Archive for the ‘Readings’ Category

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A Simone Weil Collection

April 15, 2010
 
 

Album Cover Photo, "The Death of Simone Weil"

Simone Weil by Susan Hanson
Considered by Nobel laureate André Gide and others to be “the most truly spiritual writer” of the 20th century, Simone Weil would no doubt be confounded by all the fuss. “I never read the story of the barren fig tree without trembling,” she confessed in a letter to her friend and mentor Father Joseph-Marie Perrin in 1942. “I think that is a portrait of me.”

Indeed, Weil wanted nothing so much as to lose her self altogether. “May God grant that I become nothing,” she wrote in a notebook entry that would later be included in Gravity and Grace. “We must become nothing, we must go down to the vegetative level; it is then that God becomes bread.”

An unlikely candidate for sainthood by anyone’s standards, Simone Weil was paradox embodied: she considered herself a Christian — a Catholic, to be more precise  — she came from a secular Jewish home and was never baptized; she was a pacifist but fought in the Spanish Civil War; she was a brilliant intellectual known for her anti-intellectualism, a member of the bourgeoisie who worked on a French assembly line for a year, a person who loved life and yet longed for– some would say hastened — her own death.

Born in Paris in 1909, Simone Weil was “peculiar,” to use biographer David McLellan’s term, almost from birth. At the age of three, for example, she supposedly refused a cousin’s gift of an expensive ring by saying, “I do not like luxury.” And just two years later, with the outbreak of the war in 1914, she gave up sugar and other hard-to-find foods as an act of solidarity with the soldiers.

As Weil would later admit, her belief in the value of sacrifice was shaped in great part by a story she heard as a child. Sitting at the bedside of her three-and-a-half-year old daughter, who was in the hospital recovering from surgery for appendicitis, Selma Weil entertained Simone with the tale “Marie in gold and Marie in tar.” As Weil friend and biographer Simone Pétrement explains,

The heroine of this fairy tale, who was sent by her stepmother into the forest, reaches a house where she is asked whether she wants to enter by the door in gold or the door in tar. ‘For me,’ she replies, ‘tar is quite good enough.’ This was the right answer and a shower of gold fell on her. When her stepmother saw her bring back gold, she then sent her own daughter into the forest. But when asked the same question, her daughter chose the golden door and was deluged with tar.”

For Weil, “tar” — whether in the form of physical suffering or intellectual obscurity — was always “quite good enough.”

A precocious child who was memorizing passages from Cyrano de Bergerac at the age of five and calling herself a Bolshevik by age ten, Simone Weil nevertheless saw her own abilities as mediocre compared to those of her mathematically gifted brother, André, who was older by almost three years. “The exceptional gifts of my brother, who had a childhood and youth comparable to those of Pascal, brought my own inferiority home to me,” she wrote in a letter to Father Perrin shortly before leaving France in 1942. “I did not mind having no visible successes, but what did grieve me was the idea of being excluded from that transcendent kingdom to which only the truly great have access and wherein truth abides.”

This lack of self-esteem notwithstanding, Weil was a brilliant student of philosophy, becoming an academic legend even before completing her work at the École Normale Supérieure in 1931. It was also during her years at the university that Weil became politically active, particularly on issues of peace and economic justice. So intense was her commitment, in fact, that many of her classmates found her “extremely off-putting.” As an illustration, David McLellan cites the following comment from a fellow student: “We tried to avoid her in the corridors because of the blunt way she had of confronting you with your responsibilities by asking for your signature on a petition . . . or a contribution for some trade union strike fund.” Though remembered by many for her humor and kindness, Simone Weil was nonetheless seen as a misfit—socially inept, physically awkward, and given to a style of dress that confirmed this negative image.

Following her graduation, Weil worked sporadically as a teacher of philosophy at a series of girls’ lycées. Her career was short-lived, however, not only because of her unorthodox—and largely unsuccessful—teaching methods, but also because of her passion for workers’ rights; between 1933-1937, she took an extended leave of absence, first to experience life as a factory worker and then to join a group of anarchists fighting in the Spanish Civil War. In Aragon, too, her ungainliness quickly became an issue. Because of her poor marksmanship, she was assigned to the camp cook, with whom she served until accidentally stepping into a pot of hot grease and being sent away from the front for treatment.

It was during the following year, which she spent on sick leave, that Weil traveled to Italy, a country whose art and music brought her great joy. Spiritually, too, she was feeling a new sense of life. As she put it to Father Perrin following her visit to a chapel in Assisi, “Something stronger than I has compelled me for the first time in my life to go down on my knees.” Equally powerful was her chance meeting in Solesmes, France, with a young English Catholic who introduced her to 17th century metaphysical poetry, most specifically George Herbert’s poem “Love.” Memorizing the lines, she would recite them again and again as a prayer. “It was during one of these recitations,” she later wrote to Perrin, “that, as I told you, Christ himself came down and took possession of me.”

LOVE by George Herbert (1593-1632)

LOVE bade me welcome; yet my soul drew back,
Guilty of dust and sin.
But quick-eyed Love, observing me grow slack
From my first entrance in,
Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning
If I lack’d anything.

‘A guest,’ I answer’d, ‘worthy to be here:’
Love said, ‘You shall be he.’
‘I, the unkind, ungrateful? Ah, my dear,
I cannot look on Thee.’
Love took my hand and smiling did reply,
‘Who made the eyes but I?’

‘Truth, Lord; but I have marr’d them: let my shame
Go where it doth deserve.’
‘And know you not,’ says Love, ‘Who bore the blame?’
‘My dear, then I will serve.’
‘You must sit down,’ says Love, ‘and taste my meat.’
So I did sit and eat.

Meanwhile, Weil’s health, fragile since childhood, continued to deteriorate. Years of self-deprivation, her chief means of identifying with the poor, had left her weak and increasingly vulnerable to illness. Rather than lamenting her condition, however, she considered her suffering to be a necessary step in her quest for truth. By renouncing the “I,” she believed, she was making room in her soul for God, the ultimate truth.

With the German occupation of France, and the mounting pressure on the Jews, Weil and her family immigrated to New York in 1942. As Leslie Fiedler put it, though, “America proved intolerable to her; simply to be in so secure a land was, no matter how one tried to live, to enjoy what most men could not attain.” Longing to serve with the French Resistance, Weil finally succeeded in being assigned to the office of the Free French in London, where once again she showed her compassion for the suffering of Europe by refusing to eat. Collapsing in April 1943, Weil was diagnosed with tuberculosis and sent to a sanatorium to recuperate. Though doctors were confident that she could recover, Weil ignored their recommendations of food and rest, essentially dying of starvation that August.

In the last years of her life in particular, Simone Weil increasingly found comfort in a God whom she described as “absent,” and in a consolation that wore the guise of suffering. “God gave me being in order that I should give it back to him,” she wrote in Gravity and Grace. “[H]e who gives us our being loves in us the acceptance of not being.” Like John the Baptist before her, Weil believed that “[h]e must increase, but I must decrease.”

Spiritual pilgrim though she was, Simone Weil remained outside the church to the end. Even in her attraction to Catholicism, she could not limit God to any dogma or creed; the very certainty of faith was for her a luxury to be shunned. For Weil, it was enough to gaze toward the empty place left by a God who was always just out of sight. “Attention animated by desire is the whole foundation of religious practices,” she wrote in “Forms of the Implicit Love of God.” “[L]ooking is what saves us.” Not possessing, not consuming, not controlling, but simply watching and waiting, expecting nothing, surrendering all.

What may be most admirable — and challenging — about Simone Weil is the ability she had to forego many of the assurances most of us demand. Content to live without certainty, she sought God in the darkness of faith, claiming nothing for herself. To Weil, what mattered was not finding or even seeking God, but simply waiting with open eyes, “looking” into the void.

I have no doubt that were she alive today, Simone Weil would be considered emotionally disturbed. Highly gifted, yet insecure, she often acted compulsively — and seldom in her own best interest. Rather than enjoying the life of privilege to which she was born, she chose to live in the midst of poverty and war; instead of fleeing from danger, she let herself be drawn into its heart, into a place where she could know the suffering wrought by injustice, violence, and hate.

Was she anorexic? By today’s standards, that would seem to be the case. Did she hasten her own death? To think otherwise would be to discount the facts. Psychologically healthy or not, however, Simone Weil also knew in some organic way that to desire God without the safety of dogma was to be possessed by God in return. Suffering for its own sake was debasing and cruel, but suffering with others was a means of encountering the divine.

John Marson Dunaway on Simone Weil
From all accounts, Weil was not an easy person to live with. And she is a decidedly difficult writer, in that she demands so much of her readers. One of the principle reasons for this rigid, inflexible, demanding character in both her writings and her interpersonal relationships is that she was so intolerant–toward herself as well as others–of any discrepancy between one’s beliefs and one’s way of life. Above all else she hated compromise, and her devotion to truth and obedience were significant contributing elements of her philosophy of vocation.

From Casablanca in 1942 she wrote to Father Jean-Marie Perrin: “My vocation imposes upon me the necessity of remaining outside the Church, without so much as engaging myself in any way, even implicitly, to her or to the dogmas of Christianity, in any case for as long as I am not quite incapable of intellectual work. And that is in order that I may serve God and the Christian faith in the realm of the intelligence.” (WG 40) There is an unusual clarity of vision that shines through these letters. This, of course, was well after the watershed moment when “Christ himself came down and took her” in the autumn of 1938 while she was reciting George Herbert’s poem “Love.” But I think we may trace an unusual clarity of calling growing in Simone Weil, even from quite early in her youth.

The immediately following passage from the letter to Father Perrin would apply almost equally well to the sense of calling evident even in her Marxist student days: “The degree of intellectual honesty that is obligatory for me, by reason of my particular vocation, demands that my thought should be indifferent to all ideas without exception, including for instance materialism and atheism; it must be equally welcoming and equally reserved with regard to every one of them.” 

Now one could easily question how well Weil lived out that intellectual honesty in regard to her own Jewish heritage or the legitimate contributions of the Roman Empire to world civilization. There she was certainly guilty of a certain prejudice or closed-mindedness. Yet even as she studied with Alain, she was already dedicated to achieving the kind of intellectual honesty that would be required for becoming the exemplary witness to the truth that she remains for us today. Alain’s Cartesian skepticism as a fundamental method of philosophical inquiry provided a check on Weil’s youthful impulsiveness and led her to discipline her thinking with much the same kind of rigid stoicism that characterized her physical regimen. Hence her strong emphasis on the purifying effect of atheism on the soul of the searcher for truth.

Here, as in all areas of life, Simone Weil adhered to obedience as the supreme virtue. “The carrying out of a vocation,” she writes to Father Perrin, “differed from the actions dictated by reason or inclination. … The most beautiful life possible has always seemed to me to be one where everything is determined, either by the pressure of circumstances or by impulses such as I have just mentioned, and where there is never any room for choice.”  No room for choice, actions being pre-determined. One gets here the impression of the beauty of the inevitability of suffering that shines through Greek tragedy, the heroic serenity of martyrdom. No wonder she envied the cross of Christ.

She explained her painful decision to leave occupied France in these terms. “It seems as though the decision to stay would be an act of personal will on my part. And my greatest desire is to lose not only all will but all personal being. It seems to me as though something were telling me to go. As I am perfectly sure that this is not just emotion, I am abandoning myself to it.” 

Her radical need to obey makes it easier for us to understand why she began to feel such torment and despair in 1943 when it became increasingly clear that she would never get back to her homeland to take part in the resistance effort. Francine du Plessix Gray writes that Weil “felt misunderstood and totally rejected, and had great doubts as to whether her writings were being heeded by anyone in London.” She wrote to Maurice Schumann that her work for the Free French movement would most certainly be ended soon not only by her physical fatigue, but also by “a moral limit … the ever-increasing sorrow caused by the sense that I’m not in the right place.” 

Her writings were not being widely circulated, and now her attempts to obtain a sacrificial mission in the resistance were falling on deaf ears. Her need for heroic action was being utterly frustrated.

Weil’s strong emphasis upon obedience provides a healthy counterweight to the tendency among some contemporary writers on vocation, who might lead us to understand it as an issue only for the privileged elite. After all, most people in the world even today quite clearly do not enjoy the luxury of contemplating which career path might fulfill their deep gladness. Instead, they desperately hope for whatever menial job that might come available as a means to put bread on the table. And later in this paper we shall look at how her unique vision of the mystique of labor seeks to suffuse all levels of work–from manual labor to corporate management–with meaning and fulfillment.

As in all good vocation literature, Weil talks about two different kinds of callings. If her specific purpose in life was to serve God with pure honesty in the intellect, such a goal was seen in the larger context of a general or universal call to perfection. What is unique in her description of this general vocation is that she takes great pains to divorce it from the concept of belonging to the mystical Body of Christ, the importance of which is in her eyes “one of the most serious signs of our degeneration. For our true dignity is not to be parts of a body, even though it be a mystical one, even though it be that of Christ. It consists in this, that in the state of perfection, which is the vocation of each one of us, we no longer live in ourselves, but Christ lives in us; so that through our perfection Christ, in his integrity and in his indivisible unity, becomes in a sense each one of us, as he is completely in each host. The hosts are not a part of his body.”

This state of perfection to which we all are to aspire would result in “une nouvelle sainteté,” a phrase that, while she did not borrow it from Maritain, she acknowledged him as having called for before her. Like the older Thomist philosopher for whom she had little sympathy, Weil saw that the moral complexities of the twentieth century called for a new kind of saintliness. And even though she used the word “exiger” (or “demand”), it was clearly a calling, a vocation.

Maritain’s originality had been to show that the call to saintliness was not limited to specially favored heroic exceptionality; it was a universal call, somewhat in the sense of the priesthood of all believers. But for Simone Weil, the new saintliness was not just on a different scale, but also of a different order. It was to involve a miraculous dose of genius.

A new type of sanctity is indeed a fresh spring, an invention. … It is almost equivalent to a new revelation of the universe and of human destiny. It is the exposure of a large portion of truth and beauty hitherto concealed under a thick layer of dust. More genius is needed than was needed by Archimedes to invent mechanics and physics. A new saintliness is a still more marvelous invention. … The world needs saints who have genius, just as a plague-stricken town needs doctors. 

One is reminded here of Weil’s insistence that all true artistic genius necessarily entails sainthood. Wherever there is celestial beauty she believed it was produced in saintliness. At first blush one might wonder how the necessity of genius for this new saintliness can square with the notion of its universality. Not all of us are called to be geniuses, one might object. However, we must also recall her conviction that genius is a realm where absolutely any one may have access simply by dint of genuine desire. So in that sense, we might say that Weil’s philosophy of vocation is universally applicable.

In many ways, The Need for Roots can be said to represent the most mature thinking of Simone Weil’s short life, having been written, as it was, in the final days in England that led up to her singularly stoic death in Ashford, Kent. It is there, at the conclusion of that book, that she gives her mystique of labor one of its most articulate forms. “Physical labour willingly consented to is, after death willingly consented to, the most perfect form of obedience,” she writes.  She assails the interpretations of Genesis 2 in which labor is seen as a curse, a punishment for Adam’s sin, insisting that the passage implies no disdain for work. Instead, she says “the belief in direct instruction in the various trades by God implies the memory of a time when the exercise of these trades was above all a sacred activity.”

“Labor,” she writes at the conclusion of The Need for Roots, (and she had physical labor particularly in mind) “should be the spiritual core of a well-ordered society.” And in her meditation upon Christianity and agricultural life she elaborated some details of how she envisioned such a society. “Manual labor is either a degrading servitude for the soul or a sacrifice. In the case of working in the fields, the link with the Eucharist, if only it is felt, is sufficient to make of it a sacrifice.” She recalls the innumerable comparisons in Jesus’ teachings between the life of the spirit and the daily life of the planter. The comparisons are extended to all professions and trades in her philosophy, but particularly to manual labor. The manual laborer, whether on a farm or in a factory, burns or consumes his or her flesh and transforms it into energy as a machine burns fuel, thus giving one’s body and blood to be transformed into the fruits of one’s labor (crops, livestock, manufactured goods).

