Archive for the ‘Book Recommendations’ Category

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Book Recommendation: Bonhoeffer Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy by Eric Metaxas

December 13, 2010

What a great book this is.

Writing in the Wall Street Journal on the current spate of WWII publications, Modris Eksteins commented recently: “It has been  more than 65 years away from the end of World War II, but that global conflict and its precursor, the so-called Great War of 1914-18, continue to fascinate and torment us, even as the veterans who fought in them pass away. What is striking about the current spate of books and movies about these conflicts is that for many in the West, they no longer seem to represent the unequivocal victory of good over evil, right over wrong, liberty over tyranny. A plethora of historical reassessments of the aerial campaigns against German and Japanese cities question not only the moral but also the political validity of the carpet-bombing of civilians. In his recent film, “Inglourious Basterds,” Quentin Tarantino turned all tables when he had Jews behaving like Nazis, and in the massive HBO mini-series “The Pacific” a Marine’s reference to “yellow monkeys” reverberates through the entire series.

All wars, but these two in particular, with their mass effort and mass death — the first great democratic wars of history — are now freighted with the toxic irony that came to pervade the 20th century and continues to afflict us still. If today we question traditional narratives, no longer trust our leaders and have lost all faith in grand ideas, the gnarled roots of such skepticism lead back through the World Wars of the last century.”

You won’t find that problem in Bonhoeffer Pastor, Martyr, Prophet, Spy by Eric Metaxas. The evil of the Third Reich and the seemingly endless decline of “the most Christian of nations,” Germany, is delineated with excruciating detail. It is one of those books that answers “How could this have ever happened?” to those of us who know the history but still find the loss of Dietrich Bonhoeffer irreconcileable. The prologue (which follows) marks the return of the “Good German” in the UK and begins a powerful historical recollection and consideration that has been long overdue.  I have a few reading selections from Metaxas’ masterpiece and the prologue seemed like a good place to start.

Occasionally I will read the reviews at Amazon dot com to see how others have reacted to the book. This review tells a little about the book and Eric Metaxas:

Shortly after his conversion in 1988, Metaxas read Bonhoeffer’s The Cost of Discipleship and learned the story of the young man who, “because of his Christian faith stood up to the Nazis and ultimately gave his life.” From then on, he was determined to tell the story to others. And tell it he has.

Metaxas takes readers, in 592 pages, through Bonhoeffer’s entire life, from his parent’s courtship to his memorial service. No corner of the subject’s life is left unexplored. Through the author’s use of Bonhoeffer’s personal letters to family and friends, earlier biographies, interviews with those who knew Bonhoeffer, and other thorough research, readers get a comprehensive and balanced look into one of recent history’s greatest theologians.

Appropriately, Metaxas emphasizes Bonhoeffer’s theology and how it played out in his life. In contrast to “cheap grace,” Bonhoeffer believed that true grace influences all aspects of a Christian’s life. Christianity is more than formal religion, and it requires believers to be willing to sacrifice everything to God. Christianity is also more than legalistic morality. Ethics, according to Bonhoeffer, can’t be reduced to a set of rules. These beliefs are what led this humble and devout follower of Christ to be involved in a plot to assassinate Hitler.

How Christianity and assassination plots can be reconciled is hard for many to fathom–especially those who have lived only in peace and safety. We must consider Bonhoeffer in the context of his life, his country, and the war that he had no choice but to be a part of. Ethics, once so clear, become unclear. Do we lie to the Nazis, or do we give them information that leads to the deaths of innocents? Do we obey our nation’s laws, or do we defy them by leading Jews into safety? Do we fight in Hitler’s army, or do we refuse, knowing that we will be beheaded and leave our family destitute? These are some of the questions Bonhoeffer faced.

But readers can sympathize with Bonhoeffer. Metaxas masterfully puts us in his world. We celebrate with him in his family’s parlor. We study with him in his illegal seminary. We watch with him as his world unravels. And we see him agonize over decisions, decisions that are not so clear, and decisions that he often had to make without the support of others.

Metaxas’s “Bonhoeffer” will be one of the best books of the year. I’ve learned, as expected, much about the life of a great and inspiring Christian. But I’ve also learned about the world, sin and evil, what it really means to be a Christian, and what it really means to live. There are a few books that, years after I have read them, I realize have had a great influence on me. This will be one of them. You can’t go wrong with this book; I give it my highest recommendation.

27 JULY 1945, LONDON

We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed, always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our body. Fill we which live are always delivered unto death for Jesus’ sake, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our mortal flesh. So then death worketh in us, but life in you.
2 CORINTHIANS 4:8-12

“Peace had at last returned to Europe. Her familiar face — once evilly contorted and frightening — was again at rest, noble and fresh. What she had been through would take years to understand. It was as though she had undergone a terribly protracted exorcism, one that had extracted from her the last farthing. But in the very end, protesting with shrieks as they went, the legions of demons were driven out.

The war had been over for two months. The tyrant took his own life in a gray bunker beneath his shattered capital, and the Allies declared victory.

Slowly, slowly, life in Britain turned to the task of restoring itself. Then, as if on cue,, summer arrived. It was the first summer of peace in six years. But as if to prove that the whole thing hadn’t been a dream or a nightmare, there were constant fresh reminders of what had happened. And they were as awful as anything that had gone before. Often they were worse. In the early part of this summer, the ghastly news of the death camps emerged along with the unfathomable atrocities that the Nazis had visited upon their victims in the hellish outposts of their short-lived empire.

Rumors of such things circulated throughout the war, but now the reality was confirmed by photographs, newsreel footage, and eyewitness accounts from the soldiers who liberated the camps in April during the last days of the war. The depth of these horrors had not been known or imagined, and it was almost too much for the war-fatigued British public to absorb. Their hatred of the Germans was confirmed and reconfirmed afresh with every nauseating detail. The public reeled at the very evilness of the evil.

At the beginning of the war, it was possible to separate the Nazis from the Germans and recognize that not all Germans were Nazis. As the clash between the two nations wore on, and as more and more English fathers and sons and brothers died, distinguishing the difference became more difficult. Eventually the difference vanished altogether. Realizing he needed to fuel the British war effort, Prime Minister Winston Churchill fused the Germans and the Nazis into a single hated enemy, the better to defeat it swiftly and end the unrelenting nightmare.

When Germans working to defeat Hitler and the Nazis contacted Churchill and the British government, hoping for assistance to defeat their common enemy from the inside — hoping to tell the world that some Germans trapped inside the Reich felt much as they did –they were rebuffed. No one was interested in their overtures. It was too late. They couldn’t participate in such evils and, when it was convenient, try to settle for a separate peace. For the purposes of the war effort, Churchill maintained the fiction that there were no good Germans. It would even be said that the only good German — if one needed to use the phrase –was a dead German. That lack of nuance was also part of the hellishness of. war.

But now the war was over. And even as the full, unspeakable evil of the Third Reich was coming to light, the other side of things had to be seen too. Part of the restoration to peacetime thinking was the ability to again see beyond the blacks and whites of the war, to again discern nuance and shades, shadows and colors.

And so today in Holy Trinity Church — just off the Brampton Road in London—a service was taking place that was incomprehensible to some. To many others it was distasteful and disturbing, especially to those who had lost loved ones during the war. The memorial service being held today on British soil and being broadcast on the BBC was for a German who had died three months earlier. The word of his demise so slowly staggered out of the war’s fog and rubble that only recently had any of his friends and family learned of it. Most of them still knew nothing about it. But here in London were gathered those few who did.

In the pews were the man’s thirty-nine-year-old twin sister, her half-Jewish husband, and their two girls. They had slipped out of Germany before the war, driving at night across the border into Switzerland. The dead man took part in arranging their illegal flight—although that was among the most negligible of his departures from National Socialist orthodoxy — and he helped establish them in London, where they settled.

The man counted among his friends a number of prominent persons, including George Bell, the bishop of Chichester. Bell arranged the service, for he had known and loved the man being honored. The bishop met him years before the war when the two were engaged in ecumenical efforts, trying to warn Europe against the designs of the Nazis, then trying to rescue Jews, and finally trying to bring news of the German resistance to the attention of the British government. Just hours before his execution in Flossenburg Concentration camp, the man directed his last words to this bishop. That Sunday he spoke them to a British officer, who was imprisoned with him, after he performed his last service and preached his last sermon. This officer was liberated and brought those last words and the news of the man’s death across Europe with him.

Across the English Channel, across France, and across Germany, in the Charlottenburg district of Berlin, in a three-story house at 43 Marienburgerallee, an elderly couple sat by their radio. In her time the wife had given birth to eight children, four boys and four girls. The second son had been killed in the First War, and for a whole year his young mother had been unable to function. Twenty-seven years later, a second war would take two more boys from her. The husband was the most prominent psychiatrist in Germany. They had both opposed Hitler from the beginning and were proud of their sons and sons-in-law who had been involved in the conspiracy against him. They all knew the dangers. But when the war at last ended, news of their two sons was slow to arrive in Berlin. A month earlier they had finally heard of the death of their third son, Klaus. But about their youngest son, Dietrich, they had heard nothing. Someone claimed to have seen him alive. Then a neighbor told them that the BBC would the next day broadcast a memorial service in London. It was for Dietrich.

At the appointed-hour, the old couple turned on their radio. Soon enough the service was announced for their son. That was how they came to know of his death.

As the couple took in the hard news that the good man who was their son was now dead so too, many English took in the hard news that the dead man who was a German was good. Thus did the world again begin to reconcile itself to itself.

The man who died was engaged to be married. He was a pastor and a theologian. And he was executed for his role in the plot to assassinate Hitler. This is his story.”

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Book Recommendation: Discovering Aquinas – Aidan Nichols

November 9, 2010

You can never go wrong with the clear and elegant prose of Aidan Nichols, an academic and Catholic priest, who first served as the John Paul II Memorial Visiting Lecturer at Oxford University for 2006-8 — the first lectureship of Catholic theology at that university since the Reformation. He is a member of the Order of Preachers (Dominicans) and was formerly the Prior of St. Michael and All Angels in Cambridge. Author of over 30 books, you will find frequent references to him amongst the posts here. This particular book dates from 2002 and is often used as a text in seminaries to give a quick overview of the career and thought of the Angelic Doctor.

Aquinas: Charity, The Supreme Evangelical Virtue
Just as a lamp is not able to illuminate unless a fire is enkindled, so also a spiritual lamp does not illuminate unless he first burn and be inflamed with the fire of charity. Hence ardor precedes illumination, for a knowledge of truth is bestowed by the ardor of charity.

Aquinas: Faith Knowledge
Between ordinary science-knowledge and faith-knowledge there is this difference. The first shines only on the mind, showing that God is the cause of everything, that he is one and wise and so forth, whereas the second enlightens the mind and warms the heart, telling us that God is also  savior, redeemer, lover, made flesh for us. Hence the savior of this knowledge, and the fragrance spread far and wide. ‘Behold the scent of my son is as of a field which the Lord hath blessed.’

What Is Theology
The Summa Theologiae opens by asking what theology is, and its answer is that theology is orderly reflection on the content of revelation, biblically attested as this is, and summed up in the articles of the Creed. This orderly reflection is carried out in the light of God’s own knowledge of himself and his saving plan – which light, as communicated to ourselves, we call ‘faith’. It is, then in the broadest possible terms, an integration of faith and reason, and while Thomas allows that charity may give the unlettered person a kind of intuition or instinctive judgment in matters of faith, normally it requires study and hard work.

Scheme Of The Summa Theologiae
Prima Pars begins by describing the fontal being of God [The font or source of creatures is God whose existence is, for Thomas, known by reason but the mystery of whose being, in its concrete character, requires revelation for its description.] The fontal being is totally complete self-communicating goodness expressing itself through the interplay of three subsistent relationships (Father to Son, Son to Father, Father and Son to Holy Spirit). Thomas considers the issue from God of the created world; first that of pure minds, the angels; then, that of the natural order as a whole; and finally the place of man, who is embodied mind or intellectualized body. Creatures come forth from God, structured in a way that natural philosophy indicates but dependent on God for their existence and, in the case of rational creatures, ordered to him by their tendency to seek a goal beyond themselves.

[Prima Secundae] begins by an account of human happiness which is, for St. Thomas, the purpose of morality, just as it was for Aristotle. Thanks to the doctrines of creation and redemption, however, the content of such happiness must be re-described so as to include – indeed, center on – the vision of God. This is our aim and destiny ‘return’ to God in beatification. Thomas then uses a combination of Aristotelian ethics and the ascetic and moral writings of such Church Fathers as John Cassian and Gregory the Great to give an account of the basic emotional drives of human nature and how these, like mind and will, are distorted by sin.

[The Secunda Secundae] is the first explicit treatment of the difference Christ makes: the gift of a new interior principle of acting, Christ’s Holy Spirit. [Thomas posits] that the Gospel is …the power of a new love which unites us with God and with each other. The teaching element, the written Gospels, dispose us to receive this Holy Spirit; the sacraments actually mediate this life to us, and it proceeds spontaneously to express itself in Christian living.

The spirit of Christ supernaturalizes our natural drives not just through modulating the moral virtues by also and more specifically in two particular ways – the ‘theological virtues’, new God directed dispositions, and the ‘Gifts of the Holy Spirit’.  First then, the spirit elicits faith, hope and charity, which make us tend to the God of the saving revelation as He is in Himself, giving us real contact with Him. And secondly, He bestows upon us those gifts and endowments proper to the messianic child in  the Book of Isaiah, applied by Church tradition at large to the messianic people of the New Covenant and associated by the Latin Church with, especially, confirmation.

The remainder of the Secunda Secundae is what we might call a phenomenology—a reflective description – of the Christian life, a good life informed by charity and articulating itself in both practical goodness and contemplation…The best way to be a Christian is to unite contemplation and practical goodness; the highest form of practical goodness is to pass on understanding of the Christian faith, since this alone is helpful not only for time but also for eternity; so the best way to follow the Gospel is ‘contemplata aliis tradere, ‘to give to others the fruit of contemplation’

Revelation In Thomism
Revelation for Thomas does not consist principally in public events. It is not to be found, for instance, in the Exodus and Sinai events of the Old Testament or even in the Incarnation, Life, Death and Resurrection of Christ in the New. And this is because, for Aquinas, revelation – with one caveat to be entered – is essentially an interior event, and more justly still, it is an intellectual event. It consists in cognitive acts, acts of intellectual appropriation, in which the mind judges relevant materials (and those may be events like the ones just mentioned) by a light superior to the ordinary lights that the mind normally works by in this world. God gives the recipient of revelation what Thomas calls a lumen propheticum, a ‘prophetic light’, which enables him or her to judge of their experience in a way that echoes the divine judgment of the realities concerned.

How ‘Patient’ And ‘Agent’ Intellect Impact Revelation In Thomism
Thomas thought that two things are required (for common-or-garden-knowing of the world): a capacity to register in a receptive way what is other than the mind (what Thomas, following Aristotle, called the ‘patient intellect’), and the power to penetrate what is thus registered and draw out its intelligibility – in plain English, make sense of it (for which we need that other kind of mental activity which Aristotle and Thomas call the ‘agent intellect.’ And all this is with a with a view to showing something for what it is, by the natural light of human understanding.

What we find in strictly supernatural knowledge – revelation knowledge, salvifically relevant knowledge – has to be grasped by analogy with this twofold process, What the mind receives may be impressions from the naturally or historically formed world around it – the life of the cosmos, say, so important to the Wisdom writers of the Old Testament, or the miracles of the Passion of Christ in the New. Or again, what the mind registers may be the materials directly infused by God – images or ides which God, who is immediately present to the soul as to every other reality, can place thereby his action. But in either case what the mind is patient of cannot be called ‘revelation’ unless it has actively grasped its content by an act of judgment made through a light higher than that of natural understanding because sharing in the light of the divine mind, the mind of Truth itself.

Extraordinary Richness And Variety Of Methods God Has Devised To Communicate Grace
Victor White [interpreter of St. Thomas]  has written: St. Thomas stresses the extraordinary richness and variety to be found in the methods which God has devised to make his saving ways known to men – even in the old Testament alone, the extraordinary variety, in the first place, of all sorts and conditions of men whom he has chosen to be the recipients of this revelation. Then, the extraordinary variety of historical conditions in which revelations have been made …and the manifold adaptations to the particular needs of those conditions. …Thirdly the immense variety of the kinds of things that have been the subject of those revelations – divine and transcendental things, temporal things belonging to past present and future: promises and threats; absolute things, contingent   thing and conditional things. Fourthly the immense richness and variety of symbolism which revelation has employed for its medium, ranging from the crudest of inanimate stocks and stones…to the most sublime and dazzling visions….Fifthly, the diversity of clarity of apprehension of what is revealed, ranging from the darkest night both of sense and of understanding through every degree of twilight to relatively clear daylight vision. Next the unlimited variety of modes of expression and literary form which will be given to communicate the revelations…Finally, the limitless variety of men to whom the revelations are to be communicated, and their corresponding adaptation to the needs of each…

Lumen Naturale And Lumen Propheticum
Just as the lumen naturale of the agent intellect (q.v.) is given by God as Creator to enable us to find our way in intelligent fashion in the ordinary world, so the lumen propheticum is given by God as redeemer, to enable human beings (a few of them directly, all of them indirectly) to locate and interpret aright the ultimate goal of human life, a goal entirely supernatural because it consists in the open vision of the Trinity, and hence transcends altogether finite and created nature.

Divine Revelation Is Necessary
Thomas has told his readers ….that divine revelation is necessary to us because the purpose and meaning of human existence is ultimately to be found only in the God who is invisible and incomprehensible, and yet that purpose has somehow to be made known to humankind if human objectives and activities are to be aligned with their final end. For only in that goal does salus, ‘salvation’ health and well-being for the spirit and body alike – ultimately consist. What is necessary then, is some way of abolishing the distance that separates human cognitive capacity from awareness of the divine offer of salvation, and this can be done by God himself…bestowing the prophetic light on chosen individuals, chosen so they may witness divine revelation on behalf of all.

The Old Testament and Angelic Mediation In Thomism
For Aquinas the enlargement of the judgment of a prophet comes about …through angelic mediation….The idea that the Old Law was mediated by angels is clearly found in  both the speech of Stephen in the Acts of the Apostles and in the Pauline Letters, notably Galatians, and it is crucial to the argument of the Letter to the Hebrews…As Aquinas explains, the function of the Angels is communication (the very word ‘angel’ tells us so). Now the angels themselves enjoy the Beatific Vision. So these immaterial substances are able to communicate not that Vision itself, which is infinite, but some of its finite effects, some knowledge of God’s eternal designs for his world. This they do by working in and through matter, obeying its laws while exploiting its resources…the angels are able to stimulate mental images or indeed the external sense organs to produce aural or visual images, images which then form the raw material of revelation: “The human mind is raised to understand in a certain way conformably to the manner of immaterial substances, so that with utmost certitude it sees not only principles but also conclusions by simple intuition.”

Angelic Mediation And The New Testament In Thomism
Angelic mediation [that occurred in the Old Testament] ceases….thanks to the hypostatic union, the human mind of the word incarnate is immediately open to influxes from the divine mind, for it is the human mind of one who is personally God. The revelation from which the Christian religion takes its rise is, in the first place, a vision in the inspired human intellect of Jesus, in the human soul of Christ. His knowledge of the divine Trinity and its saving plan was incomparably greater than that of the Old Testament prophets…this uniqueness of revelatory fullness in Christ is what makes Thomas call Jesus in his human nature primus et pincipalis doctor, ‘the first and principal teacher’

The Uniqueness Of The Apostles
It is for Thomas a soteriological [soteriology is the theological doctrine of salvation as effected by Jesus] principle that God gives someone grace in proportion to the mission for which he or she has been chosen. It is the unique proximity of the apostle so the fullness of time when, with the climax of salvation history at the incarnation, the first and principal teacher, the God-man was manifesting clearly the substance of divine revelation in its maximal form, exteriorizing his understanding in words and deeds, that gave the apostles a perfect knowledge of the mysteries of faith in which they were confirmed or stabilized by the outpouring of the Spirit at Pentecost.

The Apostles Creed
The truth of the faith is contained in the Holy Scripture diffusely and in different ways, some of which envelop it in obscurity. That is so much so that to extract from Sacred Scripture the truth of the faith much study and application are required, to which most people, absorbed as they are by other concerns, are in no position to give themselves or to attend. That is why it was necessary to draw from the Scriptures and to formulate as a summary something absolutely clear which could be proposed to the faith of all [The Apostles Creed]. Nonetheless, it is not a question of things added to the Holy Scriptures but of things drawn out of them.

Tradition And Scripture In Thomism
The chief reason why Thomas does not, by and large, speak of Tradition as fount of revealed understanding distinct from the Scriptures is that he things of scripture as itself transmitted by Tradition. Traditio sacrae Scripturae, the traditioning or handling on of scripture within the Church as a whole, is the norm of Christian truth. He emphasizes…that the Fathers of the church must never be separated from or counterposed against the biblical authority. For the Fathers are the authentic transmitters of Scripture – and here he [Thomas] is thinking of not just he textural tradition but also the salvific meaning of the biblical writings.

Three Considerations For Describing Scripture As Science
First, for science is always a knowledge of something through its causes, whereby we get to the bottom of something by uncovering its foundational principle. But the knowledge found in Scripture derives from God’s own knowledge of himself and his eternal design for the world, and nothing can be more cognitively fundamental than that. Secondly, like more mundane sciences, …Holy Scripture uses reasoning, as when, for example, in his first letter to the Corinth, Paul argues from the Resurrection of Christ to the resurrection of all mankind. And then thirdly, Scripture offers to thought the unity which is typical of scientific understanding , for all matters dealt with by Scripture are covered by the gift of prophetic inspiration only insofar as they are …‘revealable’ objects of revelation. And to have in this way one single, formal perspective on all the topics that his body of literature (the Bible) treats of is precisely what enables a kind of knowing to be unitary and in that sense scientific.

Lumen Fidei
Thomas understands the prophetic light of revelation by analogy with the natural light operative in ordinary human knowing. By light here we can understand whatever causes something to become manifest in some order of knowledge. …there is not only the lumen naturale and the lumen propheticum, there is also the lumen fidei, the light of faith’…And this for Thomas is a light issuing from God as Redeemer, just as is the lumen propheticum – not however, to give us direct knowledge of transient light, but to allow us to adhere to the First Truth, God himself, by assenting to what, through veridical witnesses (that is, through testimonies he has guaranteed as true), God invites us to believe about himself and his everlasting purpose for us.

Analyzing the Act Of Faith
Thomas distinguishes between credere Deo, believing by or through God; credere Deum believing God; and credere in Deum, believing in God. All these elements are present in faith’s act and therefore in the ‘virture’ or stable disposition which is the principle of all Christian believing in the life of the faithful… credere Deo…only God can activate interiorly the instinct we have for our last end, and thus, by means of the will, move the intellect to give its assent to the truths he teaches – truths which reach us from him through the “Church’s presentation of the canonical Scriptures which are themselves the expression of the preaching of those apostles who, as doctors of the faith, participated in the knowledge of the unique Witness to the divine truth, the God-man…

Although the truth of divine revelation to which thewill bids the intellect adhere is not, as it was for its immediate recipients, something evident, nonetheless this revelation is worthy of our assent  That we can grasp from the way the will is attracted to the share in our final good which revelation promises….an important factor …is the manner in which God confirms the credibility of his  revelation by furnishing its transmission with conditions that only he could originate – the fulfillment of prophecy, the occurrence of miracles, the manifestation of outstanding sanctity on the part of revelation’s representative. These signs demonstrate that it really is God who has spoken… credere in Deum…to know God by means of his own word is actually to share in his divine knowledge.

Faith is such a sharing, albeit an imperfect one, but not so imperfect that it does not orient the human mind towards the future vision of God in its wondrous fullness. … credere in Deum …faith which informs man obscurely but with certitude about the everlastingly True…determines in principle mans’ speculative intellect, also represents God to him as the Goal to be rejoined by love and thus can extend itself into the order of action…this is the end of a theology of faith…and the beginning of glory…faith has an eschatological quality. The life that flows from faith is anticipation of life with the Trinity in heaven: There the lumen fidei – made possible by the lumen propheticum, itself a supernaturalized version of the lumen naturale will reach its full term in the lumen gloriae, the light of glory.

Anabasis And Katabasis
Laying aside, then, the mystical graces of rapture, few and far between as these are, we have in this life two fundamental modes of knowing God. To introduce two key terms which were vital for the later Greek fathers and in modern Western dogmatics for Hans Urs von Balthasar, we know God both by anabasis –‘rising’ upon the basis of what is common to created and uncreated being, and by katabasis – God’s ‘descending’ self-disclosure which comes down in the Judaeo-Christian revelation from the One whom he Letter of James calls ‘the Father of lights’ (James:1:17). In Thomas… the two kinds or …directions of such knowing…are generally found interwoven….such interweaving produces in Thomas’s mind, the greatest richness of theological understanding, the maximal fullness of theological intelligibility….Thomas was a theologian who made use of philosophy, not a philosopher who was under ecclesiastical obligation to say something about faith as well.

The Interwoven Anabatic and Katabatic Approach of Thomism (Leo Elder)
Faith is non-evident knowledge which uses concepts of the natural order to signify supernatural realities. This is possible for there is an analogy between both orders, because God is the author of both. Reason must assist faith in the analysis, ordering and elaborating what is revealed. This is precisely what Aquinas does; philosophical insights and natural truths are used within sacred theology, becoming integral parts of it (without them theology is not possible) and they partake in the nature of theology as longs they are used by it. But they can also be detached from it. Once may compare their function to that of the chemical elements and reactions to the living organism. Outside the organism they occur in their own right; but in the organism they are subservient to the principle of life and taken up into a higher unity.

The Thirst For And Knowledge Of God’s Existence
Thomas holds that in a broad sense, the knowledge of God’s existence is implanted in all human beings by nature – not only inasmuch as we naturally desire happiness, and God has so disposed our nature that He alone is that happiness, that beatitude. But…this is not to know, in the full meaning of the word ‘know’, that God exists…The Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain distinguishes three kinds of intellectual thirst. The first is the thirst for the water of science. When this particular thirst is quenched, however, one thirsts for something else, and this is the thirst for the water of created wisdom – to know being in its various modes, the ontological mystery. But even then the thirst continues, and this is the thirst for the water of uncreated wisdom, for the vision of God.

The Five Anabatic Ways Or Proofs Of God’s Existence [Quinquae viae]
(1) Material causality is that out of which something is effected, the potential which, whether suddenly or by a long drawn out process, becomes actuality. But sheer potentiality cannot be a true starting point for the world. The first way argues that the true starting point is, rather, sheer actuality, a reality wholly lacking in potentiality because it is Pure Act.

(2) Efficient causality is that by whose agency something is brought into being, or brought about. Nine times out of ten it is what we have in mind when we use the word ‘cause’ in ordinary language. What causes hailstones? What caused the sinking of the Titanic? If, as regularly happens in human enquiry, we seek after such an efficient cause for some event or development, or for the emergence of some new kind of entity, we cannot be prevented, Thomas argues, from asking after that transcendent efficient cause which explains the working of efficient causes and their interrelation as a whole. This is the argument of the second way, which reaches then the conclusion that deity is at work in all processes taking place in the world.

Skip (3) for now (See below)

(4) The next kind of causality enumerated by Aristotle is formal causality. This raises the question of how a particular thing is said to be the kind of thing it is – …the question of formal properties….A very important set of properties is value-laden… we denote by terms “good”, “beautiful”, “true”, etc….how these pure-value perfection properties are embodied in the world, yet only in various degrees. Thomas’ conclusion is that as manifestations…of the qualities inherent in finite being…[they] share in divine being, which is perfect in the maximal degree.

(5) Final causality (Aristotle’s scheme)…which deals with the ends or goals for which all beings strive, whether consciously or not. Whether in a micro-context or in a macro-context of the world as a whole, goal directedness appears to be a feature of the cosmic process. The Fifth Way begins from this discovery, and it concludes to the divine intellect as the cause of the order in the world. Now consider (3), which is the central argument as the ground or basis of the fourfold causality…the relationship between observable things and their being is contingent, not necessary. Things do not have their being of themselves. Rather things receive their being – in “Thomas’ term, their esse—and that causality of esse lies at a deeper level than (1)material, (2)efficient, (4)formal and (5)final causality and is indeed the root of all of these…The Third Way concludes to God as the foundation and source not of this or that aspect of things nor of this or that aspect of the world as a whole, but of the very being of things, the very being of the world….Thomas also thinks that he has gone some way to justify, in terms of katabatic disclosure of Scripture that in God – to cite St Paul’s words to the Athenians in Acts 17:28 ['For in him we live and move and have our being.' As some of your own poets have said, 'We are his offspring.']

Exploring God’s Five Ways of Being:
The first way
leads to the conclusion that there exists a First Unmoved Mover whose being contains no potentiality at all – and this leads Aquinas to affirm the divine ‘simplicity’. In God there is no distinction between his nature and his properties, his substance and his qualities, not even ….between his essence and his existence. God’s being is entirely unique, and between our knowledge of it in a negative fashion, when, namely we understand that his esse is entirely different from that of the beings around us….

From this starting point…the doctrine of God’s perfection is linked to the Second Way…on the basis of efficient causality, that God is active…in all of the processes taking place in the world. If God is able to move with efficacy, in the transcendent mode proper to him, all efficient causes at work in the world, then he must himself be absolutely ‘achieved’ or complete – which is the original meaning of perfectum, ‘perfect’…

 Being is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual, for nothing has actuality except insofar as it is. Hence being itself is that which actuates in things, even their forms…Compare in the New Testament…’Every good and perfect gift is from above [Letter of James 1:17]

…Things strive after their own perfection, the completion of their form, they strive after God… God is that which is sought for in all the variegated activity the universe shows. Since all things tend to their own perfection, nothing can escape this seeking to become like God…the whole universe strives after liberation in him. ..

We know that the whole creation has been groaning in travail together until now; and not only the creation but we ourselves who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, groan inwardly as we wait for adoption as sons, the redemption of our bodies [Letter to Romans 8:22]

In the Third Way Thomas deals with the infinity of God , on which there follows, in his philosophical theology, the existence of God in all things. The third way concludes that there must be being that has of itself its own necessity to be and is the cause for the being of all other things. It is as the unlimited realization of reality and perfection that God is infinite, this unlimited plenitude of God’s subsistent being is prolonged by his presence in things, sustaining them at their deepest core, and yet by the sublimity of the divine nature raised high above them. God is omnipresent in space and time, not because he is in any way spatially or temporally determined, but because he continually gives being to the realities that are determined in those ways.

God is the one in whom we live and move and have our being [Book of Acts 17:28]

From the logic of the Fourth Way it follows that , if God contains within himself the plenitude of the perfections of all things, he can neither degenerate nor advance. “He does not faint or grow weary.”[Isa: 40:28b] It is because God is immutable that he knows no succession and so is eternal. ..Thomas explains…everything God is, he is simultaneously and altogether. He is his own duration, an actualized ‘now’.

