American founders, but they share in a common understanding of the essential nature of government. Thus, in the Declaration of Independence, it is the right to life, liberty; and happiness that is affirmed; the form of that life, the purpose of that liberty; and the proper ground of that happiness are left completely unarticulated. And the role of government is still exclusively protective rather than directive, since ontological antagonism is taken for granted.

When John Paul II spoke against a Western conception of freedom that is detached from justice and truth, it was this peculiarly modern, Hobbesian sense of freedom that he had in mind. When the free choice of the individual is incontestably paramount, the consequences are the materialism, self-absorption, litigiousness, and, above all, violence that so obviously mark our culture. Abortion and domestic abuse, human trafficking, capital punishment, the increasing gap between rich and poor, the appalling violence on our city streets often fueled by drugs, our sometimes arrogant and aggressive nationalism all flow from an apotheosized freedom rooted, in turn, in an antagonistic, disenchanted metaphysics.

One of the most remarkable and disturbing expressions of this Hobbesian freedom is the Planned Parenthood v. Casey decision handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1992, dealing with abortion rights. The majority of the justices determined that “at the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” What we see here, with breathtaking clarity is the complete eclipse of truth by freedom and hence the subjectivizing of any and all moral, metaphysical, or religious claims.

In the City of God, Augustine mocked the order of the Roman Empire as a pseudo-justice, based more on fear and oppression than on a dedication to real community And he clearly showed the relationship between the phony social order of the empire and its inadequate theology: the worship of vain and violent false gods led to a dysfunctional political system. What he proposed to replace it was the communio of Christianity, grounded in the love, forgiveness, and compassion of Christian believers, and ultimately in the communio of the Trinitarian persons: a good society rooted in right worship. In Pope John Paul II’s warnings to the West, we hear an overtone of this Augustinian critique. A freedom that is disengaged from the worship of the Creator God, one that is thus correlated to a false metaphysics, becomes poisonous.

Proclaiming a Christian metaphysics of participation, connection, and compassion is, obviously, difficult in a culture predicated on Hobbesian social and ontological assumptions. In a nation formed by an antagonistic and individualistic sense of freedom, it is awkward to say that our lives do not belong to us, that our liberty is for the sake of the Gospel, and that happiness lies in surrender to the divine will. Ignatius of Loyola is speaking a profoundly Christian language when he says, “Take, Lord, receive all my liberty my memory my understanding, my entire will. You gave them to me, now I give them back to you.”

What Ignatius assumes is a metaphysics of participation and creation: our being is, first and above all, given and then received, and therefore the task is to give it away in love rather than cling to it. “What you have received as a gift, give as a gift.” Americans often find this language of self-sacrifice hard to grasp. But not only our values and patterns of thought are evangelically ambiguous — our institutions and social patterns are as well. Political democracy and religious pluralism, both characteristic of America, require extensive theological analysis as carriers of culture, as do the worlds of entertainment and the professions.

American Culture as Receptive Soil
The theological assumption I made at the outset, that every culture is evangelically ambiguous, now compels us to explore the other side of this question: To what degree is American culture receptive to the sowing of the Gospel seed? As we saw, John Paul II was a trenchant and honest critic of the modern West, but he was also an admirer of the American experiment, and his theological analyses and meditations on the value of our society can guide us effectively in this section.

Pope John Paul II visited the United States in 1979, 1987, and 1995. On each occasion, he found much to praise in America. During his 1979 pilgrimage, he preached at the Chicago lakefront on the theme of the national motto e pluribus unum. Looking out over the throng of about a million people, he reminded them that they had come from a variety of cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds. He exulted in the fact that from this diversity they had created something new: “You brought with you a different culture and you contributed your own richness to the whole; you had different skills and you put them to work, complementing each other, to create industry agriculture, and business; each group carried with it different human values and shared them with others for the enrichment of your nation. E pluribus unum: you became a new entity a new people.”

This new people was forged for the purpose of pursuing material wealth, fellowship, and social progress, but, the pope reminded them, “history does not exhaust itself in technological conquest or in cultural achievement only.” There is a deeper reality, signaled by the very act of gathering around the table of the Eucharist: “your unity as members of the People of God.” What John Paul underscored was the analogy between the secular national communio of the United States and the sacred, transnational communio of the Church. Like America, the Church gathers people from every corner of the world, benefits from their distinctive contributions, and then draws them into oneness around a common principle: “The Body of Christ is a unity that transcends the diversity of our origin, culture, education, and personality”

John Paul meant to highlight this analogy not only theoretically but practically: the praxis of America, as it has painfully but effectively forged unity out of diversity, echoes the praxis of the Church as she has brought, throughout the centuries, peoples to Christ. Thus, when America has successfully produced the one from the many, it has participated, however imperfectly, in the divine unifying principle on full display in the Church, namely, Christ’s love for the world.

This insight was never more dramatically expressed than in the homily the pope delivered at Dodger Stadium during his 1987 pilgrimage. Once more looking out on an audience of striking ethnic diversity; John Paul said, “Christ is Anglo and Hispanic, Christ is Chinese and Black, Christ is Vietnamese and Irish, Christ is Korean and Italian, Christ is Japanese and Filipino. . . and many other ethnic groups.” And this is why the idea and practice of e pluribus unum make American culture receptive to the proclamation of Christ’s Gospel in universal communion.

When the Puritan settlers arrived in the New World, they expressed the significance of their pilgrimage in explicitly biblical terms. Having passed through the Red Sea waters of the Atlantic Ocean and having left behind the divisiveness and superstition (as they saw it) of Europe, they sought to establish on these shores “a city on a hill,” a New Jerusalem where a purified Christian community would gather. This sense of America as a divinely sanctioned place of fresh beginnings worked its way quickly and deeply into the national consciousness.

It can be sensed in the rhetoric of the writers and activists of the Revolutionary period, in the western movement of the pioneer generations, in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, in the poetry of Walt Whitman, and in the hope against hope of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century immigrants. American culture is shaped significantly by the intuition that we are not the victims of history, inescapably caught in a maelstrom of war, recrimination, and social oppression. Rather, we sense that, here, the rejected are welcomed and even the lowliest, by dint of imagination and courage, can move confidently into an open future.

On October 3, 1979, John Paul II gathered in the rain with three hundred thousand people in Battery Park on the southern tip of Manhattan. There he spoke of this quality of the American soul. “It will always remain one of the glorious achievements of this nation that, when people looked toward America, they received together with freedom also a chance for their own advancement.” In the cadences of our own literary tradition, the pope urged us to realize the fullness of this vision: “Break open the hopeless cycles of poverty and ignorance … the hopeless cycles of prejudices that linger on despite enormous progress. . . the inhuman cycles of war that spring from the violation of man’s fundamental rights.”

What the pope counseled was that the biblical understanding of history as hopeful, open, and providentially guided would find an echo in the American mythology of opportunity and advancement, and hence that prophetic calls to radical social transformation, which might sound strained and naïve elsewhere, would here find a receptive ear. At the very heart of John Paul’s assessment of our culture is a deep and often-expressed appreciation for our ideal of human rights.

The Hobbesian conception of rights and freedom, as we saw, has, to some degree, haunted us from the founding of the nation to the present. But it would be an oversight if we ignored the pope’s equally passionate endorsement of a properly directed and grounded freedom. In a homily delivered on October 3, 1979, in Philadelphia, John Paul drew attention to the Declaration of Independence, which had been composed and ratified in that city two hundred years earlier. He cited the prologue of the document, which contains “a solemn attestation of the equality of all human beings, endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights.”

The key word in this sentence is “Creator.” In pre-Christian political and social thought, the radical inequality of human beings was taken for granted. In Aristotle’s Politics, our fundamental differences in intelligence, courage, and physical ability provide the justification for clear social distinctions and hierarchies, including that of master and slave. But with the Judeo-Christian revelation, something radically new was introduced: the idea of a creator God in whose presence all of us, despite our differences, are respected and loved. In light of this biblical idea, it became clear that human social status could never be simply a function of natural abilities or accomplishments. It must rather be rooted in our identity as beloved children of God.

Inasmuch as Locke and Jefferson spoke of creation in their articulation of human rights, they showed the influence of this Christian heritage and their departure from a purely Hobbesian construal of the question. In that same Philadelphia sermon, John Paul drew attention to the Genesis account of the creation of human beings in the image and likeness of God. It is this biblical intuition, he implies, that informed the best of the language of “rights” from the founders of the American political culture.

Therefore when the Church speaks — as she must — of the dignity of each individual, created by God and redeemed by Christ, she ought to find a receptive audience in Americans formed by the civil tradition of human rights. ‘When, on Gospel grounds, she defends the weakest and most vulnerable members of a society– the elderly, the unborn, the economically unproductive, the mentally and physically disabled — her words ought to resonate with the deepest convictions of the American soul. In the measure that these “least” among us are legally unprotected, our culture has rejected a creation-centered understanding of rights and chosen a Hobbesian conception. A theological analysis of our rights language would be a powerful contribution to culture and society.

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The Chalcedonian Doctrine

January 11, 2010

The Fourth Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon 451AD

The following is adapted from Fr. Robert Barron’s And Now I See which one reviewer has called “the most readable, sensible and well-supported view of Christianity” he had ever read. It constantly surprises me that as I return to this book to help me advocate the Church’s positions, I always find something clear-cut and easily understandable. Most recently I was in an Internet food fight on the historicity of Jesus. The Jesus Denier was going on and on about how Jesus was in fact a fable constructed from earlier pagan myths. I used the Chalcedonian Doctrine against him, pointing out that what had gone before in various mythologies was as similar to the Jesus of the gospels as a fine burgundy wine is to grape Kool-Aid.

Anyways, here is the amalgam of arguments I used in a longer more thoughtful piece. It couples Fr. Barron’s writings on Chalcedon and Robert Sokolowski’s The God of Faith and Reason (another fine book previously featured on PayingAttentionToTheSky)

The Chalcedonian Doctrine came at the end of a long period of debate and discussion in the early church concerning the nature and salvific significance of Jesus Christ. To simplify somewhat, two camps battled for supremacy over the course of two centuries: one placing greater emphasis on the humanity of the Lord and the other on his divinity. Arius, the fourth-century heresiarch, proposed a sort of compromise according to which Jesus is somewhat divine and somewhat human. Arius’s position, to give it its due, had a certain coherency in the context of the ancient world, since it was borrowed from a mythological framework. In the legends of the Greeks, many gods and goddesses “mixed themselves” with humans, producing all sorts of divine/human hybrids, quasi-gods and demigods. Arius proposed to his Hellenistic Christian world a similar theory of the mingling of nature and supernature.

Robert Sokolowski has commented on this Christian distinction between older pagan myths and legends and the Christian religion:

Christian theology is differentiated from pagan religious and philosophical reflection primarily by the introduction of a new distinction, the distinction between the world understood as possibly not having existed and God understood as possibly being all that there is, with no diminution of goodness or greatness. It is not the case that God and the world are each separately understood in this new way, and only subsequently related to each other; they are determined in the distinction not each apart from the other.

The Christian distinction between the world and God may receive its precise verbal formulation in a theoretical context, since it is described especially by theologians and philosophers, but the distinction does not emerge for the first time in this theoretical setting. It receives its formulation in reflective thought because it has already been achieved in the life that goes on before reflective thinking occurs.

The distinction is lived in Christian life, and most originally it was lived and expressed in the life of Jesus, after having been anticipated, and hence to some extent possessed, in the Old Testament history which Jesus completed. The Christian distinction is there for us now, as something for us to live and as an issue for reflection, because it was brought forward in the life and teaching of Christ, and because that life and teaching continue to be available in the life and teaching of the Church. It is a massive theological and philosophical fact that this understanding arose and is maintained by Christian belief.

Further, as Sokolowski explains this “Christian distinction” carries with it a certain strangeness:

When we turn away from the world or from the whole and turn toward God, towards the other term of the distinction that comes to light in Christian belief, we begin to appreciate the strangeness of the distinction itself. In the distinctions that occur normally within the setting of the world, each term distinguished is what it is precisely by not being that which it is distinguishable from. Its being is established partially by its otherness, and therefore its being depends on its distinction from others. But in the Christian distinction God is understood as “being” God entirely apart from any relation of otherness to the world or to the whole. God could and would be God even if there were no world. Thus the Christian distinction is appreciated as a distinction that did not have to be, even though it in fact is. The most fundamental thing we come to in Christianity, the distinction between the world and God, is appreciated as not being the most fundamental thing after all, because one of the terms of the distinction, God, is more fundamental than the distinction itself.

In Christian faith God is understood not only to have created the world, but to have permitted the distinction between himself and the world to occur. …No distinction made within the horizon of the world is like this, and therefore the act of creation cannot be understood in terms of any action or any relationship that exists in the world. The special sense of sameness in God “before” and “after” the creation, and the special sense of otherness between God and the world, impose qualifications on whatever we are to say about God and the world, about creation out of nothing, about God’s way of being present and interior to things and yet beyond them….Furthermore, if “being” is the term that philosophers use to name that which is articulated in the sameness and otherness that reason can register, if “being” is used of the world as last horizon, it is appropriate that another term, like “esse,” be introduced for use in the “whole” made up of God and the world, as a name for what is articulated in the identities and differences occurring in this new context.

Of course it was the Council of Nicea that famously refuted Arius’s view with the counterclaim that Jesus is homoousios with God, “one in being” with the Father, not a demigod but fully divine. In the wake of Nicea, the debate continued to rage, Arius and semi-Arians fighting defenders of homoousian orthodoxy, such as Athanasius the bishop of Alexandria. At the center of the controversy was the nagging problem of relating the true and complete divinity of Jesus with his undoubted humanity. How could these two come together without contradiction, compromise, or mutual exclusion?

At the Council of Chalcedon in 451, Christian bishops and theologians of both the East and the West met to resolve the difficulty, and their statement of belief has emerged as a sort of classic expression of Christian faith on the question of the ontology of Jesus, It is interesting to note that the Chalcedonian fathers provided, not so much a philosophical explanation of how the divine and human come together in Christ, as an ecstatic proclamation born of faith. Standing in the rich tradition stretching back to the Scriptures and the first witnesses to Christ, they gave voice to the fundamental Christian conviction that, in Jesus, divinity and humanity coexist in a noncompetitive way and that, as we have often emphasized, the fullness of each is revealed precisely in their coexistence.

The “definition” of Christ offered at Chalcedon can be stated rather briefly:

One and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only begotten, made known in two natures which exist without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the difference of the natures having been in no wise taken away by reason of the union, but rather the properties of each being preserved, and both concurring into one Person and one hypostasis — not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, the divine Logos, the Lord Jesus Christ. 

The first, and in some sense elemental, affirmation of this statement is the oneness of Christ. In Jesus we are dealing, not with two things or two persons, but with one basic reality or power of existence And it is this unified ground that the Council fathers identify as the divine person of the Logos. In the language of Greek metaphysics, “person” refers to an instantiation of a rational nature, the specification and concrete expression of an abstract form.

Thus the “person” of Socrates is a particular focusing of the general species of humanity, the receptacle, if you will, into which the form of human being is poured in his case, it is that which makes Socrates this one individual and identifiable human being. The center and source of unity in Jesus is the divine “person” of the Logos, but there is a key difference with regard to Christ, for his person bears or instantiates, not one nature, but two — and here we see the real novelty of the Chalcedonian formula. No Greek philosopher would speak of a single person bearing multiple natures, though it was a commonplace to hold that a single nature could be instantiated in multiple persons, as Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates are all instances of the one nature of humanity. As is so often the case, Christian dogmatic language twists and breaks the language of philosophy even as it uses it.

In Jesus, one person “lights up” two distinct natures, divine and human, allowing both to come to expression in all of their distinctiveness and uniqueness. Accordingly, Jesus is fully human, that is to say, in possession of a human body, mind, will, and passion, as well as subject to all of the characteristic limitations of being a creature. As Karl Rahner points out, despite the union of natures spoken of at Chalcedon, Jesus remains a creature who confronts the divine across an infinite abyss. The ontologically limited and culturally determined humanity of Jesus is not overwhelmed or swallowed by his divinity.

But Jesus is also in possession of a divine nature, that is to say, of all that characterizes and renders distinctive the being of God. In him, the sacred reality that transcends the universe and yet pours itself out in creative love, is alive, operative, personally present. And the ontological proximity of the human nature of Jesus does not compromise or overwhelm this divinity. He is not a demigod or a lesser divinity, but rather “fully divine.”  As the surprising formula states it, the two natures — human and divine — exist in personal union, but without “confusion, change, separation or division.”

Sokolowski looks at the Incarnational Jesus from the standpoint of God and what it says about Him:

The Council of Chalcedon, and he councils and controversies that led up to it, were concerned with the mystery of Christ, but they also tell us about the God who became incarnate in Christ. They tell us first that God does not destroy the natural necessities of things he becomes involved with, even in the intimate union of the incarnation. What is according to nature, and what reason can disclose in nature, retains its integrity before the Christian God. And second, they tell us that we must think of God as the one who can let natural necessity be maintained and let reason be left intact; that is God is not himself a competing part of nature of a part of the world.

If the incarnation could not take place without a truncation of human nature, it would mean that God was one of the natures of the world that somehow was defined by not being the other natures; it would mean that his presence in one of these other natures, human nature, would involve a conflict and a need to exclude some part of what he is united with. Either God would only seem to have become man, or he would have become united to something less than man and would have become a new kind of being in the world. These are all ways in which the pagans thought the gods could take on human form or bring about beings that were higher than the race of men but lower than the gods. The reason the pagans could not conceive of anything like the incarnation is that their gods are part o f the world, and the  union of any two natures in the world is bound to be, in some way, unnatural, because of the otherness that lets one thing be itself only by not being the other.