In each trade, Weil identifies the relation to the Gospel in this rich biblical anagoge of work. “What is needed is … to find and define for each aspect of social life its specific link with Christ. … Thus, as religious life is distributed in orders corresponding to vocations, so in like manner would social life appear as an edifice of distinct vocations converging in Christ. … It is a question of transforming, in the largest possible measure, daily life itself into a metaphor with a divine significance, a parable.” Those of us who are teachers should remember that Jesus was the master teacher and read the Gospels from that perspective as a guide. Doctors can model their careers after the Great Physician. Builders can see him as the carpenter’s apprentice. Others can look for the many lessons in the Gospels concerning business, finance, the military, and so on. “Christianity should contain all vocations without exception since it is catholic.”

Simone Weil’s vision of a just society, then, was fundamentally structured upon this mystique of work, of labor, and of vocation. A significant influence in this regard was Alain, who had an unusually strong belief in the spiritual power of labor. Near the end of her life, she was seeking the most effective ways of causing the inner core of the Gospel to suffuse her world. Again in “Christianity and Agricultural Life,” she writes: “In a general manner, Christianity will only impregnate society if each social category has its specific, unique, inimitable link with the Christ.” 

Her own unique individual calling, she believed, was to intellectual life, to a perfect, unswerving devotion to truth. Yet her witness entailed brutal manual labor in factories, in the fields, and in non-combatant military service. Given her delicate health and physical weakness, these forays into manual labor could only hasten the coming of her premature demise. “Physical labour is a daily death,” she wrote in The Need for Roots, and how prophetic that comment became!

And her famous prayer of self- immolation (recorded in La Connaissance surnaturelle, 204-205) was even more excruciatingly and ironically prophetic when it painted the vision of utter decreation which she resembled at the hour of her passing: “that I may be a paralytic, blind, deaf, a senile idiot.” This woman whose ultimate calling was to the intellectual life prayed to be bereft of her intellect. It was the closest she could come to experiencing the cross of Jesus, for which she so often expressed a deep envy.

The deepest significance of Simone Weil’s philosophy of vocation, ultimately, shines forth in the organic unity of her thought and her life. In one who prized obedience above all and for whom there could be no more dreadful failing than not to live according to one’s convictions, this should hardly be a surprising discovery. “The universe, compact mass of obedience with luminous points. Everything is beautiful,” she writes in La Connaissance surnaturelle.  From this understanding of the world in terms of amor fati, which characterized her life and thought up to the moment of her encounter with Christ, she moved in her last four years ever more deeply into the way of mediation, of logos, of work as sacrament.

“That which in man is the very image of God is something that in us is attached to the fact of being a person but is not the person. It is the faculty of renunciation of personhood. It is obedience.”  She goes on to explain that in human relationships, the obedience of a slave does not make him resemble his master. Rather, it makes him all the more unlike the one who commands him. Yet in one’s relationship with God, the more perfectly obedient one becomes, the more one resembles the Almighty, like a son resembles a father or an image resembles a model.

“This knowledge,” she affirms, “is supernatural (Cette connaissance est surnaturelle).”  Weil must have been particularly attached to the great Kenosis passage in the second chapter of Paul’s letter to the Philippians, as well as verses such as Hebrews 5:8, in which Jesus, even though he was the Son of God, is said to have “learned obedience from the things which He suffered.” So for us, to expend our energy in labor with a view toward transforming our efforts into the fruit of the vine and the staff of life, the blood and body of Jesus, is the model of obedience in this sacramental understanding, not just of manual labor in the fields, but of all human work, thanks to the insights of supernatural knowledge.

It also subsumes affliction along with work in this all-encompassing theological vision of calling. “Supreme mediation, harmony between the why of Christ (repeated ceaselessly by all souls in affliction) and the silence of the Father. The universe (including us) is the vibration of that harmony.” 

In her “Letter to Joë Bousquet,” which was written in May of 1942 in London and was first published in Pensées sans ordre concernant l’amour de Dieu, Simone Weil explores the mystery of affliction in particularly luminous terms. For her, Bousquet was not just an unusually dear friend, he was also an extraordinarily powerful example of living redemptively with affliction. In her letter she writes that because of his paralysis, produced by wounds inflicted in war, he has the privilege of being very close to a breakthrough in supernatural knowledge. This breakthrough she describes in parabolic language with the myth of the chick hatching from inside its egg.

“The egg is the visible world,” she writes. “The chick is Love, the Love which is God Himself and lives deep inside all men, first as invisible germ. When the shell is pierced, when the being is outside, it still has this same world as its object, but it is no longer inside. Space has been torn open. The spirit, leaving the miserable body abandoned in a corner, is transported to a point outside space, which is not a point of view, from which there is no perspective, from which this visible world is seen in its reality, without perspective. Space has become — in relation to what it was in the egg — an infinity to the second or rather third power. The instant is immobile. All of space is filled — even if there are sounds being heard — by a dense silence, which is not an absence of sound, which is a positive object of sensation, more positive than a sound, which is the secret word, the word of Love that since the beginning has held us in his arms.” (Pensées 74-75)

Later in this same letter, Weil notes that it is only through affliction — or sometimes through beauty — that one is enabled to pierce through the egg into this kind of perspectiveless outer space where one sees the visible world in a way somewhat analogous to that in which an astronaut views it from the spacecraft. The suffering of affliction makes one cry out “Why?” just as the Christ did from the cross. Beauty can also elicit a “Why?” … “Why is this beautiful?”

“But rare are those who are capable of pronouncing within themselves this why for several straight hours. The why of affliction lasts for hours, days, years; it only ceases with exhaustion. He who is capable not only of crying out but also of listening hears the response. That response is silence. It is the eternal silence for which Vigny bitterly reproached God. But he did not have the right to say what is the response of the just to that silence, for he was not one of the just. The just love. He who is capable not only of listening but also of loving hears this silence as the word of God.” (Pensées 128-129)

The Romantic poet Alfred de Vigny — who fancied himself isolated by tragic exceptionality like Moses on Mount Pisgah and denied entrance into the Land of Promise — was indeed not one of the just. To Vigny, God’s silence was evidence of his absence, an absence which the poet was simply obliged to bear stoically in his own particular incarnation of the Romantic hero. The refrain of Vigny’s poem about Moses’s conversation with God on Mt. Pisgah reads: “Laissez-moi m’endormir du sommeil de la terre (Let me sleep the sleep of the earth).” God’s silence leads for Vigny to death — and not the death of the Hebrew leader who will rest in the bosom of Abraham, but only the extinction of rotting in the cold, hard earth.

For Simone Weil, the call of God was at least in some measure a silent call. But that silence spoke a rich world of wisdom. Obedience required the patience of living over an extended period of time with the why of affliction, as well as listening to the silence of God’s response. So her philosophy of vocation leads us ultimately to the sound of silence, and that silence requires supernatural knowledge for those who would hear it with understanding. “Necessity here below is the vibration of the silence of God.” (Pensées 129)

The Quoted Weil

By Fr. Edward Oakes
“Imaginary evil is romantic and varied, full of charm, while imaginary good is tiresome and flat. Real evil, however, is dreary, monotonous, barren. But real good is always new, marvelous, intoxicating.”

By Fr. Neuhaus
Everything was going just right for Christian Wiman.  He writes in American Scholar that he had found a reliable publisher for his poetry, moved into a good teaching position, and then moved on from that to assume the prestigious post of editor of Poetry. “But there wasn’t a scrap of excitement in any of this for me. It felt like I was watching a movie of my life rather than living it, an old silent movie, no color, no sound, no one in the audience but me.” For reasons he did not understand, he had given up the writing of poetry, or maybe, as he says, it had been taken from him. And with that loss was a loss of being alive. “I think most writers live at some strange adjacency to experience, that they feel life most intensely in their reaction to it.”

He recalls Simone Weil’s description of two prisoners in solitary confinement, separated by a stone wall. In time they found a way to communicate using taps and scratches. The wall separates and unites them. “It is the same with us and God,” writes Weil. “Every separation is a link.” But Christian Wiman was quite unlinked. Then he fell in love. Then he was married. And then he found out he had a mysterious cancer of the blood for which there was neither cure nor certain prognosis. “In those early days after the diagnosis, when we mostly just sat on the couch and cried, I alone was dying, but we were mourning very much together. And what we were mourning was not my death, exactly, but the death of the life we had imagined with each other.” “Then one morning we found ourselves going to church. Found ourselves. That’s exactly what it felt like, in both senses of the phrase, as if some impulse in each of us had finally been catalyzed into action, so that we were casting aside the Sunday paper and moving toward the door with barely a word between us; and as if, once inside the church, we were discovering exactly where and who we were meant to be.”

What began that Sunday morning continues: “So now I bow my head and try to pray in the mornings, not because I don’t doubt the reality of what I have experienced, but because I do, and with an intensity that, because to once feel the presence of God is to feel His absence all the more acutely, is actually more anguishing and difficult than any ‘existential anxiety’ I have ever known. I go to church on Sundays, not to dispel this doubt but to expend its energy, because faith is not a state of mind but an action in the world, a movement toward the world. How charged this one hour of the week is for me, and how I cherish it, though not one whit more than the hours I have with my wife, with friends, or in solitude, trying to learn how to inhabit time so completely that there might be no distinction between life and belief, attention and devotion. And out of all these efforts at faith and love, out of my own inevitable failures at both, I have begun to write poems again.

But the language I have now to call on God is not only language, and the wall on which I make my taps and scratches is no longer a cell but this whole prodigal and all too perishable world in which I find myself, very much alive, and not at all alone. As I approach the first anniversary of my diagnosis, as I approach whatever pain is ahead of me, I am trying to get as close to this wall as possible. And I am listening with all I am.”

We are all uncertain about what God wants us to do. That is to say, we do not know for sure. Of course it seems silly, when you’re well past middle age and have spent your life doing what you believe you’ve been given to do, to always be getting up in the morning or suddenly stopping in the middle of the day’s work to ask, “Is this what I’m supposed to be doing?” I mentioned this to a young man who is discerning whether he has a call to the priesthood, and he was shocked, perhaps scandalized. He said, in effect, “You mean after all these years of being a priest, of writing books, of editing and lecturing, of organizing so many projects, you still aren’t sure you’re doing what God called you to do? How am I ever to know that God is calling me to the priesthood?”

The answer is that we act in the courage of our uncertainties. I am fond of pointing out that the word decide comes from the Latin decidere, “to cut off.” You face choices — whether to be a priest, whether to go to this school or that, whether to marry a certain person, whether to pursue this line of work or another — and then you decide. And, in deciding, you have cut off the alternatives and pray you have decided rightly. But you do not know for sure. Or else you are trapped in the tangled web of indecision.

In this connection, I have had frequent recourse, both homiletically and personally, to one of the most liberating passages from Saint Paul — 1 Corinthians 4. He has been trying to explain himself and his apostolate to the Christians in Corinth. He doesn’t know whether he has succeeded, and then he says this: “But with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human court. I do not even judge myself. . . .

Therefore do not pronounce judgment before the time, before the Lord comes, who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart.” Do not judge before the time! I do not even judge myself! These are the words of a life set free from the tangled web of introspection and indecision.

I was thinking about the above while reading a recent and splendid book by John Peter Kenney on Augustine’s Confessions. The book is The Mysticism of Saint Augustine, and, in Kenney’s “rereading” of Augustine’s classic text, the emphasis is on the inescapably Christocentric character of Augustine’s experience. This is against the frequent reading of the Confessions as a psychological thriller, which downplays the specifically Christian and theological in Augustine’s story.

Augustine was, as everybody knows, a Neoplatonist, but a Neoplatonist with very important differences. In Neoplatonism, the ascending soul discovers its intelligible and “undescended” self in the eternal world of being as it moves from dialectical reasoning in time into pure intellect. Kenney writes: “After this transformative discovery, embodiment has no charm [for Plotinus]. But Augustine countenances no such direct access to an unfallen self. His helplessness, his habituation to sins, his tears of self-betrayal have taught him otherwise. And so have the importunity of divine grace and the providential emergence of Christ in his life, whose power effects the conversion of his wholly fallen soul.

Thus the contemplative soul cannot discover its real self within eternal wisdom, for there is no eternal self there to be recovered. Contemplation can only be an exercise in hope, the discernment of where the self may one day rest, if it should achieve its salvation. Thus, for Augustine, contemplation is inherently eschatological and, unlike in Plotinus, that eschatological hope is never realized by the embodied soul. It can only be actualized after death.” Precisely. Let no one judge before the time!

And Finally…
At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in every human being.

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The Introduction to Gravity and Grace — A View of Simone Weil

April 14, 2010

While Gravity and Grace is one of the books most associated with Simone Weil, the work as such was not one she wrote to be published as a book. Rather, the work consists of various passages selected from Weil’s notebooks and arranged topically by Gustav Thibon, who knew and befriended her. Weil had in fact given some of her notebooks, written before May 1942, to Thibon, but not with any idea or request to publish them. Hence, the resulting work, in its selections, organization and editing, is much influenced by Mr. Thibon, a devoted Catholic. His introduction to Gravity and Grace also serves as a good introduction to Simone Weil, a Christian mystic whose epigrammatic style has made her highly quotable. The quirky title of this blog is derived from her idea of paying attention. You might want to print some of this out and stick it on the front of your refrigerator…

Introduction by Gustave Thibon
Simone Weil’s writings belong to the category of very great writings which can only be weakened and spoiled by a commentary. My sole reason for introducing these texts is that my friendship with the author and the long conversations we had together clear away my difficulties in entering into her thought, and make it easier for me to replace in their exact setting and their organic context certain formulae which are too bald or need to be elaborated. We must, in fact, remember that we are here concerned, as in Pascal’s case, with simple waiting stones set out day by day, often hurriedly, with a view to a more complete building, which alas! never came into being.

The texts are bare and simple (This is the explanation of certain repetitions and negligences of style which we have scrupulously respected throughout) like the inner experience which they express. No padding is interposed between the life and the word; soul, thought, and expression form one block with no joins in it. Even if I had not known Simone Weil personally, her style alone would in my opinion guarantee the authenticity of her testimony. What is most striking in these thoughts is the comprehensiveness of their possible applications; their simplicity simplifies everything they touch; they transport us onto those summits of being from which the eye embraces in one glance an infinity of horizons one above the other. “We must welcome all opinions,” she used to say, “but they must be arranged vertically and kept on suitable levels.” Again, ‘“Whatever is real enough to allow of superposed interpretations is innocent and good.” This sign of greatness and purity is found on every page of her work.

Here, for instance, is a thought which wipes out the ancient quarrel between optimism and pessimism — that quarrel which Leibnitz could not settle: “There is every degree of distance between the creature and God. A distance in which the love of God is impossible: matter, plants, animals. Evil is so complete there that it destroys itself: there is no longer any evil: mirror of divine innocence. We are at the point where love is just possible. It is a great privilege since the love which unites is in proportion to the distance. God has created a world which is not the best possible but which contains the whole range of good and evil. We are at the point where it is as bad as possible because beyond is the stage where evil becomes innocence.”