In the Fifth Way Thomas speaks of the unity of God that is absolutely central to the old Testament revelation and finds its epitome in the Shema, ‘Hear o Israel, the Lord your God is one.’[Deut 6:4], and taken from there into the Trinitarian monotheism of the New…Thomas argues that the way things in the universe are ordered to one another, and so the way the universe itself can be said to be orderly, is inexplicable unless one supreme Mind brings about these interrelations. And this supplements his argument from the identification of God as He Who Is: plenary, fontal, esse. Of course, if God is his own nature, and includes in himself the entire perfection of being, he cannot but be one.

Our God-Given Capacity For The Knowledge Of God
Though no created intellect can comprehend God, nevertheless our minds do have an aptitude to be elevated to the contemplation of God – a potentiality, though without grace a purely passive one, to be satisfied by the Beatific Vision. Unfortunately, many human beings seem to have no inkling that this is the end to which their curiosity about the world or thirst to know reality points them… We can name God on the basis of creatures inasmuch as creatures represent God…this they do to the degree that, in exhibiting perfections of intrinsically valuable qualities of one kind or another, they show forth the source of their perfections in subsistent Being himself from which they come forth….Analogical thinking is the adaptation of the intellect to reality.

Naming God: ”He Who Is”
Thomas considers ”He Who Is” as the best name we have for God. It’s disclosure, in the Sinai theophany [A theophany is a visible appearance or other local manifestation of a deity to humans], is a high point of Scripture. ….”He Who Is” names God as the actuality of all acts and the action of all perfections. It is universal, the founding principle of all neames applied to God…it signifies being in the present – and this above all applies ot God, who knows neither past nor future. .”He Who Is” just has to be accounted the primary divine Name.

The Ontological Consistency Of Creation
For St. Thomas writing in the light of the biblical revelation, it is not only himself that God sees but all the realities that issue from him, The ontological consistency of creation is itself a consequence of the consistency of the divine knowing, identical as this is with the divine being. Thus the very materiality of things – their ‘thinginess’ – as well as their ‘form’ come from divine knowing. That knowing is not only the model of the world, as the Plato of the Timaeus already held. It is also the energy that brings the world into being. …’In God is maximal life’ writes Thomas. And so the divine knowing is inseparable from the divine willing. God’s life is a willing life, at once contented willing in the indefectible happiness of his perfect being and a will to do, to institute something, to govern the world’s course and act upon it. God wills not only himself but what is not himself, doing the latter in sovereign freedom. Conjointly with the divine knowing, the divine willing is a cause of things.

The Trinitarian Dimension Of Creative Action
Thomas proposes that while the Son proceeds according to nature, as God’s nature’s perfect image, through whom all creatures have some share in that divine nature, the Holy Spirit proceeds according to will, as the Love in whom all creatures enjoy the liberality of God.

The Word And The Spirit Of Love
Thomas writes: “By grace the soul is made like to God and therefore when a divine person is sent there is implied a being made like to him by some sort of grace. Now because the Holy Spirit is Love the soul belongs to him through the gift of charity; consequently love in its manner corresponds to the sending of the Spirit. Similarly because the Son is Word, not any kind of mental utterance but Word breathing Love, blessed Augustine says that the word he is proposing to consider is conceived in company with love. Consequently, what matches the sending of the Son to us is not just any quality of mind, but that sort of enlightening by which the mind breaks forth into loving affection…therefore Augustine remarks that the Son is sent to somebody when he is known and perceived.

The Trinity In Man
In knowing and loving the rational creature reaches God himself…Grace is so exalted that it brings about an unmediated union with the divine. The Spirit enters the soul invisibly in the gift of love, the Word in the gift of wisdom (and there is thereby a manifestation of the Father, the ultimate to whom we return). In due accord with these gifts, a likeness to what is proper to the Persons comes to be in us, and by reason of this reality-in-likeness, the Persons are truly in our souls, ‘The whole trinity, the Persons themselves and not merely their gifts, dwells in man through sanctifying grace.

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Book Recommendation: My Name Is Red by Orhan Pamuk

October 12, 2010

My Name is Red, Bulgerian Edition Book Cover

My Name Is Red is told against the backdrop of cultural and historical Islam. It is set in Istanbul during the reign of Ottoman Sultan Murat III, 1574-95, and somewhat after into the reign of Sultan Ahmet I.  It concerns the fate of miniaturists and illuminators whose art form had reached a zenith a few hundred years or so earlier. I read novels like this a few years back. I think I was lonely for my life in Japan but unwilling to return to it and longed to be away from the world I found myself in. What better way to escape than plunging myself into another foreign world in a time far away.

Miniaturists depicted battles and coronations and illustrated the epics, poems, love fables and feats of conquest. This was all done in a very formal and proscribed manner. For example, they were not representational and did not use perspective. Hence human faces and tree leaves were treated equally as design and ornamentation rather than as likenesses.

They never dared illustrate the Koran. Light, the Koran says, belongs to Allah, nature belongs to Allah; it is for mankind to love, and to view without competing with Allah, which was to invite a descent into idolatry. Man could approach and know Allah through nature and to depict nature through art was considered to be interfering with that process. Hence design and ornamentation but never representational art.

My Name Is Red is a murder story told against this moment of cultural history. It is related through the eyes of twenty different characters, a dog, and a few objects. It begins with the corpse of Master gilder Elegant Effendi who has been killed by one of his  fellow artists:  ”I am nothing but a corpse now, a body at the bottom of a well…I was happy; I know now I that I’d been happy. I made the best illuminations in Our Sultan’s workshop…” He and three other miniaturists had been secretly at work on a book (commissioned by the Sultan) using the new Frankish methods (three dimensional with perspective). This radical and blasphemous book was to have included a portrait of the Sultan himself.  

As is my habit, some reading selections here:

Painting
But the half-blind ninety two year old master caused me to sense something deeper for a moment, here, far from all the battles and turmoil: the feeling that everything was coming to an end. Immediately before the end of the world, there would also be such silence. Painting is the silence of thought and the music of sight. 

Color, Sight and Darkness
Before the art of illumination there was blackness and afterward there will also be blackness. Through our colors, paints, art and love, we remember that Allah commanded us to “See”! To know is to remember that you’ve seen. To see is to know without remembering. Thus painting is remembering the blackness. The great masters, who shared a love of painting and perceived that color and sight arose from darkness, longed to return to Allah’s blackness by means of color, Artists without memory neither remember Allah nor his blackness. All great masters, in their work, seek that profound void within color and outside time. 

Melancholy Men
Maybe you’ve understood by now that for men like myself, that is melancholy men for whom love, agony, happiness and misery are just excuses for maintaining eternal loneliness, life offers neither great joy or great sadness. I’m not saying that we can’t relate to other souls overwhelmed by these feelings, on the contrary, we sympathize with them. What we cannot fathom is the odd disquiet our souls sink into at such times. This silent turmoil dims our intellects and dampens our hearts, usurping the place reserved for the true joy and sadness we ought to experience. 

Painting What The Mind Sees
My paintings reveal what the mind, not the eye, sees. But painting as you know quite well, is a feast for the eyes. If you combine these two thoughts, my world will emerge. That is:

ALIF: Painting brings to life what the minds sees, as a feast for the eyes.

LAM: What the eye sees in the world enters the painting to the degree that it serves the mind.

MIM: Consequently, beauty is the eye discovering in our world what the mind already knows. 

Aphorisms

1.   There are moments in all our lives when we realize, even as we experience them, that we are living  through events we will never forget, even long afterward. 

2.   Time doesn’t flow if you don’t dream. 

3.   Love is the ability to make the invisible visible and the desire always to feel the invisible in one’s midst.

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No One Sees God – Michael Novak

September 8, 2010

 

Michael Novak

Michael Novak, who celebrates a birthday tomorrow, is an American Catholic philosopher, journalist, novelist, and diplomat. The author of more than twenty-five books on the philosophy and theology of culture, Novak is most widely known for his book The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (1982). In 1994 he was awarded the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion, which included a million-dollar purse awarded at Buckingham Palace. He writes books and articles focused on capitalism, religion, and the politics of democratization.

In No One Sees God (2008), “Novak brilliantly recasts the tired debate pitting faith against reason. Both the atheist and the believer experience the same “dark night” in which God’s presence seems absent, he argues, and the conflict between faith and doubt stems not from objective differences, but from divergent attitudes toward the unknown. Drawing from his lifelong passion for philosophy and his personal struggles with belief, he shows that, far from being irrational, the spiritual perspective actually provides the most satisfying answers to the eternal questions of meaning. Faith is a challenge at times, but it nonetheless offers the only fully coherent response to the human experience.” (Publisher’s blurb)
So good I have double the reading selections. What follows is part one:

Two Classes Each Fearing The Other
All others are in the same predicament. We are all in the same darkness. It is not so hard, of course, to evade the rain on the windowpanes, the tapping of the night on the doors and shutters, the darkness, the mist, and the fear. Not so hard to hide from it in the protected circles lit by comforting scientific reason. I have met people who, when you ask them how they account for the unexplainedness of life, the puzzle of it, the pain of it, smile and say: “When someone raises questions like that, I turn away, sit down, and enjoy a good lunch.” Afterward, they think of it no more.
Some people live in a protected circle of light. I notice this especially about two classes of people: first, the unquestioning Christian minds, full of light and sweetness, never doubting a doctrine, seeing in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ the answer to all things. Second, the more scientifically minded, the people of reason, the pragmatists who see no reason to wonder about where it all came from, or where it is going, or how mad it may be. Serenely, both classes race through life — each at times fearing the other.

Albert Camus Quote
The one contemporary whose life I most carefully tracked, from the beginning to at least The Fall, was Albert Camus. “A single sentence will suffice for modern man;’ he wrote in 1956: “They fornicated, and they read the papers.” Well, that’s a way to avoid the nothingness.

Mistake Your Own Nature Mistake God
Gathering force over many years, one discovery has hit me with the force of a law: If you make mistakes about your own nature, you will make as many mistakes about God, and quite properly then, reject what your inquiries put before you. The god you fantasize will appear to you not very great, a delusion, a snare from which others ought to be freed. You will despise this god.

A New Habit Of Reasoned And Mutually Respectful Conversation
This looking behind the veils of reason is what many in North America and in Western Europe today passionately resist. They do not so much despise “God” as they despise the Jewish and Christian God. (Not for the reason Nietzsche did — because Judaism and Christianity are “slave religions;’ Judaism first and in its wake Christianity –but on the contrary, because these faiths assign to humans too much liberty and judge them too exactly for their use of it.) Passionate secularists heap ridicule on the Bible. They tear to shreds Christian doctrine — the whole garment — or with some effort rip out the seams that hold its parts together.

Thus I will need to show how out in the dark, and without ever wholly coming in from the dark, I have come to understand that what the Jewish Testament and the Christian Testament teaches us about God, about human beings, and about ourselves is a truer account of reality than any other I have encountered.

Much as my atheist friends will loathe it and mock it, I have tested this judgment in living and found it to ring true. It better meets the facts of my own reality and the urgent inquiries of my own mind, and better turns aside thrusts intended to wound it and to destroy it, than any other account I have discovered. My reasoned judgment on this matter cannot really be discounted as “merely subjective:’ for it is shared under great stress by hundreds of millions of others. About one of every three human beings on this planet is Christian, over two billion in all. And in no age has the persecution of Christians reached such horrific numbers with so much cruelty. The even more barbaric assault upon our Jewish “older brothers:’ no matter what they believe, awakens amazement and full contempt.

My underlying thesis is a simple one: that unbelievers and believers need to learn a new habit of reasoned and mutually respectful conversation.

The conversation among Western atheists and Christian/Jewish believers is particularly important. An excellent model was offered in January 2004 between one of Europe’s most prominent public philosophers, Jurgen Habermas, and the Vatican’s Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, prefect at the time of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. They discussed moral relativism, Islam, and the problematic but fruitful tension between atheism and Jewish/Christian belief. In chapter ten, I try to extend and deepen their argument.

Saint Thérèse’s of Lisieux (1873-1897)
Saint Thérèse lived for most of her adult life in utter darkness and dryness and abandonment by her divine Lover. She wrote an autobiography about her experiences and how it led her to interpret the inner heart of Christianity. So powerfully and clearly did she write that Pope John Paul II inscribed her name among the historic handful of “Doctors of the Church”teach so profound and so sweeping in their wisdom that they instruct the whole Catholic people.

The canonization of Saint Thérèse in 1925 was at that time one of the swiftest on record. Miracles attributed to her care and her attention to the needy — which she promised she would “shower down” from heaven — were too many to count. As early as the war of 1914, Thérèse was the favorite saint of French soldiers in the trenches, held by them coequal with Saint Jeanne d’Arc. And so she remains today, this twenty-four-year-old victim of consumption, who after the age of fifteen never set foot outside her cloistered contemplative convent — with Jeanne d’Arc co-patroness of France.

The kernel of Saint Thérèse’s teaching is often called “the little way:’ meaning that no Christian is too humble or too insignificant to follow it and no thought or action too negligible to infuse with love. In other words, God cherishes not only great actions ( love, but also minor, childlike ones. No matter what spiritual darkness you find yourself in, choose as your North Star a tender love of the persons that life’s contingencies have put next to you. Do not go looking around for more fascinating neighbors to by Love those right nearest you.

You cannot see God, even if you try. But you can see your neighbor, the tedious one, who grinds on you: Love him, love her, as Jesus loves them. Give them the tender smile of Jesus, even though your own feelings be like the bottom of a birdcage. Do not ask to see Jesus, or to feel Him. That is for children. Love him in the dark. Love for the invisible divine, not for warm and comforting human consolation. Love for the sake of love, not in order to feel loved in return.

It happens that Agnes Bojaxhiu of Albania eventually became a missionary nun in Ireland, and chose for her religious name Therese, in the footsteps of her patron saint of darkness from Lisieux. In Spanish, the same name is Teresa, and Saint Teresa of Avila (1515-1582) was also m experienced traveler in inner darkness. She came to be a Doctor of the Church, builder of scores of convents of Carmelite nuns all over Europe, administrator and guide extraordinaire, and a canny operator in bureaucracies, running rings around most of the male hierarchy of her time. Saint Thèrése of Lisieux took the name Teresa in her honor, and followed her teaching as inscribed in Teresa’s books and in the traditions of the Carmelites. (Pope John Paul H was a close follower of the Carmelites.)

For those who love God, that way is excruciating. They would like to feel close to God, but they find — nothing! Like Saint John of the Cross (1542-1591), the Carmelite priest who was her spiritual guide, Teresa gradually came to see that if God were a human invention, a human contrivance, then warm human feelings would be quite enough..

God Is Outside Our Range
God is far greater than that. He is beyond any human frequency. He is outside our range, divine. One must follow Him without any human prop whatever, even warm and comfortable inner feelings. That may be why Jesus loved the desert as a place for prayer. The Jewish scholar David Gelernter has written:

This exactly (or very nearly) underlies Judaism’s ubiquitous image of the veil, & God beyond or behind it. In its simplest form this veil is embodied in the talit or prayer-shawl men wear at morning prayer. A more substantial instance: in the First Temple destroyed by Babylonians, worship centered on the Holy of Holies, which contained the Ark of the Covenant. In the Second Temple destroyed by Rome, worship centered on the Holy of Holies — which was an absolutely empty space. After that — today — the holiest site in Judaism is a blank wall (the Western Wall) with nothing behind or beyond it. This sequence is no accident. It’s part of the Jewish people’s coming of age and being weaned from what you properly call the child’s view to the adult’s understanding of God. That is to say, our senses cannot touch God. Neither sight nor sound, scent nor taste, nor touch, either. Our imagination cannot encompass Him, nor even bring Him into focus. How can we count on our memory? Our minds can form no adequate conception of Him; anything the mind imagines is easily ridiculed. The God who made us and out of His infinite love redeemed us and called us to His bosom is divine, not human. As such, He cannot be found using human perceptual equipment.

The Darkness In Which The True God Dwells
This is not a new idea. Serious and devout believers from the time of Elijah and Job have known about the darkness in which the true God necessarily dwells. In order for one’s soul to be ready to go far beyond any human contrivance, one must be willing to go out into the desert and the night. Thus we read of the prophet Elijah:

“At that place he came to a cave, and spent the night there. Then the word of the Lord came to him, saying, “What are you doing here, Elijah?” He answered, “I have been very zealous for the Lord, the God of hosts; for the Israelites have forsaken your covenant, thrown down your altars, and killed your prophets with the sword. I alone am left, and they are seeking my life, to take it away.” He said, “Go out and stand on the mountain before the Lord, for the Lord is about to pass by.” Now there was a great wind, so strong that it was splitting mountains and breaking rocks in pieces before the Lord, but the Lord was not in the wind; and after the wind an earthquake, but the Lord was not in the earthquake; and after the earthquake a fire, but the Lord was not in the fire; and after the fire a sound of sheer silence. When Elijah heard it, he wrapped his face in his mantle and went out and stood at the entrance of the cave. Then there came a voice to him that said, “What are you doing here, Elijah?” (I KINGS 19:9-13)

Thus, also, Job, after he had been stricken with painful boils all over his body, and sat outside where others might mock him, scraping off the scabs, and unable, now, to find the Lord in whom he had placed such utter trust:

“If I go forward, he is not there; or backward, I cannot perceive him; on the left he hides, and I cannot behold him; I turn to the right, but I cannot see him. But he knows the way that I take; when he has tested me, I shall come out like gold. My foot has held fast to his steps; I have kept his way and have not turned aside. I have not departed from the commandment of his lips; I have treasured in my bosom the words of his mouth.” (Job 23:8-12)

Saint John of the Cross Dark Night of the Soul
The teachings of Elijah and Job were not so different from those of the teacher of Saint Teresa, Saint John of the Cross, the  other great Spaniard who founded the male order of Carmelites, expert practitioners of the way to God in the darkness.

In more than one book, but especially in Dark Night of the Soul, Saint John of the Cross proceeded lesson by patient lesson to mark out for the novice at prayer the terrors yet to be faced in the desert, while human expectations were shed for those seeking to receive the divine. He vividly described the aridity and emptiness that the lover of God ought to expect, as he traded a child’s faith for that of an adult, as he was weaned away from the sweet milk of infancy and obliged to live on hard, dry bread for long stretches of time. And what the North Stars are. And the dangers to watch for. And the characteristic temptations of every stage of the journey

Beginners prone to “spiritual gluttony;’ St. John writes, are, in fact, like children, who are not influenced by reason, and who act, not from rational motives, but from inclination. Such persons expend all their effort in seeking spiritual pleasure and consolation; they never tire, therefore, of reading books; and they begin, now one meditation, now another, in their pursuit of this pleasure which they desire to experience in the things of God. But God, very justly, wisely, and lovingly, denies it to them, for otherwise this spiritual gluttony and inordinate appetite would breed innumerable evils. It is, therefore, very fitting that they should enter into the dark night, whereof we shall speak, that they may be purged from this childishness. There is thus a great difference between aridity and lukewarmness, for lukewarmness consists in great weakness and remissness in the will and in the spirit, without solicitude as to serving God; whereas purgative aridity is ordinarily accompanied by solicitude, with care and grief as I say, because the soul is not serving God.

Dark Night of the Soul is not an easy book to read. For one thing, it relies heavily upon the experience of the reader. It is intended to show the voyager of the spirit the ways through the night and the desert. How can anyone who has not known the night and desert recognize the symptoms and the signs? This is not a book for reading, but for experiencing.

Perhaps its main point may be expressed thus: Go, seek with love your Beloved, follow wherever He leads. Yet even when you come up to Him you must anticipate that there will be no one to be seen. Your faculties are simply inadequate. Were you actually to see, you would be destroyed. It is too much. Your bulbs would short out. Be prepared, therefore, to walk in darkness Not at all in doubt; on the contrary for the first time ever, aware that you are not now following illusions, but only the true darkling light of the true God, beyond human range. Anything else is human contrivance and illusion.

Saint John of the Cross imagines his soul as the bride, the spouse, eagerly seeking her Beloved for just one sight of Him. This is his great classic song to the Dark Night of the Soul, in eight brief stanzas, of which the following four are the most telling.

1. On a dark niqht, Kindled in love with yearnings — oh happy chance! —  I went forth without being observed, My house being now at rest.

2. In darkness and secure, By the Secret ladder, disguised —  oh happy chance! — In darkness and in concealment, My house being now at rest.

3.       In the happy night, in secret when none saw me, Nor I beheld aught, With out light or guide, save that which burned in my heart.

4.       This liqht guided me More surely than the light of noonday To the place where he (well I knew who!) was awaiting me. A place where none appeared.

Saint Teresa Of Avila On Spiritual Aridity And Torment
The memoirs of Saint Teresa of Avila recount years of spiritual aridity and torment:

“I may say that it was the most painful life that can be imagined, because I had no sweetness in God, and no pleasure in the world.

I believe that it is our Lord’s good pleasure frequently in the beginng, and at times in the end, to send these torments, and many other incidental temptations, to try those who love Him, and to ascertain if they will drink the chalice, and help Him to carry the Cross, before He entrusts them with His great treasures I believe it to be for our good that His Majesty should lead us by this way, so that we may perfectly understand how worthless we are…

It is certain that the love of God does not consist in tears, nor in this sweetness and tenderness which we for the most part desire, and with which we console ourselves, but rather in serving Him in justice, fortitude, and humility That seems to me to be a receiving rather than a giving of anything on our part.”

Yet Saint John of the Cross, Saint Teresa, and Saint Thérèse all break out in joy in an analogous way. Dante saw the Christian story as a happy one (commedia), not a tragic or crestfallen one — as Easter follows Good Friday.

For example, of her own spiritual aridity, Saint Thérèse of Lisieux wrote:

“But during the Paschal days, so full of light, our Lord. allowed my soul to be overwhelmed with darkness, and the thought of Heaven, which had consoled me from my earliest childhood now became a subject of conflict and torture. This trial did not last merely for thys or weeks — I have been suffering for months, and I still await deliverance . . . I wish I could express what I feel, but it is beyond me. One must have passed through this dark tunnel to understand its blackness.

Sometimes, I confess, a little ray of sunshine illumines my dark night, and I enjoy peace for an instant, but later, remembrance of this ray of light, instead of consoling me, makes the blackness thicker still . . … And yet never have I felt so deeply how sweet and merciful is the Lord.”

The Darkness And The Desert Free Us
This is the context in which Come Be My Light by Mother Teresa of Calcutta must be grasped. Teresa of Avila and Thèrése of Lisieux are her two “mothers” in spiritual growth and authentic Christian faith, in the light of the passion and death of Jesus Christ. The forty-five years of emptiness, darkness, and inner pain experienced by Mother Teresa, and honestly set forth in her private letters to her spiritual director, follow in a long tradition. They are not really signs of doubt, although the black darkness feels like that.

 They are in fact signs of Christian adulthood, following in the only way in which illusions of human contrivance can be scraped away, as Job tried to scrape away the dry boils on his arms and ribs. And in which the truly faithful, like Job and Elijah, can find Him whom they love in the darkness.

“Then his wife said to him, “Do you still persist in your integrity? Curse God, and die.” But he said to her, “You speak as any foolish woman would speak. Shall we receive the good at the hand of God, and not receive the bad?” In all this Job did not sin with his lips.” (Job 2:9-12)

It is from “human fabrication” that the darkness and the desert free us. When God subtracts His gifts, as He subtracted Job’s, Job does not take this withdrawal as punishment. Job knows his innocence; he knows his fidelity, even in the darkness and in utter suffering. He utters not one denial of his Lord. His soul stands firm beneath the pain. So also Mother Teresa of Calcutta stood darkly in the presence of her Beloved, confident that even unseen, He was best found where love for her nearest dying neighbor presented Him. To the place where he (well she knew who!) was awaiting Her — A place where none appeared. (Adapted from Dark Night of the Soul)

Prayer
Somehow I early learned that the important move in prayer is to direct an inner, quiet, steady will toward God’s love, to be united with that love, even in dryness and aridity. Prayer, essentially, is saying “Yes” to the will of God. Not knowing exactly what that will is now, or yet will be, saying “Yes:’ in any case — and in whatever tranquility one can bring to one’s disorderly, discordant self.

One Comes To Know His Presence
I came to learn that, while one can come to know that God is present, our minds are unable to form an adequate conception of Him, or to grasp Him with any of our five senses, or to imagine Him. His mode of drawing us into His presence is necessarily by way of absence, silence, nothingness. I remember an image fixed in my mind by the poetry of Saint John of the Cross, mentioned earlier: “The place where he . . . was awaiting me — A place where none appeared.”

It must necessarily be so. The true God is beyond human concepts, senses, imagination, memory. On those frequencies, He is not reachable. Mother Teresa of Calcutta acknowledged her inability to reach God on human wavelengths in a 1979 letter to one of her spiritual directors, the Reverend Michael Van Der Peet:

“Jesus has a very special love for you. [But] as for me — the silence and the emptiness is so great — that I look and do not see — listen and do not hear”

If a Christian has not yet known this darkness and aridity, it is a sign that the Lord is still treating him like a child at the breast, too unformed for the adult darkness in which alone the true God is found. Any who think they can make idols, or images, or pictures, or concepts of God remain underdeveloped in their faith. Darkness is not a sign of unbelief, or even of doubt, but a sign of the true relation between the Creator and the creature. God is not on our frequency; and when we get beyond our usual range, which in prayer we must, we reach only darkness. This is painful. In a way, it does make one doubt; in another way, experience shows us that when one is no longer a child, one leaves childish ways behind.

Our intellects, our will — these can reach out to God, like arrows of inquiry shot up into the infinite night. These are not shot in vain. They mark out a direction. Waiting in silence, in abandonment, even in the dry sands of the desert, one comes to know His presence. Not believe in it. Know it. In a 1959 interview with the BBC, C. G. Jung once made the same point. Asked whether he believed in God, Jung replied, “I don’t believe — I know.” This is a dark knowledge. One cannot expect anyone else to know it, unless they have also walked the rocky and darkling path — or somehow by God’s grace been brought to it by a different journey, along a different route. Ascent of the Mountain, Plight of the Dove, I called another book of mine. Some of us labor sweatily, others are borne on eagle’s wings.

I do not mean that this knowledge consists of warm sentiments, feelings of devotion, uplift, and “faith.” I mean a certain quiet emptiness. A dark resonance of wills. Echo to echo.

Mother Teresa wrote of her own emptiness in 1961: “I accept not in my feelings — but with my will, the Will of God — I accept His will.”

This is not a “will” characterized by effort, unrelenting desire, unshakable determination. I mean something almost the opposite: the quiet of abandonment, and trust. This is another mode of will, quite different from the striving will. It is. the willingness to forgo any other reinforcement except the blind and dark love we direct toward that infinite Light, on which we cannot set our eyes.

Nor do I mean a turning away from intellect or rationality On the contrary, I mean taking these with utter seriousness “all the way down” to the very roots of the universe. I mean trusting our own rationality our own intellect. I mean serene confidence in infinite Light, even when our senses go quite dark. Trust the light, the evidence-demanding eros of inquiry, within us. I mean the suffering love in which that Light issues forth among us. Not to, remove us from suffering. But to transfigure us by means of it.

The Line Of Belief And Unbelief
In every age there have been atheists. In every age there have been believers. Sometimes I think that the proportion of each hardly ever changes. True enough, within a given civilization the relative prominence of one may favor it far beyond the other. Furthermore, many people at any one time may take neither choice with much seriousness. Swirling along the streets, the fallen leaves of autumn. Too passive to act, one way or the other.

In my own life, I have tried to keep the conversation up between the two sides of my own intellect. The line of belief and unbelief is not drawn between one person and another, normally, but rather down the inner souls of all of us. That is why the very question stirs so much passion. I have known people who declaim so passionately and argumentatively that they do not believe in God that I am driven to wonderment: Why are they so agitated, if, as they insist, God does not exist? Why, then, do they pay so much attention? Some of the greatest converts, in either direction, are those who wrestled strenuously for many years to maintain the other side.

I want to add here, before I go back to an earlier theme, that I left the seminary after twelve years, but not out of lack of faith. On the contrary, I was much deepened in its darkness, convinced only that I could not be a good priest and also experiment and write as by then I knew was my true vocation. Maybe others could do it. I could not. Besides, the attraction of women was more than I thought that, over the long run, I could bear. For a long time, yes. But forever? It seemed to me that life as a layman would be far better for my soul. So I returned to my philosophical studies, experiments in fiction, and close attention to Albert Camus.

What particularly struck me in Albert Camus was his insistence that we begin within nihilism. Only by finding our way out from nihilism could any new civilization rest on solid ground. He meant: finding our way out by intellect, the kind of intellect that can engage with the Absurd. Now some fifty years after my first book, much of the spiritual terrain has changed — on a massive scale, and more than once. My aim at the present moment is to give one more report from that no-man’s — land, at the crossroads where atheist and believer meet in the darkness of the night.

What is it that keeps us from getting through to each other? What is it that needs to be looked at from a fresh perspective, or disentangled in one’s own mind, before true disagreement can occur? What goes through the minds of some when they use a name like “God” is very different from what goes through the minds of others.

Naturally, coming face-to-face with God is to be feared (Mysterium tremendum et fascinans, “The Mystery fascinating, attracting, and to be feared,” in Rudolf Otto’s phrase) Happily for some, this encounter within the self is fairly easy to avoid. There are many ways to avoid inwardness and to “kill time” simply by keeping busy, frequenting rooms throbbing with the strong beat of certain kinds of music, picking up the car keys to search somewhere else for something to do.

It is not at all hard for a believer to become an unbeliever. A great many do. The seed has often been thrown on dry ground, or on the soil over rocky shale, and cannot bear the heat of the afternoon. Often enough, faith leads one, to feel abandoned to darkness, isolated in inner dryness, undermined by a fear of having been seduced into an illusion For a believer, it does not take a prolonged thought experiment to imagine oneself an unbeliever.

Yet atheists may actually find it harder to imagine themselves coming by way of reason to know God than believers to imagine the opposite I hypothesize that unbelievers, especially those who have never known religion in their personal lives, or who have had bad experiences with it, experience a revulsion against reasoned knowledge of God, and even more so against a Jewish and/or Christian faith Indeed, they find it harder to imagine themselves as believers than believers to imagine themselves as un-believers. Am I wrong?

Reflecting On The Experience Of Nothingness
I noticed that Nietzsche and Sartre, Turgenev and Dostoyevsky, and all those other early writers on nihilism did one remarkable thing at variance with their theories: They wrote books for others to read. In a world that makes no sense, why would they endure the hours and hours of sitting on their back-sides, moving old pens across resisting pieces of blank foolscap? If everything is as meaningless as they say, why would they do it?

And since some people seem oblivious to the experience of nothingness, what is it that those who have the experience do, that others don’t do?