But the Christian God is not part of the world and is not a “kind” of being at all. Therefore the incarnation is not meaningless or impossible or destructive. …To consider the early Christological controversies and their attendant councils as merely historical episodes, or to suppose that they are just an importation of Hellenistic thought-patterns into Christianity, is to fail to take seriously the need to distinguish Christian faith and its theology from simply natural religion and philosophy.

On the surface of it, what is being proposed here is nonsense. How can two mutually exclusive realities — one finite, the other infinite — come together as one? It seems as though this formula violates the most elemental principle of logic, the law of noncontradiction. What is being proposed here, to borrow the language of Hans Urs von Balthasar, is a “theo-logic,” a new way of thinking about the real based upon an ecstatic sense of who God truly is.

We saw that one of the chief effects of the originating sin is the tendency to objectify the divine. Once we have established our egos as sovereign and central, God necessarily appears as a supreme being, either threatening or irrelevant. From the standpoint of the self-elevating pusilla anima, God is a being with whom we have, at best, an extrinsic relationship; he is “out there” and “over and against us.” To be sure, this attitude born of sin affects decisively the way we think theologically: we cannot imagine that God is the immanent/transcendent ground in whom we find our own center. We cannot conceive of the intimacy with the sacred that can be ours. And consequently, we find it terribly difficult to accept the ecstatic metaphysical poetry of Chalcedon, the language of divine/human unity.

But, from the standpoint of metanoia, from the perspective of the new mind, we see that God is not a competing supreme being, but the power whose very closeness to us enhances our humanity, whose very proximity makes us most fully ourselves. And we see, at the same time, that God is a reality that can work its way into every corner of creation without ceasing to be itself In a word the “natures” of God and creation can come together without compromise and contradiction, precisely because God is not a being but the mysterious power of Being itself.

The Chalcedonian fathers proclaim, in their sober philosophical language, the undoing of Eden, they see as reality what the sinful mind can appreciate only as illusion or nonsense. And this new vision, these new eyes, come from Jesus Christ, from the God/human intimacy that is his very being. In the startling and unique way of being that was Christ’s, the first believers glimpsed the theonomy that was offered but lost at Eden, that was held out alluringly throughout the Old Testament, that indirectly animated and gave purpose to all the finest expressions of the religious imagination of humanity.

Let us make this a bit more explicit with regard to the reality of God We see, in the Chalcedonian formulation, the unheard of closeness of God to the world. What we have termed the creativity, passion, and humility of the sacred are clearly on display in the language of hypostatic union. In Christ we see just how low the divine can stoop — even to the point of “becoming” what is not divine.

What is perhaps less obvious is the equal, though implicit, emphasis on the transcendence of God that is contained in Chalcedon. The realm of finitude is characterized by mutual exclusion. One finite thing is defined, appropriately, over and against all those other things that it is not to be a particular chair is not to be any other chair or any other thing. More to the point, one finite reality cannot become another without some radical change taking place a chair becomes a table or is reduced to ashes only by ceasing to be a chair, a wild beast “becomes” a  leopard only by being devoured .Because of the mutual exclusivity that marks all limited things, relationship between them is always difficult if not dangerous.

But the Council of Chalcedon boldly proclaims that, in Christ, two natures, divine and human, come together in personal unity in such a way that one can speak of God becoming a creature. Yet this becoming in no way compromises the integrity of the natures, nothing is ceded either on the part of God or on the part of the human nature of Jesus But this entails that God is not in any sense a worldly nature, decidedly not a finite form. If God were a thing alongside of others, a supreme being among beings, then the union of God with a creature would be possible only through some radical compromise of either God’s or the creature’s ontology.

As in mythological conceptions, the divine would have to supplant or push out some dimension of the non-divine as it makes its way into the world. But it is just this notion, just this style of thinking, that is consciously rejected at Chalcedon in favor of a properly “theological” solution. The God who can establish the intimacy with the race experienced in Jesus Christ must be, not any sort of being, but a power of existence that, in the most dramatic sense possible, transcends finitude God must be, not a being, but Being itself. And therefore, like the Infancy narratives, this formula implies the serenity, self-sufficiency, and sovereignty of God just as surely as it implies the tensive qualities of God’s humility, creativity, and passion. The bipolarity hinted at on Sinai in the revelation of the burning bush now comes to full expression: the God capable of hypostatic union is very strange indeed, strange enough to save us from our sins.

The God of the Incarnation is thus the power that “throws everything off,” that calls into question everything we assumed about the structure of reality. We live, not in a world of division, presided over by the supreme being, but rather in a universe of interrelationship and “charged with the grandeur of God.” God can become one of us, and therefore our minds have to change, the Word has been made flesh, and metanoia is the only valid response.

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Christmas With Fr. Robert Barron

December 25, 2009

I’ve never forgotten this little presentation Fr. Robert Barron made. Although one has heard the story from Luke so many times (as recently as today) this is the only one that truly made me understand what was going on: suddenly the swaddling clothes, the story of the census and who Caesar Augustus really was — I never quite put it all together. But it’s these details that give this story its meaning. Somehow I got lost in the tinsel of the baby Jesus for too many years.

Now the Christ is in Christmas for me which means that I call it Advent and the most important thing I do is attend Mass because that is where my home and my family are now.

Here’s the telling of the story that so impressed me:

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A Homosexualist Paradox

December 10, 2009

In Evil and the Justice of God, N. T. Wright begins by noting how the Enlightenment project for the perfection of man and the elimination of evil has received some severe checks, from the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 to the indiscriminate slaughter of the last century. Even so, the modern attempt to abolish original sin was never abandoned, although substitutes had to be found in Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche.

Postmodernism is not helpful on the subject, often branding as evil what it deems politically incorrect. We might add here that when Wright gets around to discussing the evils of the modern age, his list drips with the sort of ecclesial leftism one expects from the Anglican establishment: Third World debt, American military adventurism, capitalism, and industrial pollution. The author thinks the United States’ response to 9/11 “immature,” that we thought we could somehow “eliminate evil” by bombing the Taliban, but he proposes no alternative.

Despite these political hiccups, Wright’s discussion of evil is provocative. He begins by warning against the temptation to “solve” the problem of evil in any obvious way. Even the most sophisticated theodicies (attempts to justify God in the light of evil) run the risk of trivializing the problem. Evil is not a puzzle to be solved, but rather a question to be lived. A person who suffers the loss of a loved one does not want to hear what philosophers have to say on the subject; in fact, if that person suffers in the right way, he or she may be far closer to “solving” the problem of evil than any philosopher.

“What the Gospels offer,” according to Wright, “is not a philosophical explanation of evil, what it is or why it is there, not a set of suggestions for how we might adjust our lifestyles so that evil will mysteriously disappear from the world, but the story of an event in which the living God deals with it.” Which means that the ultimate “solution” to evil is the sufferings of Christ. God is not going to remove evil from His creation; He is not going to push the “restart” button. Rather, starting at Calvary, He is going to allow evil to be part of the solution. He is going to use it to help bring into existence the “new heaven and new earth” we read about in Revelation.

Wright points out that the blessed state on the other side of the Parousia, where evil will have no purchase whatsoever, is to be achieved only “through suffering love.” Until then, evil will remain present in our personal lives and in the world at large. Its role in our redemption will never be entirely comprehensible, and we have to take on faith the words of St. Thérèse of Lisieux that “God does not permit unnecessary suffering.” Being an Anglican, it is understandable that Wright’s discussion of evil mostly sticks to Scripture; but it may be that, until the beatific vision, the final word on the subject is to be found, not in any texts, but in the lives of the saints.

In this respect it may instructive to recall these words of John Paul II:

“It is significant that in their preaching the prophets link mercy, which they often refer to because of the people’s sins, with the incisive image of love on God’s part. The Lord loves Israel with the love of a special choosing, much like the love of a spouse, and for this reason He pardons its sins and even its infidelities and betrayals. When He finds repentance and true conversion, He brings His people back to grace. In the preaching of the prophets, mercy signifies a special power of love, which prevails over the sin and infidelity of the chosen people.

In this broad “social” context, mercy appears as a correlative to the interior experience of individuals languishing in a state of guilt or enduring every kind of suffering and misfortune. Both physical evil and moral evil, namely sin, cause the sons and daughters of Israel to turn to the Lord and beseech His mercy. In this way David turns to Him, conscious of the seriousness of his guilt; Job too, after his rebellion, turns to Him in his tremendous misfortune; so also does Esther, knowing the mortal threat to her own people. And we find still other examples in the books of the Old Testament.

At the root of this many-sided conviction, which is both communal and personal, and which is demonstrated by the whole of the Old Testament down the centuries, is the basic experience of the chosen people at the Exodus: the Lord saw the affliction of His people reduced to slavery, heard their cry, knew their sufferings and decided to deliver them. In this act of salvation by the Lord, the prophet perceived his love and compassion. This is precisely the grounds upon which the people and each of its members based their certainty of the mercy of God, which can be invoked whenever tragedy strikes.

Added to this is the fact that sin too constitutes man’s misery. The people of the Old Covenant experienced this misery from the time of the Exodus, when they set up the golden calf. The Lord Himself triumphed over this act of breaking the covenant when He solemnly declared to Moses that He was a “God merciful and gracious, slow to anger, and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness.” It is in this central revelation that the chosen people, and each of its members, will find, every time that they have sinned, the strength and the motive for turning to the Lord to remind Him of what He had exactly revealed about Himself and to beseech His forgiveness.

Thus, in deeds and in words, the Lord revealed His mercy from the very beginnings of the people which He chose for Himself; and, in the course of its history, this people continually entrusted itself, both when stricken with misfortune and when it became aware of its sin, to the God of mercies. All the subtleties of love become manifest in the Lord’s mercy towards those who are His own: He is their Father, for Israel is His firstborn son; the Lord is also the bridegroom of her whose new name the prophet proclaims: Ruhamah, “Beloved” or “she has obtained pity.”
Dives In Misericordia
John Paul II

I recently went on a very liberal discussion forum and attempted to advance the Church’s teachings as it applied to the Manhattan Declaration. I found the discussion on gay marriage at an immediate standstill and the cries of homophobia raining upon my head. And that for simply asking whether the words “healthy, happy, young and gay” didn’t present a kind of cognitive dissonance when encountered. While no one would take me to task for “young, successful and black” the cognitive dissonance of which would suggest that our society still suffers from racism in some form (that could be argued but not by me), the former was almost immediately smoked out as an attempt to “decry the problems of gay America — which are exaggerated anyway — and urge measures that can only prevent their amelioration.” I swear I hadn’t even breathed a “measure.”

My amazement with this forum is that some of those most active in heaping scorn and ridicule define themselves as Catholic. They are, of course, of the cafeteria variety who do not put gay marriage or abortion on their plates at the buffet. These apologists for homosexualism simply refuse to acknowledge the problems besetting our gay brothers in America. So “gay”, ipso facto, must be healthy when seen in one perspective; yet when advocating the ineluctable nature of the gay/lesbian fate, the homosexualists immediately don the guise of the suffering servant: “O Lord how can you accuse of choosing to be this way!” I’d gotten as far as presenting this paradox before the homophobic rain began to fall.

Andrew J. Sodergren, of the John Paul II Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family presents supportive evidence this way:

“Those who argue that homosexual inclinations are “natural” utilize a problematic understanding of nature that needs to be challenged. This understanding of nature refers to that which is innate and unchosen within a person. “I did not choose to be the way I am.” “I discovered my homosexuality within me.” Moreover, a certain normative quality is attributed to this nature such that it can and should dictate my actions. Nature as such is good, or at least neutral in respect to ethics, so the modern mentality holds that whatever I am naturally disposed to do I should do as long as it does not involve violating the rights of others. 

A Christian anthropology, however, comes to very different conclusions about “nature”. Human nature, in a Christian sense, does also have a normative content to it. As the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith says, “There can be no true promotion of man’s dignity unless the essential order of his nature is respected” (CDF, 1975, no. 3).

In creating the world, God inscribed a certain order in it. Thus, the true nature of things and their fulfillment can be understood only in light of God’s design. This is especially salient when we are speaking of desires that arise within the human heart for Christian revelation recognizes the reality of original sin.

At the start of human history, our first parents rebelled against God’s plan and by their action, brought disorder into the world: “Adam and Eve committed a personal sin, but this sin affected the human nature that they would then transmit in a fallen state” (CCC, no. 404).

The Fathers of the Church taught that human nature is one and thus all human beings participate in the same nature. Thus, when our first parents marred their likeness to God through sin, the whole human family was affected by it. Thus, the human nature that each human being inherits is disordered. Original sin is a deprivation of original holiness and justice, but human nature has not been totally corrupted: it is wounded in the natural powers proper to it; subject to ignorance, suffering, and the dominion of death; and inclined to sin – an inclination to evil that is called “concupiscence” (CCC, no. 405).

Every evil in the world is traceable back to this fundamental disruption at the beginning of time. Indeed, another crucial aspect of Christian anthropology is that human nature involves a unity of body and soul such that the human person is not wholly identifiable with either taken separately but exists as a composite of the two. In other words, the body and the soul are intrinsically united. 

The unity of soul and body is so profound that one has to consider the soul to be the “form” of the body: i.e., it is because of its spiritual soul that the body made of matter becomes a living, human body; spirit and matter, in man, are not two natures united, but rather their union forms a single nature (CCC, no. 365).

Therefore, when we say that original sin has wounded human nature, this includes both physical and spiritual effects. In this way, the doctrine of original sin can account for every sort of genetic or biological defect, disease, or disorder as well as all kinds of human suffering and inclinations to do evil. With this understanding of fallen human nature, a Christian anthropology would have no difficulty accommodating research (past or future) implicating a substantial inherited component to homosexuality.

Clearly, this understanding of original sin is essential when we are speaking of the moral quality of human inclinations. Because of original sin, a certain disorder resides in the human heart such that one often desires that which is contrary to the moral law. Therefore, even if homosexual inclinations are entirely inherited, this does not mean that they necessarily correspond with human nature in the original sense, as God intended it. Moreover, as Christ made clear in his preaching, it is the original, created order that has normative weight to it, not this transitory fallen state: 

Some Pharisees approached him, and tested him, saying, “Is it lawful for a man to divorce his wife for any cause whatever?” He said in reply, “Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator ‘made them male and female’ and said, ‘For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh’? So they are no longer two, but one flesh. Therefore, what God has joined together, no human being must separate” (Mt 19.3-6).

Thus, the inclinations that arise in the human heart must be tested according to objective moral norms because the human nature we encounter in this age of history, though wounded by sin, is still called to the same norms of behavior intended by God “from the beginning.” Why? Because God created us “out of love for love” (John Paul II, 1981, no. 11); His wise, loving plan permeates all of created reality. Therefore, to follow the norms given to us by our Creator and Redeemer is in no way an imposition or alienation but a call to happiness. The moral law given to us by God is a blueprint by which human beings can achieve their fulfillment. This implies another fundamental truth of Christian anthropology: human nature is wounded, but it is not totally corrupted. Man still has freedom. Though weakened by sin and prone to misuse, the human person still possesses the ability to make free moral choices and, by cooperating with God’s grace, grow in holiness and maturity. 

Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s responsibility. By free will one shapes one’s own life. Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection when direct toward God, our beatitude (CCC, no. 1731).

The proper, beatifying use of freedom requires God’s grace. Only with His help can we properly see the truth and act in accord with it. Thankfully, God desires all men to be saved and abundantly supplies the means for it to happen.

Which brings us very much back to what John Paul II was saying in support of N. T. Wright’s Evil and the Justice of God.

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The Resurrection

September 23, 2009
The Resurrection of Christ and the Women at the Tomb; Fra ANGELICO; 1440-41 fresco; convento di San Marco, Florence

The Resurrection of Christ and the Women at the Tomb; Fra ANGELICO; 1440-41 fresco; convento di San Marco, Florence

While faith in such things as the Resurrection springs from the relationship the believer has with the living Jesus, there are a number of facts that derive from the nature of the historical event that is reported in the Gospels. This event and the nature of the facts that are presented also point to truth as well, simply because many are facts

  1. that would be considered embarrassing to the Christian case
  2. that are never used to embellish the reputations of the original apostles
  3. that are never put in the mouths of gospel character to resolve post Easter church disputes
  4. that show a fidelity to a detail that displays careful historical work

Many of these points are affirmed by Lee Strobel in his Case for Christ:

The Gospels’ Theological Agenda
In the ancient world the idea of writing dispassionate, objective history merely to chronicle events, with no ideological purpose, was unheard of. Nobody wrote history if there wasn’t a reason to learn from it. As with any ideological document, there are people who distort history to serve their ideological ends. But it is a mistake to think that that always happens. A modern parallel from the experience of the Jewish community clarifies this. Some people, usually for anti-Semitic purposes, deny or downplay the horrors of the Holocaust. But it has been the Jewish scholars who’ve created museums, written books, preserved artifacts and documented eyewitness testimony concerning the Holocaust. Now, they have a very ideological purpose – namely to ensure that such an atrocity never occurs again – but they have also been the most faithful and objective in their reporting of historical truth. Christianity was likewise based on certain historical claims that God uniquely entered into space and time in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, so the very ideology that Christians were trying to promote required as careful historical work as possible.

The Intentions Of The Gospels
Luke states a clear intention at the beginning of his gospel to write accurately about the things he investigated and found to be well supported by witnesses. While Mark and Matthew don’t have the explicit kind of statement that Luke does, they are close in terms of genre and it seem reasonable that Luke’s historical intent would closely mirror theirs. John contains a statement of purpose n 20:31. Consider also the way that the gospels are written – in a sober and responsible fashion, with accurate incidental details, with obvious care and exactitude. You don’t find the outlandish flourishes and blatant mythologizing that you see in a lot of other ancient writings…. Further, after Jesus’ ascension there were a number of controversies that threatened the early church – should believers be circumcised, how should speaking in tongues be regulated, how to keep Jew and Gentile united, what are the appropriate roles for women in ministry, whether believers could divorce non-Christian spouses. These issues could have been conveniently resolved if the early Christians had simply read back into the gospels what Jesus had told them from the world beyond. But his never happened. The continuance of these controversies demonstrates that Christians were interested in distinguishing between what happened during Jesus’ lifetime and what was debated later in the churches.