Or there is this other thought, which throws light onto the problem of evil and reaches to the very secrets of divine love: “All created things refuse to satisfy me as ends. Such is the extreme mercy of God toward me. And that very thing constitutes evil. Evil is the form which the mercy of God takes in this world.” And. then there is this abrupt and final refutation of all such philosophers as Schopenhauer or Sartre who argue that the presence of evil in the world justifies a fundamental pessimism: “To say that the world is not worth anything, that this life is of no value, and to give evil as the proof is absurd, for if these things are worthless what does evil take from us”’

Or again, we find the law of the insertion of the higher into the lower formulated thus: “Every order which transcends another can only be introduced into it under the form of something infinitely small.” This completes and deepens the law of the three orders of Pascal. The world of life does indeed appear to be infinitely small in the midst of the material world: What do living beings represent when compared to the huge mass of the planet and perhaps of the cosmos? It is the same with the spiritual world in relation to the world of life: There are at least 500,000 living species on the earth of which only one possesses “il ben dell intelleto.” And as for the world of grace, it, in turn, appears infinitely small against the mass of our secular thoughts and affections: the Gospel illustrations of the leaven and the grain of mustard seed are clear enough evidence of this “characteristic of being infinitesimal which belongs to pure goodness.”

Impregnating the whole of Simone Weil’s work is the driving force of an intense desire for inward purification which comes out even in her metaphysics and her theology. Stretching out with all her soul toward a pure and absolute goodness of which nothing here below provides her with a proof, but which she feels to be more real than anything existing in and around her, she seeks to establish her faith in this perfect being upon a base which no strokes of fortune, no affliction, no surging waves either of mind or matter can shake. For that, it is important before all things to eliminate from the inner life all forms of illusion and compensation (imaginative piety, the “consolations” of religion, a crude faith in the immortality of the self, etc.) which too often usurp the name of God, and which are really no more than shelters for our weakness or our pride: “We have to be careful about the level on which we place the infinite. If we put it on the level which is only suitable for the finite it does not much matter what name we give it.”

Creation reflects God by its beauty and harmony, but through the evil and death which abide in it, and the blind necessity by which it is governed, it also reflects the absence of God. We have issued from God: That means that we bear his imprint and it means also that we are separated from him. The etymology of the word “exist” (to be placed outside) is very illuminating in this respect: We can say we exist; we cannot say we are. God who is Being has in a sense effaced himself so that we can exist; he has given up being everything in order that we might exist; he has dispossessed himself in our favor of his own necessity, which is identical with goodness, to allow another necessity to reign, which is alien and indifferent to good.

The central law of this world, from which God has withdrawn by his very act of creation, is the law of gravity, which is to be found analogously in every stage of existence. Gravity is the force which above all others draws us from God. It impels each creature to seek everything which can preserve or enlarge it and, as Thucydides says, to exercise all the power of which it is capable. Psychologically it is shown by all those motives which are directed toward asserting or reinstating the self, by all those secret subterfuges (lies of the inner life, escape in dreams or false ideals, imaginary encroachments on the past and the future, etc.) which we make use of to bolster up from inside our tottering existence, that is to say, to remain apart from and opposed to God.

Simone Weil presents the problem of evil as follows: “How can we escape from that which corresponds to gravity in ourselves ?”  By grace alone. In order to come to us, God passes through the infinite thickness of time and space; his grace changes nothing in the play of those blind forces of necessity and chance which guide the world; it penetrates into our souls as a drop of water makes its way through geological strata without affecting their structure, and there it waits in silence until we consent to become God again. Whereas gravity is the work of creation, the work of grace consists of “de-creating” us. God consented through love to cease to be everything so that we might be something; we must consent through love to cease to be anything so that God may become everything again. It is therefore a question of abolishing the self within us, “that shadow thrown by sin and error which stops the light of God and which we take for a being.” Without this utter humility, this unconditional consent to be nothing, all forms of heroism and immolation are still subject to the law of gravity and falsehood:

“We can offer nothing short of ourselves. Otherwise, what we term our offering is merely a label under which the ‘I’ is compensated.”

In order to kill the self we must be ready to endure all the wounds of life, exposing ourselves naked and defenseless to its fangs; we must accept emptiness, an unequal balance; we must never seek compensations, and above all we must suspend the work of our imagination, “which perpetually tends to stop up the cracks through which grace flows.” Every sin is an attempt to fly from emptiness. We must also renounce the past and future, for the self is nothing but a coagulation of past and future around a present which is always falling away. Memory and hope destroy the wholesome effect of affliction by providing an unlimited field where we can be lifted up in imagination (I used to be, I shall be…), but faithfulness to the passing moment reduces man truly to nothing and thus opens to him the gates of eternity.

The self should be destroyed in us from within, by love. But its destruction can also be brought about from without by extreme suffering and degradation. There are vagrants and prostitutes who have no more self-esteem than the saints, and whose life is confined to the passing moment. Therein lies the tragedy of degradation. It is irreparable, not because the self which it destroys is precious, for the self is made to be destroyed, but because it prevents God from effecting the destruction himself and robs eternalizing love of its prey.

Simone Weil makes a sharp distinction between this supernatural immolation and all forms of human grandeur and heroism. Here below, God is the feeblest and most destitute of beings; his love, unlike that of idols, does not fill the carnal part of the soul; to go to him we have to labor in the void, to refuse every intoxication of passion or pride which veils the horrible mystery of death, and to allow ourselves to be guided only by the “still small voice” of the Bible, which in the flesh we cannot hear and which goes unnoticed by the self. “To say to Christ as St. Peter did, ‘I will always be faithful to thee,’ is to deny him already, for it is to suppose that the source of fidelity is in ourselves and not in grace. As he was chosen, this denial was made known to all men and to himself. How many others boast in the same way — and never understand.”

It is easy to die for something forceful because participation in force produces an intoxication which stupifies us. But it is supernatural to die for something weak: Thousands of men were able to die heroically for Napoleon, while Christ in his agony was deserted by his disciples (the sacrifice was easier later on for the martyrs, for they were already upheld by the social force of the Church). “Supernatural love has no contact with force, moreover it does not protect the soul against the coldness of force, the coldness of steel. Only an earthly attachment, if it has in it enough energy, can afford protection against the coldness of steel. Armor is made of metal in the same way as the sword. If we want a love which will protect the soul from wounds we must love something other than God.”

The hero wears armor, the saint is naked. Now armor, while keeping off blows, prevents any direct contact with reality and above all makes it impossible to enter the third dimension which is that of supernatural love. If things are really to exist for us they have to penetrate within us. Hence the necessity for being naked: nothing can enter into us while armor protects us both from wounds and from the depths which they open up. All sin is an attack against the third dimension, an attempt to bring back onto the plane of unreality and painlessness an emotion which seeks to penetrate to the depths. This law is inexorable: We lessen our own suffering to the extent that we weaken our inner and direct communion with reality.

At the extreme limit of this process, life is entirely stretched out on the surface: We suffer no more except in a dream, for existence, reduced to two dimensions, becomes flat like a dream. This holds good for consolations, illusions, boasting, and all the compensatory reactions by which we try to fill up the hollows bitten into us by reality. Every empty place or hollow does in fact imply the presence of the third dimension; it is not possible to enter into a surface, and to fill up a hole is equivalent to taking refuge in isolation on the surface. The adage of ancient physics, “Nature abhors a vacuum,” is strictly true in psychology. But this vacuum is precisely what grace needs in order to come into us.

This process of “decreation,” which is the only way of salvation, is the work of grace and not of the will. Man does not pull himself up to heaven by the hair. The will is only useful for servile tasks; it controls the right use of natural virtues which are prerequisites of the work of grace in the same way as the plowman’s effort must precede the sowing. But the divine seed comes from elsewhere. . . . In this realm Simone Weil, like Plato and Malebranche, considers attention to be of far more importance than will. “We must be indifferent to good and evil, really indifferent, that is to say we must turn the light of attention equally on each of them. Then the good will triumph by an automatic phenomenon.” It is precisely this superior automatism which has to be created; it is not obtained by tightening up the self and “going beyond one’s capacity” (forçant son talent) for doing good (nothing is more degrading than a noble action performed in an unworthy spirit), but by arriving through self-effacement and love at that state of perfect docility to grace whence goodness spontaneously emanates. “Action is the needle that shows the balance. We must not touch the needle but the weight.” Unfortunately it is easier to tamper with the needle than to alter our own weight in these “golden scales of Zeus.”

So then, religious attention raises us above the “aberration of opposites” and the choice between good and evil – “Choice, a notion belonging to a low level.” So long as I hesitate between doing or not doing a bad action (for instance, possessing or not such and such a woman who offers herself to me, betraying or not betraying some friend), even if I choose the good I scarcely rise above the evil I reject. In order for my “good” action to be really pure I must dominate this miserable oscillation so that the righteous of my outward behavior is the exact expression of my inward necessity.

Holiness is like degradation in this respect This is the postulate of Hermes: the highest resembles the lowest — a central law of being of which Simone Weil gives infinite illustrations in her work. Thus the nonresistance of the saints is outwardly indistinguishable from cowardice; supreme wisdom ends in a sense of ignorance, the motions of grace have the inevitability of animal instincts. [“I have become as a beast of burden before thy face]; detachment is like indifference, etc. just as an utterly despicable man does not hesitate to possess himself of a woman if his passion demands it, or to betray a friend if it is in his interest to do so, a saint has no choice to make about remaining pure and faithful: he cannot do anything else; he goes toward goodness like the bee toward a flower.

Goodness which we choose by balancing it against evil has scarcely anything but social value; to the eyes of him who seeth in secret it proceeds from the same motives and is marked by the same vulgarity as evil. Hence the kinship often observed between certain forms of “virtue” and the corresponding sin: their and the bourgeois respect for property, adultery and a “respectable woman,” the savings bank and waste, etc. Real goodness is not opposed to evil (in order to oppose something directly it is necessary to be on the same level); it transcends and effaces it. “What evil violates is not goodness, for goodness is inviolate; only a degraded good can be violated.”

The soul engaged in the pursuit of pure goodness comes up against irreducible contradictions. Contradiction is the criterion of reality. “Our life is impossibility, absurdity. Everything that we want is in contradiction with the conditions or consequences which are attached to it. It is because we ourselves are a contradiction, being creatures, being God and infinitely other than God.” Have countless children, for instance, and you are bringing about overpopulation and war (Japan is a typical case of this); improve the material conditions of a nation and you are in danger of impairing its soul; devote yourself entirely to someone and you will cease to exist for them, etc.

Only imaginary good things have no contradiction in them: the girl who wants to have numerous offspring, the social reformer who dreams of the people’s well-being, etc., meet with no obstacles so long as they do not pass on to action; they sail gaily forward in a sea of pure but fictitious goodness; the shock of hitting the rocks is the signal which wakens them. We must accept this contradiction — the sign of our misery and our greatness — in all its bitterness. It is through fully experiencing and suffering from the absurdity as such of this universe where good and evil are mixed that we attain to the pure goodness whose kingdom is not of this world. “That action is pure which we can accomplish by keeping our intention totally directed toward pure and impossible goodness, without disguising from ourselves by any lie either the attraction or the impossibility of pure goodness.”

Instead of filling the space, which stretches between necessity and goodness, with dreams (faith in God as a temporal father, science, progress…) we must receive the two branches of contradiction just as they are and allow ourselves to be torn asunder by their distance. And it is in this tearing, which is as it were a reflection in man of the creative act which rends God, that we rediscover the original identity of necessity and goodness: “This world, in so far as it is quite empty of God, is God himself. Necessity, in so far as it is absolutely distinct from goodness, is goodness itself. That is why all consolation in affliction separates us from love and from truth. Therein lies the mystery of mysteries. When we touch it we are secure.”

He, therefore, who refuses to accept confusion is marked for suffering. From Antigone, whom the guardian of the temporal city called upon to go and love among the shades, down to Simone Weil herself, whom human injustice crucified until she was in her grave, affliction is the lot of all those lovers of the absolute who are astray in this world of relative things: “If we want only goodness we are opposed to the law which links good to evil as the illuminated object to the shadow, and, being opposed to the universal law of the world, it is inevitable that we should fall into affliction.” In so far as the soul is not completely emptied of itself, this thirst for pure goodness leads to the suffering of expiation; in a perfectly innocent soul it produces redemptive suffering: “To be innocent is to bear the weight of the whole universe. It is to throw in the counterweight to restore the balance.” Thus purity does not abolish suffering; on the contrary it deepens it to infinity while giving it an eternal meaning: “The extreme greatness of Christianity lies in the fact that it does not seek a supernatural cure for suffering, but a supernatural use of it.”

This mystery of suffering which “decreates” man and gives him back to God finds its center in the mystery of the Incarnation. If God had not been incarnate, man who suffers and dies would have become, in a sense, greater than God. But God made himself man and died on the Cross. “God abandoned God. God emptied himself: These words enfold the meaning both of the Creation and of the Incarnation with the Passion. . . . To teach us that we are nothing [non être] God made himself nothing.”

In other words God became a creature in order to teach us how to undo the creature in ourselves, and the act of love by which he was separated from himself brings us back to him. Simone Weil sees the essence of the mediatorial function of Jesus Christ in his assumption of the human condition with all that is most miserable and tragic in it: the signs and miracles constitute the human and relatively low part of his mission; the supernatural part consists of the agony, the sweat of blood, the cross, and his vain calls to an un-answering heaven. The words of the Redeemer: “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” which sum up all the agony of the creature thrown into the midst of time and evil, and to which the Father replies only with silence — these words alone are enough proof for her of the divinity of Christianity.

Man only finds salvation by living in the bare instant, renouncing the past and future. That rules out the modern myth of the indefinite progress of humanity, even when it is presented under the form of a divine education. There are few ideas which are as impious as this one, for it tends to make us seek in the future what eternity alone can give, that is to say to turn away from God. “Nothing can have a destination which is not its origin. The contrary idea, the idea of progress — poison. The plant which bears such fruit should be torn up by the roots.” This does not mean to say that humanity cannot acquire anything in the course of time but such progress, in so far as it is temporal, can never be indefinite; for duration always ends by devouring what it has brought to birth. Time, accepted as irremediably different from eternity, is for us the door opening onto the eternal: we must not make of it a substitute for eternity.

From this essential condition of salvation, the necessity of living in the pure, instantaneous present and of toiling regardless of results, Simone Weil draws a magnificent spirituality of manual work. Such work puts man into direct contact with the inherent absurdity and contradiction of earthly life and thus, if the worker does not lie, it enables him to touch heaven. “Work makes us experience in an exhausting manner the phenomenon of finality rebounding like a ball; to work in order to eat, to eat in order to work.

If we regard one of the two as an end, or the pair of them taken in isolation, we are lost. Only the cycle contains the truth.” But in order to compass this cycle we must turn from the future and rise up to the eternal. “It is not religion but revolution which is the opium of the people.”

Here below a thousand relative objects bearing the label of absolute come between the soul and God. So long as man does not consent to become nothing in order to be everything he needs idols. “Idolatry is a vital necessity in the cave.” And among these idols the social one of the collective soul is the most powerful and dangerous. Most sins can be traced back to the social element. They spring from a thirst to appear and to dominate. It is not that Simone Weil rejects the social clement as such; she knows that our environment, roots, and traditions form bridges, metaxu between earth and heaven; what she repudiates is the totalitarian city — symbolized by the “Great Beast” of Plato and.the Beast of the Apocalypse — whose power and prestige usurp God’s place in the soul.

Whether it shows itself under a conservative or a revolutionary aspect, whether it consists of adoring the present or the future city, social idolatry always tends to stifle and to replace the true mystic tradition. All the persecutions of prophets and saints are due to it; through it Antigone and Joan of Arc were condemned and Jesus Christ crucified. The social Beast offers man a substitute for religion which allows him to transcend his individuality without surrendering his self, and so, at small cost, to dispense with God; a social imitation of the highest virtues is possible by which they are immediately degraded into Pharisaism: “The Pharisee is he who is virtuous out of obedience to the Great Beast.”

Two nations of antiquity illustrate this idolatry of the collective soul: Israel and Rome. “Rome is the Great Beast of atheism and materialism adoring nothing but itself. Israel is the Great Beast of religion. Neither the one nor the other is likable. The Great Beast is always repulsive.” The conflict between Israel and Rome, in which Nietzsche saw the dual of two irreconcilable conceptions of life, was reduced for Simone Weil to a struggle between two totalitarianisms of the same nature. It must, however, be emphasized that her anti-Semitism, which was so violent that the continuity established by the Church between the Old and New Testaments was one of the chief obstacles to her becoming a Catholic, was of a purely spiritual order and consequently had nothing in common with what goes by that name today.