I began reflecting on what goes on inside the experience of nothingness, first within myself, and then among others I could talk to about it. Here a brief summary will have to do. The normal way in which Nietzsche, Sartre, and we ourselves come to an awareness of the experience of nothingness is through four activities of our own minds and wills. The one Nietzsche and the others most stress is ruthless honesty, forcing ourselves to see through comforting illusions and to face the emptiness. The second is courage, the habit that gives force and steadiness to our ability to see truly. Without courage, we would avert our eyes, as so often we have done.

Third is the ideal of community exemplified in reaching out to others through books — the good moves outward to diffuse itself. There is a kind of brotherhood and sisterhood among those who recognize the experience of nothingness in one another. There is a sort of honesty and cleanness in it one wants to share. One of the marks of “the good” is that, as the Latin puts it, bonum est deflusivum nil — the good diffuses itself. It wants others to participate in it.

Fourth is practical wisdom, that is, practical reason applied to action, by an adult experienced enough to take virtually everything concrete into account — or at least to avoid most of the common mistakes of the inexperienced. When the experience of nothingness hits, one cannot simply take to one’s bed. Well, sometimes one does, but then one can’t stay there. Moment by moment, in a kind of staccato, action keeps calling to us. Sooner or later, I have to start acting as an agent of my own future again. “Granted that I have the experience of nothingness, what should I do?”

Yes, there are such things as relativity and meaninglessness and pointlessness. Question is, What are we going to do even if that is true? We will not be able to escape practicing honesty courage, community and. practical wisdom — or else withering into dry leaves for stray winds to blow about. The choice is ours, and unavoidable.

These four virtues do not constitute a complete quiver of all the virtues needed to be a good man or a valiant woman. Still, these four do constitute quite an admirable list. They are a wonderful starting place for an ethic rooted in the experience of nothingness. Here is the point at which Albert Camus began his own ascent out of the problem of suicide (The Myth of Sisyphus), on the road to the heroic and clear-eyed compassion of Dr. Rieux in The Plague. Sartre, locked inside his own solitariness, writing that “hell is other people:’ faltered on the idea of community. No, hell is not other people. Hell is total isolation within one’s own puny mind. It is solitary confinement. (To step out of philosophy for a moment and into the terms of Christian faith: Hell is the solitary soul who freely and deliberately rejects friendship with God.) Hell is becoming conscious of what one has irretrievably chosen for oneself. This Hell has been deliberately chosen.

What we do with the experience of nothingness depends on our proven reserves of practical wisdom, community courage, honesty. By the end of our lives, learning from experience, we ought to be wiser than we were in the beginning.

Nihilism Turned Out To Be Antihuman
We may observe how the generation that fell into the nihilism of the 1930s at last stumbled onto the way. In the concentration camps and prisons, many a poor wretch unexpectedly felt himself morally bound not to become complicit in the lies his torturers demanded him to sign. But why? Why, if before they had thought they were nihilists, why couldn’t they manage to be cynics and nihilists and liars here at the end, under torture and torment and soft blandishment (“You can go free, you can have drinks with your friends again”)? Is not a lie a small price to pay in a world without truth? What would a lie mean anyway? “No one will ever know No one will ever care.”

But the liar himself would know his soul would know; in his own mind’s eye, his integrity would forever lie in the dust, humiliated. And his torturer would use this petty surrender to weaken the will of his next victim. “If he did as he was told, why can’t you?” The aim of these torturers was to destroy every last vestige of the moral sense, every fiber of integrity of soul within everyone. For those in prison, the torturers could use the harshest methods and take all the time they needed to break a man. The integrity of the entire public could be assaulted by incessant intimidation and occasional, unpredictable terror. After seducing almost everyone to spy on their associates, the slave masters could easily blackmail them forever. These poor sinners could never forget their own treason to loved ones.

Even with their almost unlimited power and ferocity of will, it proved impossible for totalitarian regimes to instill nihilism into everyone. Nihilism turned out to be antihuman. However powerfully nihilism is enforced, the human spirit is sometimes able to triumph over it by honesty; courage, community and practical wisdom.

Those who have doubts about the power of this argument should read the biographies of Anatoly Sharansky, to whose stirring memoir we will turn our attention in chapter one; as well as the stories of Václav Havel, Mihaio Mihaiov, Armando Valladares, Pavel Bratinka, Irma Ratushinskaya, Maximilian Kolbe, and hundreds of others. From the ashes of nihilism, the human spirit rose stronger and truer.

I have tested this moral principle and have found it fortifying:

Accept the experience of nothingness as a gift, search deep into it, live by its living streams. One thing I particularly appreciate about this moral principle is that it requires no illusions. Far from shutting one’s eyes to the nothingness and the meaninglessness, one keeps the cellar door open in order to feel, at all times, its cool, stale draft. In that way, one is never allowed to forget. And from these four moral virtues, one forges creative strength. Creation out of nothingness.

Freedom means choosing every moment who I am, and what exactly I must do this minute. Self-government yes, precisely that. Yet not exactly without community, community down through time, community around the planet. Not exactly isolated. One’s ancestors continue to live in one’s own consciousness. One’s universal brothers also do. All together, on a darkling plain.

In “Dover Beach:’ Matthew Arnold wrote of an ebbing Sea of Faith:

But now I only hear
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar,
Retreating, to the breath
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear
And naked shingles of the world.

But today there is a difference. The melancholy roar of a receding sea belongs to atheism.

“Unquestioning” Faith?
Our three authors (Dawkins, Hitchens, Dennet), it does seem, are a bit blinded by their own repugnance toward religion. Even his good friends, Dawkins writes, ask him why he is driven to be so “hostile” to religious people. Why not, they say, as intelligent as you are, quietly lay out your devastating arguments against believers, in a calm and unruffled manner? Dawkins’s answer to his friends is forthright: “I am hostile to fundamentalist religion because it actively debauches the scientific enterprise . . . Fundamentalist religion is hell — bent on ruining the scientific education of countless thousands of innocent, well-meaning, eager young minds. Non-fundamentalist, ‘sensible’ religion may not be doing that. But it is making the world safe for fundamentalism by teaching children, from their earliest years, that unquestioning faith is a Virtue?’ Dawkins refuses to be part of the public “conspiracy” to pay religion respect, when it deserves contempt.

Yet his complaint about “unquestioning” faith seems a bit odd. Some of us have thought that the origin of religion lies in the unlimited drive in human beings to ask questions — which is our primary experience of the infinite. Anything finite that we encounter can be questioned, and seems ultimately unsatisfying. That hunger to question is the experience that keeps driving the mind and soul on and on, and is its first foretaste of that which is beyond time and space. “Our hearts are restless, Lord,” Saint Augustine recorded, “until they rest in Thee.” These words have had clearly echoing resonance in millions upon millions of inquiring minds down through human history ever since. “Unquestioning faith?” The writings of the medieval thinkers record question after question, disputation after disputation, and real results in history hinged upon the resolution of each. Many of the questions arose from skeptical, unbelieving lawyers, philosophers, and others in the medieval universities; still others from the Arab scholars whose works had recently burst upon the Western universities; still others from Maimonides and other Jewish scholars; and a great many from the greatest pagan thinkers of every preceding century. Questions have been the heart and soul of Judaism and Christianity for millennia.

Christian Innovations
I have no doubt that Christians have committed many evils, and written some disgraceful pages in human history. Yet on a fair ledger of what Judaism and Christianity added to pagan Greece, Rome, the Arab nations (before Mohammed), the German, Frankish, and Celtic tribes, the Vikings and the Anglo-Saxons, one is puzzled not to find Dawkins giving thanks for many innovations: hospitals, orphanages, cathedral schools in early centuries, universities not much later, some of the most beautiful works of art — in music, architecture, .painting, and poetry — in the human patrimony.

And why does he overlook the hard intellectual work on concepts such as “person:’ “community” “civitas,” “consent:’ “tyranny?’ and “limited government” (“Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s.) that framed the conceptual background of such great documents as the Magna Carta? His few pages on the founding and nourishing of his own beloved Oxford by its early Catholic patrons are mockingly ungrateful And if Oxford disappoints him, has he no gratitude for the building of virtually every other old and famous universities of Europe (and the Americas)?

Dawkins writes nothing about the great religious communities founded for the express purpose of building schools for the free education of the poor. Nothing about the thousands of monastic lives dedicated to the delicate and exhausting labor of copying by hand the great manuscripts of the past — often with the lavish love manifested in illuminations — during long centuries in which there were no printing presses. Nothing about the founding of the Vatican Library and its importance for the genesis of nearly a dozen modern sciences. Nothing about the learned priests and faithful who have made so many crucial discoveries in science, medicine, and technology.

Alfred North Whitehead And Faith In The Possibility Of Science
Among my favorite texts for many years, in fact, are certain passages of Alfred North Whitehead — in Science and the Modern World and Adventures of Ideas, for instance. In these passages, Whitehead points out that the practices of modern science are inconceivable apart from thousands of years of tutelage under the Jewish and Christian conviction that the Creator of all things understood all things, in their general laws and in their particular, contingent dispositions. This conviction, Whitehead writes, made long, disciplined efforts to apply reason to the sustained Herculean task of understanding all things seem reasonable. If all things are intelligible to their Creator, they ought to be intelligible to those made in His image, who in imitation of Him, press onward in the human vocation to try to understand all that He has made.

In addition, Judaism and Christianity have inculcated in entire cultures specific intellectual and moral habits, synthesizing them with the teachings of ancient classical traditions, without which the development of modern sciences would lack the requisite moral disciplines — honesty, hard work, perseverance in the face of difficulties, a respect for serendipity and sudden insight, a determination to test any hypotheses asserted. What would modern science be without belief in the intelligibility of all things, even contingent, unique, and unrepeatable events, and without culture-wide habits of honesty; intellectual rigor, and persevering inquiry? Whitehead pointed to this marvelous indebtedness many times, much more generously than Dawkins. In Science and the Modern World (1925), he wrote: “My explanation is that the faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivation from medieval theology”

The path of modern science was made straight, and smoothed, by deep convictions that every stray element in the world of human experience — from the number of hairs on one’s head to the lovely lily in the meadow — is thoroughly known to its Creator and, therefore, lies within a field of intelligibility; mutual connection, and multiple logics All these odd and angular levels of reality, given arduous, disciplined, and cooperative effort, are in principle penetrable by the human mind. If human beings are made in the image of the Creator, as the first chapters of the book of Genesis insist that they are, surely it is in their capacities to question, gain insight, and advance in understanding of the works of God. In the great image portrayed by Michelangelo on the Sistine ceiling — the touch from finger to finger between the Creator and Adam — the mauve cloud behind the Creator’s head is painted in the shape of the human brain. Imago Dei, yes indeed.

A Theology of the Absurd
It seems useful — and necessary — to sketch out some of the facets of Christian faith to which our atheist threesome (Dennett, Harris, Dawkins) seem inattentive. Each Christian (each Catholic) sees this differently, of course, but right off the bat I notice four questions on which Christian faith offers arresting reflections.

A Theology of the Absurd. Begin with the bloody cross of Calvary. On this gibbet dies the Son of God? The cross is the very symbol of contradiction, and the absurd. When Christians speak of the act of Creation, we do not think of a perfectionist artificer making Lladró dolls, but rather of God creating flesh and blood in all its angularity deformations, imperfections, and concrete limitations, and in the midst of myriad evils and abominations. The world of His creation is riven through with absurdities and contradictions, species that die out, and the teeming, blooming, buzzing confusion of contingencies and chance. When God singles out a chosen people, He picks a small and difficult tribe in a poor, backward, and underdeveloped part of the world. His chosen ones are overrun by enemies again and again, and carted off into slavery and exile for long, long years. Then, when the Creator sends His Son to become flesh, the Son also roots his new community mainly among the poor, the uneducated, the humble, the forgotten.

But then, blasphemy is added to blasphemy, and this Son of God is condemned to death as a common criminal, and forced into the most disgraceful sort of death known to men of that time: public mockery and scourging virtually unto death, and then put out to hang on a cross where the public can shout insults, until the vultures come to pick at his eyes and his wounded flesh. This is not a Pollyanna, this Creator. But what He does do is assure those who suffer and who groan under the weight of the absurd, that, though at times they feel icy fear, they do not in the end need to be afraid. God is a good God and has His own purposes, and it is no mistake to trust His kindness, ever. The Creator did not make us to face a reasonable world in a rational, calm, and dispassionate way — like a New York banker after a splendid lunch at his Club, sunk into his favorite soft chair in the Library where a fragrant cigar is still permitted, as he comfortably reads his morning papers. Instead, there is war, exile, torture, injustice. Life is to be understood as a trial, and a time of suffering. A vale of tears. A valley of death. Even in the bosom of wealth, and luxury, and plenty — even there, cancer and failure and radical loneliness strike; but even more often still, simple boredom.

Not at all a land of happy talk, not at all the perfect world of Candide. Atheism is in the main suitable for comfortable men, in a reasonable world. For those in agony and distress, Christianity has seemed to serve much better and for a longer time, not because it offers “consolation” but precisely because it does not. For Christians, the cross is inescapable, and one ought always be prepared to take it up. I myself have watched three deeply religious people die without consolation, bereft, empty of feeling for God. To be empty of consolation, however, is not to be empty of faith. Faith is essentially a quiet act of love, even in misery: “Be it done to me according to thy will.”

Like Stephen Jay Gould, our three authors think they are destroying the argument from design by showing how poorly designed are so many parts of human anatomy, how many species have perished since the beginning of time (something like 90 percent), how chancily and seemingly without reason so many steps in natural selection are taken. They want to show that if there is a Designer, he is an incompetent one; or, more exactly, there is too much evidence of lack of design. What kind of Lladrô doll do they think God is? Our God is the God of the Absurd, of night, of suffering, and silent peace.

The Burden of Sin
It took me some years, but I have come to understand that, just as some people have no ear for music, so others (as Friedrich Hayek put it) “have no ear for God?’ Still others say they have no “need” for God. They sense in themselves no round hole into which God fits. One of the blessings of atheism seems to be that it takes away any sense of Judgment, any sense that by one’s actions one may be offending a Friend, any awareness of sin. “Sin” seems, indeed, to be a leftover from a bygone age. Beati voi! I want to cry out to atheists. Lucky you.

“At the heart of Christianity is the sinner,” a very great Christian, Charles Péguy, once wrote. Some of us are aware of doing things that we know we ought not to have done, and of not doing things that we know we ought to have done. We are aware of sinning against our own conscience deliberately doing what we know to be wrong, whether from weakness or from a powerful desire that is still out of control. Afterward, sometimes, we feel a remorse so keen that it hurts — and yet what has been done is done, and nothing we now do can take that fault away And at times the fault is shamefully grave, at that.

It is to this common, virtually universal experience that Jesus, like John the Baptist before him, first addressed his auditors, “Be sorry! Do penance. Resolve not to sin again.” (Even though the probabilities of sinning again are high, just as a man with a bad knee, though his knee has healed, knows that it will too easily go out on hint)

Christianity is not about moral arrogance. It is about moralism, and moral humility Wherever you see self-righteous persons condemning others and unaware of their own sins, you are not in the presence of an alert Christian but of a priggish pretender. It was in fact a great revolution in human history when the Jewish and Christian God revealed Himself as one who sees directly into consciences, and is not misled merely by external acts. (This God would be unpersuaded by the external pietas of the numerous Greek and Roman pagan philosophers who — unconcerned about conscience — were sure to be present at religious rites, whether they took the gods seriously or not.)

The biblical respect for conscience greatly dignified and honored inner acts of reflection, commitment, and choice. It turned a powerful beam of attention away from the external act to the inner act of conscience. It greatly honored truthfulness and simple humility Eventually, the inner duty of conscience toward the Creator became the ground of religious liberty — no other power dares intervene in this primal duty to God, which is antecedent to civil society state, family, and any other institution. (See James Madison’~ Memorial and Remonstrance) 1785.)

The Bright Golden Thread of Human History
Emphasized in the liberation of the Jews from the Seleucid Empire (celebrated at Hanukkah), from Egypt (celebrated at the Passover), and from Babylon (celebrated in the poetry of Israel’s prophets), a pilgrimage toward liberty and truth is the defining theme of the Torah. Every story in that testament has at its axis the arena of the human will, and the decisions made there (whether hidden or external). Thus, for biblical religion, liberty is the golden~ thread of human history This conception of liberty is realized internally in the recesses of the soul and also institutionally in whole societies or polities.

The Point of the Cosmos Is Friendship
No other world religions except Christianity and Judaism have put liberty of conscience so close to the center of religious life. For instance, Islam tends to think of God in terms of divine will, quite apart from nature or logic. Independently of reason, whatever Allah wills, does occur. Judaism and Christianity tend to think of God as Logos (reason), light, the source of all law and the intelligibility of all things. This difference in the fundamental conception of God alters, as well, the fundamental disposition of the human being proper to each religion: inquiry, versus submission. If it has ever occurred to you to ask, even if you are an atheist, why did God create this vast, silent, virtually infinite cosmos, you might find your best answer in the single word “friendship.” According to the Scriptures, intelligently read, the Creator made man a little less than the angels, a little more complex than the other animals. He made human beings conscious enough, and reflective enough, that they might marvel at what He had wrought, and give Him thanks. Even more than that, He made human beings in order to offer to them, in their freedom, His friendship and companionship.

Friendship is not only the biblical way of thinking about the relationship between God and man; it is also a good way to imagine the future of our nation and of the world toward which we should work. From this vision, Judaism and Christianity imparted to the world a way of measuring progress and decline. William Penn called his capital city “Philadelphia” (brotherly love), and made freedom of religion its first principle. If there is no liberty there can be no friendship. Even the atheists of the French Revolution named their fundamental principles “Liberty Fraternity Equality” — each of them a term that, as we will see in chapter two, derives not from the Greeks or the Romans, but from biblical religion.

A worldwide civilization of mutual friendship is a powerful magnet, and a realistic measure. Friendship does not require uniformity On the contrary, its fundamental demand is mutual respect, willing the good of the other as other. It births a desire to converse in a reasonable way about fundamental differences in viewpoint, hope, and a sense of practical responsibility.

Evolutionary Biology As A Guide To Life
The young Thomas Aquinas, in his late twenties, was one of the first men in the West to have in his hands an authentic translation of several key books of Aristotle. As his extended line-by-line commentaries on several of the most important of these books show, Aquinas mastered a viewpoint quite foreign to his own. Not many years after, he had to do the same in reading al-Fãrabi, Avicenna, Averroes, and other major Arab philosophers.

And so, when a Christian reader comes across Professor Dawkins’s argument that God cannot exist, because all complex and more intelligent things come only at the end of the evolutionary process, not at the beginning, the Christian’s first reflex may be to burst out laughing — but as an attentive student, he is also obliged to observe that, yes, from the viewpoint of evolutionary biology; that must in fact be so. The argument may be intellectually or philosophically satisfying, yet when its practical implications are compared with those of the Christian viewpoint, evolutionary biology may not be attractive as a guide to life. If one wants to be an evolutionary biologist, however, one must learn to confine oneself within the disciplines imposed by that field.

From a Roman Catholic point of view, at least, there is no difficulty in accepting all the findings of evolutionary biology understood to be an empirical science-. — that is to say, not as a philosophy of existence, a metaphysics, a full vision of human life. It is easier for Christianity to absorb many, many findings of the contemporary world — from science to technology, politics, economics, and art — than for those whose viewpoint is confined to the contemporary era to absorb Christianity That is just one reason that we may expect the latter to outlive the former.

It is obvious that Dawkins, at least, is quite aware of the conventional limitations of the scientific atheist’s point of view He writes that “a quasi-mystical response to nature and the universe is common among scientists and rationalists. It has no connection with supernatural belief.” A few pages of his book, in almost every section, are given over to showing how an atheistic point of view can satisfy what have hitherto been taken to be religious longings. Atheism, too, he shows, has its consolations, its sources of inspiration, its awareness of beauty its sense of wonder. For such satisfactions, there is no need to turn to religion. Dawkins does good work in restoring human subjectivity emotion, longing, and an awed response to beauty to the life of scientific atheism. For Dawkins, scientific atheism is humanistic, a significant step forward from the sterile logical positivism of two or three generations ago.

Harris Explaining Away The Horrors
Atheism has a more severe limitation, one that shows itself in the actions of its proponents. One of my favorite parts of the Sam Harris book is his attempt to explain away the horrors of the self-declared atheist regimes in modern history: Fascist in Italy, Nazi in Germany, and Communist in the Soviet Union and Asia. Never in history have so many Christians been killed, tortured, driven to their deaths in forced marches, and imprisoned in concentration camps. An even higher proportion of Jews suffered still more horrifically under the same regimes, particularly the Nazi regime, than at any other time in Jewish history. The excuse Harris offers is quite lame. First he directs attention away from the ideological character of the regime, toward the odd personalities of Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin. No, the problem is the ideology the regime, the millions of believers in atheism. Harris ignores the essential atheism of the ideologies of the regime, “scientific secularism” and “dialectical materialism?’ Yet it is these ideologies, not just a few demented leaders, that bred a furious war on God, religion, and clergy. The nature of a regime and its ideology matter more than mad leaders. Yet here is Harris, limping: “While it is true that such men are sometimes enemies of organized religion, they are never especially rational. In fact, their public pronouncements are often delusional. .. The problem with such tyrants is not that they reject the dogma of religion, but that they embrace other life-destroying myths.” In other words, delusional atheists are not really atheists.

Would Harris accept a claim by Christians that Christian evildoers are not really Christians? The real problem is not that tyrants reject the “dogma” of religion, but that they derive their furors from a dogmatic atheism that brooks no rival. They build a punitive totalitarian regime far more sweeping than their own personal madness.

Everything Is Permitted
Enthusiasts such as Harris may dismiss the argument that atheism is associated with relativism. Sometimes it isn’t. Some atheists are rationalists of a most sober, moral kind. Nonetheless, the most common argument against placing trust in atheists is Dostoyevsky: “If there is no God, everything is permitted.” There will be no Judge of deeds and consciences; in the end, it is each man for himself. Widespread public atheism may not show its full effects right away, but only after three or four generations. For individual atheists “of a peculiar character,” brought up in habits inculcated by the religious cultures of the past, can go on for two or three generations living in ways hard to distinguish from those of unassuming Christians and Jews. These individuals continue to be honest, compassionate committed to the equality of all, firm believers in “progress” and “brotherhood,” long after they have repudiated the original religious justification for this particular list of virtues. But sooner or later a generation may come along that takes the metaphysics of atheism with deadly seriousness. This was the fate of a highly cultivated nation in the Europe of our time, Germany, before it voted its way into Nazism.

George Washington considered this risk in his Farewell Address: “Let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.” If morality were left to reason alone, common agreement would never be reached, since philosophers vehemently — and endlessly — disagree, and large majorities would waver without clear moral signals. Adds Alexis de Tocqueville:

“There is almost no human action, however particular one supposes it, that does not arise from a very general idea that men have conceived of God, of his relations with the human race, of the nature of their souls, and of their duties toward those like them. One cannot keep these ideas from being the common source from which all the rest flow

Men therefore have an immense interest in making very fixed ideas for themselves about God, their souls, their general duties toward their Creator and those like them; for doubt about these first points would deliver all their actions to chance and condemn them to a sort of disorder and impotence. .

The first object and one of the principal advantages of religions is to furnish a solution for each of these primordial questions that is clear, precise, intelligible to the crowd, and very lasting.”

This extremely practical contribution is one reason Tocqueville saw religion as essential to a free people, and unbelief as tending toward tyranny

Reasons For Altruism
Dawkins attempts to get around this flaw in (what he calls) the neo-Darwinian view of chance and blind natural selection by counting out four reasons for altruism rooted in evolutionary biology: “First, there is the special case of genetic kinship. Second, there is reciprocation: the repayment of favors given, and the giving of favors in ‘anticipation’ of payback. Third, the Darwinian benefit of acquiring a reputation for generosity and kindness. And fourth, there is the particular additional benefit of conspicuous generosity as a way of buying authentic advertising.”

To these reasons based upon nature’s egotism (which furnishes little motivation to be kind or virtuous when no one is looking), Jews and Christians would add four or five others. To begin with, altruism is morally good, rooted in natural law, and most highly commended among the “laws” of God. Second, not to love one another is to disappoint the Creator who wishes us to be His friends. Next, not to love one another is a failure to imitate the Lord Jesus, who asked us to imitate Him. Fourth, experience confirms that loving others is in tune with a communal dimension of our nature, beginning in the family, but radiating outward through the polity and the economy. (Adam Smith referred to this highest law as “sympathy”) Last, as Tocqueville pointed out, every Mosaic commandment has a foundation in nature, but tends to stretch nature’s outer limits. Maimonides, Aquinas, and many others discussed this in great detail centuries ago.

As Thomas Jefferson recognized, it is self-evident that any creature owes his Creator certain duties in conscience; that much is clear by nature itself. But the commandment “Remember the Sabbath” is more specific than the natural law of reason; it stretches nature by adding to it a specifically Hebraic duty Meanwhile, Christianity specifies this duty in terms of Sunday, rather than the Jewish Sabbath. Thus, nature alone reaches the fundamental principle, but this Third Commandment, at least, specifies more than nature alone does. Jewish and Christian faiths do not reject, but build upon nature, add to it, bring it to a more concrete expression.

Finally, our three authors (Dennett, Harris, Dawkins) fail to think carefully about what Jews and Christians actually have to say about God. Their own atheistic concept of God is a caricature, an ugly godhead that anybody might feel duty-bound to reject. Dawkins makes fun of an omniscient God who would also be free. If an omniscient God knows now what future actions He will take, how will that leave room for Him to change His mind — and how does that leave Him omnipotent? Isn’t He caught in a kind of vise? -

But, of course, this is to imagine God being in time as Dawkins is in time. Dawkins fails to grasp the difference between a viewpoint from eternity outside time, and his own viewpoint from within time. He also fails to grasp the freedom that the primary cause allows to secondary causes, to contingencies, and to particulars. God’s will is not before human decisions are made. Rather, it is simultaneous with them, and thus empowers their coming into existence. Ancient philosophers proved able to grasp this point. Surely our contemporary atheists can become equally as learned?

When Catholics celebrate the sacrifice of the Mass, for example, we imagine that our moment of participation in that particular Mass is — as it.is for every other Mass we attend in our lives — in God’s eyes simultaneous with the bloody death of His Son on Calvary In our eyes, it is experienced as a “reenactment;’ but in God’s eyes both moments are as one. No doubt, for some minds this is all too mystical, and its underlying philosophy is a bit too sophisticated, especially to those of literal and purely empirical tastes. Our three authors, in any case, present a quite primitive idea of God. If the rest of us had such a view, we, too, would almost certainly be atheists.

The whole inner world of aware and self-questioning religious persons seems to our atheist authors unexplored territory. All around them are millions who spend many moments each day (and hours each week) in communion with God. Yet of the silent and inward parts of these lives — and why these inner silences ring so true to those who share them, and seem more grounded in reality than anything else in life — our writers seem unaware. Surely, if our atheist friends were to reconsider their methods, and deepen their understanding of such terms as “experience” and “the empirical;’ they might come closer to walking for a tentative while the moccasins of so many of their more religious companions in life, who find theism more intellectually satisfying — less self-contradictory; less alienating from their own nature — than atheism.

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Book Recommendation: Happiness and Contemplation by Josef Pieper

August 20, 2010

You will want to buy this book. It will fit perfectly on any bookshelf and I can’t tell you how reaffirming it is to have a very thin volume devoted to Happiness…

“Happiness” Comprehends A Variety Of Meanings
There is nevertheless a fundamental significance, which should never be overlooked, in the very fact that a single word, “happiness,” comprehends such a variety of meanings: the immortal richness of divine life and man’s part in it, as well as the petty satisfaction of a fleeting desire. We venture to assert that this ambiguity reflects the structure of the whole of Creation. St. Thomas puts it this way: “As created good is a reflection of the uncreated good, so the attainment of a created good is a reflected beatitude.”
Now the “attainment of a created good” is  a thing that happens constantly, and in a thousand varied forms. It happens whenever a thirsty man drinks, whenever a questioner receives a flash of illumination, whenever lovers are together, whenever a task is brought to a successful conclusion and a plan bears fruit. And when men call all this “happiness,” they are close to the insight that each gratification points to the ultimate one, and that all happiness has some connection with eternal beatitude. Some connection, if only this: that every fulfillment this side of Heaven instantly reveals its inadequacy. It is immediately evident that such satisfactions are not enough; they are not what we have really sought; they cannot really satisfy us at all.
Andre Gide noted in his Journals  “The terrible thing is that we can never make ourselves drunk enough.”

“Contemplation Is Man’s Ultimate Happiness”
One might take the statement that contemplation is man’s ultimate happiness and say to oneself: “Very well, obviously this refers to the ‘happiness of the philosopher.’ Undeniably there does exist a happiness of knowledge and insight, just as there is happiness in action and ‘happiness of the senses.’ Certainly it can be maintained, with good reason, that the happiness of the perceptive mind surpasses all other forms of happiness in depth and value.”
All very well. Yet to interpret this sentence in this way, to put so special a construction on it, is to ignore its real meaning. For it says not a word about any special happiness that pertains only to the “philosopher.” The dictum speaks of the happiness of man in general, of the whole, physical, earthly, human man. And contemplation is not held up as one among other modes of happiness, even though an especially lofty one. Rather what is says is this: however the human craving for happiness may time and again be distracted by a thousand small gratifications, it remains directed unwaveringly toward one ultimate satisfaction which is in truth its aim. “Among a thousand twigs,” says Vergil in Dante’s universal poem, “one sweet fruit is sought.” The finding of this fruit, the ultimate gratification of human nature, the ultimate satiation of man’s deepest thirst, takes place in contemplation!

The Created Soul And Its Essence
The great teachers of the Occident have always contested (that nature and mind are exclusive concepts). They have steadfastly maintained that here is one being which is in a precise sense both mind and nature simultaneously. This being is the created human soul. “By nature” means : by virtue of creation. All being and activity is “by nature” which – from within the central core of things – flows directly out of the primal impulse of the act of creation, by which creatures have become what they are.
Part of the definition of the created soul, therefore, is that it has received its essence – and along with that its assignment in life – form elsewhere, ab alio, from the shaping and life-giving act of creation. It necessarily follows that in the center of the created soul something happens which is its own act, and therefore an act of mind, but simultaneously a natural process “by virtue of creation.” The desire for happiness is precisely this character; it is “willing by nature,” which is to say an act of the mind and a natural process at one and the same time.

Why Do You Want To Be Happy?
Those…who cannot accept the idea of a desire for happiness inherent in man’s composition; that idea appears to them a slur upon man’s autonomous spirit. Only if we understand man as a created being to the very depths of his spiritual existence can we meaningfully conceive that the will has not the power to not  want happiness. …First the natural desire springs from the innermost core of man’s being; it concerns man’s very own will, unrestricted by any coercion. Therefore it is free. …this desire points right through the human heart back to an ultimate origin which is not human.
Man has not by his own resolve set in motion his desire for happiness; it has not been given to him to desire otherwise. Therefore “freedom” is not the right term here…St. Thomas: The will strives in freedom for felicity, although it strives for it by necessity.” In desiring happiness, then, we are obeying a gravitational impulse whose axis is entirely within our own hearts. But we have no power over it – because we ourselves are this gravitational impulse. When we desire to be happy, something blind and obscure takes place within the mind, which nevertheless does not cease to be a light and seeing eye. Something happens “behind” which we cannot penetrate, whose reason we do not see, and for which we can name no reason. Why do you want to be happy? We do not ask because no one knows the answer.