The Discoverers Of The Empty Tomb
When you understand the role of women in first-century Jewish society, what’s really extraordinary is that this empty tomb story should feature women as the discoverers of the empty tomb in the first place. Women were on a very low rung of the social ladder in first-century Palestine, There are old rabbinical sayings that said, ‘Let the words of the Law be burned rather than delivered to women’ and ‘Blessed is he whose children are male, but woe to him whose children are female.’ Women’s testimony was regarded as so worthless that they weren’t even allowed to serve as legal witnesses in a Jewish court of law. In light of this it is absolutely remarkable that the chief witnesses to the empty tomb are these women who were friends of Jesus. Any later legendary account would have certainly portrayed male disciples as discovering the tomb – Peter or John for example. The fact that women are the first witnesses to the empty tomb is most plausibly explained by the reality that – like it or not – they were the discoverers of the empty tomb! This shows that he gospel writers faithfully recorded what happened, even if it was embarrassing. This bespeaks the historicity of this tradition rather than its legendary status.

The Empty Tomb As Historical Fact
The empty tomb is implicit in the early tradition that is passed along by Paul in 1 Corinthians 15, which is a very old and reliable source of historical information about Jesus.  Christian and Jew alike knew the site of Jesus’ tomb. So if it weren’t empty, it would have been impossible for a movement founded on belief in the Resurrection to have come into existence in the same city where this man had been publicly executed and buried. We can tell from the language, grammar, and style that Mark got his empty tomb story from an earlier source. There’s evidence that it was written before A.D.37, which is much too early for legend to have seriously corrupted it. It would have been unprecedented anywhere in history for legend to have grown up that fast and significantly distorted the gospels. Mark’s account of the story of the empty tomb is stark in its simplicity and unadorned by theological reflection. The unanimous testimony that the empty tomb was discovered by women argues for the authenticity of the story, because this would have been embarrassing for the disciples to admit and most certainly would have been covered up if this were a legend.

And how to explain the  innumerable graphic little details, names, numbers, times that cluster about each gospel; here are some, for example,  listed in the Catholic Encyclopedia article on Mark:

(1)  how Jesus took Peter’s mother-in-law by the hand and raised her up (i, 31), how with anger He looked round about on His critics (iii, 5), how He took little children into His arms and blessed them and laid His hands upon them (ix, 35; x, 16), how those who carried the paralytic uncovered the roof (ii, 3, 4), how Christ commanded that the multitude should sit down upon the green grass, and how they sat down in companies, in hundred and in fifties (vi, 39-40);

(2)  how James and John left their father in the boat with the hired servants (i, 20), how they came into the house of Simon and Andrew, with James and John (i, 29), how the blind man at Jericho was the son of Timeus (x, 46), how Simon of Cyrene was the father of Alexander and Rufus (xv, 21);

(3)  how there was no room even about the door of the house where Jesus was (ii, 2), how Jesus sat in the sea and all the multitude was by the sea on the land (iv, 1), how Jesus was in the stern of the boat asleep on the pillow (iv, 38);

(4) how on the evening of the Sabbath, when the sun had set, the sick were brought to be cured (i, 32), how in the morning, long before day, Christ rose up (i, 35), how He was crucified at the third hour (xv, 25), how the women came to the tomb very early, when the sun had risen (xvi, 2);

(5)  how the paralytic was carried by four (ii, 3), how the swine were about two thousand in number (v. 13), how Christ began to send forth the Apostles, two and two (vi, 7).

Peter Kreeft has written:  “Some of the tenets of Christian faith (for example, the Trinity) cannot be discovered, adequately understood, or proved by human reason, but are “mysterious and supernatural”; others, like monotheism, can; and all of them at least do not “offend the principles of reason (Aquinas). Not all of Christianity can be proved, but some of it can, and none of it can be disproved. If it could, faith would be absurd and ridiculous.”

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was asked by reporters in the 1960s for his reaction to the fact that some intellectuals thought God was dead. The president replied, “That’s odd; I was just speaking to him this morning.” Richard Dawkins goes the former President one better; saying in a recent Wall Street Journal piece that “God was never alive in the first place.” Many of us will cast our lots with the Psalmist who wrote “The fool says in his heart there is no God.”

Many moderns opt for God, but their God is no more than a mythic evolutionary journey on a road less traveled that we make up as we go along. No “unsustainable certainty” of faith for them. Presumably they are OK with the “story” of the death and resurrection of Christ, for example, if (making no pretentions to historical accuracy) it gives one the needed psychological boost to cope with human grief and helps one find ultimate meaning in life’s struggles.

St. Paul would beg to disagree. He summarizes the Christian explanation of the Resurrection, in 1 Corinthians 15:1-14:

“Now I would remind you, brethren, in what terms I preached to you the gospel, which you received, in which you stand, by which you are saved, if you hold it fast – unless you believed in vain.

For I delivered to you as of first importance what I also received, that Christ died for our sins in accordance with the scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day in accordance with the scriptures, and that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve. Then he appeared to more than five hundred brethren at one time, most of whom are still alive, though some have fallen asleep. Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles. Last of all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me. For I am the least of the apostles, unfit to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God. But by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace toward me was not in vain. On the contrary, I worked harder than any of them, though it was not I, but the grace of God which is with me. Whether then it was I or they, so we preach and so you believed.

Now if Christ is preached as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no resurrection of the dead? But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised; if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain.”

Mark Shea has summarized some of the modern alternatives for us: “Then again, there are others who solve the problem of the Resurrection by not letting Jesus die. In this view, somebody else was crucified on Good Friday (somebody who really deserved it, like Judas Iscariot), while Jesus went off to a well-earned pension someplace else. Depending on which legend or Shocking Book (e.g., Holy Blood, Holy Grail by Michael Baigent) you choose, “someplace else” could be anywhere from Japan to France. Frequently, “Jesus didn’t die” scenarios go for the hearts-and-flowers conclusion favored by Hollywood, in which the retired Son of Man finally gets the girl, like Clark Kent in Superman II, and no longer has to pursue His unrewarding task of proclaiming platitudes.

Typically, they pack Him off to some vineyard with Mary Magdalene, there to found a dynasty of Merovingians or something. Instead of having Him escape crucifixion entirely, some scenarios grant that He was crucified but insist that He only swooned (possibly with the help of some drugged wine) and regained consciousness later. But the central claim of all such scenarios is that Jesus didn’t really die on the Cross.

Still other theorists, often involved in the New Age movement, solve the problem by allowing Him to be only a spirit (divine or angelic, depending on the preference of the author) appearing as a man, a sort of holy vision. This solves the problem of His death by making it an illusion: a tidy disposal of a messy crucifixion that preserves the happy ending.

Meanwhile, others have much simpler and cruder explanations: Disciples stole the corpse, lied about it, and founded a cult for their own selfish gain and power. Slightly kinder than this is the Hysterical Hallucination Theory, which says the well-meaning apostles hallucinated the Resurrection. Others say it was a later generation of Christians who added the Resurrection to the New Testament. Originally, it was just a collection of apostolic memoirs about the Dead Master and His witty sayings. Many think St. Paul is behind the whole thing (see, for instance, The Mythmaker: Paul and the Invention of Christianity by Hyam Maccoby).

Under the influence of pagan myth, St. Paul allegedly transformed this ordinary Jewish rabbi into a Cosmic Christ figure. The original apostles, according to this school, would be horrified at what Paul did to the teaching of the gentle and witty Y’shua….

The mention of the tomb leads some people to another favorite theory: namely, that the disciples went to the wrong tomb and leapt to the conclusion that Christ was risen. One can only wonder what such theorists think people are made of. For the apostles to conclude that Jesus was the risen and glorious Lord of all on the basis of such a blunder would have required preternatural stupidity not only on their part but on the part of the Jerusalem authorities.

Even if all the early Church was too obtuse to find its way back to the final resting place of the Man who was the focus of their devotion, surely somebody in the Jerusalem elite who opposed the growing sect of Nazarenes could have said, “Uh, guys? Here’s the corpse. You were looking in the wrong place. Next time ask for directions.” Joseph of Arimathea might have been of some help here. So might the women, who saw where He was laid. And such a theory becomes doubly silly when the early Church’s fascination with relics and tombs is factored in. Early liturgies tended to be held at grave sites, yet there is no cult that develops around the most important grave of all. Why, it’s as if the tomb had been empty or something.

Which takes us, in our taxonomy of Resurrection alternatives, to the various escape-from-death/swoon theories: the notion that Jesus somehow avoided death, either by skipping town and leaving a stooge to take the fall for Him or by enduring crucifixion and then escaping the tomb. It’s hard to say which version of this theory is more preposterous. If there’s a fact of history that’s not disputed even by hard-core atheist historians, it is the fact of His death. If we know nothing else about Him, we know that He died by crucifixion outside the walls of Jerusalem circa 30 A.D.

And yet some insist that He didn’t. Like a sort of first-century Elvis, He went into sudden and mysterious retirement, in sharp contradiction to everything He had ever said or done, and founded a dynasty or studied philosophy or something in some far-off land. What is the evidence for this? Well, there is none really, just hints, supposings, surmises, and what-ifs. It’s rather like the thinking behind Chariots of the Gods. It’s a case of a theory in search of evidence, not of evidence giving rise to a theory. Meanwhile, the people who were there give testimony, not that Jesus left town right after the Last Supper (a supper at which He specifically prophesied His Passion with a strange accuracy that would reduce Peter to tears when it all happened), but that He went to betrayal, trial, and crucifixion. And again, why would lying cult founders make up the story of that prophecy and its very embarrassing fulfillment? Indeed, eyewitnesses like John saw Jesus at both His trial and crucifixion. So there aren’t many ways for Jesus to have skipped town and left somebody else holding the bag.

Ah! But John only thought he saw Jesus die. Really, the Nazarene received a drugged wine, passed out, and awoke in a freezing-cold tomb on a chilly morning in April. The perfect setting for a dramatic recovery from scourging, crucifixion, massive blood loss, shock, and a spear wound to the heart, as nine out of ten doctors agree. He then stumbled out (after somehow freeing Himself from the bandages sealed to His torn flesh) and, shoving the zillion-ton stone that sealed the tomb out of the way, limped up to the disciples on His bloody feet, showed them His hands (complete with permanently immovable thumbs due to irreparable nerve damage), and gasped out a greeting between the stabs of agonizing pain from the spear wound. Most people, faced with such a ghastly spectacle, would dial 911. The disciples, naturally, greeted Him as the glorious Conqueror of Death and Lord of the Universe and founded a religion instead.

“Okay, fine,” the diehard skeptic says, “Jesus died. And the disciples didn’t steal the body and lie about it. They just hallucinated. Together. All 500 of them. For 40 days. No, really…”

Even if we put aside that troublesome matter of the empty tomb (with empty grave clothes in it), there’s still a problem concerning the nature of hallucinations. Mass hallucination is extremely rare. So rare, in fact, that it’s usually only invoked to explain away things like, oh, the Resurrection. The rest of the time, when 500 people say they saw somebody and spoke with him, we believe them, particularly when they have nothing to gain by saying it – when they are routinely put to death for saying it.

And we have other problems to deal with if we want to entertain the Mass Hallucination Theory. First and foremost is the curious fact that hallucinations like this are supposed to be the fruition of intense wish-fulfillment fantasies. The witnesses supposedly wanted Jesus to be alive so bad that they freaked out and thought they saw Him. On at least three occasions, however, His disciples failed to recognize Him when they did meet Him. We are told they were so desperate to see Him that they might have tricked themselves into believing they had seen Him, but they walked for half a day with Him and did not notice. Strange. More to the point, what hallucination can be touched and eats fish?

Which leaves us pretty much with the Jesus-was-a-divine-illusion school of Gnostic or New Age thinking. But if the Risen Christ was really a purely spiritual illusion sent by the divine to teach us higher truths about the unimportance of the body and the need to transcend our humanity, what could be more certain to obscure this lesson than a body that Thomas could touch, a body that breathes the air and eats fish? The apostles, at any rate, don’t seem to have picked up on these higher truths at all. They teach instead that the Risen Christ is raised bodily and is not only fully God but fully human, albeit glorified.”

A resurrected body. Glorified. Fully God and fully man. When the alternatives have all spent themselves in fruitless clamor for our attention, it’s the old Christian story that still persuades. It’s the story of the Conqueror of Death who has Himself borne the sting of death and raised our dead human nature out of the grave so that we, too, may be resurrected. You can read all about it – without crackpot alternative explanations – in the New Testament.

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Theodicy and the Idea of Salvation

September 11, 2009

salvationAt the end of my approaches to God post the other day, I threw in my personal approach to God, the notion that a conclusive argument for theodicy makes it hard to find room for the idea of redemption and obviates the need for Jesus’ ministry. I found that idea in Fr. Aidan Nichols’ marvelous book, The Shape of Catholic Theology, a text that most of my fellow students disliked – thereby creating an almost automatic condition under which I would grow to love it.

As a Yokohama Taiyo Whales fan in Tokyo, I seem to have an almost innate sense of aman’ jaku, as one of my Japanese students thoughtfully ascribed to me. I had to go to the dictionary for that one and came up with the English equivalent, perverse. Having grown up a Yankee’s fan in Boston, I had thought I was just normal. Didn’t everyone loathe the home team?

I wish I could say I had come up with linking theodicy and salvation on my own but I’m not that bright, only smart enough to recognize a good idea when I read it. Elsewhere on this blog you will see the readings I have collected on the nature of evil: Evil and Joy   or  Do Not Go Near These Wounds  to mention the two main ones. There is a lesser body of reflections on sin which embodies more than evil, a participation in it, and those are all maintained in a category on payingattentiontothesky.

Rather than just leaving the statement on theodicy and salvation out there, I thought I would give you the historical churning that accompanied those far smarter than I arriving at this conclusion. One thing I love about my Catholic faith is how it opposes the notion of sola scriptura, the Protestant doctrine that the Bible is the only infallible or inerrant authority for Christian faith, and that it contains all knowledge necessary for salvation and holiness.

It is worth repeating here that the biblical materials for a concept of God do not organize themselves. They do not automatically arrange themselves into a satisfactory form. They achieve that form only when the human mind, seeking to understand its own faith, begins to work on them and to set them out in more intelligible ways. To organize the biblical materials, we soon find that we need to draw on such philosophical categories as good and evil, freedom and necessity, person and nature, mind and will, essence and existence, being and knowing. Of course, the application of these notions to God is an attempt to speak of what lies beyond the world within terms drawn from this world, and so is only justified if we always add a postscript to that effect. Warning: This Paper Contains Metaphysical Arguments or something like that so that our atheist friends can keep their superior scientific minds free from contamination.

So the Catholic Church has over the years struggled with heresies and Scripture, relying on sacred Tradition and the Magisterium to guide us through the rough spots. Infallible is a version of perfect and rarely pressed into use, when the Church needs to fly on automatic pilot as it were. So here are the notes from the chapter on Theodicy and Salvation, a walk through the park of Evil, God’s Justice, Redemption And Salvation.

Preambles of Faith
We have encountered philosophy in the process of aiding and abetting fundamental theology by its contribution to the preamble of faith on the topic of God’s existence. At the same time, we predicted that philosophy would also assist systematic theology by making a contribution to the concept of God — giving us a valuable pre-understanding of what God is like, an inkling which can throw light on what we find in the sources of revelation. Naturally, most of us come to all this the other way round: we get to know the revealed God through Christ’s Church, and only then do we enquire into the philosophical basis of the concept of God. But this only tells us something that is true about our autobiographies, not something true about the structure of the concept of God in itself.

A Second Preamble Of Faith – Theodicy
Another area of the preamble of faith closely connected with a discussion of the existence and concept of God, and this is theodicy — or what is often referred to as the “problem of evil.” As we shall see, theodicy (from theos and dike, “justice,” hence “enquiry into the divine justice”) is also doubly relevant, in theology, to fundamentals and to systematics. In fundamental theology, theodicy is important because we need to show that the existence of God is compatible with the existence of evil, of what we can call the “major defects” of the world. In systematic theology, theodicy is important because our grasp of what could (logically) be remedied among these major defects will give us a pre-understanding of the idea of salvation; and the theme of salvation is well-nigh the central motif of revelation’s sources, Scripture and Tradition.

Our Pre-Understanding Of Soteriology
To exemplify the point, we might wish to argue that adolescence, though often painful, is built into the very idea of humanity. We could not conceive of adult persons who were fully human but never had to go through the process of becoming an independent self, a process we call growing up. If this is so, then we cannot use the tribulations of adolescence, real as these are, to cast doubt on the existence of an all-good and all-powerful God — always assuming that we regard the creation of Homo sapiens as a boon to the cosmos. On the other hand, we might well regard the destruction of the innocent (say, of babies by leukemia) as evidence against the postulate of God. Thus, if we decide that despite such counter-indications we can accept, as theodicists, the reality of God, these counter-indications will pass over into another category, namely, our pre-understanding of soteriology, the idea of salvation. Putting a stop to the suffering of the innocent is the kind of thing we would expect the Creator to do if ever he began to relate to the world in a new way — not as Creator but as Redeemer. Here I am anticipating my argument, but so as to give the reader a glimpse of the importance of this area.