She had, for example, the same aversion for Hitlerian anti-Semitism as for the Jewish idea of a temporal Messianic rule. How many times did she not speak to me of the Jewish roots of anti-Semitism! She was fond of saying that Hitler hunted on the same ground as the Jews and only persecuted them in order to resuscitate under another name and to his own advantage their tribal god, terrestrial, cruel and exclusive. Her horror of the social idol was of course extended to all other forms of totalitarian mysticism and in particular to Marxism.

Even the Catholic Church, which, moreover, she admired in many of its aspects, did not escape her criticism as a social body. Its Jewish and Roman sources, its connection with temporal things, its organization and hierarchy, its councils, certain formulae such as “no salvation outside the Church” or anathema sit, and some of its historical records such as the Inquisition, etc., appeared to her to be forms (of a higher order, but nevertheless infinitely to be feared) of social idolatry. Yet she never ceased to believe in the divine presence and inspiration within the Church. “Happily, the gates of hell will not prevail,” she wrote toward the end of her life. “There remains an incorruptible core of truth.”

Such are the main lines of Simone Weil’s thought. The schematic nature of this exposition necessarily leaves on one side a thousand touches which give precision, strength, and balance to her doctrine. But an introduction, as its name suggests, can be no more than an invitation to cross the threshold.

I may say that my friendship and veneration for Simone Weil, the pain of losing her and the joy of finding her again each day above and beyond death, the fact that I constantly feed upon her thought, and, above all, the insuperable reserve with which all true intimacy is accompanied, combine to make the effort of detachment required of me in undertaking an objective and critical analysis of her work almost impossible.

I am a Catholic, Simone Weil was not. I have never doubted for a second that she was infinitely more advanced than I am in the experimental knowledge of supernatural truths, but outwardly she always remained on the borders of the Church and was never baptized. One of the last letters she wrote me shows very clearly her attitude with regard to Catholicism: “At this moment I should be more ready to die for the Church, if one day before long it should need anyone to die for it, than I should be to enter it. To die does not commit one to anything, if one can say such a thing; it does not contain anything in the nature of a lie…At present I have the impression that I am lying, whatever I do, whether it be by remaining outside the Church or by entering it. The question is to know where there is less of a lie…”

As to whether Simone Weil was a heroic lover of Jesus Christ, my conviction has never changed; all the same her doctrine, though it is within the orbit of the great Christian truths, contains nothing specifically Catholic and she never accepted the universal authority of the Church. Now a Catholic who has to assess the thought of a non-Catholic has difficulty in avoiding two opposite extremes. The first consists of applying the principles of speculative theology to the thought in question and mercilessly condemning everything which, seen from outside, does not appear to be strictly orthodox. This method has the advantage of railings, which are always necessary on the bridges leading to God, but used without understanding or love, it is in danger of degenerating into an abuse of the evangelical precept: “If thine eye offend thee…”

For my part, as I am neither a theologian nor specially entrusted with the defense of the deposit of Christian faith, I do not feel myself in any way qualified for such an undertaking. The last thing I want to do is to set myself up as an official theologian who, armed with a sort of Baedeker of divine things, presumes to pronounce final judgment on the report, even incomplete, of a heroic explorer. .. .

The second danger consists of trying, at whatever cost, to bend the thought one is studying into conformity with Catholic truth. That is a manifest abuse of the text, “Compel them to come in.” We think that whatever is true or pure in a human life or work finds its place naturally in the Catholic synthesis without being forced or twisted in order to do so. We have no need to grasp everything for ourselves like a miser trying to increase his treasure, for everything already belongs to us who belong to Christ.

It is not for me to decide how far the ideas of Simone Well are or are not orthodox. I will confine myself to showing — on purely personal evidence — how far a Christian can interpret these ideas in order to find nourishment for his spiritual life.

I shall be particularly careful not to pick a quarrel with Sirnone Weil about words. Her vocabulary is that of the mystics and not of the speculative theologians: it does not seek to express the eternal order of being but the actual journey of the soul in search of God. This is the case with all spiritual writers. When in the Dialogue of St. Catherine of Siena Christ says to her, “I am that which is, thou art that which is not,” this formula which reduces the creature to pure nothingness cannot be accepted on the plane of ontological knowledge. It is the same with the expressions used by so many mystics who speak of the poverty of God, of his dependence in relation to the creature, etc.: they are true in the order of love, and false in the order of being. Jacques Maritain was the first to show, with perfect metaphysical precision, that these two vocabularies do not contradict each other, for one is related to speculative and the other to practical and affective knowledge.

Two things in particular in Simone Weil’s work have shocked the few friends to whom we have shown her manuscripts. First, the absolute division which she seems to establish between the created world and a transcendent God, who has tied his own hands in the presence of evil and who abandons the universe to the sport of chance and absurdity: there is a danger lest this clean cut should lead to the elimination of the idea of Providence in history and of the notion of progress, and as a result to a misunderstanding of the values and duties of this present world. In the second place, her fear of the social element is likely to lead to the isolation of the individual in a proud self-sufficiency.

We repeat that Simone Weil speaks as a mystic and not as a metaphysician. We are prepared to admit, and we do so readily, that the tendency of her genius, which inclines her constantly to stress the irreducible nature of supernatural reality, often leads her to overlook the meeting places and transitional stages between nature and grace. Nothing is more certain than that she has misunderstood certain aspects of Christian piety. But that does not authorize us to assert that the aspect she describes is not Christian. No human experierice—if we except that of Christ—has ever embraced supernatural truth in its totality. St. John of the Cross, for instance, does not emphasize the same divine realities as St. Bonaventura. There are several schools of spirituality, and if we substitute the word “God” for “world,” we can say of the mystics what the poet said of men in general:

Dan jeder sieht die Welt in seinem Sinn

Und jeder siehet recht, so viel ist Sinn darin!

If, as the Gospel says, there are many mansions in heaven, there are also many roads which lead to heaven.

Simone Weil chose the negative road: “There are people for whom everything is salutary here below, which brings God nearer; for me it is everything that keeps him at a distance.” Is not this royal road of salvation, which consists of finding and loving God in what is absolutely other than God (the blind necessity of nothingness and evil…), strangely like the bare mountain of Carmel where man has as his guide just one single word: nothing? And does St. John of the Cross speak in less absolute terms of the nothingness of created things and of the love which binds us to them? “The entire being of the creatures compared with the infinite being of God is nothing, and thus the soul, which is a prisoner of what is created, is nothing. All the beauty of creatures is supreme ugliness before the infinite beauty of God. All the grace, all the charm of creatures is insipid and repulsive before the divine beauty. All the goodness the creatures contain is only the height of malice when it is in the presence of divine goodness. Only God is good. ..

Moreover, though the theology of Simone Weil rejects the idea of popular imagination, of a God who governs the world like the father of a family or a temporal sovereign, it does not in any way exclude the action of Providence in the higher sense of the word. There is no doubt that here below matter and evil exercise “all the causality which belongs to them”; the spectacle of the innumerable horrors of history is enough to prove that the kingdom of God is not of this world. (Does not Scripture describe the devil as the prince of this world?) Nevertheless, God remains mysteriously present in creation: without in any way changing the calamities which weigh upon us, his grace plays upon the laws of gravity like the sun’s rays in the clouds. This God “who is silent in his love” is not indifferent to human misery after the manner of the God of Aristotle or Spinoza. It is out of love for his creature that he appears to efface himself from creation; it is in order to lead him on to the supreme purity that he leaves him to cross the whole expanse of suffering and darkness, abandoned and alone. In tying his own hands in the presence of evil, in stripping himself of everything which resembles earthly power and prestige, God invites men to love nothing but love in him. “He gives himself to men either as powerful or as perfect—it is for them to choose.” But here below infinite perfection is infinite weakness: God, in so far as he is love, hangs wholly and entirely on the Cross.

Simone Weil is not in any way mistaken about the dignity and necessity of temporal values. She sees them as intermediaries — metaxu — between the soul and God. “What is it a sacrilege to destroy? Not that which is base, for that is of no importance. Not that which is high, for we cannot touch that. The metaxu. The metaxu form the region of good and evil. .. No human being should be deprived of these metaxu, that is to say of those relative and mixed good things (home, country, traditions, culture, etc.) which warm and nourish the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human life is not possible.” But these relative and mixed good things can only be treated as such by those who, out of love for God, have passed through the total stripping; all others make them more or less into idols: “Only he who loves God with a supernatural love can see means simply as means.”

Whatever she may have said about “choice, a notion of a low level” and about the absolute fruitlessness of voluntary action in the spiritual domain, Simone Weil does not, for all that, fall into quietism. On the contrary she constantly recalls that without strict diligence in our practice of the natural virtues, mystical life can be nothing but an illusion. The cause of grace dwells outside man, but its condition is within him. Simone Weil’s hatred for illusion, above all when it takes the form of sensible devotion and a kind of religious “Schwärmerei,” counterbalances everything which in so purified a spirituality might flatter the imagination or the pride. She liked to repeat, after St. John of the Cross, that inspiration which leads us to neglect the accomplishment of simple and lowly obligations does not come from God. “Duty is given us in order to kill the self…We only attain to real prayer after we have worn down our own will by keeping rules.”

She regarded with such suspicion any religious exaltation unsupported by a strict fidelity to the daily task, that the infrequent negligences of which she was guilty in the accomplishment of her duties—largely as a result of her delicate health—caused her to have bitter doubts about the truth of her spiritual vocation. “All these mystical phenomena,” she wrote at the end of her life, with heart-rending humility, “are absolutely beyond me. I do not understand them. They are meant for beings who, to start with, possess the elementary moral virtues. I speak of them at random. And I am not even capable of telling myself sincerely that I speak of them at random.”

Fully sharing the political ideas of Simone Weil as I do, I think it more becoming that I should not dwell on them at great length. Any other person but myself might make something very moving out of the story of this life in which, through the influence of reflection and faith, an essentially revolutionary temperament was gradually impregnated with the cult of tradition and the past. For Simone Weil never ceased to be a revolutionary. She was not, however, pledged to a chimerical future leading men away from reality, but devoted herself more and more to revolution in the name of an unchanging and eternal principle — a principle which has to be constantly re-established because it constantly tends to be degraded by time.

Simone Weil did not believe in an indefinite perfecting of humanity: she even thought that the unfolding of history gave proof of the law of entropy rather than that of unlimited progress after the style of Condorcet. There is no need to defend her on this point. I do not see how it can be heretical to hold (in conformity with the great Greek tradition) that “change cannot be anything but limited and cyclic.” As for her invectives against the “social Beast,” however excessive a form they may sometimes take, we only have to put them back into their context in order to be assured that they do not in any way constitute an apology for anarchy. “The social order,” she writes, “is irreducibly that of the prince of this world. Our only duty with regard to the social is to try to limit the evil of it. – .. Something of the social labeled divine; an intoxicating mixture which brings about every sort of license—the evil disguised.” But she adds immediately: “And yet what about a city? But that is not of the social order — it is a human environment of which we are no more conscious than of the air we breathe — a contact with nature, the past, tradition. A man’s roots are not of the social order.” In other words, social influence is both food and poison. It is food in so far as it provides the individual with the inner equipment necessary for living as a man and for approaching God; poison, in so far as it tends to rob him of his liberty and to take God’s place. The perpetual encroachments of the social order upon the divine — that incessant degradation of mystical conceptions into politics — afford strong enough evidence, today more than ever, of the seriousness of this last danger.

Mutatis mutandis, the same remarks are applicable to the Church. Obviously a spirit so hungering for the absolute as was that of Simone Weil would necessarily be somewhat lacking in a sense of historical relativity: the words nolite conformari huic a seculo (Be not conformed to this world.) were for her a commandment allowing of no reservations. She found it very hard to understand that certain concessions of the Church to temporal exigencies did not in any way involve its eternal soul: The beatification of Charlemagne, for instance, seemed to her a scandalous compromise with the social idol. Somewhere she speaks of the Church as “a great totalitarian beast.” What does that signify? Totalitarianism is characterized at the same time by a refusal of the all and by the claim to be all. As the Catholic Church is the messenger of the All here below it does not need to be totalitarian.

The accusation made by Simone Weil, in so far as it is well founded, can therefore only be applicable to certain members of the body of the Church who arbitrarily bolt the doors of love and truth, thus failing to understand the universal vocation of Catholicism. There is no question of reopening here — especially at a time when so many Catholics do not hesitate to provide whips with which to beat their Master — the discussions formerly caused by the idea of “the Church as a body marked by sin.” We will only state that when Christ said that “the gates of hell should not prevail,” he did not promise that everything in the Church would remain eternally pure, but that the essential deposit of faith would be saved, come what might. The Church is rooted in God: that does not exclude the possibility that the tree may bear dried up or worm-eaten branches. To have faith is to believe that the divine sap will never fail. The preservation of this “incorruptible core of truth,” to use the actual expression of Simone Weil, in the midst of all the impurities mixed into the body of the Church, constitutes, moreover, one of the strongest proofs of the divinity of Catholicism. The Church could only become a “great totalitarian beast” in so far as its human body were totally separated from its divine soul. This is an impossible hypothesis for the gates of hell shall never prevail. . . . Today it is seen as the last refuge of the universal faced with rampant totalitarianisms.

Thus with Simone Weil the expulsion of the social idol does not lead to religious individualism. “The self and the social are the two great idols.” Grace saves from the one as from the other. That is doubtless what Célestin Bouglé was trying to express in his own manner when he saw in Simone Weil while she was still a student “a mixture of anarchist and cleric…

Simone Weil can only be understood on the level from which she speaks. Her work is addressed to souls who, if they are not stripped as naked as her own, have at least kept deep within them an aspiration for that pure goodness to which she devoted her life and her death. I am not unaware of the dangers of a spirituality such as hers. The worst forms of giddiness are caused by the highest summits. But the fact that light may burn us is not a valid reason for leaving it under a bushel. It is not a question of philosophy here but of life. Far from claiming to set up a personal system, Simone Weil strove with all her power to keep herself out of her work. Her one wish was to avoid getting in the way between God and men — to disappear “so that the Creator and the creature could exchange their secrets.” She cared nothing for her genius, knowing only too well that true greatness consists in learning to be nothing. “What does it matter what energy or gifts there may be in me? I have always enough to disappear. .

She had her way: Some of the text attains to that impersonal resonance which is the sign of the highest inspiration: “It is impossible to forgive whoever does us harm if this harm lowers us. We have to think that it does not lower us but that it shows our true level.” Or again: “If someone does me harm I must want this harm not to degrade me — this out of love for him who inflicted it upon me and so that he shall not really have done harm.” It is in such ejaculations of humility and love, rather than on the systematic side of her work, that Simone Weil appears as a pure messenger. I have never ceased to believe in her. In publishing the following pages I extend this confidence to all the souls who shall come to her.

All the writings contained in this book have been taken from the manuscripts which Simone Weil confided to us personally. They were therefore all written before May 1942.  More recent work, which her parents have been kind enough to show us, has not been included here. We have ourselves chosen the extracts from the notebooks, in which they were interspersed with innumerable quotations as well as philological and scientific studies. We hesitated between two ways of presentation: either to give the thoughts of Simone Weil one after the other in the order of their composition, or to classify them. The second method seemed preferable to us. We are anxious to express our thanks to all who have helped and encouraged us in our work: the Reverend Father Perrin, Lanza del Vasto, M. and Mme. Honnorat (who were personal friends of Simone Weil), Gabriel Marcel, and Jean de Fabrêgues. In the checking and transcription of the texts

M. V.-H. Debidour, who kindly helped to translate the Greek quotations incorporated in the aphorisms, and our devoted colleague, Mlle. Odile Keller, have both given us an infinite amount of valuable help.