Happiness Is A Gift
Because our turning toward happiness is a blind seeking we are, whenever happiness comes our way, the recipients of  something unforeseen, something unforeseeable, and therefore not subject to planning and intention. Happiness is essentially a gift; we’re not the forgers of our own felicity…Surely the “attainment of created good” can frequently be brought about by purposeful activity. By cleverness, energy, and diligence one can acquire a good many of the goods which are generally considered adjuncts of the happy life: food and drink house, garden, books, a rich and beautiful wife (perhaps). But we cannot make all these acquisitions, or even a single one of them, quench that thirst so mysterious to ourselves for what we call “happiness,” “reflected beatitude.” No one can obtain felicity by pursuit. This explains why one of the elements of being happy is the feeling that a debt of gratitude is owed, a debt impossible to pay. Now, we do not owe gratitude to ourselves. To be conscious of gratitude is to acknowledge a gift.

Stoic Self-Sufficiency As Happiness
Stoic self-sufficiency may still commando our respect and admiration. There is “greatness” in the unyielding resolve to desire only what is entirely ours, what we ourselves have acquired. As Seneca has expressed it, “The man is happy, we say, who knows no good that would be greater than that which he can give to himself.” Nevertheless the keener eye will not fail to observe behind all the brave banners and heroic symbols the profound non-humanity, the submerged anxiety, the senile rigidity, the tension of such an attitude. And our admiration becomes tinged with consternation and horror as it becomes apparent to us how closely such self-sufficiency verges on despair. “Suppose he lacks his miserable bread? What does that matter to one who lacks not the knowledge of how to go to his death?” (Seneca)

Happy By Virtue Of Being
When it is said that man by nature seeks happiness, the statement obviously implies that by nature he does not already possess it. “In the present life perfect happiness cannot be.” Man is not happy by virtue of his being. Rather his whole existence is determined precisely by the non-possession of ultimate gratification. That, after all, is the significance of the concept of status viatoris. To exist as man means to be “on the way” and therefore to be non-happy. …There is only one Being that is happy by His mere existence.  “To God alone may perfect beatitude be attributed, by virtue of His nature.”
The meaning of the statement is not solely that God is happy….He is his happiness…Any human being who is happy shares in a happiness that is not of himself. For God, however, being an being happy are one and the same; God is happy by virtue of His existence.

The Doctrine Of God’s Unassailable Happiness
“The beatitude of God consists not in the action by which He established the Creation but in the action by which He enjoys himself, needing not the Creation – creaturis non egens. (Aquinas). Belief that the world itself, its roots and the whole of it, is sound, plumb, and in order, could rest upon no firmer foundation than this doctrine of God’s unassailable happiness. If God were not happy, or if His happiness depended upon what happened in the human realm and not upon Himself alone, if His happiness were not beyond any conceivable possibility of disturbance; if there were not, in the Source of reality, this infinitely, inviolably sound Being – we would not be able even to conceive the idea of a possible healing of  the empirical wounds of Creation.
This is confirmed from another angle. The mind considering the course of the world, the mind seeking coherency and plunged more and more hopelessly into confusion by the incoherencies of the world, will in the end inevitably be tempted to  think (and this temptation comes precisely to the deepest and most consistent thinkers): God is not at one with Himself; God is not happy.
That confidence in the wholeness of being, on the other hand, which finds its ultimate support in the absolute happiness of God, is in no way an invalid simplification of historical reality. Rather, we may say that, far from simplifying things, it reveals them as enormously more complicated and tragic – since the incomprehensibility of evil in the world becomes fully apparent against the background of the indestructible happiness of God. Nevertheless, this belief means that as Paul Claudel has formulated it “The terrible words…. ‘In the end truth, perhaps, is sad.’ miss the underlying reality of the world; that, rather, “The great divine joy is the only reality.”

A Thirst For Happiness
Man as he is constituted, endowed as as he is with a thirst for happiness, cannot have his thirst quenched in the finite realm; and if he thinks or behaves as if that were possible, he is misunderstanding himself, he is acting contrary to his own nature. The whole world would not suffice this “natural” nature of man. If the whole world were given to him, he would have to say, and would say: It is too little. Too little, that is, to “gratify entirely the power of desire,” or in other words too little to make him happy….The long expected answer to (What would suffice this thirst of the whole human being?) is God….
(But) he interposes a concept (called) bonum universale. …Perhaps we may translate “the whole good” – goodness so very good that there is nothing in it which is not good, and nothing outside of it which could be good. Nothing than this bonum universale can quench completely and ultimately man’s deepest thirst… “The whole good cannot be found anywhere in the realm of created things; it is encountered in God alone.”

Joy And Happiness
Aquinas would say that Happiness without Joy is unthinkable; but joy and happiness are two different things. …Thomas takes it completely for granted that no full beatitude can be conceived without pleasure, gladness, enjoyment, rapture on the part of the physical, spiritual-sensual being which is man. How could the conceptions of physical well-being seriously be omitted by anyone who believes in the resurrection of the dead? …
We want to have reason for joy, for an unceasing joy that fills us utterly, sweeps us before it, exceeds all measure. This reason, if it exists, is anterior to joy, and is in itself something different from joy. “Joyousness” implies an “about something”; we cannot rejoice in the absolute; there is no joy for joy’s sake….Aquinas:  “Possession of the good is the causes of rejoicing.” This having and partaking of the good is primary; joy is secondary. Aquinas: “Therefore a person rejoices because he possesses a good appropriate to him – whether in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. The appropriate good, however, if it is perfect, is precisely the man’s happiness…Thus it is evident that not even the joy which follows the possession of the perfect good is the essence of happiness itself…..All beings…desire joy for the sake of the good, and not the converse….Thus it follows that …every joy is consequent to a good and that there exists a joy consequent to that which is in itself the supreme good.”… The “supreme good” and its attainment – that is happiness. And joy is: response to happiness.

Our Participation In Happiness
What does indeed make us happy is the infinite and uncreated richness of God; but our participation in this, happiness itself, is entirely a “creatural” reality governed from within by our humanity; it is not something that descends overwhelmingly on us from outside. That is, it is not only something that happens to us; we are ourselves intensely active participants in our own happiness. …Happiness is an act and an activity of the soul. … But has it not been said that happiness is a gift? …(Aquinas’ reply:) If sight were given to a blind man, he would nevertheless see with his own sense of sight…Happiness is a form of acting which opens all the potentialities of man to fullest realization

An Activity Whose Effects Work Inward
Along with the doing of any work there is an effect which does emerge, but remains hidden within the doer himself, perhaps chiefly as a fruit of insight, as a verbum cordis. Perhaps this fruit can grow only in the course of a man’s dealing with the pliable or resistant matter of a garden, or potter’s clay, or marble; perhaps this is the only way in which it can grow And it may not be that in this processio ad intra in this inward fructation, lies the truly beatifying element which we rightly ascribe to all creative activity?
To repeat: the activity in which we receive the drink which is happiness is by its nature an activity whose effects work inward. This cannot be otherwise, for only in such activity does the acting person actualize himself. Action which reaches outward perfects thework rather than the person who acts. Under those circumstances what happens is that the perfection of the work “does not…include the creator; he is condemned to return to his  lesser ego.”

An Act Of The Intellect
“The essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect.” …The fulfillment of the act takes place in the manner in which we become aware of reality; the whole energy of our being is ultimately directed toward attainment of insight. The perfectly happy person ….is one who sees…Man, physical, historical, “earthly” man, has a basic craving to see; strictly speaking he craves nothing else; …he lives purely as a see-er: in contemplation. ….Aquinas: “He is happy in that he has what he wants – which having, however, takes place by something other than an act of will.” …” “The happy life does not mean loving what we possess, but possessing what we love.” Possession of the beloved, Aquinas holds, takes place in an act of cognition, in seeing, in intuition, in contemplation. …Thomas is not alone is saying this. The same point is made by Augustine…
Old metaphysics was motivated chiefly by this one question: How is reality to be attained?…. Cognition is essentially seizure of the world, and grasping of reality.  To know is by the nature of knowing to have; there is no form of having in which the object is more intensely grasped…knowing is “the highest mode of having.”…
It is assimilation, the quite exact sense that the objective world, in so far as it is known, is incorporated into the very being of the knower. This indeed distinguishes cognitive from non-cognitive  being: the latter have nothing outside themselves, whereas the knower obtains a share in alien beings in that he knows them, that is to say, in that he takes them into himself and …possesses the “form:” of these alien beings. Material things have closed boundaries; they are not accessible, cannot be penetrated, by things outside themselves. But one’s existence as a spiritual being involves being and remaining oneself and at the same time admitting and transforming into oneself the reality of the world. No other material thing can be present in the space occupied by a house, a tree, or a fountain pen. But where there is mind, the totality of things has room; it is “possible that in a single being the comprehensiveness of the whole universe may dwell.” Aristotle: anima est quodammodo onmia, the soul is at the bottom all that is.” … “Eternal life is knowing Thee.” [John 17:3]

Love Is The Indispensable Premise Of Happiness
Happy is he who sees what he loves. It is only the presence of the thing or person loved that makes for happiness…without love there is no happiness…Love is the indispensable premise of happiness: …Love, then, is necessary for happiness; but it is not enough. Only the presence of what is loved makes us happy, and that presences is actualized by the power of cognition. …”Where love is, there is the eye.” …from the commentary Sentences written by a young Thomas Aquinas.
The meaning is that there are things which the lover alone observes; but above all, that the lover partakes of goods which are withheld from all others, which is to say that higher potentialities for happiness are open to him than to anyone else. Nevertheless, no matter what may be observable to his eye by virtue of love, the activity of the eye is still seeing and not loving…Contemplation is a knowing which is inspired by love….It is the living attainment of awareness. It is intuition of the beloved object.

Elements Of Contemplation
The first element of the concept of contemplation (is) the silent perception of reality. The second is the following: Contemplation is a form of knowing arrived at not by thinking but by seeing, intuition. ….it is a type of knowing which does not merely move toward its object, but already rests in it. The object is present – as a face or a landscape is present to the eye when the gaze “rests upon it.” In intuition there is no “future tension”, no desire directed toward the future, which desire corresponds with the nature of thinking. The person who knows by intuition has already found what the thinker is seeking; what he knows is present “before his eyes.”  This presence, however, this “spatial thereness,” may at any moment be converted into temporal “presence”, which is a tense-form of Eternity. …There inevitably intrudes into the midst of the peace of contemplation, the soundless call to another, infinitely profounder, incomprehensible, “eternal” peace. This is “the call to perfection of the imperfect, which call we name love.” (Aquinas)

Earthly Contemplation
Earthly contemplation …must be imagined as an inner gaze, undistracted by anything form the outside, but troubled within by the challenge to achieve a profounder but unattainable peace. It must be imagined as a satisfaction which desires nothing “else” and yet is not satisfied with itself because in its uttermost depths, yet insuperably remote, a still more complete satisfaction is sensed. This earthly existence can offer us an awareness of “the whole,” of the very essence of all that is “good” for us – a knowing of God, in other words which is the result neither of logical reasoning nor of simple faith. “Human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God, which is to be had by logical demonstration.”….

Non-seeing “rather kindles the longing rather than gratifies it. The knowledge brought us by faith is knowledge of what is absent. Contemplation, however, including earthly contemplation, is able to quench man’s thirst more than anything else because it affords a direct perception of the presence of God; contemplation is the form in which we partake of the uttermost degree of happiness which this physical, historical existence of ours is capable of holding. “Imperfect beatitude, such as can be had here, consists primarily and principally in contemplation,” that is, in earthly contemplation. “As far as contemplation extends, so far does happiness extend.” …One corollary is that insightful knowledge, spiritual vision, intellectual intuition, is possible for man here on earth; that man’s method of grasping reality is not exclusively thinking, “mental labor…”  The epose of “simple intuition” does exist. This is by no means an incontrovertible assumption but to contest it is also to dismiss the idea of earthly contemplation…The inhumanity of totalitarian labor… based upon the fact… that man is considered as s “worker” even in his intellectual life; he is permitted spare time but no true repose.
Another premise is… we must in some manner be able to partake of the object of this act, the drink called happiness, which means that God is present in the world; He can appear “before the eyes” of one whose gaze is directed toward the depths of things…reality is a creation, and that consequently God is not “outside of the world,” not a Deus extramundanus, but the acting basis of everything that exists…For the Christian earthly contemplation means above all: that back of immediate phenomena, and within them, the Face of the incarnate Divine Logos is visible.

Contemplation Is Widespread
The common element in all the special forms of contemplation is the loving, yearning, affirming bent toward that happiness which is the same as God Himself, and which is the aim and purpose of all that happens in the world. The common element is an approach whose impetus bursts forth from the core of man’s being, feeds on the energy of man’s whole nature, and carries all the powers of that nature along in its dynamic movement. Within that common element the intrinsic force of the craving for happiness is united with the data of all the senses, with the play of the imagination, with the insights of reason, and with faith and the supernatural new life – both these last goods granted as free gifts. Without this love directed toward this object, the re is no true contemplation. Love alone makes it possible for contemplation to satiate the human heart with the experience of supreme happiness. ….
In contemplation, the multiple forces of human nature are always called upon, always at play, Who would wish to term “purely religious” the contemplation which underlies S. Francis of Assisi’s Song to the Sun, or the poems of St. John of the Cross? Nevertheless, it is true that such contemplation obviously has been kindled by meditation on the divine mysteries and by prayer….
The transfiguring experience of divine satiation can come to one in a host of ways. The most trivial of stimuli can bring one to this peak. And this being so, we are brought sharply to the arresting and indeed astounding realization – so opposed is it to everything we are in the habit of thinking about contemporary man – that contemplation is far more widespread among us today than appearances would indicate. The significant features of contemplation can be attained without anyone’s being conscious of it by that name. With this as a clue, more and more new forms of achieving contemplation manifest themselves.

Contemplation In The Precise Sense
Who among us has not looked into his child’s face, in the midst of the toils and troubles of everyday life, and at that moment “seen” that everything which is good, is loved and lovable, loved by God! Such certainties all mean, at bottom, one and the same thing: that the world is plumb and sound; that everything comes to its appointed goal; that in spite of all appearances, underlying all things is peace and salvation, Gloria; that nothing and no one is lost; that “God holds in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is.” Such non-rational, intuitive certainties of the divine base of all that is can be vouchsafed to our gaze even when it is turned toward the most insignificant–looking things, if only it is a gaze inspired by love. That, in the precise sense, is contemplation. And we should have the courage to admit its identity.

The Soul Takes Precedence Over The Eye
The precision of these entries (in Gerald Manley Hopkin’s Journals) proves, among other things, how little contemplation need by-pass or blur the reality of the visible world by, say, premature “symbolization.” Rather, contemplation directs its gaze straight at the heart of objects. In so doing, it perceives in the depths a hitherto hidden, nonfinite relationship. And in that perception lies the peculiar essence of contemplation.

But what actually happens when the soul, as it were, takes precedence over the eye? No one has yet succeeded in providing an adequate descriptive account of that process…part of the nature of contemplation (is) that it cannot be communicated, It takes place in the innermost recesses. There is no observer. And it is impossible to “set it down” because no energy of the soul is left unengaged….

G.K. Chesterton, considering his life in retrospect, said that he had always had the almost mystical conviction of the miracle in all that exists, and of the rapture dwelling essentially within all experience. Within this statement lie three separate assertions: that everything holds and conceals at bottom a mark of its divine origin; that one who catches a glimpse of it “sees” that this and all things are “good” beyond all comprehension; and that, seeing this, he is happy. Here in sum is the whole doctrine of the contemplation of earthly creation.

The Active/Political/Practical Life
The active life contains a felicity of its own; it lies, says Aquinas, principally in the practice of prudence, in the perfect art of the conduct of life. But ultimate repose cannot be found in this kind of felicity …the ultimate meaning of the active life is to make possible the happiness of contemplation. …Aristotle: The whole of political life seems to be ordered with a view to attaining the happiness of contemplation. For peace, which is established and preserved by virtue of political activity, places man in a position to devote himself to contemplation of the truth.”….practical life if not only meaningful but indispensable; it rightly fills out man’s weekday life; that without it a truly human existence is inconceivable. Without it, indeed, the vita contemplativa is unthinkable…. “The truth is that as soon as we are no longer obliged to earn our living, we no longer know what to do with our life and recklessly squander it. (Andre Gide) “One thing is clear: when something is finished, it must be perfect –but what then?” (Gottfried Benn)

Common Features Of The Contemplative Man And The Happy Man
With great sureness of insight, the ancients have asserted that in the contemplative man may be found all the things which distinguish the happy man; and that ordinary speech attributes to both the same characteristics….
For example there is simplicitas, that simplicity peculiar to the gaze of contemplation. The whole energy of the seeing person gathers into a single look…. “Man’s happiness is based upon there being for him an indisputable truth.” (Nietzsche)  Here, in cognition, truth and happiness are conjoined under the aspect of simplicity. Disputation involves pros and cons, arguments and counterarguments, variety of points of view, yes and no. But an indisputable truth, not something that is merely not disputed out of mental sluggishness or doggedness, but a truth which is immune even to interior dispute – that is the simplicitas of possession. … (Aquinas:) man is not capable of an act continuing without interruption. But happiness is not happiness if it does not endure forever without loss; happiness demands eternity…
“There is always one thing which makes for happiness:…the capacity to feel unhistorically.” (Nietzsche)….the happy man needs nothing and no one…It was true of the Christian martyrs, of whom it is told that not even torture could tear them from the happiness of contemplation….Finally repose, leisure, peace, belong among the elements of happiness. If we have not escaped from harried rush, from mad pursuit, form unrest, from the necessity of care, we are not happy…Contemplation’s very premise is freedom from the fetters of workaday busyness. Moreover it itself actualizes this freedom by virtue of being intuition.

Concupiscence Of The Eyes
(Aristotle): “We prefer seeing to all else.”  If we did not already know that joy in seeing must be counted among the most elemental, irrepressible, coveted joys of mankind, we could deduce it from the everyday phenomenon of “concupiscence of the eyes.” the hypertrophy of visual curiosity, the morbidity of the contemporary craving to see. We can deduce from the extent of this degeneration which, it seems is imperiling specifically our most elemental and precious powers …” (Aquinas) This, incidentally, may suggest that the greatest menace of our capacity for contemplation is the incessant fabrication of tawdry empty stimuli which kill the receptivity of the soul….

All The Labor And History Of Man Crowned Only In Intuition
In his memoirs ..George Santayana relates how he used to accompany a friend versed in art through the great picture galleries of the world. And seeing his friend standing, completely absorbed and enraptured, in front of a masterpiece, he thought and says with great earnestness, and with the clear intent of stating a philosophical thesis: “My own load was lifted, and I saw how instrumental were all the labor and history of man, to be crowned, if crowned at all, only in intuition.

The World Unredeemable?
No one who thinks of the world as at bottom unredeemable can accept the idea that contemplation is the supreme happiness of man. Neither happiness nor contemplation is possible except on the basis of consent to the world as a whole. This consent has little to do with “optimism.”  It is consent that may be granted amid tears and the extremes of horror.

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Reading Doestoevsky’s The Idiot On A Metaphysical-Religious Level

August 10, 2010

 

Holbein's "Deposition of Christ"

Dostoevsky wrote The Idiot in 1867–1869, and today it is considered one of his greatest works, along with Notes from Underground (1864), Crime and Punishment (1866), The Possessed (1872), and The Brothers Karamazov (1880). In The Idiot Dostoevsky hoped to portray the ideal of a “positively beautiful individual,” a man who wishes to sacrifice himself for others. Prince Myshkin is a sort of Russian Christ who represents the values Dostoevsky deemed the highest and most noble: altruism, meekness, kindness, and brotherly love.

As Dostoevsky saw sexual passion as inherently selfish, it is not surprising that Prince Myshkin is a completely asexual character. Though he develops romantic feelings toward Aglaya, he subordinates them to a higher ideal of pity and compassion that he expresses in his relationship with Nastassya Filippovna. Facing the “dark world” of corruption and moral decay that he meets in society, he inevitably perishes.

On the metaphysical-religious level Prince Myshkin and Ippolit Terentyev are the main antagonists. Although Ippolit has no objective reason to hate Myshkin, he senses in him an ideological adversary: “I hate you all, every one of you ! — it’s you, Jesuitical, treacly soul, idiot, philanthropic millionaire; I hate you more than every one and everything in the world! I understood and hated you long ago, when first I heard of you: I hated you with all the hatred of my soul” (335/249). There is extrinsic evidence that Dostoevsky himself saw things in this way. “Ippolit is the main axis of the whole novel,” we read in his notebook (277). Kolya speaks of Ippolit’s “gigantic idea” without defining it. But the fact that Ippolit’s idea is apparently developed further and commented on by Kirillov in The Possessed allows us to identify the “gigantic idea” as the rejection of an absurd life. It is up to Myshkin to refute this idea.

In effect, Ippolit reverses what is known as the argument for the existence of God “from design”: the actual condition of the world is in his experience such that it makes faith in God impossible. The conflict between Myshkin’s faith and Ippolit’s revolt parallels the antinomy [vocab: a contradiction between two statements that seem equally reasonable] of Christ absolute spiritual significance and the particular facts of history, Christ’s promise of immortality and physical death continuing as ever before.

The repeated introduction of the theme of execution and Ippolit’s condition as a man doomed to death before he has started to live leads up to the scene in front of Holbein’s “Deposition of Christ,” a picture that could cause a man to lose his faith, as Myshkin observes. Ippolit, referring to the same picture, utters the ultimate challenge to faith:

The question instinctively arises: if death is so awful and the laws of nature so mighty, how can they be overcome? How can they be overcome when even He did not conquer them, He who vanquished nature in His lifetime, who exclaimed. “Maiden, arise!” and the maiden arose — ”Lazarus, come forth!” and the dead man came forth? Looking at such a, picture, one conceives of nature in the shape of an immense, merciless, dumb beast, or more correctly, much more correctly, speaking, though it sounds strange, in the form of a. huge machine of the most modern construction which, dull and insensible, has aimlessly clutched, crushed and swallowed up a great priceless Being, a Being worth all nature and its laws, worth the whole earth, which was created perhaps solely for the sake of the advent of that Being. (451/339)

The helplessness of mortal man facing inexorable nature causes Ippolit to draw some practical and hypothetical conclusions. He realizes that he could commit the most heinous crime with guaranteed impunity because his case would assuredly not come to trial: he would die before under the solicitous care of the authorities, who would be anxious to keep him alive for his trial. This conceit presages Ivan Karamazov’s maxim: “If there is no immortality, everything is lawful.” On the practical side, too, Ippolit realizes that every conceivable activity or plan he might consider is made senseless by his impending death.

Furthermore, Ippolit reaches the same conclusion as Kirillov does, with a more elaborate argumentation: choosing the time of his own death by committing suicide is the only way in which he can assert his independence from the dumb power of nature. Like his successor in The Possessed, Ippolit is loath to admit that his suicide will be an act of despair more than an act of revolt. Vladimir Solovyov, in his third “Discourse on Dostoevsky” (1883), made the point that any man who becomes aware of universal evil, as Ippolit does, but is unable to see also universal good — that is, God — is inevitably driven to suicide. Ippolit in fact perceives nature not only as indifferent but also as malevolent, cruel, and mocking. At the same time, he is unaware of any beneficent saving principle.

Like Ivan Karamazov, Ippolit does not explicitly deny the existence of God but resolutely rejects His world: “So be it! I shall die looking straight at the source of power and life; I do not want this life! If I’d had the power not to be born, I would certainly not have accepted existence upon conditions that are such a mockery” (457/344). Yet at the same time Ippolit — again like his successors Kirillov and Ivan Karamazov — loves life and asks why he must be so alienated from it: “What is there for me in this beauty when, every minute, every second I am obliged, forced, to recognize that even the tiny fly, buzzing in the sunlight beside me, has its share in the banquet and the chorus, knows its place, loves it and is happy; and I alone am an outcast” (45 5/ 343). Myshkin, a few pages later, echoes Ippolit’s sentiment (466/352).26 The theme of man’s discord with God’s world is made explicitly anti-Christian as Ippolit sarcastically rejects the Prince’s “Christian arguments, at the happy thought that it is in fact better to die” (455/342).

Ippolit himself suggests an escape from this situation: perhaps man or, rather, man’s conscious mind does not understand the world correctly and human alienation from the cosmos is due to a misunderstanding of some divine truth. It is up to Prince Myshkin to resolve this misunderstanding, although Ippolit has unwittingly found the resolution himself when he quits staring at Meyer’s wall (the wall is a symbol of the cul-desac into which reason takes man even in Notes from Underground) and becomes involved in the fate of another human being, the unfortunate young doctor who gets another chance at life through his efforts.

Myshkin, who is specifically identified as a self-proclaimed Christian believer (423/3 17), presents the alternative to Ippolit’s self-conscious solipsism: personal experience of a reality that transcends individuality. Vladimir So1ovyos who was the first to translate Dostoevsky’s fiction into the language of academic philosophy, said, “Nature, separated from the Divine Spirit, appears to be a dead and senseless mechanism without cause or goal — and on the other hand, God, separated from man and nature, outside His positive revelation, is for us either an empty abstraction or an all consuming indifference.” Dostoevsky set himself the task to realize this “positive revelation” in a fictional character. Prince Myshkin’s role as a symbol of man’s salvation is enhanced by many significant details that make him a Christ figure.

Extrinsic evidence (Dostoevsky’s notebooks and correspondence) suggests that in Prince Myshkin Dostoevsky wanted to create an absolutely beautiful character, though fully aware of the insurmountable difficulty of this task. Mochulsky suggested that Dostoevsky’s artistic tact caused him to halt “before the immensity of this task” and made him reduce the Prince to something closer to ordinary human stature. Rut we know that Dostoevsky never relinquished his plan to write “a book about Jesus Christ.”

An entry to this effect is found in one of his last notebooks. In surveying world literature, Dostoevsky came to the conclusion that Christ was the only character in all literature to answer the definition of an “absolutely beautiful character” and that the closest approximation to it was Don Quixote, a wise madman and ridiculous to boot. Accordingly, Myshkin was made not only a Christ figure but a quixotic figure as well, with Don Quixote a notable and explicit presence in the text. The fact that Myshkin is explicitly presented as a Christ figure makes the observation, appealing in itself, that Myshkin’s story is a version of the Dionysian myth somewhat redundant. The notion that Jesus Christ was yet another hypostasis of “the. suffering god” was around before Nietzsche popularized it.

Prince Myshkin returns to his native Russia from the mountains of Switzerland and returns there at the end of the novel. An innocent idealist, he enters a cruel, greedy, mercenary, decadent, but functioning society that refuses to appreciate his virtues. Kjetsaa has suggested that the ‘Johannine principle of the word made flesh and entering the world was the idea. that guided Dostoevsky in creating this character. Prince Myshkin is of ancient noble lineage but impoverished and a recipient of charity until informed that he has come into a large inheritance, which he claims on his return to Russia.

His physical appearance reminds one of an icon qf a Russian saint, and he has some pronounced monkish traits tie is a virgin at twenty-six, painfully chaste, has a love for medieval manuscripts and calligraphy, even wears a cloak that resembles a monk’s cassock and cowl He has a saint’s humility, an unconditional willingness to forgive any., wrong, and ‘refuses to be provoked to anger. by violence.’ When Ganya slaps his face he responds by saying, “Oh, how ashamed you will be of what you’ve done” (142/99)

Rogozhin calls him “such a sheep,” and he is called an “idiot” by various parties throughout the novel, although he is during the whole action of the novel obviously quite sane. His “terrible power of humility” (an idea of Myshkin’s, echoed by Ippolit) is that of the kenotic3’ Christ of the Eastern church, Christ who has divested Himself of all His glory and may appear in the hypostasis of a humble beggar.

Myshkin has other Christ-like traits. He is pure, in mind and a virgin He is attracted to children (90/57—58) He pities Marie, a “fallen woman,” and meets with the hostility of self-righteous local authorities, the pastor and the schoolmaster. The many blatant biblical echoes in the tale of Marie (the parable of the prodigal son, the washing of feet, the Mary Magdalene theme) enhance Myshkin’s Christ-like image. He seems clairvoyant, though his penetrating understanding of people is psychologically motivated by the genuine interest he takes in people and by his willingness to see things from their viewpoint (for example, 23 8/172 and 469/354). He inwardly relives not only all the terrible suffering that is part of the human condition, but also the evil and murderous passions that cause it. He knows very well how Rogozhin feels. Aglaya at one point says that though he is sometimes “sick in his mind,” he has more wisdom than all other people and that of all the people she knows only her mother has some of that wisdom (471-72/356).

Before the tragic plot comes to a head, Myshkin for a moment considers to escape it all, perhaps to return to Switzerland, but then decides that this would be cowardly and that he will have to enter this world and meet the challenge that it offers him (344/256). This suggests that Myshkin, like Jesus Christ, has a mission

In spite of all his moral qualities, Prince Myshkin is an apparent failure. He returns to the mental asylum he came from without having significantly affected the lives of most people he met. They “go on living as before and have changed but little” (668/508). A notebook entry confirms this but adds, “But wherever he did touch someone, he left an indelible trace everywhere” (242). The Prince may be held responsible for Nastasya Filippovna’s tragic and Aglaya’s disappointing fates.

There are critics who understand the allegoric message of The Idiot to be a negative one. Murray Krieger properly entitled his interpretation “The Curse of Saintliness.” Some other critics have suggested that although Dostoevsky’s original intent was to present a positive alternative to Ippolit’s pessimistic existential philosophy, the integrity of his creative imagination forced him to let Myshkin, Ippolit’s ideological antagonist, fail dismally. These critics do  consider the fact that Jesus Christ was in their terms a failure: people went on living as before and changed but little even after He departed this world. Some of the most beloved saints of the Russian church were not successful prelates but humble martyrs or “fools in Christ.” Myshkin’s response to Ippolit’s challenge has to be found in something other than the plot of the novel.

Edward Wasiolek, in his book Dostoevsky: The Major Fiction (1964), put it this way; “The..Prince is a success because for a moment he is able to kindle the faith in others of a truer image of themselves; for a few minutes he is able to quiet, by his own suffering, the rage of insult upon insult.” This moves success from the level of action and good deeds to the level of attitudes of the human soul. Kjetsaa, among others, has pointed out that it is precisely this idea that answers the question as to the novel’s religious message. He suggests that in the context of Dostoevsky’s Russian Orthodox faith the attitude of a man’s heart, his responsiveness to God’s grace, the degree of his spirituality, rather than his moral accomplishments, are the measure of a Christian’s progress.