The Chief Intellectual Obstacle To Christian Theism
Theodicy is a problem which has exercised Christian minds through the ages when wrestling with the issue of the existence of God. St. Thomas, for instance, gives it as the chief intellectual obstacle to Christian theism. He formulates the objection in his customary sharp way:

“It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name ‘God’ means that he is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.”[Thomas Aquinas, Summit theologiae Ta, q. 2, a. 3] To understand why evil is a philosophical problem of this magnitude for the Christian, we must remind ourselves of the Church’s basic confession about God. Christianity, here reflecting its own source in Judaism, ascribes to God both all-powerfulness and all-goodness. And indeed, quite apart from the fact that this is the (overall) witness of Old and New Testaments, a number of the arguments for the existence of God touched on in the last chapter also point to these qualities as characteristic of transcendence. For example, to say that God is the infinite ground of the world is to come fairly close to saying that he is almighty; and to say that he is the explanation of our sense of absolute moral obligation comes fairly close to saying that he is all-good.

Lactantius’ Dilemma
Given, then, that both a pre-theological and a specifically Christian consensus points to God as enjoying both these characteristics (and both ancient and modern deviations there from have had a frosty reception by Catholic believers), the problem of evil must be confronted. Ever since the ancient Greeks it has been formulated as a dilemma; we possess a lapidary example from the pen of the Latin Christian apologist Lactantius: “God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or he is able, and is unwilling; or he is neither willing nor able, or he is both willing and able. If he is willing and is unable, he is feeble—which is not in accordance with the character of God. If he is able and unwilling, he is envious, which is equally at variance with God; if he is neither willing nor able, he is both envious and feeble, and therefore not God; if he is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source then are evils? Or why does he not remove them?” [Lactantius, De ira Dei, 13]

St. Augustine’s Solution
What kind of reflection has there been on this issue in the tradition of Christian thought? From time to time Christians have attempted to resolve Lactantius’ dilemma while writing strictly as philosophers; thus, for instance, we find the highly original system of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) or in a Thomist idiom in our own time, the work of the late Père Ambroise Sertillanges. But it has become customary, at least in the English-speaking world, to identify the two most ubiquitous “solutions” by reference to two Church Fathers and therefore to writers in whom there is as yet no clear or systematic distinction between philosophy and theology. The more influential of these two types of theodicy is that associated with St. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) This Augustinian theodicy consists basically of four points.

  1. First, it is argued that evil is not a positive reality in its own right. It is not an infusion, but it is a kind of negative reality, a privation or deprivation of something that should have been there but is not. Because evil is such a privatio boni, an absence of the good, Augustinians argue that it cannot be an element in the ultimate reality, which is God.
  2. Second, having proposed an ontological statute for evil, we must give an account of its origin. So far as evil conceived and executed by finite minds (moral evil) is concerned, its source may be located in free will. If God has created finite spirits endowed with free will, it must be expected that this free will is going to be abused. From such sin there flows certain other aspects of human suffering, such as the physical pain inflicted by evil people, or the fear and anxiety which good people undergo when faced with the prospect of evil people. From moral evil there may also follow kinds of suffering which could be seen as divine punishment for sin (natural disasters and the like).
  3. Third, while it may be true that the essential limitedness of everything created (metaphysical evil) is responsible for many of the imperfections of this world, Augustinians affirm that it was nevertheless right that God should have made such a world as ours. To show why this is so, they appeal to what has been called a “principle of plenitude.” The principle of plenitude states that the richest and most desirable universe contains every possible kind of existence: lower and higher, imperfect and (relatively) perfect, ugly and beautiful, cholera germs and humming-birds.
  4. Finally, and connected with this third point, the Augustinian type of theodicy is often said to be “aesthetic” in character. By this is not meant that its exponents express themselves rather prettily but that they see all realities and events as englobed within a universal harmony. Even sin and its punishment belongs to this harmony, just as in music a discordant note, when resolved, makes a work more satisfying. Unfortunately, this harmony is only fully audible to God.

Father St. Irenaeus’ Solution
The second and less influential theodicy has been referred to as “Irenaean,” after the Greek Father St. Irenaeus, who was martyred as bishop of Lyons around the year 200. This alternative theodicy sees the world as essentially an environment, a difficult, sometimes agonizingly difficult environment in which the human spirit is refined by fire. The world is a “vale for soul making.” Irenaeus saw moral evil not as an interior catastrophe but as a matter of weakness and immaturity.

Accordingly, Irenaeans regard the natural evil present in this world not so much as a divine punishment for the abuse of free will, but rather as an aspect of a divinely appointed milieu, an ambience of mingled good and evil, which is just what we need for growth toward perfection. In this way, the Irenaean theodicy appears to place the ultimate responsibility for much of the world’s evil on the shoulders of its Creator. But at the same time it seeks to show that it was for a good reason that he created a world where evil is built in.

The ultimate purpose of creation is the production of fully matured persons interacting in charity and so reflecting the life of God himself. At the end of historical time, finite persons will be greater and better because of their conifict with evil than they would be otherwise. The claim that there cannot be an all-powerful and all-good God because the creation as we know it is partly hostile to human happiness is misconceived in that it implicitly defines happiness as “having a grand old time.” This world was not meant to be a paradise, a garden enclosed, but a milieu in which the most valuable potentialities of persons are drawn out by the challenges, often terrible challenges, which that milieu contains. Any otherview of the character of human life, so Irenaeans maintain, would turn us from persons into pampered animals or spoiled brats.

God As Providence Can Draw Good Out Of Evil
The Irenaean theodicy joins hands with its main competitor by echoing the Augustinian idea that God as Providence can draw good out of evil — itself posited philosophically, as we have seen, in Marcel’s argument to God from the phenomenon of hope. Irenaeans argue that it is precisely the sort of world we have that an all-powerful and all-good God would have made, and that While we cannot at present visualize the final state of affairs that will justify the presence of evil in the world’s history, we can see that to expect such a final satisfactory resolution of the story is not irrational.

A Conclusive Theodicy Makes It Hard To Find Room For Redemption
Needless to say, not all of these arguments have met with an equally glowing reception. Before considering the main criticisms that may be launched against them, we should note that were they in themselves an adequate and total vindication of the “justice of God,” it would be exceedingly hard to find room for the theological concept of redemption, a concept which, however, lies at the heart of Christian faith. Thus Christian theodicists, aiming for total victory, swing their sabers and cut off their own heads. With this caveat in mind, let us return to the two types of theodicy, beginning with the Augustinian and its four pillars of wisdom: the privative theory of evil, the free will defense, the principle of plenitude, and the notion of cosmic harmony.

Counter Arguments To St. Augustine And St. Irenaeus
The idea that evil is essentially an absence of what ought to be a presence, that, for instance, blindness is a failure in the proper action of the eye, not an extra reality added to the eye’s reality, certainly succeeds in dispensing us from having to ascribe evil to the Creator. Evil is not something God has made because evil is not something. It is important to notice that this meontic “not being” account of evil is a metaphysical and not an empirical or observational affair [Note: Meontic and Mimetic Modes: Art is involved with "experienced reality. --or with the 'representation of reality'-- the way it is involved is divided into two contrasted relationships. In the first, art imitates what is there in reality; in the second, it imitates what is not there.

 The mimetic mirror reproduces and focuses on experienced reality; the meontic mode attempts to reproduce "what is not there" or what is imagined. The mimetic and meontic modes, though offering contrasting ways of depicting reality, should be viewed in terms of a continuum, rather than absolute opposition, to illuminate things of the spirit rather than material phenomena.]. That is, it does not claim to tell us what evil feels like. A tidal wave, one imagines, feels like very far from nothing, and the same may be said of the personality of Adolf Hitler.

However, we might wish to ask whether a theory of the ontological status of evil can depart too far from the facts of experience and still stay credible. The meontic theory is fine when trying to explain what happens when a carton of cream turns sour, but it is less successful in coping with the individual who says “Evil, be thou my good,” and then seeks what is evil with extraordinary energy and determination. One may wonder whether John Milton is not closer to the truth when in Paradise Lost he appears to portray Satan as a mind whose powers are rendered more formidable by alliance with what is evil.

Original Sin — Utterly Mysterious And Philosophically Certain
Again, Augustine’s account of the abuse of freedom has not convinced all the commentators. It is hard to see why spirits that were perfectly happy and good at the first moment of their existence (such as Augustine supposes all finite spirits to be) should fall victim to temptation. Any causal account one might give of how this could happen would seem to presuppose that they had fallen already; thus, if it were pride which made them fall, then they had already fallen into the sin of pride. It is noteworthy that Kant regarded original sin as both utterly mysterious and philosophically certain. See Fr. Edward Oakes excellent meditation on this here .

The Problem With Plenitude
Next comes the principle of plenitude. It has been pointed out that the Creator has not in fact placed in this world the total imaginable number of different species. No matter how many varieties of humming-bird there are, we can always say that God could have made twice as many, and if this would involve the doubling in size of the Amazon basin, then so be it. But then it is not easy to defend the existence of cholera germs on the grounds that they had to be there since without them one expression of the divine aeativity would be missing.

The Problem With Cosmic Harmony
Finally, there is the notion of cosmic harmony. Even from our limited standpoint in historical time, the theme of cosmic harmony is audible from lime to time. For instance, if we think of the world as a unitary design, a cosmos, the transience of nature does not seem to be an evil after all, whereas if we restrict our attention to the withering of this orchid, or the expiring of that pet rabbit, decay and death in the nonhuman world strike us as sad and regrettable. Taking a wider view, the dissolution of plants and animals into their component parts is a condition for the fashioning of fresh plants and animals. The real difficulty with the cosmic harmony theme is when we come to moral evil. An incautious statement of the aesthetic picture of evil would lead us to say that sin is necessary to the perfection of the universe, since it is beautifully counterposed by divine justice, a point of view which (presumably) few people would be keen on putting forward as a philosophical defense of Christian faith.

The Excessiveness Or Redundancy Of Evil
The Irenaean theodicy, unlike the Augustinian, rests essentially upon a single thought, the conclusion of which is, to remind you, that to predict a final justificatory resolution of evil in terms of matured souls is not counter-rational. But many will say that it is precisely this which is at issue. The extent of evil is far greater than a challenging environment would require. Evil is more than cold showers to encourage manliness, The excessiveness or redundancy of evil discourages us from positing a final state of affairs to justify the myriad succeeding states of affairs the world has so far known.

If There Were A Complete Theodicy Then There Would Be No Need For Salvation
The conclusion which emerges, therefore, is that the argumentation found in the history of theodicy goes some way toward releasing Lactantius from his dilemma, but by no means all the way. Enough has been said to convince one that evil phenomena are not an insuperable obstacles to believing in a God of the kind that philosophy and faith (as found in fundamental theology) require. On the other hand, not everything has been cleared up. But as I have remarked, if in theodicy we could clear up the problem of evil to our complete satisfaction, then there would be no need for salvation as presented in Christian revelation. God comes in his incarnate Son as the world’s Redeemer, and by his Spirit as its Renewer, so as to repair the world’s defects. But there would be no point in redemption if these defects could be shown to be either not defects at all or things built into the very idea of having a world in the first place.

The Inexplicable Elements In Theodicy
We can list some of the inexplicable elements in theodicy, which must be taken over, then, into a pre-understanding of what might be involved in the story of salvation.

  1. First, there is the strange potency of evil, given that evil should be regarded metaphysically as privation.
  2. Second, there is the fall of finite spirits, who came forth from an all-holy divine ground even if, in the case of Homo sapiens, they were culturally and psychologically immature.
  3. Third, there is the apparent escape of nature from the rational control of Providence as evidenced in say, the suffering of the innocent in natural disasters. To these three factors we may add
  4. Fourth, namely, the fact that we have not been able to solve the problem of theodicy. We can call this factor the absence of sufficient meaning, our inability to make anything like complete sense of the world

Features Of Salvation
Here, then, we have some features of the idea of salvation. If the Creator entered our world as the Redeemer, he must, it seems, do four things.

  1. He must conquer and neutralize the potency of evil in its fundamental ground.
  2. He must give finite spirits a new supernatural principle of action to replace that given them by original sin.
  3. He must provide for the harmonization of nature with human happiness.
  4. He must overcome the ambiguity, or absence of sufficient meaning, in human life as we know it. But if there is to be such a redemptive action by God, then there must be some way in which we can apprehend his involvement with the world. Divine revelation must be possible. This is the next aspect of the preamble of faith in the elucidation of which philosophy has a role to play.

 

We must never forget this date so read this to fulfill your duty to its memory.

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Approaches To God’s Existence

September 9, 2009

pi-cover18Science without religion is lame. Religion without science is blind.
The important thing is not to stop questioning. Curiosity has its own reason for existing. One cannot help but be in awe when he contemplates the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely to comprehend a little of this mystery every day. Never lose a holy curiosity.
Albert Einstein

The Christian faith presupposes certain truths of reason and of history. Without these it cannot make sense and its theology cannot take root. The first of these is that the Christian faith presupposes that there is a God: it’s of little use telling people that Jesus is the Son of God if they do not believe in God in the first place. Of course, the concept of God which a pagan possesses will need to be modified in the light of the account of God offered in the Church’s preaching. So for many atheists were they to wish to embrace the Church, they arrive at the scene without even the presuppositions of faith.

Within the Church there is no general consensus among Catholic writers as to the best way of establishing the existence of God, the supreme presupposition of our faith. To complicate matters more, The First Vatican Council, in the course of the document Del Filius declared “The one and true God, our Creator and Lord, can be known through the creation by the natural light of human reason.” The council’s teaching is that images of the divine found in natural religion in all cultures can be modified or purified so as to produce a concept of God as the Creator Lord, the source of nature and history alike. At this point our hypothetical atheist (ever snarky) is probably thinking: “Ah, so there is a God and it can be proved by human reason, but nobody has found Him yet. Nice.”

The biblical materials for a concept of God do not organize themselves. They do not automatically arrange themselves into a satisfactory form. They achieve that form only when the human mind, seeking to understand its own faith, begins to work on them and to set them out in more intelligible ways. To organize the biblical materials, we soon find that we need to draw on such philosophical categories as good and evil, freedom and necessity, person and nature, mind and will, essence and existence, being and knowing. Of course, the application of these notions to God is an attempt to speak of what lies beyond the world within terms drawn from this world, and so is only justified if we always add a postscript to that effect.

But as Karl Rahner once put it, definitions are much less an end than a beginning. Where the atheist might see the beginning of a practical joke, the theologian sees the right to choose those materials from which he or she hopes to construct an approach to God’s existence. Some choose not to even engage the question — particularly if their right to reason is restricted to the scientific method (which bans the supernatural or the metaphysical from hypotheses).

Yet over the Church’s history the reasoning from the Scriptural sources of revelation to the nature of the divine has brought us several approaches to God’s existence. The great Doctor of the Church, Thomas Aquinas, is famous for his five “proofs” of God’s existence but his proofs are not scientific: there are no calculations or verifiable experiments one can run to establish the existence of the divine. They too are approaches to the divine.

Blaise Pascal once wrote: “The heart has its order, the mind has its own, which uses principles and demonstrations. The heart has a different one. We do not prove that we ought to be loved by setting out in order the causes of love; that would be absurd. Jesus Christ and St. Paul possess the order of charity, not of the mind, for they wished to humble, not to teach.” (Pensées 298)

Peter Kreeft has offered by way of interpretation: “It is a prejudice of rationalism (not reason) that rational order, the order of the mind, is the only kind of order. In fact, the heart’s order is just as much order, but a different kind. The head seeks truth, the heart seeks goodness. This is why reason’s order is that of a map or outline of truth, while the heart’s order is that of a journey to its goal, its heart’s desire….How can humbling be better than teaching? …In regard to nature, the highest stage of knowledge is knowledge. But in regard to God and his images, the highest stage of knowledge is love. We know God and man only by loving them.

St. Thomas says that it is better to know a stone than to love a stone but better to love God than to know God, because love conform the lover to the beloved, while knowledge conforms the known object to the way-of-knowing of the knower. When we love a dog, we become more doggy, but when we know a dog, we raise it up to our own level: thought. When we know God we drag him down to our anthropomorphic level, we make God more humanoid than he really is; but when we love God, we are raised up more closely to his level, we become more God-like than we were (for ‘God is love’).”

So Fr. Aidan Nichols cites in his magisterial work The Shape of Catholic Theology. six approaches to God’s existence, experiential signs and a kind of argument, that we hope the atheists among us can drop their narrow insistence on scientific method and try to relate to arguments of the heart for a change.

The Experience Of Wonder There is the experience of wonder at the fact that there is a world at all. All of us are familiar with wonder before certain particular things: the colors of dawn, the grace of an athlete, the intricate workings of an organ like the eye.

But sometimes we generalize this sense of wonder and extend it to the fact that there is a world at all. In this case the object of wonder is not the particular world we live in, which is a sum total of the particular things that exist, but the consideration that there should be any particular world at all. After all, there is nothing logically entailed in the concept of a world which makes us say, Of course, I realize that there had to be a world.

Writers as diverse as Ludwig Wittgenstein and G. K. Chesterton have regarded this sort of experience as philosophically important. From it there emerges the argument that since the world is not self-explanatory, or ontologically self-sufficient, it requires us to postulate a ground for it. Such a ground would have to be transcendent vis-à-vis the world; that is, it could not be less than the world itself. But the notion of the transcendent ground of the world is at any rate a part of what people mean by God.

The Experience Of Moral Obligation Second, a very different kind of experience relevant here is the experience of moral obligation. From time to time we do things not because it is in our interest to do them but because they are intrinsically right. If we left them undone, we might say, we could not live with ourselves. The voice of conscience would not let us be.

In such a case, it is not just that as a matter of rational ethics we would knowingly have done the wrong thing. Beyond this, our sense of what is involved in doing -the wrong thing can be at times terrifying. It is almost as though we were in the presence of a judge of irreproachable character who saw us and was obliged by his own righteousness to condemn us.