Gustave Thibon
February, 1947.

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Reading Selections from “Two Thomisms, Two Modernities” by Russell Hittinger

April 6, 2010

F. Russell Hittinger

From a reader of the essay: “It is rare that an essay aids one in understanding the landscape of one’s own faith community and tradition, but Russell Hittinger’s article did just that for me. Hittinger admirably illustrates how the bifurcation of two Thomisms—one focusing on the metaphysics of the Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae and the second concentrating on the social and political questions of the Secunda Pars—is intellectually untenable.

The fissure caused by this bifurcated reading of St. Thomas is perhaps more radical for Catholicism in America than Hittinger hints. He writes: “We need only survey the chronic and significant differences of opinion over the systematic grounding of natural law today, as well as the extraordinarily complicated and controversial skirmish lines over questions of moral theology, to see that this is so.”

Indeed, he is correct, but I suspect that the ramifications extend to liturgical questions, doctrinal opinions, devotional practices, attitudes toward ecumenism, ecclesiological models, understandings of authority, and the general understanding of how Catholics are in relation to the world at large.

Moreover, John Paul II clearly understood the divide in terms not only of the universal Church but also of the intellectual superficiality of reading one pars at the expense of another pars. The whole of his pontificate can be seen as a magisterial effort to restore the Church to reading the Summa as a whole. Every Sunday we pray at Mass that we believe in “one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church.” Intellectually, we should recommit ourselves to reading the whole Summa

Russell Hittinger is an internationally recognized contributor to major contemporary debates in jurisprudence, law, and ethics and has held professorships at the Catholic University of America, Princeton University, Fordham University, and New York University. Here he traces the historical background of the rise of two Thomisms and the two Modernisms in Catholic thought over the past hundred and fifty years and then tries to untangle them.

This seminal article in First Things back in 2007 it helped me sort out some questions that had been bubbling up as I approached the topic of Personalism in the thought of Jacques Maritain and later in John Paul II. Some highlights here:

Different Approaches to the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas
The past century and a half of papal teaching on modern times often seems a tangle: any number of different strands — theology, Thomistic philosophy, social theory, economics — all snarled together. And yet a little historical analysis may help loosen the knot. In fact, a careful reading of papal documents reveals one of the main causes of the tangle. Throughout Catholic thought over the past hundred and fifty years, there have run two entirely distinct conceptions of modernity and two quite different uses of Thomism — a combination of four threads weaving in and out of the Catholic Church’s response to the strangeness of modern times.

For example, several modern popes have championed the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, but they did so in very dissimilar ways. At times, a reactionary, legislative, and disciplinary form of Thomism was deployed, directed inward at members of the Church, chiefly about uses of philosophy in the study of sacred doctrine. At other times, Thomism was allowed to play a more constructive, synthetic, and open role, directed outward to the world, chiefly on questions of social and political order.

Views of Modernity
Meanwhile, modernity came to be seen in two ways. There were the economic, political, and legal problems of modernity — the aspects of modern life that made necessary the development of “social doctrine.” And yet modernity was also understood as a philosophical and theological system that displaced, or at least threatened, what could be called the praeambula fidei — the “preambles of faith,” which include the truths of natural reason, particularly on philosophical issues close to sacred doctrine.

An examination of the historical documents can trace each of these distinct threads — and, along the way, solve some of the puzzles of Catholic intellectual history. The two Thomisms and the two Modernisms do not line up, but their interplay helps explain how St. Thomas’ moral, legal, and political thought was gradually detached from his metaphysical and theological thought. And it helps explain, as well, why John Paul II used so much of his papacy in an effort to reunite the Church’s understanding of both Thomas Aquinas and modernity.

An Early History
Until the late nineteenth century, the word modern was rarely used for describing or listing errors. Indeed, in the eighteenth century Catholicism had comfortably — perhaps all too comfortably — adapted itself to many aspects of modernity. So, for instance, with the discovery of the New World and the rush of Catholic missions to far-flung lands, many Catholics understood that they were living in a new era of exploration, industry, education, art, literature, devotion, science, and philosophy.

The Reformation and the religious wars, culminating in the 1648 treaties of Westphalia, destroyed the old medieval common law of Christendom by creating a system of states having diverse confessional allegiances. A new common law, however, evolved among the peoples under Catholic rule. It was built on a complex and evolving set of treaties, informal agreements, and legal fictions through which the Church conceded to Catholic sovereigns rights over many aspects of ecclesiastical life — in exchange for which those sovereigns protected the Church from schism and supplied the resources for missions across the world. The sovereigns were deemed junior apostles, entitled to rule “in trust” the everyday life of the Church in Europe and her colonies.

Catholicism thus developed a remarkable symbiosis with the new system of modern sovereignty — so long as it was in the hands of Catholic families. This political system is what writers in the nineteenth century called the ancien régime, because Catholics had no living memory of any other order. But it was, in fact, neither ancient nor medieval. It was, instead, something quite modern — and for the Church it worked, off and on, reasonably well.

The French Revolution, however, upended this modern system of religious and political Christendom. France’s 1790 Civil Constitution of the Clergy gave church governance not to the mischievous yet familiar Catholic families but to the nation, and this French model soon spread elsewhere, particularly to the former European colonies in Latin America. The clergy became civil servants, elected by democratic vote. In other words, modernity saw the transference of rights that had once belonged to the Church itself. Catholic kings received those rights first, but the nation-states would soon inherit them — nation-states that were, as often as not, governed by a doctrine of often anti-Catholic laicism.

After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, the Congress of Vienna attempted to restore the earlier model of a religious sovereign — the union of throne and altar, brought back to tamp down the fire of social rebellion. Thus, encyclicals of the era urged Catholics to obey legitimate authority, beginning with the pope’s own temporal authority in the Papal States. But the revolutions of 1848 swept aside the Restoration, and, with the 1864 Syllabus of Errors, something we might call the Paper Wars commenced.

The Paper Wars and The Syllabus of Errors
The Syllabus of Errors derives from one simple historical fact: In 1860, Pius IX lost his Italian dominions to the House of Savoy, and the Papal States came to an end. The immediate effect was the removal of the pope from the political problems of governing, but there was a second and unexpected effect: Along the way, the papacy lost the inhibitions about speaking on political matters that actual rulers must have. But how should the Church speak? There had been no systematic political theology for two centuries, so Pius IX and his advisers cobbled together a number of pontifical statements and admonitions, grouped them under various headings, and fired away.

The Syllabus of Errors was the result. Attached to the encyclical Quanta Cura, the Syllabus lists eighty condemned propositions, and even the most sympathetic churchmen quickly realized the problem of carrying on a theological discussion in this way. Published in a new era of daily newspapers and the telegraph, the list of errors instantly reached millions of readers, nearly all of whom were confused.

The format was particularly vexatious: Almost every erroneous proposition is stated in the affirmative, leaving the reader to puzzle out the correct Catholic view by negation. So, for example, the eightieth proposition condemns the idea that the pope is obliged to “reconcile himself to contemporary liberalism.” The negation might be that “the pope is obliged not to reconcile himself to contemporary liberalism,” or it might be that “the pope is not obliged to reconcile himself to liberalism (though he could, if he wanted).” It might even be that “the pope is obliged not to reconcile himself to contemporary liberalism (but liberalism understood in some other way might be all right).”

Still, despite such confusions, Pius IX had a clear target in mind with the Syllabus. This was not a disciplinary encyclical on matters inside the Church. Over and over, in seventy-three of the eighty propositions, the Syllabus takes aim at the modern common law of Christendom. Pius IX flatly rejects the rights once exercised by Catholic sovereigns and then by nation-states. He declares, in effect, the independence of the Church not only in matters of ordinary governance (sacraments and the episcopacy) but also with regard to schools, religious orders, marriages, families, and sodalities.

Late in 1869, the First Vatican Council convened. Parts of the Syllabus were reworked into five chapters and twenty-one canons of the first draft of a conciliar document, De Ecclesia Christi, where they seemed to add up to something like a separation of the Catholic Church from the formerly Catholic states. In the end, the chapters and canons drawn from the Syllabus were dropped when the bishops could not agree about any overarching theory to unify them. They did agree that the Church is independent of the nation-states. And, on that principle, they reconfirmed the universality of the Church, giving the papacy universal jurisdiction to try to solve the problem, and went home.

Leo XIII
The result was that, when Leo XIII was elected pope eight years later, he inherited an incomplete revolution. He had no new catechism or full set of conciliar doctrines, and no part of the revolution had been canonically codified. He inherited a fact rather than a coherent theory.

At least two things needed to be put into some kind of synthesis: the Syllabus of Errors and Vatican I’s constitution for the Church, Dei Filius. The Syllabus would need to be converted not merely into negations but into a positive civil doctrine. For that matter, Dei Filius asserted that God is the “Lord of the Sciences,” that faith and reason have distinct yet mutually supportive objects and ends, and that the “assent of faith is by no means a blind movement of the mind.” The preambles of the faith, in other words, needed to be clarified and organized for modern times.

For his answer, Leo chose to move the school he had founded, the Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, from Perugia to Rome and to make cardinals out of two of its faculty members (including his brother). A year later, in 1879, he issued his great philosophical encyclical, Aeterni Patris.

Aeterni Patris insists that a sound philosophy is needed “in order that sacred theology may receive and assume the nature, form, and genius of a true science.” He advocated the wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas as the modern antidote: “While, therefore, We hold that every word of wisdom, every useful thing by whomsoever discovered or planned, ought to be received with a willing and grateful mind, We exhort you, venerable brethren, in all earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas and to spread it far and wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all the sciences.”

What Leo saw is this: The issues of faith and reason highlighted in Dei Filius could not be advanced by philosophical eclecticism. Since the sixteenth century, he complained, philosophical systems have “multiplied beyond measure,” and even Catholic philosophers have accommodated themselves to a curricular mentality that “depends on the authority and choice of any professor.”

Leo proposed that Thomas be held out as the “Master” whose doctrines must enjoy “excellence over others” — but his purpose was not to reduce the Catholic mind to a homogeneous Thomism. Rather, it was to achieve an integrated response to issues that were both theological and political. When we read Aeterni Patris as a whole, we see that Leo framed the revival of Christian philosophy chiefly in the context of the ongoing political problems: “False conclusions concerning divine and human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy, have now crept into all the orders of the State.” Indeed, throughout Leo’s work — in the some 110 encyclicals and other teaching letters — Thomas is rarely discussed or referenced apart from social and political problems.

Leo’s two aims — picking up the pieces from the Syllabus and fleshing out Dei Filius — were not without tension. In the subjects close to sacred doctrine, it was crucial to achieve a rather tightly organized account of the relation between philosophy and the deposit of faith. Even slight changes in the philosophy entail new estimations of the doctrine. Social and political issues, however, allow much more room for creative maneuver, and there emerged a kind of broad Thomism suitable for these issues. Thomists developed rather freewheeling accounts of the political, economic, legal, and social order, and they showed considerable ingenuity in making their accounts look continuous with the work of the Angelic Doctor.

A New Kind Of Paper War
Turning away from the example of Pius IX, Leo undertook a new kind of paper war. He took the outmoded structure of a medieval scholastic article (for example, what we find in St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae, with the question, the objections, the sed contra, the response, and the replies to objections), changed the questions, and rebuilt the article in the prose of an encyclical teaching. It was in part dialectic, in part systematic, and in part apologetic. There was no need to make lists of errors that would leave Catholics scratching their heads.

The affirmations to be negated in Pius IX’s 1864 Syllabus became affirmations to be affirmed in Leo XIII’s famous 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum — positive statements of Catholic teaching on modern social and political issues. The underlying Thomistic doctrine gave the body of work at least the appearance of coherence, and, as Leo’s papal successors, together with lay and clerical scholars, continued the project, there emerged a remarkably structured but evolving body of social doctrine.

Pius X
All of this makes more curious Pope Pius X’s sudden condemnation of Modernism, which appeared in two documents in 1907. On July 3 of that year, the Vatican published a decretum called Lamentabili Sane, containing a syllabus of sixty-five Modernist propositions to be condemned. Two months later, on September 8, the pope issued the encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis. Admitting that his exposition was unusually prolix and didactic, Pius X insisted that such was necessary to deal with Modernism as a “whole system,” indeed as “the synthesis of all heresies.” Modernists were accused of reducing revelation to experience, Scripture to history, and doctrine to evolving symbols.

If, however, we examine the condemnations with an eye to the pattern of two Modernisms and two Thomisms, much comes clear — for Pius X had gone back into the mode of making lists of errors, but he focused his attention not on social modernity but on the doctrinal and metaphysical aspects of modern thought. Lamentabili Sane not only listed sixty-five errors; to complicate matters, it also referenced the 1794 encyclical Auctorem Fidei, which condemned eighty-five further propositions in connection with Jansenism. A scrupulous scholar under ecclesiastical discipline now found himself reckoning with 150 propositions — 230, if the Syllabus of Errors is added in. Who could keep track of all these errors?

…For Pius, the sure sign of Modernism was derogation from, or even disparagement of, scholasticism. “Whether it is ignorance or fear, or both, that inspires this conduct in them, certain it is that the passion for novelty is always united in them with hatred of scholasticism, and there is no surer sign that a man is tending to Modernism than when he begins to show his dislike for the scholastic method.” To be heard carping at scholasticism was a ground for dismissing faculty and administrators at ecclesiastical schools.

Lest there be any doubt what is meant by scholasticism, Pius X issued in 1914 a motu proprio called  Doctoris Angelici, which put the Thomistic norm for studies (in degree-granting ecclesiastical schools) explicitly under precept from the Holy See. To curb the private opinions of professors, Pius X ordered that the Summa Theologiae itself be used as the text of the lectures and that professorial comments be restricted to Latin. The Thomistic fundamentals, or “capital theses,” were not to be “placed in the category of opinions capable of being debated one way or the other.”

A few weeks later, just before Pius X’s death, Cardinal Lorenzelli, prefect of the Sacred Congregation for Studies, published a list of twenty-four theses to be affirmed — including, at the very beginning, a statement of divine being as pure act, in contrast to the admixture of potency in creatures. In other words, these were metaphysical theses of just the sort that Pius X had said cannot be placed “in the category of opinions capable of being debated.” Everyone understood that Lorenzelli’s “XXIV Theses” were aimed in the direction of the sixteenth-century Jesuit scholastic philosopher Francisco Suárez, beginning with the doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures, which was not generally held by his followers.

The Two Thomisms
By the time Pius X died in 1914, the Vatican had in place two entirely different Thomisms, one broad and oriented to social questions, the other narrow and focused on capita that could not be debated. For a good example, look at the international congress in Granada that was planned for 1917, the third centenary of the death of Suárez. The Catholic press, of course, noted that the XXIV Theses had impeached the reliability of Suárez on certain questions of metaphysics. Moreover, the newly drafted Code of Canon Law (1917) required those in charge of religious and clerical formation to teach the “principles of the Angelic Doctor and hold to them religiously.” The congress did not fall under the discipline of canon law, but it was an awkward moment nonetheless, and Rome’s solution was to recommend that the congress focus on the social, political, and international-law aspects of Suárez’s thought. On these matters, one was permitted to avow an evolving line of thought and to celebrate its utility in handling modern problems.

And yet, beginning with Benedict XV, the papacy grew increasingly unwilling to enforce Pius X’s official Thomism, even within the seminaries and the religious orders. While the exhortations of Leo XIII and the precepts of Pius X were duly noted by Benedict and his successors, rigorous enforcement proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, only five months after Pius X’s death, Benedict said that there is room “for divergent opinions” so long as they constitute no “harm to faith or discipline” and so long as they are expressed “with due moderation.”