In a conversation with Rogozhin in chapter 4 of part 2, Myshkin brings up this topic. He tells of a murderer who begs God for mercy even as he cuts his victim’s throat and of a young mother who crosses herself as she sees the first smile on her baby’s face, then observes that “religious feeling does not come under any sort of reasoning or atheism, and has nothing to do with any crimes or misdemeanors” (252-53/183-84). Dostoevsky’s works have a pattern of tolerance of sins of commission. His drunks, thieves, frauds, and even murderers are often treated with sympathy. They also have a pattern of stern judgment of sins of omission — that is, a lack of compassion, kindness, and forgiveness.

With his own example and with those that he reports, Prince Myshkin acknowledges the irresoluble antinomy between the Orthodox Christian’s position and that of the unbeliever. Michael Holquist has defined this antinomy in terms of two aspects of time: chronos and /kairos. There is unstoppable, irretrievable, entropic chronos: Nastasya Filippovna cannot retrieve her innocence, Myshkin cannot stop the unfolding catastrophe, Rogozhin cannot escape his fate. Christ died on the cross, a son of man, nor did He stop the course of history..

This is the only kind of time the unbeliever Ippolit knows, time as man’s enemy, time the destroyer and the bringer of death. But there is also kairos: the good time, the right time, the moment of epiphany, the moment when chronos comes to a stop, all of which Ippolit mockingly rejects (425/318). It is here that Myshkin’s epilepsy acquires a symbolic meaning. He is subject to the course of time in a real world (only Christ is beyond time), but during the moment of ecstasy before a fit time does have a stop (258/188). The experience described by Myshkin is real and not to be confused with “abnormal and unreal visions” triggered by opium, hashish, or wine; it is in fact an experience of reality quintessentially compressed.

Early on in the novel, Myshkin expresses his intuitive awareness of a reality other than that of mundane experience: “I kept fancying that if I walked straight on, far, far away and reached that line where sky and earth meet, there I should find the key to the mystery, there I should see a new life a thousand times richer and more turbulent than ours” (82/51).

Myshkin’s function on the religious-metaphysical level of the novel is “not to alter the course of the action but to disseminate the aura of a new state of being.” This “state of being” is one of communion and unity with the all, with God, and hence with nature and humanity. Somewhat surprisingly the explicit statement to this effect is made by Ippolit and not by Prince Myshkin: “In scattering the seed, scattering your ‘charity,’ your kind deeds, you are giving away, in one form or another, part of your personality, and taking into yourself part of another; you are in mutual communion with one another… All your thoughts, all the seeds scattered by you, perhaps forgotten by you, will grow up and take form” (447/336).

This “state of being” means overcoming the separation from God, nature, and humanity that comes in the wake of human individuation and surrender to hostile chronos. This victory over human alienation is easier for the Orthodox Christian, since Orthodox Christianity, taking a less extreme view of the effect of original sin than the Western church, perceives man as inherently divine as well as earthly, while Western Christendom stresses man’s sinful earthly nature. To Dostoevsky, at Orthodox Christian, moments in which man’s divine nature allows him to commune with God and His cosmos are a part of reality

Ippolit, an unbeliever and a self-centered, alienated individual looking for the absolute but finds none because he looks for it for and within himself. Myshkin, a believer, gratefully accepts what God, nature, and men bring him because he has overcome his sense of separateness. At one point Prince S. suggests that Myshkin believes in finding paradise on earth (380/ 282). However, in several passages in the novel we learn that Myshkin at one time suffered precisely from a sense of separateness and alienation: “What affected me most was that everything was strange [chuzhoe, which is perhaps better translated by “alien”]; I realized that. I was crushed by the strangeness of it. I was finally roused from this gloomy state, I remember, one evening on reaching Switzerland at Bâle, and I was roused by the bray of an ass in the marketplace” (78-79/ 48).

Later in the novel, Myshkin remembers how he had “stretched out his hand to that bright, infinite blue, and had shed tears” because “he was utterly outside all this” (466/351). However, Myshkin’s alienation is different from Ippolit’s. It is not alienation through individuation, the inevitable result of human free will and a condition that follows the fall from grace, but rather the pristine condition of a soul that is awakening to a consciousness of self, of its freedom, and of God.

The allegoric role of Nastasya Filippovna is announced early in the novel. As Myshkin is left alone with her photograph, he raises it to his lips and kisses it (104/68). Adelaida, on seeing it, says: “With beauty like that one might turn the world upside down” (105/69). Nastasya Fi1ippovna is no ordinary beauty. (Adelaida, it must be noted, is herself an exceptionally handsome woman.) Nastasya Filippovna’s is a beauty illuminated by an aura of the ideal. Mochulsky, who on the empirical plane describes Nastasya Filippovna as a “proud beauty” and “wronged heart,” projects her on the metaphysical plane as “a symbol of beauty,” seduced and degraded by “the prince of this world.”

Myshkin immediately recognizes in her divine Psyche, an emanation of the world soul. In a somewhat less fanciful way, one may see Nastasya Filippovna as a symbol of pure beauty cast into a world that is incapable of appreciating beauty. Totsky, Ganya, Epanchin, and Rogozhin, each in his own way, futilely seek to possess her. Totsky, who fancies himself an aesthete, is really a common lecher, who reduces the radiant beauty of an innocent maiden to the glamor of a demimondaine.

Rogozhin, obsessed with the urge to possess her, does not realize that he is pursuing beauty, an ideal entity, which must inevitably elude his violent carnal passion. Nastasya Filippovna tells him that his passion for her is no different from his father’s obsession with the accumulation of money, also a futile pursuit of a forever elusive goal. Rogozhin, wiser than his father, kills her. Only Myshkin can perceive the ideal of pure beauty in her. Myshkin, who says that “beauty will save the world,” cannot save Nastasya Filippovna. The very context (423/317) suggests that he was wrong. This agrees with the message of The Brothers Karamazov, where Dimitry Karamazov, a believer in the power of beauty, learns that it is not beauty that saves the world, but faith.

Nastasya Filippovna’s beauty suffers the same fate as Prince Myshkin’s saintliness. In mundane, temporal terms, it does not save anyone. It does turn the world upside down, and it causes Nastasya Filippovna and all the men around her nothing but grief. But as a vision, as the symbo1of an ideal, it is an immediate revelation of the divine. Again, this makes more sense in an Orthodox Christian context than it does in a secular context.

The Orthodox belief that ideally the human face has retained the divine features of God’s face, a belief on which the worship of icons is based, makes Prince Myshkin’s reaction to Nastasya Filippovna’s portrait more understandable.

The irresoluble contradiction between two opposing principles is underlined by recurrent bursts of strident dissonance, scandal, and violence that disturb the otherwise placid world of middle-class St. Petersburg. Prince Myshkin’s appearance coincides with an eruption of disorder, discord, and ultimately misery and death in the world he has entered. This is allegorically significant. The temporal world to which Christ descended was one of discord and violence. The disharmonious world of The Idiot falls in line with the orientation of modern religious novels by Graham Greene, François Mauriac, Heinrich Boll, Anthony Burgess, and others.

The conjuring of scandals is one of Dostoevsky’s great specialties, and The Idiot features a long line of them. The Prince is a party to a series of scandalous scenes. Varya spits in her brother’s face, who tries to attack her, is stopped by the Prince, and slaps the Prince’s face (142/99). Rogozhin’s drunken crowd crashes the genteel gathering at Nastasya Filippovna’s, and a climactic scandalous scene ensues (184/131-32). Nastasya Filippovna disrupts a gathering that has already seen much unpleasantness by announcing that Rogozhin has bought up Evgeny Pavlovich’s IOUs (337/251). A bit later there comes the horsewhipping scene (391/291).

The scene between Aglaya and Nastasya Filippovna ends in another scandal. Finally, Nastasya Filippovna runs away from her wedding. Myshkin is unable to prevent any of these scandals. Yet his reaction is in each case that of a Christian, not to say that of a Christ figure. The allegoric message of this is that religious feeling “has nothing to do with crimes and misdemeanors” or, more specifically, that the essence of religion does not lie in the successful prevention or curtailment of scandalous behavior, impropriety, violence, or crime but in a willingness to meet these acts with forebearance, kindness, and courage.

The same applies to a series of executions that appear in the text in one form or another throughout the novel. They are another symbol of the jarring dissonance between the principles of chronos and kairos. Myshkin brings up this theme twice at the very outset of the novel and immediately establishes the cruel paradox it entails:

The uncertainty and feeling of aversion for that new thing which would be and was just coming was awful. But he said that nothing was so dreadful at that time as the continual thought, “What if I were not to die! What if I could go back to life — what eternity! And it would all be mine! I would turn every minute into an age; I would lose nothing, I would count every minute as it passed, I would not waste one!” He said that this idea turned to such a fury at last that he longed to be shot quickly. (83-84/52)

The point of this is, of course, that the condemned man will, if his life will be indeed spared, go back on his promise to live a life beyond the tyranny of chronos. He will not “turn every minute into an age” but will waste it, as most men do most of the time.

Subsequently several further executions are brought up. The Countess Du Barry pleads with her executioner for another moment of life (227/164). The boyar [vocab: A member of a class of higher Russian nobility that until the time of Peter I headed the civil and military administration of the country] Stephan Glebov, impaled under Peter the Great, Chancellor Osterman, who went through a mock execution (571-72/432-33), and finally Thomas More (580/440) are brought up to illustrate the idea that in earlier days men were “of one idea” and therefore capable of making death a meaningful part of their existence, while “modern men are broader-minded — and I swear that this prevents their being so all-of-a-piece as they were in those days” (572/433).

We also hear that the Prince is “collecting facts relating to capital punishment” (426/319). There is also the description of Holbein’s “Deposition of Christ,” Ippotit’s “Essential Explanation,” and the death of Nastasya Filippovna under Rogozhin’s knife. In all of these instances Prince Myshkin is more than a passive observer. Rather, he vicariously experiences each death as though it were his own, each execution as though he were the victim — and the executioner. This powerful assertion of dissonance, discord, and death is deeply meaningful, because it does not disturb the Prince faith or his serene acceptance of the world as it is.

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William F. Buckley Jr. Patron Saint of the Conservatives – John B. Judis

July 26, 2010

William F. Buckley Jr. marshaled polysyllabic exuberance, famously arched eyebrows and a refined, perspicacious mind to elevate conservatism to the center of American political discourse.

Let me indulge some nostalgia here: I am a child of the sixties and grew up with William F. Buckley.  I thought he was the funniest thing on TV and like many others had a bowl of popcorn and a dictionary handy when Firing Line came on. No one has ever replaced him for me. The only one the least comparable with WFB (in terms of vocabulary and scholarship) is David Hart, but he’s not a media figure and not political.  A month or so ago I was haunting the library when I saw Judis’ biography of WFB and picked it up.  All the old stories were in there and it was a great memory lane read. Anyways, here are some anecdotes that capture some of Buckley… I do miss him.

The Army Influence
When Bill entered the Army, he was an obnoxious brat incapable of forming friendships except with a select few whose background, beliefs, and intelligence he approved of. When he left the Army two years later, he had learned a certain humility and had become capable of appreciating people who didn’t share his background and beliefs. He explained what he had learned in the Army in a long letter to his father:

I don’t know whether you were aware of this while I was in Millbrook, but I was not very popular with boys. After a good deal of self-analysis, I determined that the principal reason for this revolved around my extreme dogmatism — particularly in matters concerning politics and the Catholic Church. I could not understand another point of view; it seemed to me that anyone who was not an isolationist or a Catholic was simply stupid. Instead of keeping these sentiments to myself, I blurted them out and supported them upon the slightest provocation. I was intolerant about all kinds of things. I would not sit in on sex conversations or trivial gossip because I considered them wrong. Because I was intellectually able to support most of my arguments, my opponents would normally lose out in any discussion. The result of this was that my company was very little sought for except by a few close friends.

When I went to the Army, I learned the importance of tolerance, and the importance of a sense of proportion about all matters — even in regard to religion, morality etc. Some friends I made whom I really prized were atheistic, and even immoral. But I learned. nevertheless, that regardless of the individual’s dogmas, the most important thing as far as I was concerned was the personality: would his friendship broaden your horizon or provide you with intellectual entertainment? I found that there were actually very few prerequisites to, the good friend: he had to have a good sense of humor, a pleasant personality and a certain number of common interests.

Bill had not abandoned his political or religious convictions, nor the sense that he had a mission to defend these beliefs in a world that was hostile to them. But in the Army, he had learned to distinguish the rules of personal friendship from those of political combat.

 Publisher’s Statement in National Review’s First Issue
Buckley saw conservatism as a radical and dissenting philosphy. He made the point in a “Publisher’s Statement” that he wrote for the first issue:

Let’s face it: Unlike Vienna, it seems altogether possible that did National Review not exist, no one would have invented it. The launching of a conservative weekly in a country widely assumed to be a bastion of conservatism at first glance looks like a work of supererogation, rather like publishing a royalist weekly within the walls of Buckingham Palace. It is not that, of course: if National Review is superfluous, it is so for very different reasons: It stands athwart history, yelling Stop, at a time when no one is inclined to do so, or to have much patience with those who do.

Winter Vacations in Switzerland
Buckley spent most of his evenings at dinner parties. According to Kenner, the most memorable was an evening that he and the Buckley’s spent with Charlie and Oona Chaplin, who lived in Monteux. The dinner party at a restaurant in Vevey had been arranged by Buckley’s friend James Mason, who was also there. Chaplin was preoccupied with the assassination of President Kennedy, which had occurred three months earlier, and he suggested to his guests that it had been a plot by the CIA or Texas John Birchers.

“I don’t trust the FBI. Do you, Mr. Buckley?” Chaplin asked.

“No,” Buckley replied. “After all, they let you get out of the country without paying your income tax.”

Pat kept kicking Bill under the table, but Chaplin himself was amused by Buckley. “Bill was being masterfully skeptical,” Kenner recalled. “He was dissenting quite principally from the things that Chaplin was saying without offending him in any way.” Later, Oona Chaplin told Pat, “Mrs. Buckley, you mustn’t mind. Don’t kick your husband. I’ve been kicking mine for thirty years, and it simply doesn’t work.”

Lessons from Whittaker Chambers and James Burnham
Drawing from the theme of the unfinished Revolt Against the Masses, he declared that “there is growing in America a spirit of resistance to the Twentieth Century. . . . In America we are dragging our feet; kicking, complaining; hugging on to our ancient moorings.” But the revolt against the twentieth century was by no means complete, and if conservatives attempted to hurry it beyond its accepted pace, they might risk sidetracking it. Buckley put into his words what he had learned from Chambers and Burnham and what had been reinforced by the Goldwater experience:

A conservative is concerned simultaneously with two things, the first being the shape of the visionary or paradigmatic society towards which we should labor; the second, the speed with which it is thinkable to advance towards that ideal society and the foreknowledge that any advance upon it is necessarily asymptotic; not, at least, until the successful completion of the Society for the Abolition of Original Sin. How this movement, considering the contrary tug of history, has got as far as it has got, is something that surpasses the understanding of natural pessimists like myself. Even so, I am guilty of yielding, from time to time, to the temptation to overstress the ideal, often at moments when the prudential should weigh most heavily. I urge you to join with me in trying to resist that temptation.

These two insights — that conservatism, even on the eve of Goldwater’s humiliation, was on the rise, but that conservative politics, to succeed, must mediate between the ideal and the prudential — would inform Buckley’s politics over the next decades and, through his writings, would influence a great many conservative politicians. Buckley’s speech to the New York Conservatives marked his final break with his own radical and pessimistic past.

The Mayoralty Campaign, City of New York 1965
REPORTER:          What would you do if you were elected?
BUCKLEY:            Demand a recount.

Buckley refused to display what he later called “the usual neurotic confidence of all political candidates.” But he also feared that, come November, he might not only lose, but lose big. “I felt no confidence, other than in the cogency of my views, and would have found it personally and professionally embarrassing to go about town speaking nonsense about my own expectations,” he wrote later.

In reporting his announcement, the Herald Tribune described Buckley as a “right-wing and ultra-conservative debater” and warned that 1965 was not a proper year for “staging esoteric debates.”  But Buckley’s wit and defiance of convention thoroughly charmed the city’s press corps and even attracted national media attention to the campaign. While the editors fulminated, the reporters and columnists covered Buckley’s press conferences the way they might a good Broadway show. According to The New Yorker, the members of the press had a “non-partisan reaction: regardless of what Buckley says, they thoroughly enjoy the way he says it. They seem to be grateful for being spared campaign clichés, and to relish his wit, vocabulary, and rococo style.”

Writing in the New York World-Telegraph after Buckley’s first press conference, Murray Kempton commented:

We have already had candidates for mayor various enough to satisfy every taste except the most refined, and the apparition of William F. Buckley may complete the scale. The truly refined taste, after all, progresses from discontent with each way the thing is being done to the final decision that the thing ought not to be done at all. And Buckley made it plain yesterday that he does not merely disdain the opposition but rather disdains the office itself.

Buckley carried through these indignities as handsomely and containedly as any gentleman ranker offered his first introduction to the men’s latrine. He also had the kidney to decline the usual humiliation of soliciting the love of the voters, and read his statement of principles in a tone for all the world that of an Edwardian resident commissioner reading aloud the 39 articles of the Anglican establishment to a conscript assemblage of Zulus.

The Mayoralty TV Debate
The first televised debate was held on Sunday, September 26, and was broadcast over WCBS-TV. Lindsay was platitudinous (“I ask all New Yorkers to join me, to roll up their sleeves, to care”), Beame was visibly nervous and tedious (“I will go to Washington, where I will be welcomed as a Democrat, and fight for federal aid”), and Buckley was acerbic and witty. Asked if he still would be “flabbergasted” if he were elected, Buckley responded, “Having heard Mr. Beame and Mr. Lindsay, I would be flabbergasted if I weren’t elected.”

The Unmaking of a Mayor
By making his writing more personal, Buckley changed his literary persona. He became far more attractive to his readers — appearing in print the way his friends and his colleagues on National Review experienced him. In his early books, Buckley appeared to be an arrogant brat. In The Unmaking of a Mayor, Buckley portrayed himself as an innocent in the wilds of politics; his humor was often at his own expense. For instance, he (recounted his experience the evening of the day in which he had proudly announced his plan for a bicycle path through Manhattan — a proposal that all his advisers had urged him to forgo because it would be seen as flippant.

I remember the evening of that press conference, which I spent at the home of an old Negro election-district boss in Bedford-Stuyvesant, a former Pullman porter of indefatigable political energy and utterly total recall, who had promised to deliver me the entire Bronx, or whatever, and had got together his family and a few lieutenants. We sat about the living room while his warm and hospitable wife in the kitchen below sent up a torrent of sandwiches, cakes, drinks, cigars, as the old gentleman rambled around in his copious memory telling us of this and that. His daughter-in-law, a sophisticated, slightly cynical, more than slightly bemused nurse’s aide from a local hospital, told me at one point: “You know, I was for John Lindsay until today.” “What,” I asked, delighted, “did John Lindsay do today?” “It was that ridiculous bicycle scheme,” she said. I paused. But only for a moment, let the devil record. “That was ridiculous, wasn’t it,” I exclaimed — changing the subject, and concluding that as of that moment, I had really and truly become a politician, and how would I formulate that sin at my next session with my confessor.

The Bill Buckley of God and Man at Yale had charmed older conservatives and inspired younger ones who felt themselves to be part of an embattled Remnant. But the new Buckley could win the sympathy and attract the interest of a far broader range of readers. The Unmaking of a Mayor made Buckley into a popular writer.

Dislike For Politics
He expressed his dislike for politics in more abstract terms in a speech he gave in December 1965 at National Review’s tenth anniversary celebration.

Politics, it has been said, is the preoccupation of the quarter educated, and I do most solidly endorse this observation, and therefore curse this country above all things, for its having given sentient beings very little alternative than to occupy themselves with politics it is all very well to ignore [the Johnson administration’s] Great Society. But will the Great Society ignore us? . . . Where can we go and feel free not to read the New York Times? No such freedom exists nowadays, which is the conclusive reason, surely, to deplore this century’s most distinctive aggression, which is against privacy, publicly understood

WFB at the U.N.
Having convinced himself that Nixon wasn’t simply trying to appease the right wing by appointing him and that he might have some impact at the U.N., Buckley agreed to serve for one term, from September to December. Over the summer, he was confirmed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (When the FBI called Rusher to check routinely on Buckley, it asked him, “Has Mr. Buckley done anything since 1969 that might embarrass the Nixon administration?” “No,” Rusher replied, “but since 1969 the Nixon administration has done a great deal that has embarrassed Mr. Buckley.”

Buckley’s experience, from the first day, confirmed his initial misgivings about the U.N. job. At the orientation in Washington, Buckley was told that someone must always sit at the U.S. desk in the General Assembly and appear to be listening to the speaker. “Above all, we were warned, we must guard against falling asleep.” When Buckley met with Scali (the UN Ambassador who had asked him to the public delegate position) to receive his formal assignment, Scali began to hedge on appointing him as the head of the Third Committee delegation. It was “my first premonition,” Buckley wrote later, “that Walter Mitty was dead.”

The first week, he sent Scali a memorandum, with a copy to Kissinger, outlining what he thought could be accomplished on the Third Committee. “Unless I am instructed to do otherwise,” he wrote, “I plan to feel free to discuss human rights even if the inference can be drawn from what I say that I also believe in human rights within the Soviet Union.” Scali called him in the next morning and instructed him not to send memoranda either to him or to Kissinger and to clear all his speeches with him. And Scali warned Buckley that détente with the Soviet Union was the “overarching policy.”

Over the next months, Scali and his aides vetoed one after another of Buckley’s speeches as being too “provocative.” A column Buckley wrote describing a speech by Zaire’s President Mobutu (“An aide to General Mobutu placed his speech on the podium, and, after he was done, retrieved it. Such menial tasks as placing one’s own speech on a podium are inconsistent with the pride of the President of Zaire.”) caused a furor in the White House, which was planning to receive the offended Mobutu. Buckley’s best lines had to be reserved for unofficial addresses.

On United Nations Day, Buckley gave a speech on New York politics at a buffet lunch organized by New York socialite Mrs. John Loeb. During the question-and-answer session, a black ambassador asked Buckley what his views were on a transportation bond referendum. “To tell you the truth,” Buckley replied, “I have not studied the issue, which I can divulge in good conscience because I don’t have to vote on it, since I vote in Connecticut.” Mrs. Loeb interjected, “You see, Mr. Ambassador, in America, we don’t vote where we work, we vote where we sleep.” “Well,” Buckley responded, “even that is not exactly correct. If I voted where I slept, I would vote in the United Nations.”

Meeting Ronald Reagan
Buckley’s friendship with Reagan dated back to 1960 when Reagan, the chairman of Democrats for Nixon in California and National Review subscriber, introduced him at a Nixon rally in Beverly Hills. Buckley described the incident in an article about Reagan:

He was to introduce me at a lecture that night in Beverly Hills. He arrived at the school auditorium to find consternation. The house was full and the crowd impatient, but the microphone was dead; the student who was to have shown up at the control room above the balcony to turn on the current hadn’t. Reagan quickly took over. He instructed an assistant to call the principal and see if he could get a key, He then bounded onto the stage and shouted as loud as he could to make himself heard. In a very few minutes the audience was greatly enjoying itself. Then word came to him: no answer at the principal’s telephone. Reagan went offstage and looked out the window. There was a ledge, a foot wide, two stories above the street level, running along the side of the window back to the locked control room. Hollywoodwise, he climbed out on the ledge and sidestepped carefully, arms stretched out to help him balance, until he had gone the long way to the window, which he broke open with his elbow, lifting it open from the inside and jumping into the darkness. In a moment, the lights were on, the amplifying knobs turned up, the speaker introduced.

With David Niven
While Buckley was in Switzerland, Saving the Queen appeared. Although the major reviews were lukewarm—in The New York Times, Walter Goodman called it “serviceable entertainment”– it quickly climbed to the top of the best-seller list. Buckley, Niven, and Gaibraith continued their friendly competition over whose books were superior. Asked by an interviewer to explain Saving the Queen’s success, Gaibraith said, “Bill Buckley has a genuine talent for fiction, as his discriminating readers have always known.” He called Buckley’s decision to write novels “a quantum step in self-recognition.”

David Niven had reasons of his own to take Buckley down a notch. When Niven’s second book of memoirs had appeared in 1975, he had asked Buckley for a jacket blurb and Buckley had responded with “Probably the best book ever written about Hollywood.” When Saving the Queen was about to be published, Buckley asked Niven for a blurb, and the actor, busy filming, told Buckley to write it for him. When they were in Switzerland, Buckley told him casually that he had submitted a statement in his name, “Probably the best novel ever written about fucking the Queen. David Niven.” “1 think that was the only time I ever saw him really caught off balance,” Buckley said. “For about half a second, which for him was a long time. Then he started to laugh.”

But Niven got his revenge that winter. Buckley and Niven painted together in Switzerland at an atelier they rented, and Niven brought the painter Marc Chagall to visit. Niven, who described Buckley as “the worst amateur painter in the world,” had warned him not to show Chagall any of his paintings, but Buckley insisted upon trotting out a collection of paintings, including several of his own. When Chagall came upon a blank canvas, he exclaimed, “I like that one best.”

Debating the Panama Canal Treaties with Ronald Reagan
Reagan became the national leader of the campaign against the treaties, using it as the first stage of his 1980 campaign for the presidency. Buckley and Reagan were both concerned that their disagreement over the treaties might endanger their friendship, and they took pains to soften the blow of their difference. After an exchange of correspondence on the issue, Reagan wrote Buckley: “I must confess we are still disagreeing on the matter of the canal. [But] I assure you it would not in any way affect the friendship I feel for you.”

In January, the two aired their differences in a public debate. Reagan accepted Buckley’s invitation to join him in a special two-hour Firing Line, staged at the University of South Carolina. Buckley took along George Will and Burnham as seconds, while Reagan was accompanied by Pat Buchanan and Latin-American expert Roger Fontaine.

Buckley was in a difficult situation for a debater — one that, ironically, recalled his Yale days. The audience was very conservative and supportive of Reagan’s rather than his own position. Reagan was able to appeal to sentiment — the imperial nostalgia that had affected Americans after the American defeat in Vietnam — while Buckley had to call on his listeners to rise above sentiment. But just as he had at Yale, he relished the situation. “If Bill was concerned, he never showed it,” Neal Freeman recalled. “He delighted in debate and rebuttal.” The debate was held in a theater in the round, with the two camps seated facing each other. The Washington Post described it as a “Super Bowl of the right.” To the audience’s applause, Reagan, tanned and relaxed, argued that without control of the Canal, the U.S. could get pushed around in time of war when it needed to send its ships through the Canal. Buckley, somewhat disheveled, his hair fashionably long, his eyebrows popping up and down, his tongue darting, responded that the U.S. would be better off militarily if the Panamanians were not harboring resentment against the U.S. for controlling part of their land. If the U.S. needed to move its Navy quickly through the Canal, Buckley said, “that mobility is more easily effected if we have the cooperation of the local population.”

The two men made the most of their own embarrassment at being on opposite sides of a major public issue.

If Lloyds of London had been asked to give odds that I would be disagreeing with Ronald Reagan on a matter of public policy, Buckley began, I doubt they could have flogged a quotation out of their swingingest betting man because judging from Governor Reagan’s impeccable record, the statisticians would have reasoned that it was inconceivable that he should make a mistake. But of course it happens to everyone. I fully expect that someday I’ll be wrong about something.

After the two debaters had made their opening presentations, they were given seven minutes to question each other. “Well, Bill,” Reagan began, “my first question is why haven’t you already rushed across the room to tell me that you’ve seen the light? ““I’m afraid that if I came any closer to you the force of my illumination would blind you,” Buckley replied.

When Reagan claimed that it was the Torrijos government, rather than the people of Panama, that was demanding the return of the Canal, Buckley turned his wit on Reagan’s argument.

BUCKLEY:  But it was before Torrijos became the dictator that the initial riots took place demanding an assertion of sovereignty. How do you account for that?

REAGAN:  I think the first time that it was expressed was in 1932 in the Charter of the new Communist Party of Panama that they put as one of their top objectives the taking over of the Canal.

BUCKLEY:  Are you saying that the Communists invented patriotism in Panama?

REAGAN:  No, no.

BUCKLEY:  Yes. Well, you really tried to say that.

In his concluding remarks, Buckley made light of Reagan’s recitation of the history of American-Panamanian relations. He recounted the explanation of the Louisiana Purchase that James Thurber had given to two inquiring ladies:

He said, “Louisiana was owned by two sisters called Louisa and Anne Wilmont, and they offered to give it to the United States, provided it was named after them. That was the Wilmont Proviso.”

Now, intending no slur on my friend Ronald Reagan, the politician in America I admire most, his rendition of recent history and his generalities remind me a little bit about that explanation for the state of Louisiana having been incorporated into this country. He says we, in fact, don’t negotiate under threats, and everybody here bursts out in applause. The trouble with that is that it’s not true.

Buckley’s performance—designed at once to re-establish his credentials as a hardliner and to appeal to American generosity—was masterful and largely defused Reagan’s jingoistic appeals.

Buckley got the last word not only on Reagan but on the press. In his story on the debate, Washington Post reporter Ward Sinclair chided Buckley for being wrong. “He says Cortez crossed Panama and was the first to espy the the Pacific Ocean. It was Vasco Nüfiez de Balboa.” Buckley responded in a letter to the Post.

What I said in my speech was, “If there is a full-scale atomic war, the Panama Canal will revert to a land mass, and the first survivor who makes his way across the isthmus will relive a historical experience like stout Cortez when, with eagle eyes, he stared at the Pacific and ail his men looked at each other with a wild surmise, silent upon a peak in Darien.”

The lines are from John Keats, his sonnet “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer.” I felt presumptuous enough correcting Ronald Reagan’s foreign policy without straightening out Keats’s historical solecism. But tell Mr. Sinclair not to worry: It happens all the time, people’s inability to tell where I leave off and Keats begins.

Buckley wrote later of Reagan’s stand on Panama, “I think, ironically, that Reagan would not have been nominated if he had favored the Panama Canal Treaty, and that he wouldn’t have been elected if it hadn’t passed. He’d have lost the conservatives if he had backed the treaty, and lost the election if we’d subsequently faced, in Panama, insurrection, as in my opinion we would have.” (Overdrive. 119.)

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The Philosophical Act II by Josef Pieper

July 21, 2010

A continuation of yesterday’s essay on the nature of the philosophical act. Written over 60 years ago, but still relevant to asking the big questions in a world where the capacity to see the laws of material being seems to make us incapable of seeing the ethical message contained in that being. Let’s remind ourselves what the philosophical act is all about…
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So, then: whoever philosophizes, takes a step beyond the work-a-day world and its daily routine.