Expressed less pictorially, the values we put into our system of values (whatever these may be) do not entirely behave as things we have created. We seem to be tributary to them, rather than the other way round. Those who do not care for the implications of such experiences of moral obligation may hypothesize that they derive from the effects of parental conditioning upon us. Either our own parents or that corporate parent we call society has put a taboo on certain ways of behaving, and the taboo sticks. When we defy it we are covered with feelings of guilt, just as if we have offended a wonderfully good and sensitive person.

But on the other hand, some of the most interesting examples of conscience must surely be those that occur to individuals who, having assessed facts and arguments, feel obliged to depart from some prior moral consensus and break through to a new level of moral awareness. Think of Lincoln’s appeal to conscience concerning slavery. So the experience of obligation is not so easily cut down to size, and it points toward the existence of a supremely holy one as its own ultimate explication. This was Newman’s own preferred approach to transcendence. C.S. Lewis uses this also in his landmark book Mere Christianity.

The Experience Of Our Own Dissatisfaction A third kind of experience relevant here is the experience of our own dissatisfaction. This may seem a strange sort of starting point for an argument in metaphysics, but dissatisfaction with any of the objects we can attain in this world must surely be the greatest single source of religious belief. Genetically, we are not programmed in such a way that we can know from the outset what objects will bring us satisfaction.

Of course we have certain drives—toward physical nourishment, sexual intimacy, and so forth. But the satisfaction of these drives is not exactly our satisfaction. We may satisfy them as much as we will , and yet when we are finished we are still left with such questions as What is the meaning of life? Where will I find lasting happiness? and so on. None of these questions, it may be said, finds any full solution within the world.

So the further question suggests itself, If a being exists who has no goal within the world, a being whose desire to know and need to love appears to be in some sense endless, then perhaps the goal of this creature’s striving lies beyond the world in what the religions of the world call God. The Greek Father Gregory of Nyssa already came near to this conative argument for God (vocab: from the Latin verb conare, “to strive”: we are striving for something beyond this world, and it seems more reasonable to posit that something as the ground of our striving rather than to write off our striving as absurd, something strictly unintelligible.) On Gregory’s crucial notion of epektasis.  

A modem form of the same notion is found in F. C. Copleston, Religion and Philosophy (Dublin: 1974), who writes that the search for a metaphysical ultimate is based on “an experience of limits, coupled with a reaching out towards that which transcends and grounds all limits.”

The Experience Of Hope A fourth dimension of human existence that fits in here is the experience of hope. We all have hopes for particular things. We hope for peace in our time, for nice friends, for a better website on exploring Catholic faith. But this is not the experience of hope Christians think of when they use the word “Hope”.

What Christians have in mind is that general attitude of hopefulness as a response to the future which so many people evince in quite impossible situations, and which seems almost a necessary condition for the survival of humanity in hard times. People hope against hope that tyranny will be ended; that their children’s children will live to inherit this planet.

But even if the worst happened, even if an evil government possessed itself of the world or a nuclear holocaust devoured the earth tomorrow, people would still go on hoping amidst the ruins. They would crawl out of the holes and burrows and start to pick up the pieces. This is natural to us because it is natural to us to hope. The question is, Does this point to anything metaphysical? It could be argued, as did French philosopher and dramatist Gabriel Marcel, that it suggests an unconscious grasp of the reality of God as the ground and guarantor of human history, of human destiny.

The Mystical Experience Another area that repays investigation in this regard is that of mystical experience. A large number of people in various cultures have laid claim to direct experience of the divine. Some of these people may have been mad, and some may have been bad. Their claims may have been made through self-delusion or by the deliberate desire to obtain power, prestige, or money. But where records are copious, in the case of figures who most impressed, therefore, their contemporaries, the mystics give an impression of integrity rather than its opposite.

Certainly, mystics have described their experiences in terms drawn from the religious tradition in which they were at home: Muslim mystics encounter Allah; Jewish mystics the Shekinah, or “Glory of the Lord”; Christian mystics the Trinity. But this does not necessarily invalidate their witness. We would expect that they would use concepts and images already familiar to them to interpret a reality by definition beyond concepts and images, namely God. Whether the concepts and images used by one mystic, for example St. Teresa of Avila, correspond more to the nature of the true God than do the concepts and images of another mystic, say, the Muslim al-Hallaj, would have to be decided on other grounds.

But all the mystics share the assertion that they have encountered what we can call the eternal reality — however they pictured the reality in question. Such a weight of human testimony from so many different cultures cannot easily be dismissed. This is, in part, the approach to God’s existence favored by the English Benedictine philosopher Iltyd Trethowan.

The Knowability Of The World Sixth and finally, I would draw attention to the epistemological argument for the existence of God associated with the late Fr. Bernard Lonergan of the Society of Jesus. Lonergan proposed that the main cue we need to move toward an affirmation of God’s existence is found in the very knowability of the world.

For some reason, the world has a structure such that the human mind can penetrate it by means of his own processes of thought. How can we account for this fact? It might have been the case that human beings had intelligence but that the world was not amenable to exploration by that intelligence. There could have been a lack of fit between the world and the human mind.

But in point of fact, there is not; on the contrary, there is considerable harmony between them as, among other things, the fruits of scientific knowledge in technology demonstrate. It is argued, therefore, that the world’s intelligibility requires us to posit the existence of a creative mind, analogous to but infinitely transcending the human mind, by which the cosmos was brought into being.

John Henry Newman’s Essay In Aid Of A Grammar Of Consent  So much for the six main kinds of approach that have historically been popular. The list is not exhaustive. It could be extended by, for example, reference to the fact that we have a language for perfection — better known as the “ontological argument.” Nothing prevents our combining these approaches on the principle that the sum total of a number of individually less-than-convincing arguments may be a convincing case. This was, as it happens, John Henry Newman’s strategy in his Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Consent, published during the First Vatican Council, in 1870.

There Newman offered a new context in which to display the various argumentative strategies and the strata of experience that are relevant to belief in God. Earlier, Newman had worked out a distinction between explicit and implicit reason, pointing out that in ordinary everyday affairs we make judgments about people and events without following arty strict logical progression, any mode of explicit reason. Instead, we gather together a whole series of experiential clues and pieces of argumentation. These fragments of experience and argument then act as signals that point us in the direction of a true conclusion, which is attained, therefore, by implicit reason.

In the Grammar of Assent Newman further refined this idea in relation to the basic tenets of Christian theism, dubbing such a manner of arriving at certitude about something or someone the “illative sense.” In a jigsaw, when you spread out the pieces on a table, all you seem to have is a complete jumble, an accidental collection of bits and pieces that tell you nothing. But put them together and you have a picture. So Newman’s suggestion is that we can defend belief in God by putting together a number of experiential signals and lines of thought, which converge on the conclusion that there is a God.

Following Newman, it may be suggested that while none of these arguments taken singly might be wholly compelling, taken cumulatively they amount to a very strong case. This case may fall short of strict demonstration. But no matter: at least it shows that it is more reasonable to believe in God’s existence than not. Clearly, if we were unable to show that it is at least as reasonable to believe in God’s existence as it is not to, being a believer at all would be an irrational exercise.

But more than this, as Catholic Christians with a duty to the Church’s conciliar tradition, we are expected to say that it is in fact more reasonable to believe in God’s existence. For whatever force is given to the assertion on this topic in Del Filius, it surely cannot mean less than this.

Argument From Evil And may I offer, finally, my own experience – one that I have explored in various pieces here in consideration of the nature of evil. There is no satisfying Christian theodicy, no one great argument that explains the coexistence of an all powerful loving God of goodness with the evil of this world. St. Thomas posed the problem in his Summa Theologiae: “It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the name ‘God’ means that he is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.”  

Man has wrestled with explaining the nature of evil in the world and the “justice of God.” But were they in themselves an adequate and total vindication any form of “Justice,” it would be exceedingly hard to find room for the idea of redemption, a concept which lies at the heart of Christian faith on the Cross. Jesus died for our sins. He died to redeem us. If there were some way, any way we could redeem ourselves or find justice in this shit hole of a world, I’m sure I would have found it. I’m a very resourceful guy, brighter than most and modest as all hell.

Atheists would have us believe you can get up each day and create your own meaning out of a meaningless void of scientific materialist matter. It works for a while. Until you get dragged kicking and screaming to the foot of the Cross and tears streaming down your face mumble those first words of prayer…”Please, God”….

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Reading Selections from The Freedom of Heaven & the Freedom of Hell by Anthony Esolen

July 31, 2009
The Barque of Dante

The Barque of Dante by Eugene Delacroix

Anthony Esolen is a professor of English at Providence College, where his classes are featured in the college’s Western Civilization Core Curriculum. He is the author of The Politically Incorrect Guide to Western Civilization, Ironies of Faith: Laughter at the Heart of Christian Literature and is the translator of several epic poems of the West, including Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things: de Rerum Natura, Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata, and the three volumes of Dante’s Divine Comedy: Inferno, Purgatory, and Paradise. Anthony Esolen has published many scholarly articles and essays, including several on Renaissance literature. A graduate of Princeton and the University of North Carolina, Esolen is proficient in Latin, Italian, Anglo-Saxon, French, German and Greek.

As you know, I am on an eternal read of the Divine Comedy and it is one of my favorite topics for posts. This essay, appearing in  First Things several years back, is a splendid read and I don’t think you can find a better piece that correlates the Christian faith to Dante’s work. The Christian faith is rooted in a narrative, the narrative of the Gospels. You can also find it in Dante’s creation. Selections from the essay here:

The Modern Suspicion Of Heritage
Woodrow Wilson once remarked that the purpose of the modern university was to make young men as unlike their fathers as possible, fathers who had immersed themselves in business and could no longer see the grand sweep of history. Otherwise, their sons would be hard to enlist in the progressive movement, man’s march toward greater enlightenment and freedom.

Wilson’s dictum was, in a way, Immanuel Kant’s philosophy, translated into practical politics. Man is growing at last into adulthood, Kant suggested in his 1784 manifesto What Is Enlightenment? Man is learning to think for himself, liberating himself from the malign influence of traditional authorities and the past. “Reason,” wrote Kant, “must regard itself as the author of its principles, independent of foreign influences; consequently, as practical reason or as the will of a rational being, it must regard itself as free.” Those foreign influences include the claims of loyalty impressed on us by those among whom we live: the “book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a physician who decides my diet, and so forth.”

There is something chilly about Wilson’s vision of liberated men, marching, like Christian soldiers, away from their forefathers — individuals all, and good party members. And there is something treacherous in Kant’s dismissal of tradition and community, as though they were not gifts to be received in gratitude, whatever their limitations.

Nonetheless, we in the West have inherited this suspicion of heritage. We share the assumption that freedom must mean freedom from — freedom from the limitations imposed on us by the old institutions: church, community, family. It seems not to matter that such freedom presupposes our alienation from one another. Existential alienation is a small price to pay for enlightenment, the fulfillment of the progressive movement, or the satisfaction of appetites.

The Medieval Definition Of Freedom
It is hard to recall the medieval definition of freedom, which was not the political license to follow our bellies or the philosophical encouragement to send our elders packing. Freedom was understood, rather, as a growing into the habits, the virtues, that allow us to fulfill our end as human beings without the impediments of vice.

In the Divine Comedy, the pilgrim Dante, having climbed the mountain of Purgatory and scoured away the effects of habitual sin, hears Virgil say that the fruit of joy once lost in Eden is now near. And so he fairly rushes into the freedom of being what he has been created to be:

Will above will now surged in such delight
to climb the top, that with each step I took
I felt my feathers growing for the flight.

Dante’s callow soul will soon be welcomed into the community of the blessed saints, for whom freedom means the grace-filled incapacity to will anything but the good for themselves and for one another. Thomas Aquinas steps forth from the constellation of the wise to express this freedom as the now utterly natural and supernatural virtue of love. Says he to Dante, who has been too stunned with wonder to ask his name:

When the radiance
of the Lord’s grace, which lights the flames of true
love and by love still grows in eminence,
With such multiplication shines in you
it leads you up these stairs no man may take
descending, without climbing up anew,
He who’d deny his flask of wine to slake
your thirst would not be free, would have such power
as rivers not returning to the sea!

Thomas cannot do other than love. In that very propensity, as of a rushing river, consists his freedom.

Dante’s Rejection of Wilson and Kant’s Modern Notion of Freedom
In his way, Dante has foreseen our modern notion of freedom — the notion expressed by Wilson and Kant — and he has rejected it. That is not because such false freedom is often directed toward evil, as when it becomes the license to snuff out the life of an unborn child. It is, rather, because any freedom that severs us from one another, from our memories of those who came before us, is built on a lie about being. It is a misunderstanding of that Being whose essence is to exist. It is autonomy collapsing into antinomy [vocab: A contradiction between principles] , the denial of law itself and of our created being. Dante knows both that there is an autonomy in accord with the structure of created existence, which is truly free, and that there is an autonomy that violates it, caught by its own snare.

On The Nature Of Hell and Satan
In the first part of his epic, Dante and his guide Virgil descend ring by ring, down into the sludgehole of the universe. This is the funnel of hell, leading to an icy and windswept wasteland. Students who read the Divine Comedy for the first time may be surprised by the relative absence of fire from hell. Dante employs fire as punishment for sins that affront the majesty of the Deity: blasphemy, for instance. But, for the poet, the activity, freedom, and divinity of fire, and the love that fire suggests, make it less fit for the worst sinners — the traitors — than the hard, dead stasis of ice.

So there Dante and Virgil are, picking their way among the ice-encased traitors, slowly making their way toward Satan, the creature of fundamental sin, error, and falsehood — fundamental, because traitors mistake what it means for any of us to be. This is not a Satan who spits out a volley of abuse, like the demonic stooges of the popular drama. Nor does Dante create a grand antihero, uttering Milton’s great words of defiance: Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven! Indeed Satan does not speak at all. The creature called by Christ “the father of lies” says nothing. He seems sublingual, even subsapient. And his speechlessness reveals the poet’s deep insight into the nature of truth and love and created being.

Though he says nothing, Satan does do a few things, with the terrible regularity of an automaton. He has three mouths, from three faces, joined ignobly “where the cock sports his crown,” and in those mouths he gnaws forever the naked bodies of the great traitors of Church and empire, the two great communions Dante believed were ordained by God. Satan gnaws Judas Iscariot headfirst, in the central mouth, and Brutus and Cassius feet first, to the left and right. With his claws he strips the leather off their backs — blood is a rich part of this diabolical communion. He strips and chews, strips and chews. And he does one thing more:

Beneath each face extended two huge wings,
large enough to suffice for such a bird.
I never saw a sail at sea so broad.
They had no feathers, but were black and scaled
like a bat’s wings, and those he flapped, and flapped,
and from his flapping raised three gales that swept
Cocytus, and reduced it all to ice.

Consider the flapping of those wings. It is natural for earthbound human beings to see in the flight of birds a symbol of freedom — a disconnection with the earth. If we could fly, we think with our misty apprehension of infinity, we would make contact with a terrestrial world only when and where we wanted. We should be princes of the air.

Yet it is that very motion of the wings that raises the gale above the River Cocytus and freezes Satan in his place, along with all the other traitors. If he could cease to move those wings, the gale would subside and the Cocytus would melt. In other words, if he could cease to act on his will to rise, he would be able to rise.

Now the foolish way to regard this is to see in it only an adventitious connection between Satan’s flapping and the ice that locks him in place. That is, God has decided, with malice, to stick Satan in just that hole wherein his sin — if it be a sin to wish to rise and be free — would be self-thwarted and self-punished. It is exactly as if God were to plunge a thirsty man into saltwater, with the added zest that the man would never die.

The Essence Of The Sin Is Made Manifest In The Punishment
But readers of Dante’s Inferno who have traveled with him all the way to the bottom know that the essence of one’s sin is made manifest in the punishment — that the punishment is the sin repeated endlessly and inexorably. And appropriately so. Thomas Aquinas, in justifying the eternity of hell, notes that mortal sin is an infinite and self-defining act of enmity against the peace of the City of God. Such sinners long for immortality, he says (quoting Gregory the Great), so that they might sin forever — for, even more than they love life, they love the sin to which they have given their lives.

What exactly, then, is the sin made manifest here in hell’s deepest pit? The flapping of wings, the ice, the act of treachery, and the temptation of Satan that penetrates time all derive from falling to the temptation, “Ye shall be as gods.” These four motifs have much to teach us about freedom and autonomy, rightly and wrongly understood.

The Psalms lend a hint: All things, says the psalmist, declare that “he made us; we did not make ourselves.” Even the atheist must agree that we did not make ourselves. The statement expresses contingency and dependence, and these are plainly discernible by reason. I did not come into the world self-made. Indeed, I came into a world already present for me to enter: an intelligible world, not a congeries of arbitrary and unrelated forces. Had there been no such world, I would not have existed.

To claim, then, that we did make ourselves would be to deny the real contingency of our beings — which would also be to deny the web of relations into which we have entered by our being and without which we must cease to be. Deep at the heart of this denial is the prideful sin of ingratitude. We see that we are provided with what we could not have provided for ourselves: not only the material conditions that support our existence — our food and drink, the care of our parents — but the fact of our existence itself. Yet we respond with a lie. We repeat what Satan implicitly affirms at the bottom of hell, the loneliest words ever uttered: “I am my own, I am my own! My mind is my own, to fashion what truth I shall please. My body is my own, to dispose of as I please. My will is my own. I rise — by my power. I exist — by my power.”

A Chaos Of Isolated Atoms Of Will
If this is autonomy, if this is what it means to be a law unto oneself, then law is the first thing that must die. No genuine communion among such autonomous beings is conceivable. We would be left with a chaos of isolated atoms of will, sometimes rebounding against one another in war or in the falsely called love that is often worse than war, but always essentially alone. To deny that “we did not make ourselves,” either explicitly or by our behavior, is to betray the natural debts we owe to the world and the community into which we have entered.