Pius XI’s Studiorum Ducem
With the disaster of the First World War and the rise of the totalitarian regimes, the papacy’s attention was funneled back into the social and political issues. The shift of magisterial attention to political modernity is particularly evident during the pontificate of Pius XI, who became pope in 1922. In the 1923 encyclical  Studiorum Ducem, he approvingly quoted Pius X’s admonition that there must be no deviation from Thomas in metaphysical issues. This core of metaphysical systematics must be preserved intact, even while allowing the “lovers of Thomas” to engage in “honorable rivalry in a just and proper freedom which is the life-blood of studies.”

But what is most striking about Studiorum Ducem is the interest in the social and political issues. In Ubi Arcano (1922), Pius XI had insisted: “There is a species of moral, legal, and social modernism which We condemn, no less decidedly than We condemn theological modernism.” Accordingly, in Studiorum Ducem he emphasized Thomas’ contributions “in the science of morals, in sociology and law, by laying down sound principles of legal and social, commutative and distributive justice, and explaining the relations between justice and charity.” He noted particularly “those superb chapters in the second part of the Summa Theologiae on paternal or domestic government, the lawful power of the State or the nation, natural and international law, peace and war, justice and property, laws and the obedience they command, the duty of helping individual citizens in their need and cooperating with all to secure the prosperity of the State, both in the natural and the supernatural order.”

“It is therefore to be wished,” Pius XI concluded, “that the teachings of Aquinas, more particularly his exposition of international law and the laws governing the mutual relations of peoples, became more and more studied, for it contains the foundations of a genuine ‘League of Nations.’”

Prima Pars Vs Secunda Pars
On paper, Thomas’ metaphysics remained the standard, but in practice Pius XI focused not on the prima pars, with its metaphysical armature, but rather the secunda pars of the Summa, on human conduct.
While Pius XI never separated the two Thomisms — his encyclicals are as elegantly synthetic as were Leo’s — he focused intently, in the 1920s and 1930s, on Thomistic resources for the political and social problems.

Remember the four threads we set out to untangle in the last century and a half of papal teaching — the two Thomisms and the two Modernisms. On the one hand, there was a constructive and open form of Thomism, which began as a way to discuss political and social issues. On the other hand, there was a legislative and disciplinary form of Thomism, developed originally to discuss sacred doctrines and the metaphysical preambles to faith. Meanwhile, there were two ways to understand modernity: first, as a set of social and political problems brought to a head by the French Revolution and the loss of the Papal States; and, second, as a defiantly nationalist, antireligious, and anti-Catholic philosophical movement.

It would be convenient if the two pairs lined up in what appears to be their natural order: the disciplinary Thomism used for philosophical Modernism, and the constructive Thomism used for political modernity. Unfortunately, that was not always the case, and the two Thomisms and two Modernisms cannot be aligned in papal documents without a great deal of guesswork.

Still, the disciplinary form of Thomism may have created more problems than it solved, even when properly applied to matters of sacred doctrine. Lists of errors and truths never really achieved the results for which they were designed. Whether in response to political or philosophical modernity, the syllabi sparked confusions and resentments. In the news-hungry environment of the modern media that emerged in the nineteenth century, these lists invited constant spin on the part of the Church’s friends and enemies. They did not substitute for a catechism, and they certainly did not equal the Leonine practice of encyclical teaching, which was more effective, both ad extra and ad intra.

Nor did the list-making approach play to the strong suit of Thomism, which requires not only definitions and conclusions but also a deeply textured set of questions and distinctions. The metaphysical issues were complex, subtle, and difficult on their own terms, never mind the practical questions of how to instantiate and enforce them in educational institutions. To put beyond debate the most intellectually challenging work of Thomas Aquinas did no favors for his heritage. A slight and passing familiarity with Thomas’ system, usually acquired secondhand and enforced as a party line, was almost bound to breed that kind of contempt that comes from bored students who know a little but not enough.

The Decline Of Thomistic Metaphysics
We often think of John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris (1963), with its long list of human rights, as the epitome of the Second Vatican Council’s spirit of aggiornamento. Of the twenty-five discrete rights listed in that encyclical, however, all but three are quotations or paraphrasings of Leo, Pius XI, and Pius XII. Moreover, by the time of Pacem in Terris, lay and clerical neo-Thomists — Maritain, Murray, Rommen, Journet, Simon — had produced a widely read body of scholarly literature on these subjects.

As ecclesiastical discipline declined precipitously in the 1950s and 1960s, systematic Thomism underwent a kind of defenestration. No longer privileged in the curriculum of either seminaries or Catholic schools, Thomistic metaphysics became a scholar’s specialty consigned to a chapter in the history of medieval philosophy. But we should not be surprised that in the topics related to human action — intention, choice, the moral virtues, natural law, and political philosophy — Thomism survived as worthy of study beyond the historical cubbyholes.

And yet the gradual separation of the social doctrine from the overall system of Thomas began to create the impression that the philosophy of practical reason was freestanding: a kind of first philosophy in its own right, connected to the metaphysical system and even sacred theology only by way of dotted lines. The two Thomisms ceased to be deeply integrated — with the secunda pars of the Summa Theologiae (on human action) read separately from the doctrine of providence, the metaphysics, and the anthropology of the prima pars. We need only survey the chronic and significant differences of opinion over the systematic grounding of natural law today, as well as the extraordinarily complicated and controversial skirmish lines over questions of moral theology, to see that this is so.

John Paul II’s Fides et Ratio
When he became pope in 1978, John Paul II inherited the problem of how to put the two Thomisms back together. As outward looking a pope as we have had since Leo XIII — as socially and politically concerned — John Paul II nonetheless saw that the solution required him to emphasize, throughout his pontificate, that Thomistic metaphysics demands study. Speaking at his alma mater, the Angelicum, on the anniversary of Aeterni Patris in 1979, he said that “the philosophy of St. Thomas is a philosophy of being, that is, of the ‘act of existing’ (actus essendi) whose transcendental value paves the most direct way to rise to the knowledge of subsisting Being and pure Act, namely to God.” In his 1998 encyclical Fides et Ratio, he again warned that theology needs both analytic rigor and a sapiential dimension drawn from a philosophy of being.

The real questions facing John Paul were, first, how to rekindle interest in sapiential philosophy without resorting to ecclesiastical imposition from on high, and, second, how to show its relevance to the practical problems. He found a solution that stood close to the genius of his magisterium. He contended in Fides et Ratio that anthropology is the nexus of the two Thomisms: “Metaphysics should not be seen as an alternative to anthropology, since it is metaphysics which makes it possible to ground the concept of personal dignity in virtue of their spiritual nature. In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and hence with metaphysical enquiry.”

Far from conforming human persons to a philosophical system, the Church has held Thomas as the master because humans themselves thirst for the kind of wisdom Thomas pursued and taught. The metaphysical questions are neither divine nor angelic, but human — because man himself stands at the frontier of matter and spirit. As John Paul II said: “The segmentation of knowledge, with its splintered approach to truth and consequent fragmentation of meaning, keeps people today from coming to an interior unity. How could the Church not be concerned by this? It is the Gospel which imposes this sapiential task directly upon her pastors.”

A Teacher On The Integrity Of The Human Person
Some have claimed that, in all this, John Paul II is subordinating both human action and metaphysics to a philosophy of personalism, but that misjudges his steady desire to repristinate (vocab: To restore to an original state) what Leo XIII had proposed in Aeterni Patris. We have come a long way from Pius X when John Paul II insists that the Angelic Doctor should also be called the Doctor Humanitatis. Thomas is recommended not as a tool for weeding out disorder within the Church but rather as a teacher on the integrity of the human person. There can be no social doctrine without reckoning with “the integral truth about what is real.” And there can be no efficacy in a systematic philosophy that loses sight of the vocation of the human knower to the whole of reality.

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Some Readings on Jacques and Raissa Maritain

March 19, 2010

First, some reading selections from “The Achievement of Jacques Maritain” by Michael Novak:

An Architect Of Christian Democratic Politics
Although the twentieth century was often proclaimed by the church to be the “Age of the Laity,” it remains true that most Catholic discourse is still taken up with the words of popes, bishops, priests, and sisters. Nonetheless, as in the nineteenth century so in the twentieth, a number of lay men and women have made intellectual contributions to religious discourse of such magnitude as to place not just Roman Catholics but the entire body of Christians in their debt. Of these, no one has been so influential in so many different spheres as Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), a man who, in addition to his intellectual stature, was widely esteemed for his holiness of life.

His range was truly catholic. Perhaps no one in any tradition has written more beautifully of the subject he addressed in his book Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. (So lovely is that book that often, while reading it as an undergraduate, I had to put it down and go for a long walk, my heart burning with more than it could bear.) In political and social thought, no Christian bas ever written a more profound defense of the democratic idea and its component parts, such as the dignity of the person, the sharp distinction between society and the state, the role of practical wisdom, the common good, the transcendent anchoring of human rights, transcendent judgment upon societies, and the interplay of goodness and evil in human individuals and institutions. Indeed, in the thrust that this body of thought gave to Christian Democratic parties after World War II, Maritain gained the right to be thought of as one of the architects of Christian Democratic politics both in Europe and Latin America.

A Giant of Catholic Intellectual Life
Nonetheless, it is perhaps in his profound grasp of the metaphysics of the philosophia perennis (vocab: An idea taken up by the German mathematician and philosopher Gottfried Leibniz, who used it to designate the common, eternal philosophy that underlies all religions, and in particular the mystical streams within them. The term was popularized in more recent times by Aldous Huxley in his 1945 book: The Perennial Philosophy). that one must seek the essence of Maritain’s achievement. More clearly and subtly than anyone else in modern times, and over a larger body of materials, Maritain grasped the “intuition of being” that animates the deepest stratum of Catholic intellectual life. For him, this was at once an intuition of charity as well as of being. He chose most often to express this intuition philosophically — philosophy, not theology, was his vocation — but his vision of caritas, “the Love that moves the sun and all the stars,” broke through over and over again.

A number of critics have pointed out that of all Maritain’s books no doubt the most seminal, like a pebble plunked in a quiet pool and rippling outwards in ever-expanding circles, is his tiny Existence and the Existent. This “Essay on Christian Existentialism,” a difficult and dense but immensely pregnant book, lies at the heart of his work. Its brief 142 pages were penned in Rome from January through April of 1947, as much of Europe still lay in the ruins of war and as the terribly disappointing Cold War of the subsequent era was just beginning. Its five compact chapters, it is safe to predict, will echo in the world’s thinking for generations to come. Indeed, their full meaning is likely to become more apparent in the future than at the time of the book’s first appearance, as thinkers from other world traditions engage its arguments.

Limits of His Achievements
I would not suggest that there are no faults or limits in Maritain’s achievement. Concerned as much as he was for the poor (or, as he usually expressed it in the vulgar Marxism current at the time, the “workers”), it is surprising how little sustained attention Maritain gave to the most significant new discipline of post-medieval times, political economy, with the accent on economy. Maritain came to the problems of politics and society rather late in his reflections and then, having achieved much, never took up a study of the great economic classics, especially those of the Austrian and Anglo-American worlds. Further, much as he admired the United States — a civilization, he felt, full of reverberations of the realities to which he was trying to point in Integral Humanism — Maritain never fully grappled with such classics of American political economy as The Federalist, his fellow Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, or the writings of Abraham Lincoln.

His Writing Style
On the whole, Maritain wrote a beautiful prose, a prose that reaches the heart and the imagination more than that of most philosophers, even while manifesting a Thomist love of exquisite clarity, particularly in the making of distinctions. To read him on any subject is to be forced to look, through such distinctions, from many angles of vision at once. And all for the sake of unity: “To distinguish in order to unite” was a most suitable motto for his life’s work. He had a passion for clear and precise ideas, distinguished sharply from their nearest neighbors, as well as for the relations that tie each idea to every other. Sometimes, indeed, he tried to capture too much at once, piling up within a single sentence distinctions within distinctions or introducing an analogous aside, all the while trying to encapsulate an entire argument. Many of his sentences require rereading. But the effort is almost always worthwhile, for Maritain’s true conversation partners were less his contemporary critics than the classics, whose intricate treasures he did not wish to muffle, encrust, or belittle by oversimplification.

In the autumn of 1960, in one of my first conversations with a full professor in Harvard’s philosophy department, a teacher of metaphysics and ethics who confessed cheerily that he deeply admired Hume’s happy atheism mentioned how nonetheless deeply impressed be bad been with Jacques Maritain during the latter’s presence on campus. “He was perhaps the most saintly philosopher I have ever known,” be said, “gentle, kind, honest, almost childlike. Of course, I didn’t agree with a single position he took. But I did come to admire him a great deal.” This was meant to be a warning to me, of course; I, also a Catholic, should not expect an easy time at Harvard. Yet it was also meant as a token of esteem for a significant tradition and a remarkable thinker: no small tribute considering its source.

Understanding Fragility
That professor’s tribute to Maritain’s saintliness, his gentleness, his childlike manner has remained with me, especially the unusual word (for Harvard), “childlike.” This is, I think, the key to Maritain’s intuition of being, a way of seeing in which so many other philosophers simply could not follow him. Maritain approached each day with a certain wonder — at the color of the sky, the scent of the grass, the feel of the breeze. He marveled that such a world could have come to be. There was, he understood, no necessity in its coming to be. It had happened. Here it was. He could sense it, his every sensible organ alive to its active solicitations of color, sound, scent, taste, and feel. More than that, his intellect would wonder at it, knowing that it did not have to be as it was on that particular day, or on any other day. And it could also cease to be.

Well before the cloudburst of the first atomic bomb, long before a perceived “ecological crisis,” Maritain perceived the fragility of life on earth — not only in his personal mortality, nor even in the fragility of planet earth. Rather, Maritain sensed, in the obscure way of the human intellect at its most childlike and most profound, that all changeable created things— all things short of an Existent necessarily and fully existing in Itself — are fragile and dependent….

Nonetheless, I am emboldened by the recent testimony of my second-favorite atheist humanist, Sidney Hook—Albert Camus still being my first—who just before his death confided to the American Jewish Committee Archives that there were many times in his life, at the height of his powers, that he often felt well up within him the desire to say thanks that things, which might have gone badly, worked out in existence as they had. This barely conscious, intuitive inference seems to me wholly natural. It seems to me also a bit of data about the human intellect that ought never to be lost to the attention of philosophers. Sidney Hook was a supremely honest man, willing to put on the record evidence that went against his own philosophy. True, Hook never understood that bit of data as Maritain did, or accepted the interpretation of human life that went with it, but his experience of the movement of human intellect to utter thanks remains a phenomenon to be explained.

Maritain and Russell Kirk
It is not my intention, however, to spell out the implications that Maritain derived from his intuition of the existent, not at least in the direction of metaphysics, the philosophy of God, or even Jewish and Christian faith. (Maritain was deeply involved through his wife Raissa in questions of Jewish as well as Christian faith; in fact, he may have done as much as any Christian in our time to lay the intellectual groundwork for a special instinct of fraternity among Christians and Jews.) I would prefer here to carry the intuition of the existent into Maritain’s further reflections on politics and society.

For if all of human existence is fragile, even more fragile is human action, above all in the political sphere. Maritain writes in Existence and the Existent that the end of practical wisdom is “not to know that which exists but to cause to exist what is not yet.” Between the cup and the lip, many a slip. It is easier to intend results in ethical or in political action than to achieve those results. Politics, in a language more favored by Reinhold Niebuhr than by Maritain but by no means in conflict with the latter’s, is the realm of the contingent, the ironic, and the tragic.