The meaning of taking such a step is determined less by where it starts from as by where it leads to. We must ask a further question: just where is the philosopher going when he transcends the world of work? Clearly, he steps over a boundary: what kind of region lies on the other side of this boundary? And what is the relationship of the place where the philosophical act happens, to the world that is transcended and left behind by this same philosophical act? Is that the “authentic” world, and the world of work the “inauthentic”? Is it the “whole” as opposed to the “part”? Is it the “true reality” as opposed to a mere shadow world of appearances?

No matter how such questions could be answered in detail, in any case, both regions, the world of work and the “other realm,” where the philosophical act takes place in its transcending of the working world — both regions belong to the world of man, which clearly has a complex structure.

Therefore, our next question is, “What is the nature of the world of man?” — a question that cannot be answered if the human being is ignored. In order to give a clear answer at this point, we must begin again, and start as it were from the very bottom.

It is in the nature of a living thing to have a world: to exist and live in the world, in “its” world. To live means to be “in” a world. But is not a stone also “in” a world? Is not everything that exists “in” a world? If we keep to the lifeless stone, is it not with and beside other things in the world? Now, “with,” “beside,” and “in” are prepositions, words of relationship; but the stone does not really have a relationship with the world “in” which it is, nor to the other things “beside” which and “with” which it lives. Relationship, in the true sense, joins the inside with the outside; relationship can only exist where there is an “inside,” a dynamic center, from which all operation has its source and to which all that is received, all that is experienced, is brought.

The “internal” (only in this qualitative sense: the “inside” of a rock would refer only to the spatial location of parts) — the “internal” is the ability to have a real relationship, a relation to the external; to have an “inside,” means ability to be related, and to enter into relationship. And “world”? A world means the same thing, but considered as a whole field of relationships. Only a being that has an ability to enter into relationships, only being with an “inside,” has a “world”; only such a being can exist in the midst of a field of relations.

There is a distinctly different kind of proximity that obtains in the relationships of pebbles, which lie together in a heap somewhere beside the roadway and are “related” in that way, and, on the other hand, in the relationship of a plant to the nutrients which it finds in the vicinity of its roots. Here we see not merely physical proximity as an objective fact, but genuine relationship (in the original, active meaning of relationship): the nutrients are integrated into the orbit of the plant’s life — by way of the real internality of the plant, through its power to be related, and to enter into relationship. And all this — all that can be taken in by the relating-power of that plant — all this makes up the field of relationships, or the world, of that plant. The plant has a world, but not the pebble.

This, then, is the first point: “world” is a field of relations. To have a world means to be in the midst of, and to be the bearer of, a field of relations. The second point is, the higher the level of the inwardness or, that is to say, the more comprehensive and penetrative the ability to enter into relations, so the wider and deeper are the dimensions of the field of relations that belongs to that being; to put it differently: the higher a being stands in the hierarchy of reality, the wider and more profound is the standing of its world.

The lowest world is that of the plant, which does not reach beyond what it touches in its own vicinity. The higher-ranking, spatially wider realm of the animal corresponds to its greater ability to enter into relationships. The relation-ability of the animal is greater, insofar as the animal has sense-perception. To perceive something is quite extraordinary, compared with what the plant can do: it is a completely new mode of entering into relationship with one’s environment.

But not everything that an animal, as such, can perceive (because it has ears to hear and eyes to see) really belongs to the world of such an animal: it is not true that all the visible things in the environment of an animal with vision are in fact seen, or even can be seen. For “environment” as such, the perceivable environment, is still not a “world.” That was the typical belief, until the environmental researches of the biologist Jakob von Uexküll; until that time, as Uexküll puts it, “it was generally held, that all eye-equipped animals could see the same things.” But Uexküll discovery was that, on the contrary, “the environments of animals are not at all the whole expanse of nature, but resemble a narrow, furnished apartment.” For example, one could well imagine that a crow could see a grasshopper (a very desirable object for a crow) whenever the grasshopper came across its path, or to be more precise, whenever in came into view of its eyes. But that is not the case! Instead, to cite Uexkull, “the crow is completely incapable of seeing a grasshopper sitting still… we would first assume that the form of a resting grasshopper would be very well known to a crow, but because of the blade of grass in the way cannot be made out as a unit, just as we have difficulty seeing an image hidden in a picture-puzzle. Only when it jumps does its form ‘release’ itself from the neighboring shapes — or so we would think. But after further investigation, it can be shown that the crow does not even recognize the form of a resting grasshopper, but is only prepared to sense moving things. This would explain the ‘playing dead’ behavior of many insects. Since their resting-form does not at all appear in the sense-world of their predators, they escape that world completely and securely simply by lying still, and cannot be found, even if they are actively sought.”

This selective milieu, then, to which the animal is completely suited, but in which the animal is also enclosed (so much so that the boundary cannot be crossed — since “not even if it looks for something” — even if equipped with an excellent searching-organ, could it find something that does not correspond to the selective principle of this partial world); this selective reality, determined and bounded by the biological life-purpose of the individual or the species, is called an “environment” [Umwelt] by Uexküll (in distinction from a “surrounding” [Umgebung], and in distinction also, as we will later see, from a “world” [Welt]). The field of relations of the animal is not its “surroundings,” nor the “world,” but is its “environment,” in this special sense: a world from which something has been left out, a selected milieu, to which its dweller is at once perfectly suited — and confined.

Someone will perhaps ask at this point, what has this to do with our theme, “What is it to philosophize?” Now the connection is not as distant or indirect as it may seem. We last inquired about the world of the human being, and this was the immediate interest in Uexküll concept of environment — namely, that our human world “can in no way claim to be more real than the sense-world of the animal” (so he says); that, consequently, the human being is in principle confined to his world in the same way as the animal; that is, to a biologically selected partial environment, and that man cannot perceive anything that lies outside this environment, “not even if it was actively sought” (no more, then, than the crow could find the resting grasshopper). One might well ask how a being so enclosed in its own environment, so closed in on itself, could be able to perform scientific research on the nature of environments.

But we don’t want to engage in controversy on this point; rather, we can leave the point aside and ask another question instead, since our attention is directed to man and the human world to which he belongs: what is the relating-power of the human being? What is its nature? What power does it have? We said that the perceptive-ability of the animal, when compared with what is in plants, is a more far-reaching way of relating to things. Would not, then, the peculiarly human manner of knowing — for ages past, termed a spiritual or intellective knowing — in fact be another, further mode of putting-oneself-into-relation, a mode which transcends in principle anything which can be realized in the plant and animal worlds?

And further, would this fundamentally different kind of relating power go together with a different field of relations, i.e., a world of fundamentally different dimensions? The answer to such questions can be found in the Western philosophical tradition, which has understood and even defined spiritual knowing as the power to place oneself into relation with the sum-total of existing things. And this is not meant as only one characteristic among others, but as the very essence and definition of the power. By its nature, spirit (or intellection) is not so much distinguished by its immateriality, as by something more primary: its ability to be in relation to the totality of being.

“Spirit” means a relating power that is so far-reaching and comprehensive, that the field of relations to which it corresponds, transcends in principle the very boundaries of its surroundings. It is the nature of spirit to have as its field of relations not just “surroundings” [Umwelt] but a “world” [Welt]. It is of the nature of the spiritual being to go past the immediate surroundings and to go beyond both its “confinement” and its “close fit” to those surroundings (and of course herein is revealed both the freedom and danger to which the spiritual being is naturally heir).

In Aristotle’s treatise on the soul, the De Anima,[De Anima III, 8 (431b)] we can read the following: “Now, in order to sum up everything said up until this point about the soul, we can say again that, the soul, basically, is all that exists.” This sentence became a constant point of reference for the anthropology of the High Middle Ages: anima est quodammodo omnia [“The soul, in a certain way, is all things”. “In a certain way”: that is to say, the soul is “all” insofar as it sets itself in relation to the whole of existence through knowing (and “to know” means to become identical with the known reality -- although we cannot go into any further detail about this as yet).

As Thomas says in the treatise De Veritate (“On Truth”), the spiritual soul is essentially structured “to encounter all being” (convenire cum omni ente[Quaestiones disputatae de veritate I, 1]), to put itself into relation with everything that has being. “Every other being possesses only a partial participation in being,” whereas the being endowed with spirit “can grasp being as a whole.” [Summa contra gentiles III, 112] As long as there is spirit, “it is possible for the completeness of all being to be present in a single nature.”[Quaestiones disputatue de veritate III, 2] And this is also the position of the Western tradition: to have spirit [Geist], to be a spirit, to be spiritual — all this means to be in the middle of the sum total of reality, to be in relation with the totality of being, to be vis-à-vis de l’univers. The spirit does not live in “a” world, or in “its” world, but in the world: world in the sense of “everything seen and unseen” (omnia visibilia et invisibilia).

Spirit, or intellection, and the sum-total of reality: these are interchangeable terms, that correspond to one another. You cannot “have” the one without the other. An attempt to do just this (we mention only it in passing) — to grant the human being superiority to his surroundings, to say that man has “world” (Weld) (and not merely “environment” [Umwelt]), without speaking of man’s spiritual nature, or rather (what is more extreme), to maintain that this fact (that man has “world” and not only “environment”) has nothing whatever to do with this “other” fact, that the human being is equipped with intellection or spirit — this attempt has been made by Arnold Gehlen in a very comprehensive book which has received a great deal of attention: Man: His Nature and Place in the World.

In opposition to Uexküll, Gehlen rightly says that the human being is not closed within an environment but is free of his surroundings and open to the world; and yet, Gehlen goes on to say, this difference between the animal as environmentally limited and the human being as open to the world-as-a-whole does not depend “on the characteristic of. . . spirit.” Instead, this very power to “have the world” is spirit. Spirit by definition is ability to comprehend the world.

For the older philosophy — that is, for Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Thomas — the connection of the two terms “spirit” (or “intellection” [Geist) and “world” (in the sense of total-relatedness) is so intimately and profoundly anchored in both directions that not only is it true to say that “spirit is relatedness to the sum total of existing beings”; for the earlier philosophers, the other truth, asserting that all things are essentially in relation to spirit, is just as valid, and in a very precise sense, which we do not dare to formulate in words as yet. For not only is it the property of the spirit that its field of relations includes the sum total of existing things; rather, it is also the property of existing things that they lie within the field of relations of the spirit. And to go further: for the older philosophy, it is all the same to say that “things have being” as to say that “things lie in the field of relations of the spirit, are related to spirit,” whereby is meant, of course, no mere “free-floating” spirituality in some abstract sense but rather personal spirit, a relating power that is well grounded, but then again, not only God, but the created, finite, human spirit as well. For the old ontology, it belonged to the nature of existing things to be within the field, within the reach of the spiritual soul; “to have being” means the same as “to lie within the field of relations of the spiritual soul”; both statements refer to one and the same situation. This and nothing else is the meaning of the old doctrine which has become so removed from us:

“All being is true” (omne ens est verum), and the other doctrine with the same meaning: “being” and “true” are convertible expressions. For what does “true” mean, in the sense of “the truth of things”? To say that something is true is to say that it is understood and intelligible, both for the absolute spirit as well as for the non-absolute spirit. I need to ask for your patience in simply accepting this for the moment, since it is not possible to justify these things in any detail at this point.

“Intelligibility” is nothing other than being related to a spirit that has understanding. So when the old philosophy states that it belongs to the nature of existing things, that they are intelligible and are understood, there could not be any being which is not known and knowable (since all being is true); when it is the said that the concepts “being” on the one hand, and “intelligibility” on the other, are convertible, so that the one could stand in the other’s place, so that it is the same for me to say that “things have existence” as to say that “things are known and intelligible”; in saying this the old philosophy also taught that it lies in the nature of things to be related to the mind (and this -- the concept of the “truth of things” -- is what matters in the context of our present inquiry). To summarize, then, what we have been saying: the world that is related to the spiritual being is the sum-total of existing things; this is so much the case that this set of relations belongs as well to the nature of spirit; the spirit is the power of comprehending the totality of being, as it belongs to the nature of existing beings themselves: “to be” means “to be related to spirit.”

What stands revealed to us, then, is a series of “worlds”: at the lowest, the world of plants, already locally limited to the surroundings they touch. Beyond this is the realm of the animals; and finally, transcending all these partial worlds, is the world related to spirit, the world as the totality of being. And to this ranking of worlds and fields-of-relations correspond, as we have seen, the ranking of the powers that relate: the more comprehensive the power, the more highly dimensioned is the corresponding field of relations, or “world.”

Now a third structural element is to be added to this twofold structure. For the stronger power of relating corresponds to a higher degree of inwardness; the power to relate is greater to the same degree as the bearer of that relation has “inwardness”; the lowest power of relating not only corresponds to the lowest form of being in the world but also to the lowest grade of “inwardness,” whereas the spirit, which directs its relating-power to the sum total of being, must likewise have a corresponding inwardness. The more comprehensive the power of relating oneself to the world of objective being, so the more deeply anchored must be the “ballast” in the inwardness of the subject. And when a distinctively different level of “world” is reached, namely, the orientation toward the whole, there too can be found the highest stage of being-established in one’s inwardness, which is proper to the spirit.

Thus both of these comprise the nature of spirit: not only the relation to the “whole” of the world and “reality,” but also the highest power of living-with-oneself, of being in oneself, of independence, of autonomy -- which is exactly what has always been the “person,” or “personality” in the Western tradition: to have a world, to be related to the totality of existing things -- that can occur only in a being that is “established in itself”: not a “what,” but a “who” -- an “I,” a person.

But now it is time to look back over the path we have taken and return to the questions from which we began. There were two questions, one more immediate, the other more remote. The first was, “What kind of world is the world of man?” and the second was, “What does it mean to philosophize?”

Before we begin again with our formal discussion, a brief remark is in order about the structure of the world that is related to the spirit. It is not, of course, by a greater spatial compass that the world that is spirit-related differs from the world that is related to the non-spiritual (a point that was not addressed when I distinguished “environment” from “world”). It is not only the sum-total of things; but it is also the “nature of the things,” with which the world related to the spirit is constituted. The reason why the animal lives in a partial world is because the nature of things is hidden from it. And it is only because the spirit is able to attain to the essence of things that it has the ability to understand the totality of things.

This connection was made by the old doctrine of being, whereby “the universe,” as well as the nature of things, is “universal.” Thomas says, “Because the intellectual [or spiritual] soul is able to grasp universals, it has a capacity for the infinite.”[Summa Theologiae L Q, 76, a. 5, ad 4um] Whoever attains to an understanding of the universal whole essence of things is thereby able to win a perspective from which the totality of being, of all existing things, are present and ascertainable; in intellectual understanding, an “outpost” is reached, or can be reached, whence the whole landscape of the universe can be taken in. We have reached a context into which we can take only a brief glimpse but which will also lead us into the very center of a philosophical understanding of being, knowing, and spirit.

But now, let us return to the questions which we set out to answer. The first step to take is to the more immediate question, “What kind of world is the world of man?” Is the world of man the world that is related to the spirit? The answer would have to be that man’s world is the whole reality, in the midst of which the human being lives, face-to-face with the entirety of existing things — vis-à-vis de 1’univers — but only insofar as man is spirit. But man is not pure spirit; he is a finite spirit so that both the nature of things and the totality of things are not given in the perfection of a total understanding, but only in “expectation” or “hope.”

But first, let us consider the fact that man is not pure spirit. This statement, of course, could be spoken in a variety of tones. Not seldom, it is said with a feeling of regret, an accentuation that is usually understood as something specifically Christian, by both Christians and non- Christians alike. The sentence can also be said in such a way as to imply that “certainly, man is not pure spirit,” but that the “true human being” is nevertheless the intellectual soul.

Now these. doctrines have no basis in the classical tradition of the West. Thomas Aquinas used a very pointed formula on this matter which is not as well known as it should be. The objection he raises is the following: “The goal of the human being is to attain complete likeness to God. But the soul when separated from the body which is immaterial would be more like God than the soul with the body. And therefore the souls will be separated from their bodies in their final state.” This is the objection, that the real human being is the soul, dressed out in all the tempting glamour of theological argumentation.

And how does Thomas reply to the objection? “The soul that is united to the body is more like God than the soul that has been separated from its body because the former more perfectly possesses its own nature.” [Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei 5, 10, ad 5] This is no easily digested statement, considering how it implies not only that the human being is bodily, but that the soul itself is also bodily.

If this is the case, if man essentially is “not only spirit,” if man is not in virtue of a denial, or on the basis of a departure from his authentic being, but really and in a positive sense a being in whom the various realms of plant-, animal-, and spiritual beings are bound into a unity — then man lives essentially, not exclusively, in the face of the totality of things, the whole universe of beings. Rather, his field of relations is an overlapping of “world” and “environment,” and necessarily so, in correspondence to human nature. Because man is not purely spirit, he cannot only live “under the stars,” not only vis-à-vis de l’univers; instead, he needs a roof over his head, he needs the trusted neighborhood of daily reality, the sensuously concrete world, he needs to “fit in” with his customary surroundings — in a word: a truly human life also needs to have an “environment” (Umwelt), as distinct from a “world.”

But at the same time, it pertains to the nature of body/soul being that man is, that the spirit shapes and penetrates the vegetative and sense-perceived regions in which he exists. So much so, that the act of eating by a human being is something different from that of the animal (even apart from the fact that the human realm includes the “meal,” something thoroughly spiritual!). The spiritual soul so profoundly influences all the other regions that even when the human being “vegetates,” this is only possible because of the spirit (neither the plant nor the animal “vegetates”). Consequently, this very non-human phenomenon, this self-inclusion of man in the environment (and that means, in that selective world determined solely by life’s immediate needs), even this confinement is possible only on the basis of a spiritual confinement. On the contrary, to be human is: to know things beyond the “roof” of the stars, to go beyond the trusted enclosures of the normal, customary day-to-day reality of the whole of existing things, to go beyond the “environment” to the “world” in which that environment is enclosed.

But now, we have unwittingly taken a step closer to answering our original question: What is it to philosophize? Philosophy means just this: to experience that the nearby world, determined by the immediate demands of life, can be shaken, or indeed, must be shaken, over and over again, by the unsettling call of the “world,” or by the total reality that mirrors back the eternal natures of things. To philosophize (we have already asked, What empowers the philosophical act to transcend the working-world?) — to philosophize means to take a step outside of the work-a-day world into the vis-à-vis de l’univers. It is a step which leads to a kind of “homeless”-ness: the stars are no roof over the head. It is a step, however, that constantly keeps open its own retreat, for the human being cannot live long in this way.

He who seriously intends to wander finally and definitively outside the world of the Thracian maiden is wandering outside the realm of human reality. What Thomas said about the vita contemplativa applies here also: it is really something more than human (non proprie humana, sect superhumana). [Quaestio disputata de virtutibus cardinalibus I] Of course, man himself is something more than human: man transcends man himself for the sake of the eternal, Pascal said; an easy definition does not go far enough to reach the human being.

But instead of developing these considerations, which may lead us too near to babbling nonsense, let us return to the question, “What does it mean to philosophize?” and attempt another approach to it, in more concrete fashion, and on the basis established by the foregoing. How does the philosophical question different from the non-philosophical question? To philosophize means, we said, to direct one’s view toward the totality of the world. So is that a philosophical question (and that alone) which has for its explicit and formal theme this sum-total of all existing things? No! What is peculiar and distinctive about a philosophical question is that it cannot be posed, considered, or answered (so far at least as an answer is possible), without “God and the World” also coming into consideration, that is, the whole of what exists.

Once again, let us speak quite concretely. The question, “What are we doing, here and now?” can clearly be intended in various ways. It can be meant philosophically. Let us attempt it, then. The question can be asked in such a way as to anticipate a technical-organizational answer. “What is happening now?” “Well, a lecture is being delivered during the Bonn Week of Higher Education.”

That is a straightforward, informative sentence, standing there in a clearly lit world — or rather, “environment.” It is an answer spoken with one’s attention directed to what is immediately at hand. But the question could also be meant in another sense so that the questioner would not be content with the answer just now given. “What are we doing right now?” One person is speaking; others are listening to what he is saying, and the listeners “understand” what is being said; approximately the same process is taking place within the minds of the many listeners: the statements are grasped, thought about, weighed, accepted, denied, or accepted with some hesitation, and then integrated with each person’s own fabric of thought. This question expects an answer coming from the special sciences; it can be meant so as to call on the psychology of sense perception, cognition, learning, mental states, and so on, and these sciences would provide the adequate answer.

An answer of this kind, then, would exist in a world of higher and deeper dimensions than the first answer, with its merely organizational interest. But the answers of the special sciences have still not reached the horizon of total reality; this answer could be given without having to speak at the same time of “God and the World.” But if the question, “What are we doing right now?” were meant as a philosophical question, such an exclusion would not be possible; for if the question is meant philosophically, then the question is about the nature of knowing, of truth, or even of the nature of teaching itself.

What, in the last analysis, is it “to teach”? Now someone will come along and say, “A man cannot really teach; just as when someone is healed from illness, it is not the doctor who has healed him, but nature, whose healing powers the doctor has, perhaps, allowed to operate.” Someone else will come up and say, “It is God who really teaches, within, on the occasion of human teaching.” Then Socrates will stand up and say that the teacher only makes it possible for the one who learns “to acquire knowledge from himself” through reminiscence; “there is no learning, only recollection.”[ Plato, Meno 85; 81] And still another one will say, “All human beings are confronted by the same reality; the teacher points it out, and the learner, or the listener, sees for himself.”

What are we doing here? What kind of phenomenon is taking place? Is it something of a socially organized nature, a part of a lecture series? Is it something that can be analyzed and researched in terms of psychological science? Is it something taking place between God and the World?

This, then, is what is peculiar and distinctive about a philosophical question, that something comes to the fore in it, touching the very nature of the soul: to “come together with every being” (convenire cum omni ente) — with everything that exists. You cannot ask and think philosophically without allowing the totality of existing things to come into play: God and the World.

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Pope Benedict XVI’s Theological Vision by Fr. Thomas Rauch, S.J.

July 14, 2010

This is a reading selection from Fr. Thomas Rauch’s Pope Benedict XVI: An Introduction to His Theological Vision. The Holy Father is an “enormously competent” theologian and I for one needed to get an overview of his numerous (over one hundred) publications. I think Fr. Rauch’s book does a fairly good job of that although I had to scratch my head here and there at some of the criticisms he seems to favor (Luke Timothy Johnson’s off the reservation comments on sexuality and the Church seem to push the envelope somewhat.) Pay close attention to the footnotes when you read it.

As a theologian, Pope Benedict XVI is enormously competent. At home discussing biblical texts and their languages, the fathers of the church, or the writings of contemporary theologians and philosophers, he is a man of culture as well as of learning. He is a member of the Academic Française, the Rhineland-Westphalia Academy of Sciences, and the European Academy of Sciences and Arts. Best known for his work on episcopacy, Eucharist, ministry; tradition, and eschatology, he has published over one hundred books. One cannot read him without being amazed at the breadth of his scholarship. While clearly an intellectual, his pastoral concern has always been to safeguard from harmful speculation the faith of those whom he calls the “simple faithful.”

As a person, Pope Benedict is unfailingly gracious; he is reserved, diffident, even shy in his manner. But as Joseph Ratzinger he was also something of a polemicist. He often responded to critics directly and was not above using sarcasm in dismissing arguments he deemed frivolous. He has expressed his distaste for abstract theological texts, and though he can be as abstract as any philosopher, there is a passion in his writing, a concern to present the truth of the faith as he sees it against the wisdom of the world, which without the gospel is no wisdom at all. Even as Cardinal Prefect of the CDF [Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith], he was not afraid of controversy, responding at times to his critics by name. If he knows the church’s theological tradition intimately and can articulate it with grace, his own theological wisdom flows from certain distinctive fonts.

Ratzinger was never comfortable with the Neo-Scholasticism so dominant at the time he did his studies. He found it abstract, dry; and lifeless. This included Aquinas. In his memoirs, he said, “I had difficulties penetrating the thought of Thomas Aquinas, whose crystal-clear logic seems to me to be too closed in on itself; too impersonal and ready-made.” His own theology has always been rooted, first in scripture, then in the liturgy and the fathers of the church, the “return to the sources” or ressourcement that was to bear enormous fruit at the Second Vatican Council. If he was also concerned with aggiornamento, that bringing up-to-date and renewal of structures and life sought by the more progressive members of the council, his deepest instincts have been for ressourcement.

In a second polarity, the traditional tension between Catholicism’s two greatest doctors, Augustine and Aquinas, a tension evident at the council and in its aftermath, Pope Benedict has always been on the side of Augustine. Augustine was not dry; he wrote with passion. In commenting on the 1985 Extraordinary Synod of Bishops, Avery Dulles noted the presence of two major schools, the first of which, “led by figures such as the German cardinals Ratzinger and Hoeffner, had a markedly super-naturalistic point of view, tending to depict the church as an island of grace in a world given over to sin. This outlook I call neo-Augustinian.” Ratzinger is not reluctant to acknowledge his debt to Augustine. In an address to seminarians at Rome’s major seminary in February 2007, he reminisced about his own seminary studies: “I was fascinated from the beginning especially by the figure of St. Augustine and then also the school of St. Augustine in medieval times, St. Bonaventure, the great Franciscans, the figure of St. Francis.” But just as Augustine’s thought owes much to the Platonic tradition, particularly to the Neo-Platonism that was so strong in his own time, so Ratzinger owes a considerable debt to the heritage of Plato. Plato, Augustine, and Bonaventure have all left their marks on his thinking.

First, from Plato he learned to understand and privilege truth as the intelligible. Second, his anthropology or view of the human is deeply Augustinian. Finally, his epistemology and understanding of eschatology are profoundly stamped by his study of Bonaventure. In attempting to give an overview of Ratzinger’s theology we will consider the formative influence of these three thinkers and examine how they have affected his approach to modernity.

The Platonic Heritage
Ratzinger’s episcopal coat of arms bears the motto Cooperatores Veritatis, Co-workers of the Truth (“Therefore we ought to support such people, so that we may become co-workers with the truth.” 3 John 8). He has always seen his vocation, as a scholar and as a bishop and now as pope, to be in the service of truth. He sees truth as illumining the world of the sensible and the experiential from beyond, finding its ultimate embodiment in the logos, the person of Christ, who is the way, the truth, and the life (John 14:6). Indeed, much of the criticism he has received over the years can be attributed to his professorial way of boldly speaking the truth as he sees it. His understanding of truth very much reflects the Platonic heritage that has so nourished his thought. First, like Plato, Ratzinger locates the true and the good beyond the world of experience, in the spiritual. Second, his notion of wisdom, though illumined by his faith, is very much formed by Plato.

Truth as the Intelligible
Plato and the Neoplatonism that so influenced Augustine located the true and the good in the spiritual realm, reflective of Plato’s world of the forms or ideas. Though this tradition saw an epistemic connection between these forms and human knowledge, the material world that we experience every day was only a poor reflection of the ultimately real. The true was the intelligible, not the merely sensible. Knowledge comes from recollection.

While Aquinas also emphasized the intelligible as the object of human understanding, he was formed in the tradition of Aristotle, who was considerably more empirical or experimental in his approach to human understanding. With his esteem for the physical sciences, Aristotle prized what humans could learn by careful observation and achieve through the application of critical reason. Ratzinger’s epistemology is much more Platonic than Aristotelian; in a remark that cleverly reverses the popular view of the seventeenth-century controversy with Galileo, he once argued that Galileo’s opponents were Aristotelian empiricists, while Galileo himself was a Platonist who placed more emphasis on understanding than on what appeared to the senses.

Ratzinger sees Plato as doing battle against the radical enlightenment of his day that denied that truth was in any way accessible to human beings. Of course he sees parallels here with contemporary, post-Enlightenment Western civilization with its skepticism, limiting knowledge and truth to what can be empirically demonstrated. For modern thought, ultimate reality remains unknowable, while the postmodernist ethos reduces all knowledge and “meta-narratives” to systems of meaning, “socially constructed” on the basis of one’s social location, meaning that all knowledge is relative to issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and sexual identity, which filter how we perceive the world. Ratzinger’s objection to the “dictatorship of relativism” is rooted here, in the modern reduction of knowledge to what is constructed on the basis of social location and thus is relative. Against this contemporary relativism, Ratzinger juxtaposes wisdom.

Wisdom
In his discussion of the gift of wisdom, Ratzinger goes back to Plato, who so shaped the development of wisdom in the Christian tradition. Plato taught that truth is an attribute of God. If humans cannot actually possess it, they can love it and search for it, drawn by Eros, which moves them to search for the Good and the Beautiful, in this way moving them beyond the limits of the merely intelligible toward the eternal. Ratzinger does not, however, rule out experience; even in the human sphere there is no knowledge without experience, and only the experience of God can yield knowledge of God. Wisdom can learn much from science, particularly to be sober, exact, and methodological. But knowledge cannot be limited to what is rational from a scientific point of view; in language familiar to us today he says that in a totally rationalized world, which limits rationality to the exact sciences, there evolves “a frightening dictatorship of uncontrolled irrationality.” Instead, he argues that when Eros is ordered, not just to the intellectual but to the eternal, then “the rational receives fecundity and warmth from the depths of the Spirit in whom truth and love are one.”

This theme of Eros drawing humans to God reappears in Benedict’s first encyclical, Deus Caritas Est. He finds in Plato an ally against the skepticism of our own day. But finally he privileges Augustine over Plato, for while Plato’s philosophy remained elite and in the last analysis hypothetical, Augustine was able to discover true wisdom in Jesus, the self-subsistent wisdom of God.7

The Primacy of the Idea
Nevertheless there remains a Platonic or Neo Platonic cast to Ratzinger’s thought, privileging the idea over the concrete and the empirical, which others have noted. Walter Kasper has several times called attention to the Platonic character of Ratzinger’s thought. In the late 1960s, shortly after Ratzinger’s Introduction to Christianity was published, Kasper wrote a critical review that led to several exchanges. Calling attention to the “latent idealism” in Ratzinger’s book, he noted that Ratzinger’s starting point was the Platonic dialectic between the visible and the invisible. What was real was the invisible, the ground for the real. Kasper suggested an alternative starting point for a systematic theology, the embodied situation of humans in nature, society; culture, and history. His point was that only in this way could theology take seriously the concrete problems of real people in a world where injustice, hunger, and violence rule. In his responses, Ratzinger denied the accuracy of Kasper’s charges.

More than thirty years later, Kasper, now a cardinal himself, raised the same issue in regard to Ratzinger’s ecclesiology. Ratzinger has long maintained the ontological and temporal priority of the universal church over local churches. In a disagreement on this point, Kasper observed that the debate was not about any point of Catholic doctrine but a “conflict between theological opinions and underlying philosophical assumptions.” Ratzinger’s argument, Kasper maintained, is essentially Platonic, starting from the primacy of the idea, while his own position is more Aristotelian, seeing the universal as existing in the concrete reality.