The man who says, “I am my own, good and evil are what I declare them to be,” may happen to have a gentle temperament, never lifting his hand in anger. But when he dies, he dies a traitor nonetheless. If we missed it in the murderous history of the twentieth century, we can still see it in the frozen Cocytus of Dante’s hell. Frozen in isolation from one another are the traitors — those who partake most fully of the fundamental lie that is also the fundamental mistake, those who in their treachery most clearly say, “I am my own, I rise by my power.” They are free in the sense in which a being, cast out of the universe and severed from true connection with every other being, would be free. They have made their law, and they obey it; they are bound to it.

With every flap of his wings, Satan sins again, commits treachery against God and also against all contingent and dependent beings. That treachery locks him in the ice of his self-imposed law. While he flaps those wings, he engages in an act that should remind him of his contingent being, but it becomes a sign of his brute power over other beings: He eats Judas and Brutus and Cassius, everlastingly. Not that he derives nourishment from them. His wings never manage to lift his hide out of the ice.

Why Satan Does Not Speak
It is no surprise that Satan does not speak. What would he say? The idea of a word, for a contingent being, implies the existence of one who is not myself (the one to whom I speak) and the existence of a truth that is not myself (that about which I speak). Language is a robe for love. The fundamental lie is that we are not for or from one another. Such a lie distorts existence itself. The devil is a liar and the father of lies, says Dante, quoting the Word of God, and that is why, in the end, Satan has nothing to say.

Freedom Is A Good Thing And Good Has Substance
Let us affirm, as Dante did, that freedom is a good thing and that the word good has substance to it. What, then, is freedom good for? If it is supposed that some contingent beings are free, then freedom must be good for them, and for them as contingent beings. But then freedom must unite them, precisely because they do not possess their existence from themselves. Such beings can be, together, a law unto themselves — autonomous — if they recognize that the law in question is not one they give themselves. That is, if they recognize and accept their contingency.

They will then see that the law that binds them together depends not on any one contingent being nor on all contingent beings taken in a collective but rather on the fact of contingency itself. It will depend on what it means to depend — one on another, and all together on a world that no contingent being has made. They will thus be free in their gratitude for that world, in their humble recognition that their existence is not necessary, and in their love for all those who share their mode of being and on whom they rely.

Purgatory Where We Learn How To Be Free
Gratitude, humility, love — we do not see these in hell. But we do enjoy them in that realm of the Divine Comedy where souls go in fellowship to learn how to be free; we enjoy them in purgatory. At the base of the island-mountain of purgatory, Dante and Virgil see a light swiftly approaching them through the mists of dawn. Virgil recognizes what is coming and cries:

Now fold your hands in prayer! Fall to your knees!
Behold, it is the herald of the Lord!
Now you will see such ministers as these.
See how he holds man’s instruments in scorn:
he needs no oars nor any other sail
but his own wings, between such distant shores.
See how he lifts his pennons to the sky,
sweeping the air with his eternal feathers,
changeless — unlike the hair of those that die.

Their crossing of the waters of hell required many of man’s instruments, notably the long pole that Charon, the ferryman of the dead, plants in the mud of the Acheron to punt his miserable vessel along, bringing the damned to their eternal loss. The angel pilot in purgatory, however, needs no oar, no sail; he sweeps the air with his wings and speeds the blessed souls across the ocean with a swiftness that befits their journey to freedom.

In that angel’s beating wings, there is no likeness to Satan’s. The blessed spirit lifts his pennons “to the sky,” to the heavens, and thence comes his power. He is immersed in the curious freedom of one who acknowledges that he is not his own, that he is neither from himself nor for himself. For though he need not bother with an oar, the angel pilot is not too haughty to deal with air and boats and human souls. He assists those souls, and his last act is to bless them with the sign of the cross as they disembark. He is free to love them. The exaltation whereby he can ferry them across the seas is one with the free humility whereby he will do it; though an angel, he is a member of their community.

As for those souls, they’re glad to be in the boat and are eager to reach the mountain where their purgative suffering will begin. They are singing their burial hymn, In exitu Israel de Aegypto, the psalm that the priest and acolytes chanted as they took the body from the church to the grave. Yet it is a jubilant song of freedom, not from the body but from the bondage of sin, which is itself a living death, a turn toward nonbeing. They rejoice to have begun their journey of liberation from Egypt, with all its worldly might, its fleshpots and vast tombs, across the sea and desert to the Promised Land.

The Souls In Purgatory
The souls in purgatory do not seek a freedom to be found after death. They seek, instead, a freedom from death to be found by dying to themselves. As Christ says, “Whosoever loses his life for my sake, he will save it.” These souls in the boat have made their final and complete confession of being from and being for.

That gives them the strength and the freedom to do a few things the reader has not yet seen in the Divine Comedy. They are together, not just in space but in spirit, as they sing with one voice. They reverse the curse of the traitors, because they reverse the sin. They can form a community. By their song they assist one another in hope and worship. They are not disconnected Israelites but Israel, and it is only in their being together that they individually find themselves. To paraphrase Aristotle, man, the contingent being — not self-sufficient even for his modest material needs, let alone for his intellectual thirst — is the sort of being that thrives only in the context of a community. Man is an ecclesiastical animal.

Thus the blessed souls of purgatory can be trusted to love. They do not need to be “herded like sheep into hell,” as Psalm 49 puts it. No Minos confronts them, slinging his bull’s tail round his waist to indicate the number of their prison cell. No one in purgatory pushes them. The discipline of the mountain, embraced by all the souls, will cure them of the remaining effects of the lie they no longer accept, until finally they will enjoy autonomy, needing no one to enforce from without the law of their created beings. Lord of yourself I crown and mitre you are Virgil’s last words to Dante after he has passed through the final stage of purgation, the wall of fire separating the mountain slopes from earthly paradise at the peak.

There Is No Prayer In Hell
To be free of the delusion that I am my own: This is what the souls, praying and singing in the boat, illustrate and foster. Prayer is impossible for a soul trammeled up in itself, and therefore there is no prayer in hell. There is also no song in hell, for song would require bursting the prison walls in the freedom of exuberance. But we may justly say that song and prayer are what purgatory is, as a foretaste of and preparation for paradise. The prayer is a confession of dependence, and the song is an expression of gratitude for what has been given. What the angel does with his wings, they do with their hearts and voices.

But the song means more. Consider again the mystery of singing. There is something about song that is playful and gratuitous, like the splendor of finches’ wings. It swells forth from the abundance of the heart. Whence should contingent beings derive this plenty, if not from a being that possesses it in himself? It is insufficient to say that God is capable of love. God, as the Gospel of John puts it in one of the most misunderstood verses of Scripture, is love. His love is not contingent on creation. God is Love, before he ever spoke the light into existence and saw that it was good. Love is essential to his being, his life. He is, as Dante puts it, “the One who moves all things,” loving them into being and loved by them in turn, whence comes their motion.

To dwell on the meaning of God’s love, for the Christian poet, is to stand at the brink of a glorious and unfathomable sea. When Dante has risen to the utmost heights of paradise, he stands before a vision of that one God — the unity that comprehends plurality. There is a plenty in the being of God, and this plenty admits of love, receives love, and is love:

O Light that dwell within thyself alone,
 who alone know thyself, are known, and smile
 with love upon the knowing and the known!

Dante revels in the plenitude of God, for whom even the ancient Israelites, to whom we owe the clearest expressions of his oneness, used the plural Elohim to describe a power and glory that burst the bonds of what we can comprehend as single and alone. “Let us make man in our image,” says God (Genesis 1:26).

The Trinity and Freedom
The Trinity, then, has something to teach us of freedom. Even had he never created a universe, God would himself have been a universe of love. As Benedict XVI has written, God, in his own being, comprehends being from and being for; “man is in the image of God precisely because the being for, from, and with constitute the basic anthropological shape.” Thus, if any contingent being longs to be truly free, he must reflect that ultimate freedom of God. His autonomy can make sense only in the self-emptying of love.

Love opens our eyes, allowing one contingent being to reveal the mysteries of beauty to another. But it also gives us wings, prompting the intellect to soar in contemplation of that beauty. Throughout the Divine Comedy, Dante’s beloved Beatrice has been preparing the pilgrim for the ultimate and yet infinite flight, to see the Beloved face to face.

In harsh contrast is the vision of Satan and his trinitarian heads. They are seamed together, but incongruously. There is no harmony among them, as there is no interaction among the traitors he gnaws. No community, no exit from the self. “Hell is other people,” said Sartre, and he was correct in this sense: If for you hell is other people, then you are in hell, and so are your fellow traitors.

Satan’s lie, then, is also Satan’s mistake. He who is not God wants to be God, to rise by his own power and be his own. But God is his own precisely in his love — in his being for. “You should be as gods,” Satan says to Eve, and he unwittingly speaks the truth. We should be as gods, and we can be, in gratitude and humility and love. For the outpouring of a grateful heart, which loves because it receives what it has not deserved, reflects the exuberant power of God, who loves into existence beings whom he does not need. And the self-emptying that is essential to love — the humble willingness to acknowledge that, as we did not make ourselves, we do not exist for ourselves — reflects the plenitude of God, who in his creation deigns to put himself at the disposal of the contingent beings he loves.

He is the cup that runneth over — in love. He can be sung about; he can be prayed to. If we would be laws unto ourselves, Dante would say, we must wisely and freely embrace the laws of our contingent being, obeying them as an obedient and beloved son cheerfully obeys his father, growing into the father’s authority by deeper and wiser and freer acts of obedience. And in obeying those laws we will find ourselves great-souled, able to love one another. We should be as gods.

Contingent Intellect Grasps Incontingent Love
Therefore, Dante’s last vision is not of God as Creator but of God as the power and wisdom and love that lie at the heart of reality — the three Persons that Christians adore in the Trinity. Within that Trinity, Dante beholds the central mystery of God, the ultimate being for: the Word made flesh. He sees two rings, with a fire proceeding between them, and in the second ring the image of a man. He cannot fathom how this can be: “Mine were not the feathers for that flight.”

The pilgrim poet is straining to understand with his contingent intellect what incontingent love is all about. He is flapping his wings, to no avail. Yet it is God who has given him these wings, and it is he who descends to speed Dante on an instantaneous flight, smiting his mind like a bolt of lightning.

This is, finally, what it means to be a law unto oneself, utterly free from the shackling self-will of the traitor. The law is Love, who freely gives the freedom to fulfill the law:

Here ceased the powers of my high fantasy.
Already were all my will and my desires
turned — as a wheel in equal balance — by
The Love that moves the sun and the other stars.

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The Intellectual Chops, Communication Skills, Charisma And Savvy

July 6, 2009

prolife2This is a very strange time in the history of the pro-life movement. As Micah Wilson, Director of the Center of Politics and Religion and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Union University in Jackson, Tennessee has written recently: “The lines of disagreement in the philosophical debate over abortion have never been clearer. While the politics of abortion remain as tumultuous and contested as they have ever been, the underlying philosophical, ethical, and scientific issues have been clarified to the extent that any careful person can examine the arguments of both sides and come to a principled and informed position.

This has not always been the case. Before the Supreme Court thrust the issue onto the national stage more than thirty-six years ago, pro-choice philosophers like Judith-Jarvis Thompson and pro-life philosophers like Germain Grisez were contributing to a debate that became more politically contentious even as the underlying scientific and philosophical issues were becoming clearer.

Consider the basic pro-life argument as it has developed over the last thirty years. Though there are many versions and several sophisticated philosophers who have made the case in more formal terms, the argument rests on three simple fundamental beliefs. The first is normative, the second medical or scientific, and the third is political.

The normative premise is that human life is a fundamental good and all human beings have a right to life. Some philosophers hold that this is a right not to be intentionally killed, though the killing of a human being may be accepted if it is the foreseen but unintended consequence of another justified action. Other philosophers do not completely rule out intending to kill a human being, but would take culpability and desert (vocab: to forsake one’s duties or obligations) into account. Regardless, pro-lifers generally agree that unborn human beings have a right to life that cannot be violated.

The scientific belief that ties into the normative premise is the simple medical fact that embryos and fetuses are human beings. There is no longer, strictly speaking, any debate about “when life begins.” That question has been answered not by religious authority but by the disciplines of human biology and embryology. A human life begins at the moment of conception when a distinct and complete, though immature, human being forms from the joining of her parents’ gametes.

What follows from the conjoining of the scientific and normative beliefs is disarmingly simple: all human beings have a right to life; unborn human beings are human beings; thus unborn human beings have a right to life. When you add the basic political belief that the purpose of governments and laws is to protect fundamental human rights, you arrive at the basic pro-life position.

The scientific component of the argument has become very clear over the last few years. No longer do we hear as much about “clumps of tissue” and the “products of conception” and other euphemistic attempts to obfuscate what is at stake in the abortion debate. Thanks to the remarkable advances in medical imaging technology, this scientific truth seems to be making inroads in the general public. When describing the realties portrayed in the ultrasounds pictures that now adorn millions of kitchen refrigerators, we refer to those creatures pictured by their names. They are not masses of tissue with the potential to be human; they are human beings, our sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, and grandchildren.”

Despite all of this the political debate remains as rancorous as ever and a singularly amazing ability to fudge issues has brought to Washington a man who is perhaps the most aggressively pro-choice candidate in the history of the Presidency. He is smart enough to know that the greater number of Americans now identify themselves as pro-life, and would never support a FOCA type piece of legislation, but this has not swayed him from trying to get the legislation passed piece-by-piece.

A public exchange of views was convened on the topic, “The Obama Administration and the Sanctity of Human Life: Is There a Common Ground on Life Issues? What is the Right Response by ‘Pro-Life” Citizens?” at Washington, D.C.’s National Press Club, Thursday, May 28, 2009.

Discussing their respective views was Robert George, McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and the Director of the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University, and Douglas Kmiec, Professor of Constitutional Law and Caruso Family Chair in Constitutional Law at Pepperdine University School of Law and a Catholic Obama supporter – the latter a kind of walking contradiction in terms that emerged during the last election when 54% of American were able to turn their back on their faith and vote for the pro-choice Obama.

Moderating the exchange was Mary Ann Glendon, Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and former United States Ambassador to the Holy See, most recently a major actor in the Notre Dame fiasco with Obama. The debate explored different perspectives on current governmental policy regarding such issues as abortion and embryonic stem cell research and its impact on societal attitudes regarding the respect for human life.

You can watch the video on Catholic University’s website or CSPAN. Links are at the bottom of this post.

I’m a great fan of Professor George’s and have been since reading his book The Clash of Orthodoxies a few years back for which I have a page of reading selections here. Feel free to copy and paste his arguments on to forums when you confront the pro-choice folks, those who pursue the gay agenda, euthanasia or the pornography as “freedom” crowd.

The presentation he made at the National Press Club was quite powerful and in my opinion totally took the wheels off of Obama’s Catholic apologists as personified by Douglas Kmiec who had enabled the President’s election in the Catholic community. Kmiec is a particularly nasty fellow (IMHO) who claims on the one hand to be Catholic and on the other to counsel those of the faith that the Church has “lost” the abortion debate and that it should move on to “solving” the issue — whatever that means.

They use an argument based upon Evangelium Vitae 73 and the problem of lesser evil.  They attempt to argue that the relative weight of various life and social justice issues may cause a voter to vote for the pro-choice candidate rather than the pro-life candidate. In Obama’s case, his record on poverty, war and the environment could (so went the argument) cause the Catholic voter to abandon his position on pro-life to vote for him.

Professor George advocates that justice, the common good and, above all, commitment to human rights are values that Catholics should vote in elections. But where the greatest violations of humans rights are taking place is also critical. Hence the scope and magnitude of the injustice need to be weighed. More than one million human lives are destroyed by surgical abortion each year in the United States and stacking that up against the environment, war, poverty, etc, is a no-brainer. The scope and magnitude of the evil gives priority to those opposing the Obama agenda. Quite frankly Catholics such as Kmiec are misusing the concept of “consistent ethics” by ignoring the scope and magnitude of abortion in America. It was something Kmiec used during the campaign, the idea that Obama, though his policies, would lower the number of abortions. Nothing could be further from the truth. If you read Prof George’s comments on the current situation, you will see that this hope has been all but eliminated and Obama’s minions at the White House have flatly told pro-life advocates that it’s not the numbers but the “need” that the President seeks to lessen – more pro-choice jive. The President has accordingly shifted his carefully chosen rhetoric: no more about “reducing the numbers of abortions.”

Professor George is in the position of making an appeal to Kmiec appeasers to return to their faith and help those of us who oppose the President, the abortion industry and his pro-life apologists. His remarks now follow:

“One does not treat an interlocutor with respect if one refuses to speak plainly. Candor, far from being the enemy of civility, is one of its preconditions. And so I will speak candidly of the points where I, as someone dedicated to the principle that every member of the human family possesses profound, inherent, and equal dignity, find myself at odds — deeply at odds — with President Obama and his administration.

In my judgment, citizens who honor and seek to protect the lives of vulnerable unborn children must oppose the Obama administration’s agenda on the taking of unborn human life. Our goal must be to frustrate at every turn the administration’s efforts, which will be ongoing and determined, to expand the abortion license and the authorization and funding of human embryo-destructive research. Because the President came into office with large majorities in both houses of Congress, ours is a daunting task. But the difficulty of the challenge in no way diminishes our moral obligation to meet it. And I here call upon pro-life Americans, including those who, like Professor Kmiec, supported President Obama and helped to bring him to power, to find common ground with us in this great struggle for human equality, human rights, and human dignity.