We might pause here to observe the sharp difference between a Thomist view of politics, such as that of Maritain, and that of classical conservatives such as Russell Kirk. Struck by the contingency and organic relatedness of social institutions, practices, and actions, and dismayed by the Utopian ideologies to which so many modern minds are prone, paleoconservatives (as they now style themselves) such as Kirk are opposed to “ideological infatuation” or even to imagining social projects for the future at all. Considering the projection of social notions into the future to be signs of the disease of “ideology,” such conservatives prefer to let things continue, to move along “organically,” to be. They resist “thinking for the future,” for fear of contamination by ideology. Maritain had a significantly different view. For him (as for Thomas Aquinas), practical intellect is aimed by its very nature not at knowing that which already exists, but at causing to exist what is not yet. Practical intellect is oriented toward the future, more precisely, to changing the future, to making the future different, “to cause to exist what does not yet exist.” For this reason, Maritain did not hesitate in Integral Humanism (1936) to imagine possible futures or to suggest new courses of action that would alter the awful European present in the direction of a better—a more humane, more Christian—proximate future.

Maritain took considerable care not to think in a merely Utopian fashion. But he did not hesitate to try to imagine proximate, achievable next steps, which might in turn lead to yet further achievable steps, toward building up a more humane and more Christian civilization than the world had yet known. In brief, Maritain shared with those who are currently known as neoconservatives a willingness to project a future at once more attractive and more plausible than socialists or others could imagine, a future thoroughly realizable within the bounds of proximate probable developments. Unlike Kirk, Maritain was not willing to embrace social laissez-faire in the political realm, and he was resolutely opposed to mere nostalgia about some supposedly more humane premodern era. Maritain claimed the future. Indeed, insofar as the Christian Democratic parties of Sturzo, de Gasperi, Schuman, and Adenauer drew crucial inspiration from his work, Maritain may be said to have in fact caused to exist much that had not existed before him.

Charity and Wisdom
In this sense, Aquinas is properly called the “first Whig” because his ethics and his politics did lay claims upon the future, did inspire, down the ages, a search for political institutions worthy of the rational, consensual dignity of humans. This is the sense in which Maritain was able in Christianity and Democracy, Man and the State, and other works to claim for a specific idea of democracy the support of the main spine of the Christian intellectual tradition. For this tradition nourished over the centuries the slow emergence of the ideal of a civilized politics, a politics of civil conversation, of noncoercion, of the consent of the governed, of pluralism, of religious liberty, of respect for the inalienable dignity of every human person, of voluntary cooperation in pursuit of the common good, and of checks and balances against the wayward tendencies of sinful men and women. As we shall see presently, Maritain did not claim too much for the historical efficacy of the Christian intellectual tradition; he chastised its failures severely and gave credit to nonbelievers for crucial advances. But neither did he wish to claim too little.

Here it is necessary to see how profound was Maritain’s understanding of the hold that the ideal of caritas had upon the political thinking of Thomas Aquinas. Maritain held that action in the world — whether ethical action among individuals or political action among systems, institutions, and groups — is always action among existents, among real sinners and saints and all those in between, not among purely “rational agents.” For him, realistic thinking about ethics and politics could not be conducted wholly within the boundaries of philosophy; theology was necessarily required.

Why? Because ethics and politics are about the real, existing world, and in this existing world humans are not purely rational agents but, rather, fallen creatures redeemed by grace on the condition that they are willing to accept God’s action within them. To proceed in purely philosophical categories about ethics and politics would be Utopian; one must deal with real, existing creatures locked in the actual historical drama of sin and grace.

That is why, in explicating “the fundamentally existential character of Thomist ethics,” Maritain stresses two points, one regarding charity, the other regarding practical wisdom or prudence. Concerning the first, he writes:

St. Thomas teaches that perfection consists in charity, and that each of us is bound to tend towards the perfection of love according to his condition and in so far as it is in his power. All morality thus hangs upon that which is most existential in the world. For love (this is another Thomist theme) does not deal with possibles or pure essences, it deals with existents. We do not love possibles, we love that which exists or is destined to exist.

Regarding practical wisdom, Maritain makes two extremely subtle points whose fullness I will not be able to reproduce. The first is that, at the heart of concrete existence, when an actual person is confronted with a set of particulars among which to decide to act, that person’s appetite—that person’s will or secret and deepest loves—enters into the quality of his or her perception of alternatives. More than that, for Aquinas, the rectitude of an existing person’s intellect depends upon the rectitude of his existing loves. This is a powerfully realistic doctrine. Intellect follows love, and if the love is errant so also will be the judgment of practical intellect or “conscience.” Although, for Maritain as for Aquinas, practical intellect still exerts a major discipline over the soul (over its loves, for example), nonetheless, here and now, under the immediate pressures of choice, the predispositions of one’s loves are highly likely to bend the intellect to their purposes. (Were not David Hume and Adam Smith, under different background assumptions but with the same Augustinian sense for real experience, to make an analogous point?)

Hence, for Aquinas, there is necessary in one’s ethical formation in advance of such choices a deep and profound habit of disciplining and directing one’s loves, seducing them so to speak, so that in every case they will love the good, the true, and the just, and be habituated to being restless with anything less. Absent a right will, a right practical intelligence will also be absent. In doing what they think is best, those whose loves are disordered will distort even their own intellects. As they love, so will they perceive. “Love is blind,” we say, meaning that, disordered, it is more powerful than light, obscures the light, and darkens the eye of intelligence itself.

The second subtle point that Maritain makes about practical intellect begins again with the fact that ethical and political action are always about existents. This time he points out that such action always faces two wholly singular, unrepeatable realities: first, the singular character, here and now, of this particular agent; and, second, the singular, never-to-be-repeated circumstances of the here and now. For these reasons, practical wisdom is utterly different from science. Whereas scientific judgment depends upon regularities, moral judgment must cope with singulars. “The same moral case never appears twice in the world. To speak absolutely strictly, precedent does not exist.” Practical wisdom concerns unprecedented singulars (“Useless to thumb through the dictionary of cases of conscience!”). At the same time, however, its point is “not to know that which exists, but to cause that to exist which is not yet,” and so it is moved by the appetite of will or love that thrusts us toward creating something new, whether of evil or of good.

Building A Humane, Christian Society
From this discussion of the sheer existing of ethical and political action—here and now, singular, unprecedented, unrepeatable—it follows that building a humane, Christian society is an uncertain business. It cannot be built upon any institutional framework at all; it has preconditions; many things can go wrong. Thus, to be faithful to the full measure of Christian intellectual conviction about the dignity (and fallibility) of the human person, about civilization as a state of society characterized by uncoerced decisions arrived at through civil discourse, and about the pull upon human love of God’s own command of love, new forms of social institutions will have to be labored towards in history, and not without setbacks. For reasons Maritain articulates at some length, a certain kind of democracy, guarded against the diseases to which “pure” democracies are prey, best represents the full flowering of human practical wisdom about the sorts of institutions worthy of Jewish and Christian thought. This particular kind of democratic reality gives the broken world some hope for a better future.

Maritain is not unsophisticated about democracy. He knows, writing in 1944 in the depths of destruction, that “the very name democracy has a different ring in America and in Europe.” And before proceeding very far on this subject in Christianity and Democracy, Maritain makes three important distinctions, each of which he discusses at more length than we can here duplicate. “First, the word democracy, as used by modern peoples, has a wider meaning than in the classical treatises on the science of government. It designates first and foremost a general philosophy of human and political life.” Its inner dynamism, although consistent with a monarchic regime and even other classic “regimes” or “forms of government,” leads “in the words of Abraham Lincoln,” to “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” Democratic regimes are not the only good regimes, but all good regimes will have to embody the dynamism of respect for free persons and their consent.

Second, Maritain argues that democracy after the war will certainly have to be ordered democracy, based on constitutions that have at least three characteristics: formation through the consent of the governed; protection of “the essential bases of common life, respect for human dignity and the rights of the person”; and grounding in a “long process of education.” This long process of education will be necessary to lead peoples away from habits of dictatorship, nationalistic impulses, and the mental sloth of unfree and coercively minded peoples. It will have to lead them towards the “slow and difficult construction” of new habits in the temporal life of nations, supportive of “the soul of democracy,” that is, “the law of brotherly love and the spiritual dignity of the person.”

By these first two distinctions, Maritain shows that he intends what in the United States we mean by a democratic republic, protective of the rights of the person. He means no totalitarian or merely majoritarian democracy, but limited government, grounded in a tradition of sound habits, associations, and institutions. Moreover, he means a set of principles not exhausted by any one form of regime, and yet capable of distinguishing false from true ideas of democracy.

Then, by his third distinction, Maritain makes clear both that Christian faith cannot be made subservient to democracy as a philosophy of life and that democracy cannot claim to be the only form of regime demanded by Christian belief. He intends “by no means to pretend that Christianity is linked to democracy and that a Christian faith compels every Christian to be a democrat.” To so argue would be to mix the things of Caesar and the things of God. Nonetheless, Maritain does affirm “that democracy is linked to Christianity and that the democratic impulse has arisen in human history as a temporal manifestation of the inspiration of the Gospel.”

Christianity In The World
Maritain does not believe that Christianity exists in the world solely as the Church or the body of believers. Rather, he sees Christianity “as historical energy at work in the world. It is not in the heights of theology, it is in the depths of the secular conscience and secular existence that Christianity works in this fashion.” Maritain is equally far from asserting that Christians brought modern democratic institutions into existence: “It was not given to believers in Catholic dogma but to rationalists to proclaim in France the rights of man and of the citizen, to Puritans to strike the last blow at slavery in America.” He knows full well the many non-Christian sources of the democratic impulse: “Neither Locke nor Jean-Jacques Rousseau nor the Encyclopedists can pass as thinkers faithful to the integrity of the Christian trust.”

Once again, Maritain is interested in existents, not essences. In the existing world of 1944, “The chances of religion, conscience, and civilization coincide with those of freedom; freedom’s chances coincide with those of the evangelical message.” The terrors of war have obliged the democracies to rethink their spiritual foundations so as to recover their spiritual energies and humanizing mission. They dare not go back to what they were before. The demands of ‘the human spirit for the time include authentic understandings, many of them rooted in the Gospels and in the deepest Christian intellectual traditions, about the nature of human existents. But these have not always been best expressed, or best developed in practical life, by believers.

It is clear that Maritain considers the Christian message about the cry of the poor for justice to be a motor of human temporal improvement. He holds simultaneously that existing democratic ideas, traditions, and institutions were often championed in actual history by those who were non-Christians or even anti-Christian; and yet that, in building better than they knew, such persons were often generating in human temporal life constructs whose foundations were not only consistent with Jewish and Christian convictions about the realities of ethical and political life, but in a sense dependent on them. Pull out from under democratic principles the beliefs of Judaism and Christianity about the transcendent dignity of the person and the human propensity to sin, and the existing edifice of democratic thought is exposed to radical doubt.

Thus, Maritain argued, existing democratic institutions need to be grounded on a deeper, sounder foundation of intellectual conviction and moral habits than had been achieved in previous history. He urged Christians to take up this work both in intellect and in active practice. He saw a great deal to be done, both intellectually and morally, in the “slow and difficult construction” of a more humane world, whether considered from a Christian or a humanistic viewpoint.

Reading Selections from Raissa Maritain: Philosopher, Poet, Mystic by Fr. Michael Sherwin, O.P.

Her Life and Work
Raïssa’s understanding of her Hasidic heritage is best seen in her description of the work and personality of another Russian Jew, her friend Marc Chagall:

“The tender spiritual joy that permeates his work was born with him in Vitebsk, in Russian soil, in Jewish soil. It is thus penetrated with melancholy, pierced by the sting of nostalgia and a hard-pressed hope. Truly, Jewish joy is not like any other; one might say that by sending its roots deeply into the reality of life, Jewish joy simultaneously draws from this reality the tragic sense of its fragility and of death.”

With images drawn from Chagall’s paintings, Raïssa continues:

“The Jewish bride cries under the wedding canopy. The little Jew who dances does not lose the memory of his misery; by dancing he mocks it and accepts it as his divine lot. If he sings, he sings with sighs; for he is penetrated with the past sufferings of his people and his soul is bathed in the prophetic awareness of the unimaginable sufferings that are reserved for it. Did not God forewarn them about it? Did not God take the trouble, something he did not do for any other people, to tell them through the prophet Isaiah, through Jeremiah and the other great voices of the Bible, about the purifications that his love reserves for them? They know all of these things, those Jews who have not given themselves over to the secular world, but are bathed each day in the living waters of the Scriptures. They know these things, the Jews of Chagall.”

Raïssa Maritain was also to know them. In describing Chagall’s art, she describes herself. Her life and work were also suffused with a “tender spiritual joy” that was “penetrated with melancholy,” and “pierced by the sting of nostalgia and a hard-pressed hope.” The song she sings throughout her writings, she sings with sighs: she too was permeated with the past sufferings of her people; her soul too was bathed in the awareness of the sufferings that are reserved for all wayfarers on earth. By the time she wrote her reflections on Chagall, she had already long discovered the mystery of human suffering revealed in Christ. Yet, that was later. First, she was to undergo exile and a painful search for meaning.

Meeting Jacques Maritain
When Raïssa began her studies at the University of Paris she was seventeen years old and the year was 1900. It was a time of great scientific achievement and the Sorbonne was one of its centers. Marie and Pierre Curie, for example, had discovered radium there only two years before. It was natural, therefore, for Raïssa to turn to the sciences for the answers she sought. To her dismay, however, she soon discovered that her professors were either strict materialists or simply did not pose for themselves philosophical questions concerning truth and meaning. Hope began to wane in her heart. Yet, she also continued to await “some great event, some perfect fulfillment.”8 The first step toward that fulfillment came when she met the man who would become her greatest companion during her earthly pilgrimage.

Almost from the moment that Jacques Maritain introduced himself to Raïssa Oumansov they became inseparable. They were both students at the Sorbonne, he a year older than she, and they both were searching for the meaning of their lives. Jacques Maritain came from a family that embodied the values of the French Revolution.” Maritain offers a revealing description of these values in his account of the intellectual outlook that filled the home of his closest boyhood friend, Renan’s grandson, Ernest Psichari. He explains that his friend’s home was suffused by:

a spirit of moral inquiry that was extremely broad and lofty, but foreign to all metaphysical certainty, a marked tendency to ignore the conflicts created by the opposition of intellectual principles. You did not fight Christianity, you were deeply persuaded that you had assimilated it and outgrown it.

Maritain was raised in a similar intellectual climate. He early discovered, however, what many others of his generation would one day recognize: the metaphysical agnosticism that was their heritage was too thin a soil for the sense of justice that burned in their hearts. To withstand the winds of tyranny, justice needs deep roots and a rich soil in which to sink them. It was during his search for that rich metaphysical soil that Jacques encountered Raïssa. In the friendship that grew between them, they undertook the search together.

As they pursued their studies, the calm materialism and convinced atheism of their science professors left them cold. The philosophers at the Sorbonne were equally disappointing to them.

“Our teachers were philosophers, yet they in fact had lost all hope in philosophy…. Through some curious de facto contradiction, they sought to verify everything by processes of material learning and of positive verification, and yet they despaired of truth, whose very name was unlovely to them and could be used only between the quotation marks of a disillusioned smile.”

The cumulative effect of their years of study led Raïssa and Jacques to the threshold of despair. For Raïssa, her exile from the homeland of faith that began when her family first left Russia was now reaching its lowest ebb.

We swam aimlessly in the waters of observation and experience like a fish in the depths of the sea, without ever seeing the sun whose dim rays filtered down to us,… And sadness pierced me, the bitter taste of the emptiness of a soul which saw the lights go out, one by one.

In the midst of their distress, Jacques and Raïssa reached a fateful decision that would shape the rest of their lives. While strolling through Paris beloved Jardin des Plantes they both agreed that if it were impossible to know the truth, to distinguish good from evil, just from unjust, then it was impossible to live with dignity. In such a case it would be better to die young through suicide than to live an absurdity. Something, however, kept them from taking that final step. Their refusal to accept the absurd and their desire to know truth, a desire that caused them great suffering, seemed to point to something beyond the absurd.

What saved us then, what made our real despair still a conditional despair was precisely our suffering. That almost unconscious dignity of the mind saved our minds through the presence of an element which could not be reduced to the absurdity into which everything seemed to be trying to lead us.