Another example of the primacy of the idea in Ratzinger’s thought is what we might call a “principle of reception,” with the emphasis always on what is received in its givenness, rather than on what develops or changes in the world of time and experience. Again this suggests a certain conceptual, even a priori character to his approach to theology and to the problems it must address. Jim Corkery calls this the priority of logos over ethos, of receiving over making, of being over doing, and sees it as lying at the heart and center of Ratzinger’s theological synthesis. It shows how Ratzinger thinks, but it also has concrete implications as to how theology addresses challenges in the church and its life.

Thus, from an anthropological perspective, Ratzinger typically argues that the human person is oriented not to some interior depth but to the God who comes from without. In the rite of baptism, for instance, the exorcism implies that the catechumenate is more than instruction and decision; only the Lord can effect our conversion, breaking our resistance to the powers that enslave us and enabling us to believe (37-38). Faith comes not from reaching deep into ourselves but from outside us; it is based on our meeting something (or someone) for which our experience is inadequate.

Ecclesiologically, the church lives from the faith it receives as a gift and from the sacraments that it cannot institute but only receive. It does not resemble a club, creating its own rules and statutes. ‘While there is a certain truth here, Ratzinger’s approach seems to leave little room for the church to respond to new challenges in the light of its faith, to renew and reform its structures or sacramental forms. A more historically oriented ecclesiology would show how the church’s structures developed in time, often borrowing from political and cultural models.

Liturgically, he argues that the community cannot bestow the Eucharist on itself, it can only receive it. “The Lord does not arise, as it were, from the midst of the communal assembly. He can come to it only from ‘without’ — as one who bestows himself’ in unity with all other communities (293). Similarly, for Ratzinger, a holy day, unlike a holiday, is God’s gift to humans; we do not make it, nor is it dependent on our decision; we receive it (82). Ecumenically, the unity of the church cannot come from the base, a sociological program inspired by neo-Marxism, or from the churches themselves; “it is no longer just a question of institutional ecumenism against ‘base’ ecumenism but of the ecumenism of a Church man can construct against that of a Church founded and given by the Holy Spirit” (303). Thus Ratzinger’s typical impulse is to see meaning as already given and fixed; he does not seem to leave room for development, higher viewpoints, new understandings, and change.

At one point Ratzinger raises the problem of the shortage of priests. But his approach is hardly empirical. He does not look at changing attitudes toward sexuality and the importance of marital intimacy; or at a culture unable to see celibacy as a value, or to families with fewer children reluctant to encourage a priestly vocation. Instead he questions the efficacy of the Eucharist in the church experiencing the shortage, arguing that “there is a correspondence between the capacity for sacramental marriage in accordance with the gospel and an openness to virginity” (298). While of course there may be some truth to what he says, there are certainly other, perhaps more persuasive reasons to be considered.

As far as reform in the church goes, he eliminates the usual arguments, for example, that the church restricts human freedom with its rules, that it has not integrated the rights and freedoms that are the patrimony of the Enlightenment, that we need to move from a paternalistic church to a community church for which we ourselves are responsible. He acknowledges that the church will always need human constructions. But just as Michelangelo sees the image hidden in the block of stone and works by an ablatio, the removal of what is not really part of the sculpture, true reform of the church takes place, he argues, by a similar ablatio, removing obsolete human constructions, “to allow the nobilis forma, the countenance of the bride, and with it the Bridegroom himself, the Living Lord, to appear.” Reform is not a matter of tinkering with the structure; it means letting the church’s true nature as the embodiment of Christ shine forth.

In regard to the debate over the ordination of women, in a comment on the 1976 CDF instruction concerning the exclusion of women from the priesthood, Inter insigniores, Ratzinger published a commentary that juxtaposed a functionalist conception of law with a sacramental conception of the church. According to Michael Fahey’s summary Ratzinger argued, “The sacramental view recognizes ‘pre-existing symbolic structures of creation, which contain an immutable testimony.’ The priesthood is not a career at the disposal of the institutional Church but is an independent, pre-existing datum.’

Thus, Ratzinger’s tendency is to stress the idea over the real and the existential, not unlike Plato’s famous allegory of the cave, in which the objective world of ideas lies beyond the world of appearances experienced in the cave. This suggests an a priori dimension to his theology. Others would argue that theology today must always be concerned with the real and the experiential, not just the ideal; praxis is important.

Augustine
The most formative influence on Ratzinger’s thought was Augustine (354-430), the great doctor of the church whose ecclesiology was the subject of Ratzinger’s doctoral dissertation. In an article about one of his most successful books, his Introduction to Christianity, Ratzinger acknowledged his debt to Augustine:

“Augustine has kept me company for more that twenty years. I have developed my theology in a dialogue with Augustine, though naturally I have tried to conduct this dialogue as a man of today.”

Augustine was to shape to a remarkable degree Ratzinger’s understanding of the human person, and of the world which we inhabit.

Ratzinger’s dissertation was on the church as the people and house of God. In it he contrasted the ancient Roman “city of the gods” and its cult with the true City of God now revealed in the church where true worship took place. True worship means human life lived according to God’s will and God’s revelation. Specifically, as we shall see, it means the Eucharist. But in a pagan state or secular society, when human activity is no longer governed by a proper relationship with God, the demonic takes over. When God’s law is not honored, life is no longer held sacred, materialism and consumerism rule, and the autonomous self emerges with all its self-aggrandizing tendencies. Ratzinger experienced this firsthand in the Germany of his youth, when Nazi neo-paganism brought the whole world into conflict. His experience of growing up under the Third Reich only reinforced the Augustinian cast to his theological sensibilities.

Augustinianism and Thomism
The contrast between Augustine and Aquinas can be overemphasized. Aquinas had great respect for Augustine and cited him more than any other author. Augustine was largely responsible for joining the Greek philosophical tradition, particularly that of Plato and the Neoplatonists to the Christian tradition of the West. He insisted that reason is to govern the other faculties of the soul, thus stressing the superiority of the rational over the merely experiential. Understanding was based on an isomorphism between what is known and what is, that is, between the structure of being and what is known, assisted by God’s illumination of the human mind. In this there is little difference between Augustine and Aquinas.

But Augustine’s epistemology was far more Platonic than that of Thomas, who depended on Aristotle, as we have seen. For this reason, the Augüstinian tradition has sometimes been described as “voluntarist” because it emphasizes the role of the will in knowing, in contrast to Aquinas’s emphasis on the intellect)8 True knowledge is based on a prior choice of the good; we know what we love. Because Augustine regards intelligence as at least damaged by original sin, he esteems wisdom, the gift of God, far more than knowledge. The doctrine of original sin remains one of Augustine’s greatest theological achievements, but it colors his view of the goodness of humankind, as would become so clear in the teaching of the Protestant Reformers, particularly as developed in the Calvinist doctrine of total depravity.

This Augustinian emphasis reappears in Ratzinger’s thought; he calls attention to the fathers of the church, who saw Jesus’ words “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they will see God” (Matthew 5:8), as the key to knowledge of God. “The possibility of ‘seeing’ God, that is, of knowing him at all, depends on one’s purity of heart, which means a comprehensive process in which man becomes transparent, in which he does not remain locked in upon himself.” Humility plays a key role in Ratzinger’s epistemology. He quotes with approval the words of his two mentors, Augustine, who said of his mother, Monica, a woman without the benefit of an education, that because of her simplicity of life she had reached the pinnacle of philosophy; and Bonaventure, who remarked of an elderly woman of deep faith that she “actually possessed more wisdom than the greatest scholars.” As Jim Corkery observes in reference to Ratzinger, “Augustine’s extolling of the humble believer over the proud philosopher surfaces repeatedly; and the point is frequently made that it is not proud philosophical insight, but humble, purifying faith that is needed for knowledge of the truth, for knowledge of God.” As Pope Benedict would write in his book Jesus of Nazareth, “The organ for seeing God is the heart. The intellect alone is not enough.”

In contrast, the Thomistic tradition is more intellectualist. While Aquinas, like Augustine, stressed that reason must work with faith, Aquinas tended to be more optimistic on what reason can know on its own. Our intelligence is “nothing more than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types.” In the words of Joseph Komonchak, intelligence “was a created power, resident in each individual and making the human knower the active co-agent in understanding and judging rather than the simply passive recipient that the knower appeared to be in the Augustinian view.” Thus, Aquinas had far more confidence in what intelligence could know; he taught that the intellect could grasp self-evident truths and had an important role to play in both philosophy and theology.

Ratzinger agrees with Aquinas that all knowledge begins with the senses, that there is a sensory structure to all human knowing, that even our way of thinking about God is dependent on and mediated by the senses, as we have seen. Even faith begins with experience, but it is never limited by experience. There is a self-transcending quality to faith that creates new experiences, allowing us to know something of the always greater God. But without faith, philosophy — that is to say, merely worldly wisdom — remains in darkness. Thus, from Augustine comes the distinction between wisdom (sapientia) and knowledge (scientia), so important for Ratzinger.

An Augustinian Pessimism
Ratzinger’s thought remains deeply influenced by the pessimism about the human evident in Augustine. The confidence one finds in Aquinas concerning the integrity of human knowing and willing is absent in Ratzinger. In many ways, Ratzinger’s instinctive attitudes toward human intelligence and thus its achievements in “modernity” show him to be much more like Jean Calvin and the Reformers than like Thomas Aquinas and his modern commentators. He frequently quotes Luther, and, like Luther, he emphasizes a theologia crucis, a theology of the cross that stresses the priority of grace over human achievement, philosophical reason, or ecciesial power.

Always he accentuates the sinful nature of the human person. In 1985 he told an interviewer that if he were to retire from his position at the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, he would return to the university and devote the remainder of his life to writing about original sin, for “the inability to understand ‘original sin’ and to make it understandable is really one of the most difficult problems of present day theology and pastoral ministry” His sober, if not pessimistic, Augustinian vision is evident in his lack of enthusiasm for what is for many Vatican II’s most optimistic document, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et spes.

As a peritus at Vatican II, Ratzinger was known as one of the progressives. He played an important role in the development of the conciliar texts on the church, divine revelation, and the missions. Yet he found problems with the text on the church in the modern world, precisely for conceding too much to the world. In his reflections on his experience at the council, published a year after it ended, he described a conflict between what he called Biblicism and modernity evident among the drafters of the constitution. Those advocating a modern theology, particularly certain French theologians, were legitimately concerned with using a language that contemporary men and women would understand. The text they produced was reasonable and polite, but Ratzinger found it problematic. He contrasted “the very plausible idea of man as a being called to subdue the world and free to decide his own fate” with “the Christological idea that man is saved by Christ alone.”

Suggesting that the text had opted for dialogue instead of engaging faith’s radical claim on human existence, it risked, in his opinion, reducing faith “to a kind of recondite philosophy.” In criticizing the schema for “an almost naïve progressivist optimism,” Ratzinger was touching on a theme that would come to dominate his thought when he moved from the university to Rome.

These same themes are present in his reflecting on Gaudium et spes more than fifteen years after the council’s close, indicating the consistency in Ratzinger’s thought. He acknowledged that the content of Gaudium et spes was entirely in keeping with the tradition. At the same time, he questioned its pre-theological concept of world, its emphasis on dialogue, and the “astonishing optimism” it displayed. Here his neo-Augustinianism emerges into focus. Some of the French and Belgian bishops and theologians who drafted the schema saw the “world,” with its scientific and technical mentality; as the counterpart to the church, and looked forward to a new cooperation with the world, in order to build it up. The council emphasized the concept of dialogue, seeing the relationship between the church and the world as a “colloquium” or conversation, as though both could enter into dialogue as equals.

Of course Ratzinger was suspicious of this emphasis. For him and some of the Germans, the world is the realm touched by sin, always in contrast to that of grace. And he found the assumption that nothing would be impossible if both church and humanity could work together simply too optimistic. What seemed to be missing was the “attitude of critical reserve towards the forces that have left their imprint on the modern world.” As Joseph Komonchak has observed, “The Augustinian distinction between science and wisdom would have offered a deeper epistemology than that of Aquinas, and greater emphasis on the Cross as the necessary point of contradiction between church and world would have enabled the council to avoid semi-Pelagian language and notions.” Ratzinger called Gaudium et spes a “counter syllabus” to the famous Syllabus of Errors of Pius IX (1864), acknowledging that it represented an attempt on the part of the council to reconcile the church to the new era that was inaugurated by the French Revolution; in other words, it was to be a reconciliation with modernity.

Another example of how his own thought is influenced by the heritage of Augustine is evident in his disagreement with his onetime colleague Karl Rahner. Specifically, he objects to Rahner’s insistence that what is truly human is truly Christian, as it seems to him to collapse God’s special revelation into a more general revelation readily accessible to human reflection. Thus, when Rahner says “He who.. .accepts his existence.. .says. .Yes to Christ,” Ratzinger argues that this means resolving the particular into the universal, denying the newness or uniqueness of Christianity or of Christian revelation. Furthermore, it seems to ignore the fallen nature of the human person. He writes that both Testaments teach “that man is what he ought to be only by conversion, that is, when he ceases to be what he is… A Christianity that is no more than a reflected universality may be innocuous, but is it not also superfluous?” It means a self-affirmation of the human person rather than the biblical call to conversion.

Here again, Ratzinger’s basically Augustinian view of the relationship between the divine and the human emerges; he stresses humanity’s fallenness, and thus the “ultimately paschal” character of God’s dealing with us, converting and transforming us, purifying us through grace.

Ratzinger’s anthropological writings embody a distinctive position, a definite “take,” on the relationship between nature and grace. This position emphasizes discontinuity over continuity; it indicates that the way of grace is the way of the cross; it puts the stress on grace healing and transforming nature (gratia sanans) more than on grace elevating and perfecting nature (gratia elevans). In itself, this is unsurprising, given Ratzinger’s preference for Augustine and Bonaventure over Aquinas.
Jim Corkery, “Joseph Ratzinger’s Theological Ideas” in Doctrine and Life 56 (2006)

Thus, Ratzinger’s discomfort with Rahner’s exaltation of the human is rooted in the Augustinian and Bonaventuran cast to his thought. It also illustrates how different his anthropology is from contemporary Western culture, with its optimistic attitude toward the human and its relativism regarding truth and value.

Bonaventure
Ratzinger did his Habilitation, the second dissertation required for a university chair in Germany, on the neo-Augustinian thought of St. Bonaventure. As he explains in his memoirs, since his dissertation on Augustine had dealt with ecclesiology, this new effort was to engage him with the theology of revelation. His work on Bonaventure was later to pay dividends at the council. But Ratzinger’s own attitude toward secular learning was to be deeply stamped by Bonaventure’s epistemology, and, even more significantly, his study of Bonaventure’s theology of history was to profoundly influence his understanding of eschatology.

At the time that Ratzinger took up the study of Bonaventure, European theology, particularly in Germany, had focused on the concept of salvation history, the idea that God’s saving plan for humanity is both worked out and revealed in a special history intermingled with world history. While Catholic scholars had also adopted this concept, Protestant thought tended to divorce a theology of salvation history from the metaphysics so important to Catholic theology. They rejected this joining of faith and metaphysics as a problematic “Hellenization” of the Christian tradition. To address this problem Ratzinger turned to Bonaventure.

Bonaventure’s Eschatology
Elected minister general of the Franciscan order in 1257, Bonaventure (1221-74) was caught up in an inner-Franciscan struggle with a group known as the “Spiritual Franciscans” or simply the “Spirituals,” disciples of a charismatic Cistercian abbot from Calabria, Joachim of Fiore (1135-1202). According to Joachim’s teachings, history is divided into three epochs or ages. The first was the Age of the Father (ordo conjugatorum). It embraced the period of the Old Testament, when God’s people lived under the Mosaic Law. The second was the Age of the Son (the ordo clericorum), the period beginning with the New Testament, in which God’s grace is mediated by the rites and sacraments of the church, administered by clerics or priests. The third was the Age of the Spirit (ordo monachorum), which Joachim proclaimed would dawn in the mid-thirteenth century introduced by St. Francis and his coinmunity. The Franciscans were the most spiritual of the traditional orders and would be the new and final order, representing the new people of God, the ecclesia contemplativa, arising out of the tribulation of the last days. Ratzinger translates this novus ordo as the “new People of God.” The Spiritual Franciscans saw themselves as representing the beginning of this new age of the Spirit.

While Bonaventure found much of Joachim’s thought problematic, not least for the tensions it had created within the Franciscan order, he also saw Francis as the sign of a new age, recognizing the possibility that this new age had actually begun. As Aidan Nichols says, “Bonaventure, just like Joachim, hopes for a new age of salvation within history. Between Jesus Christ and the final consummation of history he makes space for an ‘inner-historical transformation of the Church.” Bonaventure also taught that

[P]rior to history’s entry into God’s eternity there will be a “last age” in which the poverty of the church’s Jerusalem beginnings will blossom again in a reign of the poor on earth. Before the name “liberation theology” was ever heard of Ratzinger had to arrive at some judgment about this uncanny thirteenth century anticipation of liberationist eschatology.
Aidan Nichols, Thought of Pope Benedict XVI

One can see immediately where Ratzinger would have profound difficulties with Bonaventure’s vision. He objects that Bonaventure’s eschatology was raising “a new, inner-worldly messianic hope,” “a new salvation in history;” “an inner-historical transformation of the church” — all of which rejected the view “that with Christ the highest degree of inner-historical fulfillment is already realized so that there is nothing left but an eschatological hope for that which lies beyond all history.” It also amounted to making salvation something in history, rather than beyond it, relativizing if not replacing the unique role of the church by making it primarily contemplative rather than mediational, and anticipating a new mission of the poor against the covetous. What Ratzinger learned from his study of Bonaventure had a profound effect on his thinking, an insight or judgment that would return again in the face of new theologies of liberation with similar tendencies to place eschatology in history rather than beyond it, or to speak of a church of the poor, or to advocate modern congregationalist ecclesiologies that dispense with hierarchical mediation.

Bonaventure’s Epistemology
If Ratzinger was critical of Bonaventure’s theology of history, he also learned considerably from Bonaventure’s epistemology, which privileged the wisdom of faith over philosophy and the natural sciences. Writing in the mid-thirteenth century, a time in which the recent introduction of the thought of Aristotle was changing the traditional, largely Platonic understanding of theology Bonaventure saw theology as “nothing other than the understanding of Scripture.”~ Since Christ was the center of all things, philosophy for Bonaventure had to be radically Christian. But under the influence of the Aristotelians, philosophy was becoming increasingly self-sufficient, an autonomous discipline based on natural reason. While Bonaventure did not include Aquinas among the contemporary Aristotelians he was criticizing, he felt that Aquinas showed too much confidence in Aristotle. His own thought moved in another direction. According to Ratzinger, Bonaventure’s Collationes in Hexaemeron represented “a battle against a self sufficient philosophy standing over against faith.” It was not just anti-Aristotelian, but developed “into a general anti-philosophical attitude.”

There are of course parallels here between Bonaventure’s epistemology and Ratzinger’s. Ratzinger admires especially Bonventure’s absolute rejection of any philosophy not integrated into Christian wisdom. For both, Christ is the true wisdom. Komonchak refers to Ratzinger’s “Bonaventuran” theological vision:

“The gospel will save us, not philosophy, not science, and not scientific theology. The great model for this enterprise is the effort to preach the gospel in the alien world of antiquity and to construct the vision of Christian wisdom manifest in the great ages of faith before philosophy, science, and technology separated themselves into autonomous areas of reflection and activity.”
Komonchak, Church in Crisis, 13

Bonaventure, for whom Francis of Assisi was always a model, saw an essential relation between revelation and humility; the relation was such “that anyone who is entirely lacking in humilitas is also incapable of receiving any knowledge of revelation.” This emphasis, learned from both Augustine and Bonaventure, also becomes characteristic of Ratzinger’s thinking.  

Attitude toward Modernity
Given the Platonic and Augustinian currents in Benedict’s thought as well as his own personal history his evaluation of modernity is ambiguous at best. His Augustinian tendency to contrast ±e wisdom of the world with that of the church was certainly reinforced by his experience of coming to maturity in Nazi Germany. He looks back on the church and its teaching as the one bulwark against the destructive ideology of the Nazis: “she had stood firm with a force coming to her from eternity. It had been demonstrated: The gates of hell will not overpower her.”

While many have argued that his thought moved in a more conservative direction after the student revolts of 1968, much of which he saw as Marxist-inspired, Michael Fahey insists that his thought “shows an amazing consistency.” According to Joseph Komonchak, Ratzinger very early aligned himself with a stream of renewal represented by theologians like Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou, who advocated a ressourcement, or return to the sources of Christian faith and life. “He showed little interest in another stream (represented by figures such as Marie-Dominique Chenu, Bernard Lonergan, Karl Rahner, and Edward Schillebeeckx) which, inspired by Aquinas, proposed and attempted a positive engagement with modern intellectual and cultural movements.” Indeed, Ratzinger’s attitude becomes evident in his observation that the movement toward renewal in Catholic theology after World War I had been based on ressourcement, but since the council the emphasis has been on aggiornamento, so concerned with the present moment that “it regards any recourse to the past as a kind of romanticism.”

Benedict wants the church to be distinct from the world and its wisdom. He feels that a tendency to accommodate modem thinking has led to the loss of a sense of identity and mission for the church. Thus, his tendency is to return always to the sources of the faith in the scriptures, the liturgy, and the fathers of the church. But, important as this is, it makes him seem less open to advances in learning that could be identified as “secular” rather than “sacred.” In the words of one critic, he “sees all traditions and historical experiences outside his own as gray, while the castle of Catholic tradition that he inhabits is suffused with the deep reds and blues of stained glass and the flame of candles… .As the searchlight of orthodoxy and liturgy drown out the weaker voices of liberal critics.. .the Pope and the magisterium—the centralized authority of Roman Catholic wisdom—have no need to look outside for enlightenment.”

For example, like Pope John Paul II, who described contemporary culture as a “culture of death,” Pope Benedict in his installation homily used the metaphors of “desert” and “sea of darkness without light” to describe the contemporary world. While these metaphors may sometimes be meaningful, they also suggest that there are no values or advancements in understanding in contemporary culture from which the church might learn, for example, an emphasis on democratic structures, participation in decision making, transparency, the accountability of those in authority; and the principle of subsidiarity, which honors the right of smaller communities to make decisions appropriate to their life. This makes his approach seem overly negative.

Ethical Questions
His approach to ethical questions suggests a closed hermeneutical circle. He correctly argues that the scripture does not offer specific moral propositions but rather a structure; it points to reason as the source of moral norms. Here he sees three agencies at work: the Christian and human experience of the church at large, the work of scholars, and the listening and deciding undertaken by the church’s teaching authority. In Nichols’s words, the teaching charism of the pope and bishops “is not meant to substitute for the exercise of the experiential and learned elements in the Church, but to ‘place’ the results of the latter within a wider whole: the apostolic Church in its response to the apostolic revelation.” While this does not exclude doctrinal development in the area of morals, it does not presuppose it either.

Ratzinger, however, does seem to overload the church’s teaching authority with the presumption that it always knows the truth. He does not appeal to extra-ecclesial sources, for example, to advances in knowledge assisted by scientific research, sociological evidence, or psychology. The church today faces many questions that come from such advances, questions that are not answered simply from within the hermeneutical circle of scripture, the tradition, and the magisterium. What about what is learned through the sciences—can such historical data also become data for theology? For example, does the church need to rethink its discipline excluding those in second marriages without annulments from receiving holy communion, appealing to the principle of “economy,” as do the Orthodox? What about the relatively recent discovery of the concept of sexual orientation as given, not chosen, with increasing indications that it is determined very early in a child’s life or even before birth—does this have any implications for the church’s understanding of homosexuality? What about the many issues raised by advances in modern medicine, questions in the area of bioethics, such as the “end of life”? Has the church kept pace with a new appreciation of women in society; and the implications this might have for the church? Has the church sought to address these issues, drawing on the wisdom of its scholars and bishops and the experience of its faithful, or does it speak simply in the voice of the Roman congregations? Is there some wisdom, born of experience, from which the church might learn?

The apparently closed nature of Ratzinger’s hermeneutic circle has led some commentators to argue that he is not really open to what might be learned from other sources. As Komonchak observes, there are in his writings “very few positive references to intellectual developments outside the church; they almost always appear as antithetical to the specifically Christian.”

Theological Pluralism
The phenomenon of globalization has brought new challenges to the church and its theology; with the inevitable tensions between the local and the universal. How can a universal, multicultural church embrace theologies that reflect the unique insights, problems, and approaches that make up the diverse cultures of the Catholic Church? Can there be genuinely Asian or African theologies? Will Rome be open to the whole issue of theological inculturation? Or does the theological language that developed in the West become a standard for the newer theologies of Asia, Africa, or Latin America?

Many theologians today argue that effective evangelization depends on regional churches being able to develop their own theologies, reflective of their own contexts. Others are much more cautious, suggesting that local theologies pose a threat to the unity and universality of the church. In an early reflection on the highlights of Vatican II, Ratzinger seemed more open to local theologies. He observed that the implantation of Christianity in Asia had so far failed, in part because it had been unable to move beyond Occidental culture. “To this hour there has arisen no really indigenous Asiatic Christianity reflecting a genuine grasp of the spirit and culture of the Orient.”

Yet as prefect of the CDIF, Cardinal Ratzinger was reluctant to use the term inculturation. In 1993 he told the bishops of Asia that they should avoid the term, using instead inter-culturality. The idea of inculturation seemed for him to imply that “a faith stripped of culture could be transplanted into a religiously indifferent culture whereby two subjects, formally unknown to each other, meet and fuse.” Inter-culturality suggests a meeting of two cultures, such that one does not destroy, but can enrich the other. His point here is an important one. As Francis Schussler Fiorenza points out, Ratzinger does not think it possible to conceive of Christianity independent of culture. He fears that such a transcultural vision of Christianity would entail a loss of its distinctive Christian identity.

But he also seems to presume the normativity of Western culture for Christian theology In his interview with Vittorio Messori, he said that “there is no way back to the cultural situation which existed before the results of European thought spread to the whole world.” His 2006 academic lecture at Regensburg seemed to go even further. He pointed out that the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures produced in Alexandria between 300 and 200 BCE, was more than a mere translation; it was “an independent textual witness and a distinct and important step in the history of revelation” in which a profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place, evident in the later Wisdom literature. The New Testament also reflects this Greek spirit. Thus, for Ratzinger the Western rapprochement between faith and the use of human reason is part of biblical revelation; it is “part of the faith itself.

He sees Western thought as having moved beyond this synthesis between Christian faith and Greek reason, the result of the call for a “de-Hellenization of Christianity” that had already begun to emerge with the Reformation’s rejection of metaphysics, with its principle of sola scriptura. This same rupture of reason and faith was continued by liberal theology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and in the contemporary effort to argue that the early church’s synthesis of faith and reason under the influence of Hellenism is not binding on other cultures. Indeed, he argues that Christianity has more in common with ancient cultures, and, indeed, with other religions, both of which teach that humans must turn toward God and the eternal, than with the relativistic and rationalistic world of today that has cut itself loose from these fundamental insights.

While Benedict’s privileging of Western thought, at least in its historic synthesis of faith and reason, makes him less open to non-Western modes of thinking in principle, the point of his address at Regensburg was to insist that the modern, Western self-limitation of reason to the empirical and the demonstrable rules out a genuine dialogue with other cultures and religions, particularly with those that see the exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their deepest convictions. This of course was the main point of the address, which was largely lost because of the controversy over his remarks about Islam.

Nevertheless, Benedict’s point here was crucial. Without a concept of reason open to the questions of religion and the divine, a critical dialogue with religion that examines the rationality of faith remains for the West impossible. Nor will such a culture be able to enter into a genuine dialogue with a religion such as Islam, which looks upon Western culture as essentially atheistic.

Interreligious Dialogue
Ratzinger’s attitude toward dialogue differs considerably from that of his predecessor, John Paul II. In his encyclical Redemptoris Missio, John Paul affirmed that the “Spirit’s presence and activity affect not only the individuals but also society and history peoples, cultures and religions” (no. 28). In other words, for John Paul, the Spirit is mysteriously at work in some way in other religions. Though he holds firmly to Jesus as the one mediator between God and humankind, he also recognizes what he calls “participated forms of mediation,” which acquire meaning only from his mediation (no. 5).

However, Ratzinger seems much less willing to recognize the Spirit’s work in other religions. While the declaration Dominus Jesus, which came from Ratzinger’s CDF, quotes John Paul’s remarks in Redemptoris Missio (no. 55) that God “does not fail to make himself present in many ways, not only to individuals, but also to entire peoples through their spiritual riches, of which their religions are the main and essential expression even when they contain ‘gaps, insufficiencies and errors” (DI 8), it also distinguishes between faith as a supernatural virtue and gift of grace found only in Christianity and belief. James Fredericks asks:

Dominus Jesus concludes that “the sacred books of other religions, which in actual fact direct and nourish the existence of their followers, receive from the mystery of Christ the elements of goodness and grace which they contain.” If the grace contained in the Sutras and the Upanishads, the Qur’an, and the Dao-de king is from Christ and not merely the product of human wisdom untouched by grace, how then can Christians maintain a stark, un-nuanced distinction between “theological faith,” on the one hand, and “belief, in the other religions” which is merely “that sum of experience and thought that constitutes the human treasury of wisdom and religious aspiration”?

What emerges in Ratzinger’s language here is a characteristic distinction between the natural and the supernatural, reflective of his own Augustinian emphasis on the primacy of grace. Dominus Jesus, which came from the CDF under Ratzinger’s prefecture, spoke of those in other religions as capable of receiving divine grace, but added “objectively speaking they are in a gravely deficient situation in comparison with those who, in the Church, have the fullness of the means of salvation” (no. 22). In many ways Pope John Paul’s approach to other religions was more like Rahner’s, more willing to recognize the ubiquity of the Spirit’s presence.

Ratzinger’s emphasis on evangelization in Dominus Jesus, while making an effort to incorporate what Vatican II says positively about other religious traditions, is so focused on the need to evangelize, to recognize the equal dignity of persons but not of doctrinal content, and to announce “the necessity of conversion to Jesus Christ” even in interreligious dialogue (DI 22) that it fails to communicate a sense that to enter into dialogue with another religious tradition can itself be a truly religious act. It is not simply a means of evangelizing but a way of approaching the mystery of God’s truth, for these religions “often reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all men and women” (NA 2).

In a more positive essay, “The Dialogue of the Religions,” he outlines three principles. First, dialogue takes place not by renouncing truth but by entering more deeply into it. Second, while looking for what is positive in the belief of the other, we must be willing to accept criticism of ourselves and of our own religion. Third, dialogue is always a dialogical process. It does not replace missionary activity but is always aimed at finding the truth, at conviction, so that mission and dialogue become not opposites but rather mutually interpenetrate each other. The “dialogue of religions should become more and more a listening to the Logos, who is pointing out to us, in the midst of our separation and our contradictory affirmations, the unity we already share.”