Professor Kmiec and I share common ground in the belief that every member of the human family — irrespective of race, class, and ethnicity, but also irrespective of age, size, location, stage of development or condition of dependency — is entitled to our care and respect and to the equal protection of our laws. This is what it means to be pro-life. In this shared conviction, Professor Kmiec and I are on one side of a crucial divide, and President Obama is on the other. Professor Kmiec and I stand together in our opposition to abortion and human embryo-destructive research, but we share very little common ground on these matters with President Obama and those whom he has appointed to high office who will determine the fate of vast numbers of our weakest and most vulnerable brothers and sisters.

I appreciated the President’s candor at Notre Dame when he said:

“Now understand, understand, class of 2009, I do not suggest that the debate surrounding abortion can or should go away. Because no matter how much we may want to fudge it . . . the fact is that at some level the views of the two camps are irreconcilable.”

The President is right. His view regarding the status, dignity, and rights of the child in the womb, and the view shared by Professor Kmiec and myself, are irreconcilable. A chasm separates those of us who believe that every living human being possesses profound, inherent, and equal dignity, and those who, for whatever reasons, deny it. The issue really cannot be fudged, as people sometimes try to do by imagining that there is a dispute about whether it is really a human being who is dismembered in a dilation and curettage abortion, or whose skin is burned off in a saline abortion, or the base of whose skull is pierced and whose brains are sucked out in a dilation and extraction (or “partial birth”) abortion. That issue has long been settled — and it was settled not by religion or philosophy, but by the sciences of human embryology and developmental biology.

So it is clear that what divides us as a nation, and what divides Barack Obama, on one side, from Robert George and Douglas Kmiec, on the other, is not whether the being whose life is taken in abortion and in embryo-destructive research is a living individual of the human species — a human being; it is whether all human beings, or only some, possess fundamental dignity and a right to life. Professor Kmiec and I affirm, and the President denies, that every human being, even the youngest, the smallest, the weakest and most vulnerable at the very dawn of their lives, has a life which should be respected and protected by law. The President holds, and we deny, that those in the embryonic and fetal stages of human development may rightly and freely be killed because they are unwanted or potentially burdensome to others, or because materials obtained by dissecting them may be useful in biomedical research.

The President speaks of human rights, and I do not question his sincerity. But he does not understand the concept of human rights, as Professor Kmiec and I do, to refer to rights — above all the right to life — that all human beings possess simply by virtue of our humanity. For the President, being human is not enough to qualify someone as the bearer of a right to life. Professor Kmiec and I, by contrast, believe that every member of the human family, simply by virtue of his or her humanity, is truly created equal. We reject the idea that is at the foundation of President Obama’s position on abortion and human embryo-destructive research, namely, that those of us who are equal in worth and dignity are equal by virtue of some attribute other than our common humanity — some attribute that unborn children have not yet acquired, justifying others in treating them, despite their humanity, as non-persons, as objects or property, even as disposable material for use in biomedical research.

President Obama knows that an unborn baby is human. He knows that the blood shed by the abortionist’s knife is human blood, that the bones broken are human bones. He does not deny that the baby whom nurse Jill Stanek discovered gasping for breath in a soiled linen bin after a failed attempt to end her life by abortion, was a human baby. Even in opposing the Illinois Born-Alive Infants Protection Act, which was designed to assure that such babies were rescued if possible or at least given comfort care while they died, Barack Obama did not deny the humanity of the child. What he denied, and continues to deny, is the fundamental equality of that child — equality with those of us who are safely born and accepted into the human community.

During his campaign for the Presidency, then-Senator Obama was asked by Rick Warren: When does a baby acquire human rights? In reply, the future president did not say, “well it depends on when a baby (or a “fetus”) comes to life, or becomes a human being.” He knows that an unborn baby is alive and human, and he did not pretend not to know. His response to Pastor Warren did seem to express doubt of as to when rights begin, saying that the question was “above his pay grade.” But Obama’s record as an activist, legislator, and now as President makes clear his view that an unborn baby, or even a baby outside the womb like the one discovered in that soiled linen bin by Jill Stanek, possesses no rights that others are bound to respect or that the law should in any way honor. Throughout his political career, Obama has consistently and fervently rejected every form of legislation that would provide unborn babies or children who survive abortions with meaningful protection against being killed. Indeed, he has opposed even efforts short of prohibiting abortion that would discourage the practice, limit its availability, or directly favor childbirth over abortion.

Professor Kmiec and I believe in the equal fundamental rights of all, including the equality of mother and child. We recognize that women with undesired pregnancies can undergo serious hardships, and we believe that a just and caring society will concern itself with the well-being of mothers as well as their children. We agree with Mother Teresa of Calcutta, who by precept and example taught us to reach out in love to care for mother and child alike, never supposing that love for one entails abandoning care and concern for the other. President Obama holds a different view. He has made clear his own conviction that the equality of women depends on denying the equality and rights of the children they carry. He has made what is, from the pro-life point of view, the tragic error of supposing that the equality of one class of human beings can and must be purchased by denial of the equality of another.

One wishes that President Obama had listened carefully, and with an open mind and an open heart, to the pleas of Mother Teresa during her last visit to the United States. Her message was that a pregnant woman in need is not in need of the violence of abortion. What she and her child need are love and care — love and care from all of us. Our task, Mother reminded us, as individuals and as a society, is to love and care for mother and child alike.

President Obama’s supporters do him no good service by pretending that his expressions of willingness to find “common ground” with pro-lifers involve, at some level, recognition that abortion or embryo-destructive research is bad or tragic because it kills a living member of the human family. Unlike, say former President Clinton or former New York Governor Cuomo, or even Vice President Biden, President Obama does not profess to be “personally opposed” to abortion, or to believe that abortion is a wrongful act that must nevertheless be legally permitted because the consequences of outlawing it would be worse than those of tolerating it. His belief, and his policy, is that abortion, if a woman chooses it, is not wrong. That is why he is not personally opposed to it. There is no wrong there to oppose. Indeed, the President made crystal clear his view that abortion can be an entirely legitimate and even desirable option, when he said that if one of his daughters made a mistake and became pregnant, he would not want her to be “punished with a baby.” In such a case, he saw abortion as the right solution to a problem — a solution that we should be happy is available, and that we should make available if it happens not yet to be available. Without it, a young woman would be “punished.”

I have no doubt that the President regards it as deeply unfortunate, sometimes even tragic, that the problem giving rise to the woman’s need for an abortion exists; but there is equally no room to doubt that President Obama regards it as fortunate that a solution to the problem — in the form of abortion — is available. For someone holding this view, and many people in the academic world hold it, abortion is not in itself a bad or wrongful thing, any more than a knee replacement operation is in itself a bad or wrongful thing. Of course, it would be better if no one ever injured a knee and found himself in need of a knee operation. No one regards knee operations as desirable for their own sakes. No one deliberately injures himself just so that he can have a knee operation. And people don’t have knee operations performed on them for frivolous reasons. But a knee operation is not something that one would discourage or be personally opposed to. It is a solution to a problem, and should therefore be made as available and accessible as possible for people who need them. For those who share President Obama’s view of the moral status of the child in the womb, the decision to abort may be more wrenching for many women than the decision to have a knee operation typically is, but it is like a knee operation precisely inasmuch as it is a legitimate solution to a problem.

All of this was made transparently clear at a recent meeting at the White House in which people on both sides of the abortion issue were brought together to see if they could find some common ground. The meeting was led by Melody Barnes, the Director of the President’s Domestic Policy Council and a former board member of Emily’s List, one of the nation’s most aggressive organizations devoted to legal abortion and its public funding. At one point in the meeting, she recognized pro-life activist Wendy Wright, who attempted to explain ways that the President could begin to achieve his reported goal of reducing the number of abortions. Barnes interrupted her to make clear that the precise goal of the administration is to “reduce the need for abortions.” Two days after the meeting, the President spoke at Notre Dame, and he chose his words carefully. In speaking of common ground, he did not propose that we reduce the number of abortions, but rather [and I quote] “the number of women seeking abortions.” Get it? The President and his administration will not join us on the common ground of discouraging women from having abortions or even in encouraging them to choose childbirth over abortion. The proposed common ground is the reduction of unwanted pregnancies — not discouraging those in “need” of abortion from having them. The idea that the interests of a child who might be vulnerable to the violence of abortion should be taken into account, even in discouraging women from resorting to abortion or encouraging alternatives to abortion, is simply off the table.

The President and the people he has placed in charge of this issue, such as Melody Barnes, have a deep ideological commitment to the idea that there is nothing actually wrong with abortion, because the child in the womb simply has no rights. This commitment explains the policy positions President Obama has consistently taken since he entered the Illinois legislature. It crucially shapes and profoundly limits what he and those associated with him regard as the “common ground” on which he is willing to work with pro-lifers. And it explains why he and they reject what we, as pro-lifers, propose as common ground.

Because the President does not believe in the profound, inherent, and equal dignity of every member of the human family; because he does not believe that babies acquire human rights until after birth; because he does not see abortion as tragic because it takes the life of an innocent human being, he is utterly and intransigently unwilling to support even efforts short of prohibiting abortion that would plainly reduce the number of abortions. Moreover, he is adamantly in favor of funding abortions and abortion providers at home and abroad, and has already taken steps in that direction by revoking the Mexico City Policy and proposing a budget that would restore publicly funded abortions in Washington, D.C. — despite the well-documented and universally acknowledged fact that when you provide public funding for abortion, you get more abortions.

Some pro-choice people think that the killing of unborn children where there is no grave threat to the mother, though bad and unjust, should not be made illegal at least in the earliest stages. Potentially we would have significant common ground with these fellow citizens in the form of policies to discourage abortion and reduce the number of killings. For example, we could join together to oppose the funding of abortion at home and abroad; we could work together for bans on second and third trimester abortions, on abortions for sex-selection, and on particularly heinous methods of abortion, such as partial-birth abortions; we could agree on what Professor Hadley Arkes calls “the most modest first step of all,” namely requiring care — at least comfort care — for the child who survives an attempted abortion and is born alive. We could provide desperately needed financial support for pro-life clinics that assist pregnant women in need — need that is not always financial, but is often emotional and spiritual — and encourage and help these women make the choice for life. We could enact waiting periods, informed consent laws, and parental notification laws that have been shown, in research by Michael New and others, to reduce abortions. We could reject the funding of embryo-destructive research, and join together to support promising research and treatments using non-embryonic sources of stem cells.

However, far from meeting us on any of these areas of common ground, President Obama opposes our efforts. Political realities have prevented him from making good on his promise to the abortion industry to sign the pro-abortion nuclear bomb called the Freedom of Choice Act as one of his first acts in office. But he was not lying when he made that promise. His policies, and above all his appointments to key offices in the White House, the Justice Department, Health and Human Services, and elsewhere make clear that his strategy will be to enact the provisions of FOCA step by step, rather than as a package. As anyone occupying the role of David Axelrod or Karl Rove will tell you, this is obviously the politically astute way for the President to prosecute his agenda. The country does not accept President Obama’s extreme position on abortion. A recent poll showed that a majority of Americans now regard themselves as pro-life, and a majority favors significant legal restrictions on abortion. Plainly the President’s actual views are far more favorable to abortion than those of the general public; so if he is to advance his goals, and the goals of those who share his commitment to making abortion more widely available and easily accessible, the last thing it would make sense to do is try to enact FOCA as a package.

At Notre Dame, the President offered to work with pro-lifers to draft what he called “sensible” conscience protections for pro-life physicians and other health care workers. This favorably impressed some in the pro-life community, especially since one of President Obama’s first acts was to rescind conscience protection regulations supported by the pro-life community that had been put into place by the Bush Administration’s Department of Health and Human Services. Here, alas, I must urge caution. It seems to me overwhelmingly likely that the key word in the President’s offer is “sensible.” What is “sensible” to him, I predict, is precisely what is regarded as sensible by the Committee on Ethics of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, namely, requiring physicians to refer for abortions, even if their consciences forbid it, and allowing pro-life obstetricians and gynecologists to refuse to perform abortions only when it is clear that an abortion can be provided by a willing physician in the area. For physicians and surgeons who believe that abortion is unjust killing and a grave violation of human rights, this is not sensible. It is ominous. I beg the President’s pro-life supporters urgently to request from him a statement clarifying the meaning of “sensible” conscience protection. If it means weakening current laws, so doctors will be compelled to refer for abortions and in so-called emergencies even to perform abortions, then even here pro-life citizens have no common ground with the President of the United States.

Finally, let me say a word about a matter that has been of deep concern to me — the expansion of federal funding for embryo-destructive research. I regret that the President passed up a golden opportunity to establish true common ground with pro-life citizens. He could have left the funding of research involving cell lines created by the destruction of human embryos in place, and led the charge to promote ethically unproblematic non-embryo-destructive forms of stem cell science. He could have rallied the nation around adult stem cell science and brilliant new technologies for the production of pluripotent stem cells that manifest the very qualities that make embryonic stem cells interesting and potentially useful. He could have shown that we can give both sides in the great stem cell debate what they want — the promise of stem cell science, without the moral stain of embryo killing. But the President did not do that. He revoked the restrictions on funding research involving embryonic stem cell lines created after August 9, 2001. He even took the additional step of revoking President Bush’s 2007 executive order promoting research to advance non-embryo-destructive sources of pluripotent stem cells. Finally, he opened the door to funding research involving stem cell lines created by producing human embryos by somatic cell nuclear transfer or other means specifically for research in which they are killed. He delegated the details of any new guidelines to the National Institutes for Health. The NIH, under Acting Director Raynard Kington, a Bush-administration holdover, recently published its draft guidelines, which mercifully decline to walk through the door the President opened. For now, at least, there will be no funding of research involving embryos created just for destruction. If the President’s pro-life supporters are partially responsible for this piece of good news, they deserve our sincere thanks, and I here heartily offer mine. The NIH guidelines also include strong consent rules for parents. Already the supporters of embryo-destructive research and so-called “therapeutic cloning” are pressing the NIH to reverse course in both these areas. For that reason, I plead with all who believe in respect for human life, and especially those whose support of the President politically has given them influence with him and his administration, to work tirelessly to ensure that there is no further expansion of funding for embryo-destructive research or weakening of current consent requirements.

The common ground I am interested in is with pro-life Americans who, like Professor Kmiec, have supported the President politically. The election is over, and the current question is not who anyone thinks will do the best job as President, or even whether one may legitimately support candidates who deny the fundamental dignity and right to life of unborn human beings and who promise to protect and extend the abortion license and expand the funding of embryo-destructive research. The question is: On which issues will we support the President’s direction, and on which will we challenge him because he is heading in the wrong direction? Those pro-life Americans who voted for him and support him should not object when we speak for the most vulnerable and defenseless of our fellow human beings, even when that means severely criticizing the President’s policies. They should stand with us on common ground, and join their voices with ours.”  End of Prof. George’s comments.

It is time for Catholics to get their act together. The 54% have to recognize they were sold a bill of goods and should not interfere with the pro-life agenda. This is a good time to be pro-life. There is no reason the number of abortions in this country could not be halved in the next decade.

The clarifying advances in the scientific realm has also affected the normative debate. The argument is no longer about what sort of entity is killed during an abortion, but whether each human being, as a human being, has a right to life. Unlike the scientific consensus about when a human life begins, here the debate remains contentious, though the central dividing line is once again surprisingly simple.

Either one believes that all human beings as such have a right to life, or one believes that amongst the category of human beings some have a fundamental right to life and others do not. Hence the debate has shifted from determining when human life begins to when human personhood begins. This clarification of the debate is welcome and edifying.

Pro-choice philosophers differ amongst themselves about what qualities of a human being warrant the designation of human person, and when in the life cycle those qualities are salient enough to declare personhood. One such quality is the ability to feel pain, another is self-awareness, and yet a third is viability, or the capacity of the fetus to live outside the womb. Other pro-choice philosophers, however, take a different tack. They acknowledge a right to life for all human beings, but find other rights held by the mother to outweigh the right to life of the unborn human being. A mother, the argument might run, has a right to her own bodily integrity, or perhaps a right to make plans for the future autonomously. According to this line of thinking, such rights outweigh the real but secondary right to life of the fetus. Thus pro-lifers will refer to a fundamental right to life to distinguish their position from pro-choice advocates who acknowledge a right to life but believe it can be defeated.

Pro-life theorists often differ about political strategies and prudential tactical choices. They also differ amongst themselves as to the grounding of the normative claim that human life is a good. Some pro-lifers emphasize the religious underpinnings of the sacredness of life and the Judeo-Christian concept of imago dei; others do not necessarily hold such beliefs but start from the self-evident good of human life and leave theological considerations out of the public discussion. It is fair to say that pro-lifers generally agree on both the value of all human beings regardless of age and state of development and on the goal of seeing this value protected in law and cherished by the culture. They often disagree, however, on the argumentative and political means to achieve that end.

Nevertheless, the philosophical debate about the normative dimensions of the abortion issue still comes down to the aforementioned watershed difference: either human beings as such have a right to life, or some human beings have a right to life and are thus persons, and some are not and are thus expendable.

While pro-life philosophers must continue their work by applying principles to emerging bioethical questions, the argumentative clarity achieved by their work in the abortion debate has implications for pro-lifers who seek to continue to influence both the law and the culture. Perhaps the most important implication is also the most obvious. If the philosophical debate about abortion is over, the political debate remains.

What is needed now are pro-life thinkers and activists who have the intellectual chops to navigate the arguments and insights of the philosophers, the communication skills to translate them for both the pro-life rank-and-file and the persuadable middle, and the charisma and savvy to inspire and guide the pro-life movement.

You can watch the video on Catholic University of America’s website here.

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Engaging Atheism

July 1, 2009
Atheism

Atheism

Michael Novak in his book No One Sees God reviews the works of the most prominent new atheists: Christopher Hitchens, Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Daniel Dennett. Following that he engages nonbelievers in a Socratic dialogue while describing the phenomenology of human life in general — for believers and non-believers. It is an interesting attempt to find common ground between the two camps based on mutual experience.

But in the end he has to recognize that there really are two camps in this life: atheists who interpret human experiences one way, and those who know God who interpret them in another. Still there is a sense of frustration (?) or disbelief that comes in his closing paragraphs:

“Sometimes I wonder what atheists are missing that everyone else gets. The atheist is inflamed with intelligence that runs right through the middle of his head and out to the farthest speck in the most distant curvature of the universe. What intelligence finds, within and without, mostly makes sense. Everything is potentially intelligible, law-like, rich with emerging probabilities that run their courses; full of contingencies, chance, improbabilities. All that we find explodes with exultation, with glory: It is, it exists. It is heavy not only with intelligence but with the force that drives it, pushes it, into existence — like daffodils and tulips and green grass pushed up through the moist spring soil.

Most of what we experience closest to us is composed of transient things — passing, here today but by no means forever, passing like sand through one’s fingers at the beach, or like pink sands through an hourglass. Passing like comets through the night sky, self-incinerating.

Why are atheists not grabbed by the fragility the passingness of all the bittersweet beauty around them? Why do they not grasp hold of the power and glory of the sheer insight and beauty in all that surrounds them, penetrates them, embraces them?

Why do they not see reflectively that the insight and intelligence that runs through their heads and races through the universe is the first sign of what most common people mean by God? In the wonder that comes over them when they contemplate the turbulent, explosive order of the world In the sheer mathematics of the thing. Even within chance, mere probability schemes, and what physicists call “chaos:’ intelligence seeks light, pursues inquiry, draws inferences. Chance is not necessarily proof of the absence of intelligence, but is a pointer to a more sophisticated kind of intelligence: that of an Artist.

Alter a long and fascinating conversation, Professor Dawkins once asked Michael Heller, the physicist-priest from Poland, who has done brilliant work on the necessary separations and yet connections between science and religion, “What divides us?” Professor Heller answered: “A single letter. You write ‘mathematics’ with a small ‘m’ I write it with a capital ‘M’

The beautiful intelligence that runs through everything.

In all your life, you see no evidence for the existing God? My God, man, what, more do you want?”

In the United States nowadays, atheism is out in the open: like gays and lesbians, it has come “out of the closet.” It used to be, in the good old days, that the only open enemy of their religion that American Catholics had to worry about was Protestantism. But the old dispute between Catholicism and Protestantism was small potatoes in comparison to the new dispute between Catholicism and atheism. Protestantism objected to certain particulars of Catholicism; atheism objects to the whole root-and-branch of Christianity.

All this being the case, American Catholics would be wise to give serious attention to atheism. Atheism has been in the world for many centuries, it has many varieties, it has offered many defenses of itself and it arises from many different motives. I’ve uploaded an excellent article on the motives of atheism by Dr David R. Carlin, a professor of sociology and philosophy at the Community College of Rhode Island, and the author of The Decline and Fall of Catholicism in America (Sophia Institute Press, 2003). His most recent book is Can a Catholic Be a Democrat? (Sophia Institute Press, 2006). There is also a previous series of posts that encapsulate the views of Dr. Steven M. Barr as he engaged the scientific materialism that is at the root of the atheist conceit or worldview.

Here my object is a little bit different. Most readers of these posts are Catholic and as such accept St Paul’s teaching that we must evangelize our faith, that the way that God’s Revelation in the Gospels is achieved is by someone having heard about it.

Fr. John Cihak sums up the challenge fairly neatly: “The greatest challenge I find in bringing someone to Christ and his Church is finding ways to engage him in meaningful conversation.

Talk of truth is often met with a yawn, and an assertion about what is good is met with a stare of incomprehension. In the malaise of contemporary American life, people do not seem to be moved much by claims of truth or goodness. Relativism has made truth to be whatever one desires, thereby turning the good into whatever makes one “feel” good. With access to these roads of Truth and Goodness into the human heart darkened by relativism, how can one engage the average non-believer? How can one place him on the road that would ultimately lead him back to the Truth and the Good?

Though people may glaze over when one makes claims of truth and goodness, their ears seem to perk up at the mention of beauty: the flash of lightening across the sky, the dramatic auburn colors of a late summer sunset, a sublime snatch of music whether it be Mozart’s Requiem or a David Gilmour guitar solo.

An even more intense encounter is with the beauty that expresses human love: the exhilaration when love is extended and the other’s eyes sparkle, trembling lips break into a smile and say “Yes.” The heart soars, and one may even weep for joy. Often the encounter is described as being swept off one’s feet. Though perhaps darkened to what is true and good, the post-modern heart is still captivated by beauty revealing love, and this may be the road to Christ for many citizens of the post-modern world.”

Hans Urs von Balthazar
There is a Catholic Theologian whose work captures this central apologetic theme of beauty revealing love. His name is Hans Urs von Balthazar. Born in 1905, he lived through the horror and devastation of both World Wars, writing his doctoral thesis, The Apocalypse of the German Soul, during Hitler’s rise to power. He was immersed in literature, music, and philosophy. In 1929, after a retreat where he felt a powerful call to the priesthood, he entered the Society of Jesus and was educated by some of the best of his time including the Polish philosopher, Erich Przywara, and French Jesuit and patristic scholar, Henri de Lubac.

Balthasar is becoming recognized as perhaps the greatest theologian of the 20th century — yet he never held an academic position in theology. Far from being an ivory tower academic, he was involved with the pastoral duties as a student chaplain at the University of Basel, Switzerland. It was there that he came to know Adrienne von Spyer, who converted to the Catholic Church and became the recipient of what seems to have been intense mystical graces.

Together they discerned a call to found a secular institute (a community whose members take vows of poverty, chastity and obedience but live in the world engaged in secular professions), the Community of St. John. To continue his work as leader of the community, Balthasar eventually had to make one of the most painful decisions of his life: to leave the Jesuit Order and become a diocesan priest. In the 1950s, this simply was not done.

This irregular ecclesial situation led to his being not invited to Vatican II as an “expert theologian,” yet in the wake of the Council he served on the Vatican’s International Theological Commission. Toward the end of his life he was named to the College of Cardinals by Pope John Paul II, but died on June 28, 1988, two days before receiving his red hat. During his life he authored thousands of works in theology and literature. His aim was always two fold: to help the believer understand his faith more deeply, and to draw others into the saving relationship with Jesus Christ and his Church.

Through his studies and life in German culture, he realized the direction Western civilization was heading. He knew the dizzying heights to which Western culture could soar in music, art, literature, and philosophy, but that it also chose ugly depths: war, oppression, abortion, and exploitation. As a Catholic priest, he knew he had to help Western civilization open itself again to God’s revelation of absolute love in the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, and be saved. Balthasar seized upon love revealed in beauty as the path to bring the non-believer to faith. Western culture, having grown tired of seeking truth and goodness, and largely despairing of finding them, could be brought back to the One who is both Truth and Goodness through Beauty. His arguments are found in two foundational works:, Love Alone is Credible (abbreviated LA) and The Glory of the Lord (abbreviated GL).

Balthasar argues that the encounter with beauty in the world is analogous to the encounter with the Triune God. What happens in the “aesthetic encounter”? He sees that beauty is an indissolvable union of two things: species and lumen. Beauty consists of a specific, tangible form (species) accessible to human senses with a splendor emanating from the form (lumen). Beauty has a particular form, is concretely situated in the coordinates of time and space, and thus has proportion so that it can be perceived. The splendor is the attractive charm of the Beautiful, the gravitational pull, the tractor beam pulling the beholder into it. When confronted with the Beautiful, one encounters “the real presence of the depths, of the whole reality, and . . . a real pointing beyond itself to those depths” (GL).

In the perception of beauty, two moments occur: first vision and then rapture, the result of which is the impression of the form on the beholder. The splendor moves out from within the form, enraptures the person and transports him into its depths. Thus the visible form “not only ‘points’ to an invisible, unfathomable mystery; form is the apparition of this mystery, and reveals it while, naturally, at the same time protecting and veiling it” (GL). In beauty, the beholder is drawn out of himself and pulled into the form by the attractive force of the beautiful thing, thereby encountering the beautiful thing in itself.

The Aesthetical Encounter
A simple example to illustrate the aesthetical encounter can be found in looking up into a clear night sky at the stars. One is struck by the immensity and order of the universe, by the arrangement of the constellations. On an especially clear night, one seems engulfed by the sheer number of stars. Presented with this beautiful form, a sensitive viewer is drawn in by light breaking forth from the form. This light is not simply the light emanating from each star, the result of burning gases. It is the light of Being. Transported into the depths of the form, the viewer ponders foundational questions such as: How did this happen? Where did these things come from? Why is this form so beautiful? Why am I so moved by it?

The result of the aesthetical encounter is an encounter with the mystery of Being-in-itself. One has been shown the form and through the form been brought into an encounter with the depth of Being. Wondering at the mystery of a particular being, one is drawn into that beautiful form, and touches the mystery of absolute Being. The form and the depths of its being are indissoluble. In beauty one doesn’t “get behind” the form. Rather one touches the depths of Being in the form itself.

For Balthasar, things that exist don’t just lay there in existence; they glow from their participation in absolute Being. In Beauty, one is taken in and grasped by Being. In order to perceive a particular being as it is, one must surrender, be receptive, and be willing to be taken in by the form. Control or manipulation on the part of the beholder derails the aesthetical encounter. To share in the beauty, the viewer must renounce himself. The result of the encounter with beauty is the impressing of the form on the person leaving him breathless, exhilarated, full of awe and infused with joy. He is “seduced” by the beautiful form whether it is a stunning landscape or one’s beloved.

While acknowledging the joy of beauty in this world, and especially the beauty in human love, a terrible frustration accompanies, and threatens that joy. Human love is marked by three failures: limitation, selfishness and death. “Human love being finite seems to contradict itself,” (LA) writes Balthasar, because “what love means . . . is that the present should be eternal” (LA). Not only is human love limited, it’s also infected with selfishness. He reasons, “The ordinary level of human existence, where man meets man, is a sort of middle zone where love and self-interest, love and the absence of love, temper one another” (LA). Love’s limitation and brokenness are marked by the ultimate seal of death, which seems to rob human love of everything it strives for. He concludes, “Human love, regarded as created love only, is a strange hieroglyph” (LA). Man cannot find the resolution to his predicament in the world or in himself. Is there liberation from it?

Balthasar answers, “God’s love [is] a love which goes in search of man in order to lift him out of the pit, free him from his bonds and place him in the freedom of the divine love that is now human as well” (LA). How can man perceive God revealing himself, and give himself to God in the act of faith? God, who is love, has startled the world with his self-revelation as the Beautiful One.

Balthasar argues that the beautiful is the first point of insight by which one perceives God’s revelation. God’s appearance in the world is analogous to the aesthetical encounter. Analogy is the only possible means whereby man may speak about God without depriving him of his absolute mystery, or the believer the possibility of articulating an explanation of divine revelation. Analogy neither distances nor compromises God’s absolute transcendence and love. What corresponds to “beauty” on the natural plane is the Lord’s “glory” on the divine plane.

The Father, Son and Holy Spirit have revealed themselves as one God in order to liberate man and bring him to live within the divine life of the Trinity. Man could never anticipate God’s astounding initiative in reaching out to save him.

The Form of the Cross
The pinnacle of this revelation, which Balthasar calls the “Christform”, is Jesus nailed to the Cross. One may object, “How can the crucifixion of Jesus be the preeminent revelation of Beauty?” In the ugliest place of human existence (crucifixion and death) God reveals himself as absolute, total self-giving love. The Trinity is self-giving love. Being disguised under the disfigurement of an ugly crucifixion and death, the Christform is paradoxically the clearest revelation of who God is. This love can only be fully revealed in a world corrupted by sin through death, the ultimate expression of self-giving in this world.

And so this is the supreme moment of transcending beauty, a revelation of love visible in the world, yet pointing to a love beyond this world. As St. John so profoundly grasps in his Gospel, the concealment of the Son under the form of the Cross is his glory because it reveals a love to the absolute end. The glory of the Son does not come after the Cross. The Cross is his glory. Even in this ultimate form of beauty in self-giving love, God does not overwhelm human freedom. No one is forced to believe that this crucified man is the divine Son of God saving the world.

As in the aesthetical encounter, the form is Jesus nailed to the Cross. One must decipher the Christform which stands in history as a concrete sign (species). Anyone can stand before it and wonder, “Who is this?” God has disturbed history forever with his provocative sign of love. The perception of faith, however, is beyond the ability of man alone. What is required is a new light. Without this light man cannot see the depths of the form. In other words, the non-believer looks at the Cross and says, “I see just a man.” God must awaken in man the capacity to recognize him.

The splendor (lumen) emanating from the form is the glory of the Lord containing divine grace. This glory strikes the non-believer (vision) pulling him into the form and enabling him to believe (rapture). He is pulled into its depths, not simply for an encounter with absolute Being, but into a personal relationship with the tri-personal God (who is also absolute Being). The act of faith is to be swept up into the form of the Triune God’s self-revelation in Jesus of Nazareth through the splendor of divine grace. The non-believer is seduced by the form.

Divine grace, working in the interior of the person, allows him to see the form for what it is. Only grace enables him to organize the evidence for belief into a coherent whole and see what the sign reveals. As in beauty, to share in the revelation of divine love, one must renounce himself and surrender to the grace offered. Furthermore, one does not “get behind” the form of the Cross in order to then see God. Rather the Trinity is revealed in the Cross. Jesus said to Philip, “He who has seen me has seen the Father” (John 14:9). When the non-believer encounters Christ crucified, an historical event situated in time and space, he can be pulled into that form, by assenting to the grace offered, for an encounter with the Triune God.

In the Cross man encounters a love not of this world. Man sees “that the love offered him is quite unlike anything he knows as love; and that the scandal [of God’s love] exists in order to make him see the uniqueness of this new love — and by its light to reveal and lay bare to him his own love for what it is, lack of love” (LA). The non-believer asks, “With my broken love, and my life hurtling toward death, is there anything worthy of my belief?” Jesus of Nazareth is the unique sign, expressive of a persuasive love which draws the beholder into the same dynamic of love. In the act of faith, as in the encounter with beauty, one is marked by the beautiful form. The Father impresses his form on the Son, and the Son, through the Holy Spirit, presses his form on the believer. The person’s own life is to take on the dimensions of the Christform. He is not to be a bystander but a participant in this dynamic of divine love.

The credibility of the revelation comes through the Christform, from which breaks forth the pulsating, burning furnace of Trinitarian love. This sign needs no other proofs. It is the proof of love. In the encounter of faith, the non-believer realizes that this revelation not only unites the fragments of truth in the world, not only gives meaning to mankind at its deepest level, but that it pulls him beyond into the very life of God encountering a love beyond his capacity to imagine. Finally, one finds a love worthy of his faith, of his very life. This is a love that is believable.

The Invitation to Eternal Life and Divine Love
Balthasar is not out to prove the revelation of God’s love through reason. Divine love is reasonable, but it transcends human reason. Rather, Balthasar provokes the non-believer with the historical sign of revelation in order that he may open his heart and so be drawn in by beauty.

The non-believer, with his fractured and ultimately failed love, by the inescapable reality of death, sees in the encounter with the Cross the reality of the Triune God shining in its depths. In this revelation of Glory, man is offered the possibility of sharing an eternal life of divine love. He realizes that his small, finite human love can be elevated to share in the inexhaustible, infinite love of God. But the encounter with divine love requires an open heart, a heart sensitive to beauty, a heart able to wonder, a heart that can surrender to the forms of beauty found in this world, a heart that is in anguish as it attempts to love in the face of death.

A consequence of Balthasar’s insight is that the divine love revealed on the Cross is meant to transform not just the non-believer but the apologist as well. He must also be marked by the Christform. As a believer, the apologist has been pulled by divine grace into the encounter of the form of Christ, and so his life must then take on the contours of the form. In this world, divine love is revealed in the suffering and death of the Son. For this reason the apologist can win a person to Christ and his Church only if he first loves that person and is willing to suffer, and even die, for him. The beauty of the apologist’s life will draw one to perceive God’s revelation. Listen to Penn talk about the gift of a book of Psalms.

Not only should parish churches be places of beauty and the celebration of Mass be beautiful and passionate, but most of all, the lives of believers must be beautiful. A believer’s life must radiate the beauty of divine love. The work of apologetics goes beyond winning arguments to being grasped by the Christform: “It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Galatians 2:20).

Balthasar’s approach is useful not only to provoke non-believers, but also to attract those who have fallen away, to reawaken lukewarm believers, and to help the apologist understand his faith more deeply. Those who wish to delve more deeply in Balthasar’s thought may begin with Love Alone and then turn to his treatment of the “Three Days” (Good Friday, Holy Saturday and Easter Sunday) in Mysterium Paschale (tr. Aidan Nichols [Ignatius, 2000]). He continues this apologetic line in In the Fullness of Faith: On the Centrality of the Distinctively Catholic (tr. Graham Harrison [Ignatius, 1988]). Those more ambitious may tackle volume one of The Glory of the Lord. For an introduction to his thought, I have found the study by Fr. Edward Oakes, S.J., The Pattern of Redemption (Continuum, 1994), to be very helpful. Also see Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work (Ignatius, 1991), edited by David L. Schindler.

In reflecting on his own work Balthasar wrote, in My Work…In Retrospect (Ignatius/Communio, 1993): “You do good apologetics if you do good, central theology; if you expound theology effectively, you have done the best kind of apologetics.” God’s self-revelation, the center of pulsating love revealed as beauty, is disguised under the disfigured, ugly crucifixion and death of Jesus the obedient Son. Through the encounter with divine love revealed as beauty, one is led back to truth and goodness because he is led into the encounter with the One who is True, Good and Communion.

Through the beauty of divine revelation, man can discover a love that is believable.

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