Conclusion
Though Joseph Ratzinger was one of the youngest of the peritus at the Second Vatican Council, his instinctive tendency is much more toward ressourcement than aggiornamento. Few contemporary theologians are more rooted in tradition, particularly in the biblical and patristic tradition of the church. From his long years as a professor he is well read in contemporary theology and refers to it constantly in his work.

Yet his particular gift is to expound the tradition with a remarkable clarity rather than to reinterpret it creatively for new situations and problems. His optic on the human is colored by his love for Augustine. His own thought, often described as neo- Augustinian, has more in common with Augustine and the Reformers, especially with Luther and his theologia crucis, than with Aquinas or modern interpreters such as Kit! Rahner and Bernard Lonergan. While he contrasts Rahner’s theology as speculative and philosophical, conditioned by Suarezian scholasticism and its new reception in the light of German idealism and Heidegger, he characterizes his own intellectual formation as shaped by scripture, the fathers, and “profoundly historical thinking.”

Yet it is not clear how much historical consciousness has really shaped his thinking. There is a decidedly Neo-Platonic cast to his thought, deepened by his study of Bonaventure which has left him suspicious of any wisdom that is merely secular. At the same time, his preference for the idea over the real and the existential gives an a priori character to much of his theology and raises the question of how “new data,” whether from recent discoveries, from the social sciences, or from practical human experience, are integrated into his theological reflection. His tendency is to stress the supernatural over the merely natural.

His firm conviction of the complete character of the revelation of Jesus Christ (DI 4) makes him somewhat ambivalent in regard to dialogue with non-Christian traditions. His concern is always to safeguard the absolute truth possessed by the church, not just from the “acids of modernity” but also from the modern tendency to see all religions as equally valid ways to the truth, which is detrimental to the church’s mission. This is not entirely wrong. As Francis Clooney emphasizes, “in the West we have forgotten that dialogue is a search for truth, not simply a modus vivendi.” Benedict argues that if all religions are equal in principle, “then mission can only be a kind of religious imperialism, which must be resisted.” The truth of God’s revelation in Christ must be offered as a gift, but freely and in love.

Thus, an obvious strength of Ratzinger’s theology is his adamant refusal to let secular modernity define the rules of the dialogue. In his view, the West since the Enlightenment has cut itself loose from its Christian roots with its historical synthesis of faith and reason, reducing knowledge to a narrow model based on scientific reason and the criterion of verifiability. Christianity cannot be reduced to an illumination in the depths of the person; its nature is historical because it is based on events.

Even biblical interpretation has been subjected to this same rationalism. Without a place for the transcendent, or for Christian revelation, Western intellectual culture has settled for technical knowledge rather than wisdom. Rather than constructing a society based on shared moral values rooted in God’s revelation, modern society relies on social engineering. Religion has been confined to personal interiority thus to the realm of subjectivity Each person is left free to construct his or her personal faith.

Of course Pope Benedict rejects all this. His theology begins from the principle that God has spoken in our history, that the divine self-disclosure takes place in the person of Jesus, the Word made flesh. He has challenged secular rationality not just as a religious leader but precisely as a theologian. He wants scripture to be the word of God, not just another historical text. 

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Robert Browning and the Irony of Humility

July 6, 2010
 
 

 

Robert Browning

 

Anthony Esolen uses Robert Browning’s The Ring and the Book here to demonstrate how the richest irony presupposes truth and order. In his book Ironies of Faith he also shows how irony is used by Shakespeare, Herbert, Dickens and Gerard Manley Hopkins to reveal the mysteries of Christian faith.

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Before I define what irony is, let us examine what habits of mind are necessary for understanding so subtle a feature of language. Those habits are all the more necessary as the language of Christendom grows more distant and the culture more foreign.

Cleverness is not the answer. I would like to illustrate why by turning to a masterpiece of Christian poetry. Robert Browning wrote his longest and most difficult work, The Ring and the Book, precisely to show human beings failing to interpret correctly the actions and motives of one another. They fail not because they are dim-witted, but because their moral compromises limit their vision. Pride — and its concomitant assumption that everyone must be just like oneself, only not quite so intelligent or strong-willed — is the problem.

Browning derives his plot from the account of a notorious series of trials in late-seventeenth-century Rome. Violante, a childless wife, finds a woman of the streets who has recently given birth to a girl. She pays her for the baby and passes it off to her husband Pietro as their own. They christen her Pompilia , and together they live well enough for people with no hereditary title. ‘Worried that the secret of the birth will come out, Violante seeks to marry Pompilia away as soon as she can to someone with the title they lack. She finds one Guido, an Aretine and hanger-on at the cardinal’s court, no priest but enough of a cleric to claim ecclesiastical privilege. He is a short, middle-aged, cowardly, ugly, embittered, and poverty-stricken aristocrat. The marriage is a hugger-mugger affair, Pietro not even present. Guido expects a large dowry; Pietro imagines the wealth of Guido’s ancestral home. When that castle in Arezzo proves dilapidated and cold, and when Guido treats the parents with brute tyranny, they flee to their old home in Rome, leaving Pompilia behind.

There she bides, patient and unhappy, subjected to Guido’s tyrannical whims and to the obscenity of his brother, a canon of the church. When the parents suddenly turn about and attack their attacker, testifying that Pompilia was not their daughter (and that therefore Guido was not entitled to her dowry), Guido counters by attempting to tar her as an adulteress. Fic uses maids and “friends” to try to press Pompilia into compromising herself with a local priest, the dashing Giuseppe Caponsacchi. He goes so far as to compel her to “write” letters at his instruction: he holds her hand and forces the pen along, as she can neither read nor write, nor does she know the content of what he has her compose. Caponsacchi, however, who has never spoken with or met Pompilia but only looked upon her sad, strange beauty once and from afar, sees through the ruse and resists.

Pompilia entreats first the governor of Arezzo, then the archbishop, while weeping like a child, pleading to he rescued from the evil that threatens her, body and soul. But they are worldly men and cronies of her husband. They know better. They wink at the wickedness and tell her to go home. They have no ears to hear.

At that, Pompilia turns to her last hope. She has never spoken to Caponsacchi. By all rights she should know nothing about him. But she does know. She has looked into his eyes once and seen — her knight.

Browning dares the reader to play the archbishop or the governor, to smile and shake his head and say that such “knowledge” is for fairy tales and not for real life (whatever that is). But a true man is what Pompilia sees. She manages to send him a plea to come take her away. After some days of hesitation, for he knows that no one will understand, and that he is about to destroy the churchly career his superiors have chiseled out for him, Caponsacchi submits to the promptings of a holy love. He sweeps her away to Rome. Just before they arrive, they are overtaken by Guido and his henchmen — Pompilia sleeping in a bedroom in a wayside inn, the priest watching over her.

 So incriminating are the appearances that Guido might have slain her on the spot and been pardoned. But he is a coward; the priest raises a sword to defend Pompilia, and when the henchmen pinion his arms, the girl herself seizes a sword and raises it against Guido. At this point he retreats and decides to take legal action. The trial of charge and countercharge ends in stalemate: Guido is allowed to keep the dowry, Caponsacchi is removed to a retreat house, and Pompilia is committed to a convent outside Rome. When, a few weeks later, she is found pregnant, the court mercifully remands her to the home of her mother and father, under provision that she not leave. There she gives birth to a son, whom she names Cactano, after a recently canonized saint, for as she sees it, Guido has no part in this son — only heaven.

Infuriated by the perceived insult to his honor, Guido steals to Rome during Christmastide and knocks at the door where the family dwells. When they ask who is there, he utters the magic word, “Caponsacchi.” When Violante opens, he slashes her in the face. He and his fellows cut her mother and father to pieces, and give Pompilia what should have been a dozen death-stabs. But Pompilia does not die, not yet. Guido is discovered fleeing back to Arezzo and is brought to Rome to stand trial. Pompilia gives her full testimony from the bed where she will soon die — the testimony of a young woman in love, chaste love, with her champion, the gallant Caponsacchi The priest and Guido testify and Browning provides us with the “opinions” of the half of Rome that is for Guido, and of the half of Rome that is for Pompilia, and also of what he calls “Tertium Quid,” the sophisticates who see more keenly, so they think, than does either side of the rabble. We are likewise presented with the trial preparations of the prosecutor (the grandly titled Fisc) and the defense attorney — worldly men, not exactly had and not exactly good, full of themselves, and cutting a partly comic figure in their pretending to know everything.

When Guido is convicted and sentenced to death, he appeals to the pope, Innocent XII, himself old and dying. The pope responds that while, everyone might have expected Guido to long outlive him, as it is, in all his weakness the pope will live another day, while Guido shall not see the sun set again.

What Browning shows us in this tangle of purity and wickedness, and half-virtue and shadowy half-vice, is not only how difficult it is for us to “read.” That is what critics of Browning put forth: he is the poet, they say, of multiple points of view, himself coolly distant from judgment. We are granted the irony of seeing that the same events might he viewed in a variety of ways, with all kinds of arguments to justify them.

But the irony Browning relishes is deeper than that. The spokesman for “Tertium Quid,” a cool aristocratic skeptic, dismisses Pompilia’s claim of innocence as incredible and dismisses Guido as a coward who in part got what he deserved. And he expects the pope to do the “reasonable” thing, to commute the sentence. Tertium might well be a modern trader in literary criticism. He is well-heeled, smiling at outrageous claims either to surpassing virtue or to surpassing wickedness. He pretends to a careful examination of evidence, hut actually he works for self-advancement, whispering into the ear of his lordly master just what his lordly master is to believe of all the brouhaha. Yet the irony cuts against him and against all skeptics: for Browning reveals that Pompilia was not only innocent but miraculously pure. We who cannot believe are the ultimate objects of his admonition.

Pompilia is also the most acute “critic” in the poem — she, barely seventeen, who can neither read nor write, and who was married, as she says, “hardly knowing what a husband meant” (7.410). What makes her wise? Browning identifies it unhesitatingly. Pompilia’s humility enables her to move outside herself, to imagine what it might be like to be someone else. So she is the only one in the poem, aside from the similarly humble pope, to excuse the whore who sold her away:

Well, since she had to hear this brand  — let me!
The rather do I understand her now, —  
From my experience of what hate calls love, –
Much love might be in what their love called hate. (874-77)

So too she reads the virtue in Caponsacchi, though he — trained for worldly expectations, and having priested it so far among the gentry — struggles honestly and abashedly to find the same. And, ironically, she knows that others will “know” better:

So we are made, such difference in minds,
Such difference too in eyes that see the minds!
That man, yon misinterpret and misprise –
The glory of his nature, I had thought,
Shot itself out in white light, blazed the truth
Through every atom of his act with me:
Yet where I point you, through the crystal shine,
Purity in quintessence, one clew-drop,
You all descry a spider in the midst.

One says, “The head of it is plain to see,”
And one, “They are the Feet by which I judge,”
All say, those Films were spun by nothing else.” (7.918-29)

We judge by what we see, and unless we love deeply, we see ourselves. So will a cheat watch the fingers of everyone else at the card table.

What do the Romans make of the evidence? Most often, Browning shows, evidence is a motley’ thing, patched up with fads, haff—heard news, clichés, smug assumptions about how all people must be, self—satisfaction, and, in the case of the, professional Fisc and his hilariously slick—talking opponent Lord Hyacinth of the Archangels, the false alleys provided by a little learning and a heap of rhetorical trash. Pompilia, Caponsacchi, and the pope also have to weigh evidence; but humility opens their hearts to insight. Here is Pompilia, trying to express a joy in bearing a child who xviii never know his mother, but who will probably hear the lies:

Who is it makes the soft gold hair turn black,
And sets the tongue, might lie so long at rest,
Trying to talk? Let us leave God alone!
Why should I doubt tie will explain in time
What I feel non’, but fail to find the words? (7.1756—61)

Her words profess incapacity — and speak to the heart. God, who unties the tongue of the infant, will reveal to Gaetano the truth. An innocent child will hear when all the world is deaf.

The pope hears and understands. We meet him in his chambers, pondering the mystery of evil, knowing he is not long for this world, and wondering what fruit of all his shepherding he will have to show in the end. The world regards him as powerful, but the world is wrong. Consider with what humility and love he regards Pompilia:

Everywhere
I see in the world the intellect of man,
That sword, the energy his subtle spear,
The knowledge which defends him like a shield— Everywhere; hut they make not up, I think,
‘the marvel of a soul like thine, earth’s flower
She holds up to the softened gaze of God!
It was not given Pompilia to know much,
Speak much, to write a book, to move mankind,
Be memorized by who records my time.
Yet if in purity and patience, if
In faith held fast despite the plucking fiend,
Safe like the signet-stone with the new name
‘That saints are known by, — if in right returned
For wrong, most pardon for worst injury,
If there be any virtue, any praise,–
Then will this woman—child have proved — who knows? –
Just the one prize vouchsafed unworthy me. (10.1019-29)

No one sees what is really going on, says the pope; no one can read the narrative of the world from God’s point of view. Yet he sees, humbly enough, that the finest harvest from his priesthood may be just this one poor soul, the illiterate Pompilia, a “woman-child,” of whose virtue and sanctity Innocent considers himself unworthy. She never wrote a book, or even her own name. The papal historian will not remember her. But the Recording Angel will. Does that assertion strike the reader as credulous sentiment? Beware. The problem with skeptics and cynics is not only the faith they lose, but the faith they gain. It is what the pope identifies as Guido’s telltale mark, “That he believes in just the vile of life” (10511). On the night before his execution Guido can “see through,” with what he thinks is ironical acuity, the façade of the pope’s goodness:

The Pope moreover, this old Innocent,
Being so meek and mild and merciful,
So fond o’ the poor and so fatigued of earth,
So . . . fifty thousand plagues in deepest hell (11.55-58)

So the spokesman for “Half-Rome” can also “know” what a curly-haired young priest is all about, “Apollos turned Apollo” (2.794)1 He’ll not “prejudge the case” (68o), he insists, yet so far does prejudge it that he pieces events out with his own sly imagination, picturing the contretemps between Pompilia and Caponsacchi, things that never happened at all: “Now he pressed close till his foot touched her gown; / His hand touched hers” (803-4).

If we must he blind, would it not he better to be dazzled by a piercing light? In this way Pompilia is blind, and therefore she sees — and it is actually there — the virtue of a man, Caponsacchi, who is yet to become the man she imagines. If she is blind to the faults of a less-than-chastely spent youth, it is because she is dazzled by the greater light. These are her dying words, spoken as if even now Caponsacchi were her saving knight, and not she his saving damsel.:

So, let him wait Gods instant men call years
Meantime hold hard by truth and his great soul,
Do out the duty! Through such souls alone
God stooping shows sufficient of His light
For us i’ the dark to rise by. And I rise (7.1841-45)

Criticism and Gossip
THE RING AND THE BOOK is a storm of irony, currents and crosscurrents of knowledge and ignorance surefire plans foiled, certitudes that wither awry, and un-possibilities come to pass. To understand the irony we must adopt the stance of Socrates, who in humility, perhaps in mock humility, insisted that he was the only man in Athens who did not know anything. For irony, as we shall see, has to do with what people think they know, or what they think they can expect. All criticism that does not begin in the humility of wonder must end up as the one or the other half of Rome: when correct, correct by happenstance; pretending to analyze, yet studying nothing with that patience that invites us to learn from what is beyond us; mired in gossip, and often gossip with a clear incentive in money or prestige.

From gossip we learn nothing new. If Mrs. Jones flirts with the delivery man, we may find it shameless; but we know nothing more from our self-pleasing gossip than that she has done what we would not (usually, let it be noted, because we happen not to be tempted that way). But of what it might he like to be Mrs. Jones, or the poor workman, nothing. Gossip preempts, then deadens, our half-hearted attempts to enter imaginatively into the life of another. If we could glimpse the world for a moment through something distantly like Mrs. Jones’s eyes, our understanding of her action might be very different. We might then be ready to invite her to tea, or to lock her up. There is no logical reason to suppose that our imaginative entry into her world must make us think the better of her; the pope saw into Guido, and found the lizards of our lower nature. Consider how uncomfortable you would feel if your admirers could enter your thoughts for the twinkling of an eye.

But perhaps I have miscast the action. Most of us are not endowed with what Keats called “negative capability,” the imaginative power whereby we empty ourselves and assume the minds and souls of others. If we are to work our imaginations, we must love or hate. If we hate, we will, from our position of moral superiority, see our own vices smiling back at us, as Browning’s Romans do, the vices we would possess if we were like the people we judge; but, thanks he to almighty God or to a sound education, we are not like them. He whom I imagine is no better than I am. So the Fisc, to win his case for Pompilia, will not concede that she had any love affair with the priest, nor that she committed adultery (unless the priest took his importunate way with her while she slept). Fine; but see how his “defense” patronizes her supposed weakness of character and turns her into a common flirt:

And what is beauty’s sore concomitant,
Nay intimate essential character,
But melting wiles, deliciousest deceits,
The whole redoubted armoury of love? (9.229-32)

No beauty that reflects the grandeur of God, this. The Fisc’s vision is imaginative indeed, drearily so, and many “truths” of the petty and misleading variety can be derived from such a thing. We can happily note the small wickedness of others, and miss the darkness that is our own.

The truly educative act of imagination is spurred by love: that turn of the mind towards the fellow sufferer on his way to the grave. It may he tinged with pity; it need not be, and may be better if not. I turn towards him because he means something to me — he is as I am. Such an act of imagination begins in humility. I am no better than is he whom I imagine. I may be worse. In any case, I will be more apt to aspire to assume his virtues than to assign to him my vices. My understanding of him will thus be far subtler and far richer, far more fulfilling than if were moved by hate. For virtue is to vice as manliness is to machismo, as womanliness is to effeminacy, as any full-blooded reality is to its caricature. In this vision, by an act of humble imagination, I recast my inner world in the image of someone else.

Unfortunately, much of what passes for criticism is little better than idle gossip. Its initial spur is often not honor for the work of genius at hand, but the desire to say something clever. That is not fertile ground for love; thus, neither for the imagination. Yet the result can be impressive in a perverse way. Milton’s Satan, hating Eve, saw his own vices potentially in her, and thus could squat like a toad at her ear, imaginatively entering her and attempting to pollute her. Nor could Nietzsche have misunderstood the Bible so well had he not hated it so thoroughly.

With far less of fallen glory the same can be said of many a critic of Shakespeare, Chaucer, or Milton. Their words all but confess that they dislike the deepest beliefs these men either possessed or struggled vainly not to possess. Having delivered beauty, sex, love, sport, religion, education, youth, age family life, and even the care of newborns to an obsession with politics, the modem critic sees his own political face everywhere. Lorenzo and Jessica in the Merchant of Venice sing their rallying love-hymn to the night; the critic sees tiresome struggle for power. The traitor Macbeth is beheaded; the critic snickers and says that Malcolm will probably prove worse.

Emptying Ourselves of What We Think We Know
Is it possible to come to wrong conclusions on every important point? If our criticism were subject to random chance, we would be bound to get many things right. But the more intelligent we are, the more consistent our conclusions will be, and if we start from false principles, the more consistently wrong they will be. Take for example a young critic of medieval and Renaissance English poetry. Suppose that he is thoroughly conversant with the language of those old texts. Suppose also that he knows the history of England — and not just the wool trade or the tin mines or other now fashionable niches of economic history. Grant that he knows it well enough to place the poetry in its historic context, the better to understand what the words on the page mean. Grant him the rare knack for catching the well-turned phrase or the well-hewn line. Such a critic must still fail if he does not also understand what it might he like to believe in the Christianity which was the shared faith of Chaucer, Spenser. Donne, Shakespeare, Jonson, Herrick, Herbert, and Milton.

Can such an understanding he attained? If not, why read books? I am a great lover of the poet Lucretius, though he is a materialist and, for all practical purposes, an atheist, while I am not. When I read Lucretius, the skeptic, the satirist, and the scientist in me can relish his attack upon superstition. So could the ancient Christian polemicist Lactantius, who enjoyed the poetry and then used it as a sabre against paganism. But Lactantius could hardly have done so had he not entered into the spirit of Lucretius.

For the sake of understanding materialist poetry, then, I become provisionally and temporarily a materialist. As C. S. Lewis says, what the critic requires is not so often a suspension of disbelief as a suspension of belief. It is too easy to respond that such self-transformation is an illusion. Of course we cannot leave our minds behind. The point is that our minds possess myriads of possibilities, usually dormant, inactive, unrealized. Good reading sets them in motion. For the sake of Lucretius’ great poetry I allow the materialist in me to take the stage and declaim. That Lucretius’ voice is still bound up with my own does not matter. It could not he otherwise; nor do I require it. All I require is that humbling release of what I am and what I believe now, surrendering to what I might have been or to what I might have believed had I been more like Lucretius. I say with Alyosha Karamazov, who tries to understand his brother Ivan, “I want to suffer too” (The Brothers Karamazov, 287). I surrender in imaginative love.

Now there is a catch to this surrender. The farther you are from the faith of the author you are reading, the more readily you will acknowledge the need to surrender yourself, but the more difficult it will be. The closer you are to the author’s faith, the easier the surrender would be, could you ever he prevailed upon to see the need. In the case of Christianity, it is as Chestcrton puts it. You had better be in the faith completely or out of it completely. The worst position, if you want to understand it, is to be partly in and partly out, or to have a passing, culturally based familiarity with its surface. You are neither so familiar with it as to probe its depths, nor is it so strange that you are moved to approach it with care. You take the attitude of Petronius, or of “Tertium Quid,” You’ve seen it all before.

Apply a two-dimensional Christianity to the mature allegories of Spenser and Milton, and at once you will discover discrepancies and incoherence. Why don’t Spenser’s Guyon and the Palmer kill the witch Acrasia? Are they still tempted by her Bower of Bliss? Why do the devils in hell discourse on philosophy? Has Milton rejected his classical education? Are faith and reason to part forever? Many such false dilemmas arise because the critic has failed to understand the subtleties of the Christian faith.

And Christianity is the subtlest of faiths, yet of a wondrous simplicity “I thank thee,” Jesus observes with biting irony, “O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent and hast revealed them unto babes” (Matthew 1:25) The kernel of the faith can he grasped by a child. We are sinners. The Lord who created us not to sin sent his obedient Son to die for us. That Son rose from the dead to sit at the right hand of the Father. We may join him in heaven if we have faith.

Christianity is the opposite of a mystery religion: the creed is short and openly professed. Yet its simple tenets belie unfathomable depth. “Matter is a form of energy.” We all know this Einsteinian truth — a child could be taught it, and, to the limits of his capacity, really believe it. But what does it imply? What does it mean? “There are three persons in one God. Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Again, a child could learn the formula, but what does the Trinity imply? The wise and prudent are struck dumb. A religious anthropologist may chatter about the symbolism of three, and how all cultures attach a mystical importance to it, and on and learnedly on. But to the clean of heart it may reveal the mystery of existence itself. So Dante implies in his invocation to God:

O Light that dwell within thyself alone,
who alone know thyself, are known, and smile
with Love upon the Knowing and the Known.
(Paradise, 33.124-26)

Merely to exist, to be a knowable object, is to have been made by the God of knowledge who knows and is known, whose being is love, and who has loved into being all things that have been, are, and are to come.

Pride is blinding; the moral problem becomes epistemological.  Suppose we assume that the lanky fellow across the table is a dullard. When he remarks of someone else’s immorality, “For them as likes that sort of thing, that is the sort of thing they likes,” we will find our prejudice confirmed. The statement is tautological arid evasive. But if we knew that the man was Lincoln, we might see the wry condemnation hiding beneath the hayseed humor. We will know, when he assumes the self-deprecatory air, not to take him at his word. When we later discover the same man condemning that behavior, we will know that it is not he who is inconsistent, but we who underestimated him.

Irony and Knowledge
WHAT DOES THIS HAVE to do with irony and faith? Much, if we consider what irony is. Until fairly recently, most writers on irony have defined it as speech that means something other than (or opposite to) what is literally said. The problem with this definition is that it is at once too narrow, too broad, and beside the point. Liars mean other than what they say, but the lie is not in itself ironic; and you may, with irony, mean exactly what you say, but in a way that your audience (or perhaps a putative audience, more foolish than those who are actually listening to you) will not understand. The definition is beside the point, since moments of dramatic irony, or what some have called “irony of event,” may not involve speech at all, but only strange turns of fate.

Contemporary literary theorists have attempted to distill the essence of irony, that which underlies both the winking assertions of ignorance made by Socrates, and concatenations of events that seem (but only seem) to suggest design, or that demolish any sense of design. Irony, they assert, is a universal solvent: no theology or epistemology can contain it. It dissolves— — “deconstructs” every assertion of absolute truth

The trouble with this view of irony now prevalent in the academy is that it enshrines one sort of ironic statement or event and ignores the rest. Worse, the kind of irony it enshrines is destructive, and the first thing it destroys is irony. If there is no objective truth — if irony must undermine and destabilize — then, once we have noticed the fact, there is no more point for irony, just as it makes no sense for the skeptic to embark on a quest for knowledge, when there is no knowledge to be had. How, after all, does one then proceed. by irony, to undermine the “truth” that every truth can be undermined? If all speech is inherently slippery, why trouble oneself with the subtleties of irony? Why pour oil on a sheet of ice?

But in fact, irony commonly is used to exalt rather than undermine. It can stun us with wonder and raise our eyes to behold a truth we had missed. All kinds of unsuspected truths, particularly those combined in paradoxes await our attention, but we are too dulled by habit to notice. Then irony — verbal or dramatic — awakes us. Consider:

1. A bystander watches as a professor, holding forth to his suffering companion on the epistemological subtleties of irony, steps dangerously near a banana peel.

2. In King Lear, Gloucester tries to refuse the help of his son Edgar, whom he cannot see and does not know: “I have no way and therefore want no eyes; / I stumbled When I saw,” (4.1. 18-19)

3. In II Henry IV (and apparently in real life, too) the usurper King Henry, who had wanted to atone for his sin by fighting in the Crusades, removes to die in a room called “Jerusalem,” noting that it had been foretold to him that he would die in Jerusalem. (4.5 236-40)

4. St. Paul sings a hymn of Christ’s Atonement:

Let this mind be in you, which Was also in Christ Jesus: Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to equal with God: But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men: And being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; And that even tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father
(Philemon 2:5-11)

5. In Moliere’s comedy Tartuffe, the jealous husband Orgon squirms under the table where his wife Elmire has put him, listening as his protégé Tartuffe, the one man he is amazingly not suspicious of attempts to seduce her. (4.5)

What do the cases have in common? The first verges upon slapstick; the second involves a lesson learned in an unusual way; the third hinges upon a play on words; the fourth is a theological reversal of expectations; the fifth is a piece of staged ignorance. Each involves a problem of knowing. The irony lies in a stark clash between what a character thinks he knows and what he really knows. This clash is staged to let the reader or the audience in on the secret. We are, then, not merely watching ignorance, but ignorance unaware of itself and about to learn better, or at least about to teach by way of its own incorrigibility. The irony reveals, with a kind of electric shock, order where randomness was expected, or complexity and subtlety where simplicity was expected.

Each case involves a staged clash of incompatible levels of knowledge:

1.  The professor thinks he knows a lot about the subtlest things, but misses the humble and material banana at his feet. The bystander probably knows a great deal less about irony, but he does see the hazard and, if he possesses either a profound moral sensibility or none at all, will stand back to enjoy the tumble. The apparent intellectual hierarchy belies a richer order: the great intellect is not so wise. He “deserves” to slip, falling victim to the very thing, irony, about which he declaims so proudly. Had he known less about it, he might have looked to the sidewalk in time.

2.  Only after Gloucester loses his eyes does he ‘see” how rashly and unjustly lie has treated his son Edgar. The irony, a reversal of expectations accompanied by a deepening knowledge, is richly theological as well. For there is an order at work, bringing about Gloucester’s sight through blindness, and his reconciliation with his son through suffering. The man before him is that wronged son, whom he has seen in disguise and taken for one Tom-a-Bedlam, the “poor, bare, forked animal” that “un-accommodated man” is (King Lear, 3.4. 105-106). Now it is the wronged Gloucester reduced to misery who requires assistance from Mad Tom. Gloucester does not yet understand what his “way” is, why he has been blinded and what he must suffer still. He says he has no way, yet his meeting with Edgar shows that a way has been designed for him nonetheless. He will walk towards a final, terrible resignation to his punishment and reconciliation with his son. And Edgar wii1 he his eyes — his spiritual guide — along this way.

3.  We “know” that Henry might have died in any room or might have died falling from a horse on a holiday hunt. He had hoped to die in the Holy Land, and when he learns the name of the room, he finally sees the design and resigns himself to its justice. For us, that death feels right–better than if he had died a-crusading, better than if he had been hanged at the Tower of London. The usurper should not be granted a matyr’s death; better that he should he disappointed by his hope to expiate the crime. The place of his death reveals a more subtle order than either he or we had expected.

4.  The chasm between human expectations and divine will has never been sung more powerfully. The prophet cries, “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord” (Isaiah: 55:8), but here Saint Paul fleshes out that cry with specifics that seem impossible to hold simultaneously. If Christ is equal with God, why should He, or how can He, empty himself, making himself of no reputation?  How can God become obedient to God, obedient unto the shameful death on a cross? How can submission exalt? For Christ is not exalted despite his humility but in it and through it. For the believer, then, Paul’s hymn reveals complexities in the notions of equality and hierarchy: because Christ was the Son of God, He set aside that equality, and in his obedience He is set above all things in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. He is equal to the Father because he obeys.

5. This brilliant stage business shows dramatic irony at its purest. Of this double-plot no one, not even the audience, can see everything. Elmire knows she is chaste, but as she leads ‘Tartuffe on, to prove to her husband under the table what a fool he has been to trust the charlatan, she must worry lest her trick backfire and Tartuffe ravish her before Orgon manages to get out from under there. For she cannot see him, and cannot be sure that he will come to his senses even when he hears Tartuffe making love to her. Meanwhile Organ can only fry in imagination: he hears but cannot see the couple, and must restrain his wrath and jealousy long enough to let Tartuffe hang himself for certain. The audience, too, can see Tartuffe and Elmire, and so they know’ what Orgon must learn; but they cannot see Orgon, and must guess, from his awkward and frantic movements under the table, what must be going through his mind. Finally, there is Tartuffe, master trickster, steeped in ignorance, believing himself so clever yet missing so obvious a trick — for I do not think Orgon can remain as still as a chuchmouse!

It is, then, not the unexpectedness of a thing that produces irony—a violin flung at a man’s head is unexpected, but not ironic — nor is it ignorance that produces irony — after all, if he saw the violin he would duck. Irony arises, rather, from the ignorance of unseen or unexpected order (or, as it may happen, disorder), from the failure to note subtleties, or from seeing subtleties that are not there, especially when the ignorance and the failure are highlighted before observers are in a better position to see the truth. That is the sort of thing we feel as ironic. A violin flung at a man’s head is not ironic. A man missing a sharp as he tries to hum the Kreutzer sonata is not ironic. The same man botching Beethoven as the violin sails his way — now that is ironic.

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