Thus, they decided to give “the unknown” a chance to explain itself to them and to reveal a truth that they could live by.

Léon Bloy And Baptism Into The Catholic Church
In the days that followed, Jacques and Raïssa Maritain were to discover the wondrous fact that the Unknown God “desires all to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth” (1 Timothy 2:4). God in his great mercy led them to Christ, to baptism in the Catholic Church and to the consolation of the Eucharist. Their way to faith in Christ had many twists and turns. It led from the philosopher Henri Bergson, through the writings of Plotinus and Ruysbroeck, and finally by way of Maeterlinck to the writer and fiery lay preacher, Leon Bloy.

In reading Bloy’s great novel, The Woman Who Was Poor, the Maritains encountered the profile and the grandeur of the Christian saint. “What struck us so forcibly on first reading La Femme Pauvre was the immensity of this believer’s soul, his burning zeal for justice, the beauty of a lofty doctrine which for the first time rose up before our eyes.” Upon meeting Bloy and his family, they were even more impressed. His poverty, his faith, his heroic independence, all spoke to the young Maritains of the life-giving mystery of Christ. Entering Bloy’s home seemed to them a homecoming. They recognized in his description of sanctity and in his efforts to live it — with its zeal for divine justice, its desire for truth and its tender love for the afflicted — the image of the longings present in their own hearts.

Equally important for Raïssa was Bloy’s book Le Salut par les Juifs (Salvation through the Jews). Although Bloy’s earthy and prophetic style was often offensive to the very people he intended to defend, Raissa recognized in Bloy’s description of the vocation of the Jewish people the key to solving the problem that had plagued her since childhood: the problem of God and suffering. The key was Christ. Paradoxically, by leading Raïssa to Christ, Bloy gave back to her the Jewish faith of her childhood, now brought to completion in the New Covenant in Christ’s blood. Bloy was explaining something to Raïssa that she somehow already sensed: the salvific power of human suffering when in God’s grace it is united to the sufferings of Christ.

Léon Bloy was perhaps the most remarkable figure to arise in France at the twilight of the nineteenth century. Destitute, constantly harassed by creditors, with a wife and two children to feed, Bloy spent his life thundering against France’s rejection of God and the lukewarm complacency of those believers who still remained. At the very moment when Paris was preparing to celebrate its paean to human progress — the Exposition of 1900 — Bloy was telling France to prepare for the destruction that would befall her: “The Exposition … ought not to take place, because Paris and all nations will have enough to do with hardening their sinews against death.” When war finally did come, with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Bloy remarked that it was “only the beginning.”

In 1916, in the preface of Au Seuil del’ Apocalypse (At the Threshold of the Apocalypse ), Bloy writes, “In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a nation was found to undertake something that had never been seen since the beginning of History: THE EXTINCTION OF SOULS. This was called German Culture.”

This hyperbolic assessment, so characteristic of Bloy, pointed out a real truth: something was terribly wrong in Germany, and it was spreading. Bloy was particularly concerned with the new strain of anti-Semitism that was arising around him. It was no longer this or that individual Jew or community of Jews that was being attacked. Jews were now in danger as an entire race. Remarkably, Bloy was writing this in 1916

Bloy’s message was not solely a message of destruction. He also spoke of a coming renewal. Christians would have to suffer, but united to Christ their sufferings would purify them and help many souls find the healing love of God. Mysteriously, in Bloy’s view, the sufferings of the Jews were a sign that pointed to the Christ, their fellow Jew who suffered with them. Bloy’s mission, as he saw it, was to help France prepare to walk with Christ the way of Calvary so that the Church might be renewed.

Raïssa was receptive to Bloy’s message. In 1906, with Jacques and Vera, she was baptized into the Catholic Church, with Léon and Jeanne Bloy as her godparents. From that point on, Raïssa began to discern the features of her vocation. She was being called to live in union with Christ. She was also being invited, through a life of prayer and study, to put into words — in prose and poetry — the truths she was now discovering in Christ. In the years that followed, physical and emotional suffering would never be far from her, but there was also peace and a quiet joy. She was strengthened by the growing conviction that in Christ her sufferings were secretly working for the good of souls. The life that she and Jacques were to live in the service of the Church is best understood as an effort to live Bloy’s vision.

The House in Meudon
The years between their baptism and the outbreak of the First World War were a time of spiritual gestation for the Maritains, and for many others in Europe. Those years saw the conversion of Jacques’ sister and Raïssa’s father. A number of their friends also converted at this time, including two who had become dear to many in France through their writings and exploits: Jacques’ boyhood friend, Ernest Psichari, and his early mentor, Charles Péguy. During those years, Jacques and Raïssa with her sister Vera became Benedictine oblates, establishing together a domestic community of prayer and study. Jacques and Raïssa had decided to live as brother and sister, forsaking marital intimacy and the joys of raising a family in order to dedicate themselves more deeply to their vocation to serve the truth. It was also during those years that the Maritians discovered Thomas Aquinas and began, under the guidance of their Dominican mentors, to study his works in depth.

Although Jacques was already beginning to become known in France through his articles, it was only after the First World War that his life as a philosopher began in earnest. Having received a bequest in support of his work from a soldier killed at the front, the Maritains were able to buy a home in Meudon, a village not far from Paris, and bring their plans to fruition. They could live a life of prayer and study, and make their home a center for Catholic thought and culture, under the patronage of St. Thomas Aquinas. Their home became a place where artists and intellectuals could find friendship and lively discussion. The guest lists to their home during those years read like a Who’s Who of the Catholic intellectual revival in France. It was during the Meudon years that Raïssa’s public life as a writer and a poet began.

Raïssa’s Writings
Raïssa Maritain’s first publication was the slender La Vie d’Oraison (Prayer and Intelligence), a work she wrote with Jacques as a spiritual guidebook for the Thomistic study groups she and Jacques had formed. The goal of this little work was to convey to the members of the study groups the priority of prayer and Christian love for progress in the intellectual life: “the intelligence itself can only develop its highest powers in so far as it is protected and fortified by the peace given by prayer. The closer a soul approaches God by love, the simpler grows the gaze of her intelligence and the clearer her vision.” The intellectual life, therefore, must be fortified by the contemplative life if it is to make real progress in discovering truth and in leading others to know and love the truth.

Raïssa took to heart the message of her book and strove to live it. From the earliest days of her conversion she felt an intense call to contemplative prayer. It was during this period that Raïssa began to write her Journal, which was published only after her death. With arresting clarity she describes the Lord’s action in her life and her struggles to understand and respond. Brief insights — “To love and understand one’s neighbor one must forget oneself” — are interspersed with descriptions of her struggles and pearls of calm wisdom, such as the following:

“Error is like the foam on the waves; it eludes our grasp and keeps reappearing. The soul must not exhaust itself fighting against the foam. Its zeal must be purified and calmed and, by union with the divine Will, it must gather strength from the depths. And Christ, with all his merits and the merits of all the saints, will do his work deep down below the surface of the waters. And everything that can be saved will be saved.”

The journal also provides the record of her awareness that the Lord was inviting her to accept a share in his suffering:

“During silent prayer I feel inwardly solicited to abandon myself to God, and not only solicited but effectively inclined to do it, and do it, feeling that it is for a trial, for a suffering, for which my consent is thus demanded. I make this act of abandon in spite of my natural cowardice.”

Her Poetry
It was during these years at Meudon that Raïssa received the gift of poetry: “He who would know the depths of the spirit or, if you will, the spirituality of being, begins by entering into himself. And it is also in the inwardness of life, of thought, of conscience that he encounters Poetry, if he be destined to encounter it.” In the depths of her prayer, Raïssa encountered Poetry. Poems became a way for her to express her inner experiences. While specialists have noted the technical limitations present in a number of her poems, her best pieces succeed in making the ordinary events of life glow with “spiritual transparency.” One finds here themes that recur throughout her works: the sudden encounter with God in the ordinary (“The Cloud”); the mystery of moral evil and natural beauty (“The Fall of Icarus”); the workings of God’s providence in the midst of human sinfulness (“Meditation”); and the ever present mystery of Christ’s suffering and our vocation to participate in it (“O Cross”). In all, Raïssa wrote close to ninety poems, published in four different collections, and brought together into one volume by Jacques after her death. For those who have the patience to let the poet’s art speak to them, her poems are of enduring value.

Meditation
Darkness below and darkness above;
Under Archangel’s black wing
The plan of God unfolds.

Creation’s paradox is infinite
Eternity is being made of time,
Imperishable good by evil fostered.

Humanity plods onward seeking justice
On lazy by-ways of iniquity,
And the deceits and errors of today
Tomorrow’s truth will serve.

The little good,
Through unavailing it may seem
To overcome disaster in our time,
Contains the seed of love’s eternal tree

The Fall of Icarus
A branch in flower frames the sea.
Some ships dream of the universe; On shore the sheep stand drowsily.
Icarus has fallen from the sky
With a sea-gull’s downard dive.
In noon-day sun creation sleeps –
The world, serene, its beauty keeps.

O Cross
O Cross you divide the heart,
O Cross you split the world,
Cross divine and wood of bitterness,
Bloodstained price of the Beatitudes,
Royal rood, imperious impress,
Most sombre Cross, gibbet of God,
Star of Mysteries,
Key to certitude.

The Cloud
A cloud in the sky,
Ezechiel’s chariot
Flashing by.

In the meadow see
Under the peach tree
Roses glow,
Then you appear

And the tears flow
In the thin air
Upon your face
O messenger.

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Reading Selections from “René Girard for Holy Week” by Fr. Edward T. Oakes, S.J.

March 11, 2010

Edward T. Oakes, S.J., Ph.D.is Chester & Margaret Paluch Professor of Theology at the University of St. Mary of the Lake/Mundelein Seminary, the Catholic seminary for the Archdiocese of Chicago. As you know I have featured a number of posts on Girard, whose theories I find fascinating. In this article, published in First Things (You can find the original here.) back in 2007, he looks at Girardian theory from a Catholic perspective. Exactly what I was looking  for. I’ve grouped the posts on Girardian Theory in the category “Understanding Violence.”

A Key To All Mythologies
To read René Girard is to want to slap one’s forehead and say, “Of course, why didn’t I think of that?” If I might pump up the volume on my praise a bit more, he is the direct opposite of that sad figure in George Eliot’s masterpiece Middlemarch , the Rev. Mr. Casaubon, who spent his whole adult life pathetically trying to complete a “Key to All Mythologies,” a project that brought both him and his marriage to ruin. But Girard has pulled it off, at least in my estimation: Here we do have a key to all mythologies.

The Challenge of Blameless Tragedies
Although he started off as a medieval historian, Girard became more and more interested in literary criticism — to be sure, in the dreary debunking mode that would soon become the métier of the deconstructionists. But his outlook made a significant turn when, in the spring of 1959, he began work on a study of five novelists (Cervantes, Flaubert, Stendhal, Proust, and Dostoyevsky) that eventually was published as Desire, Deceit, and the Novel . He had been an agnostic for the previous twenty-six years, but a health scare forced him to reconsider his past convictions, abetted by the experience of his brother’s suicide earlier, where he noticed how difficult it was for his family to come to terms with that tragedy without apportioning blame.

The combination of these two events must have got under his skin while he was writing the book, for Desire, Deceit, and the Novel bears no resemblance to the poststructuralist efforts common in France at that time. As he recounted in an interview in 1997, he discovered that his earlier constant reliance on the “hermeneutics of suspicion” — always harping on the bad faith of the writers he was studying — was gradually leading him to a concept of original sin: “An experience of demystification if radical enough, is very close to an experience of conversion.” And so we are not surprised to learn that, while writing Desire, Deceit, and the Novel, he returned to his Catholic faith.

Mimetic Desire
As an added bonus, Desire, Deceit, and the Novel is brilliant, a tour de force of teeming insights, one piled on another — proof that literary criticism can sometimes make for a thrilling read. Taking a cue from Aristotle’s remark in his Poetics that “man is distinguished from the other animals by his capacity for imitation,” Girard saw how each of his chosen novelists depicted a protagonist who was besotted by a literary model he or she wanted to mimic.

Thus Don Quixote spent his life trying to emulate the fictional knight Amadis de Gaul; Madame Bovary modeled her life on the adulteresses she read about in romances; and the narrator in Proust’s In Search of Lost Time openly says, “I was incapable of seeing a thing unless a desire to do so had been aroused in me by reading.” In Notes from Underground , the narrator — a petty bureaucrat obsessed by what others (might) think of him — crashes a banquet put on by his former school chums (now mostly successful army officers) and tries to be noticed, all the while loathing them: “Smiling scornfully, I paced backwards and forwards on the side of the room opposite the sofa. . . . I was trying with all my might to show that I could do without them; meanwhile, I purposely made a clatter with my boots, coming down hard on my heels. But it was all in vain; they didn’t even notice.”

“Every man hath business and desire,” says Hamlet to Horatio, and that’s the key to Girard: Besides the needs we share with the other animals, we also have desires, or more exactly, learned desires — born purely out of imagination and mimicry — which Girard dubs “mimetic desires.” (Think here of the advertising and fashion industries, the “worship” of Hollywood stars, on and on, and everything Girard says falls into place.) But as Quixote, Bovary, and the “underground man” all show, these desires can never be fulfilled. In a deft formulation, Girard says that “masochists are always fascinated artisans of their own unhappiness.”

The Scapegoat
This inevitable frustration (trying to satisfy the demands of mimetic desires) always leads to resentment, which will collectively build up in society until it gets focused, like lightning in a charged atmosphere, and lands on a scapegoat. But the scapegoat can only purge this collective frustration when the sacrifice of the victim becomes society’s conscious act, meaning when the scapegoat is ritually slaughtered. This is the insight of Girard’s next great book Violence and the Sacred , whose title nicely encapsulates, and is encapsulated by, this central thesis: “Violence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred.”

Girard’s anthropological book is interesting in its own right, but I want to get to Girard’s later discussion of the Bible in perhaps his most theological work, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning . In this fascinating book, Girard shows no worries about some obvious formal parallels with the scapegoating rituals of other societies and the Christian doctrine of the Atonement.

Scapegoating And Christ’s Victimhood
He does not feel threatened by these parallels because he also sees a fundamental difference between scapegoating and Christ’s victimhood. In a provocative essay, “Nietzsche and the Crucified” (in The Girard Reader ), he remarks: “Resentment is the interiorization of weakened vengeance. Nietzsche suffers so much from it that he mistakes it for the original and primary form of vengeance. He sees resentment not merely as the child of Christianity, which it certainly is, but also as its father, which it certainly is not.”

Given the sordid history of Christian anti-Semitism, witch burning, heretic hunting, and the like, this gnomic passage might sound like special pleading on Girard’s part. But his retort to that more-than-obvious objection is subtle: Because of its doctrine of the Atonement, Christianity is uniquely placed to recognize these episodes as rank deviations from its true message; and thus it is from Christianity that society has learned to take the side of the victim. As he says in The Scapegoat:

The invention of science is not the reason that there are no longer witch-hunts, but the fact that there are no longer witch-hunts is the reason that science has been invented. The scientific spirit, like the spirit of enterprise in an economy, is a by-product of the profound action of the Gospel text. The modern Western world has forgotten [Christian] revelation in favor of its by-products, making them weapons and instruments of power; and now the process has turned against it. Believing itself a liberator, it discovers its role as a persecutor.

Liberalism’s Narcissistic Pro-Victim Indulgences
If you want to know why liberalism instinctively identifies with certain classes of favored victims but is so ruthless in its politics, there’s your answer. Crying crocodile tears over the genocide in Sudan is permitted provided we don’t do anything about it; and while we’re at it, let’s enjoy watching White House aides get their just deserts in court. Still, that’s better than approving the Islamist government of Sudan perpetrating the genocide. And that vestigial identification with the victim we owe to Christianity, however reluctant we are to act on our narcissistic pro-victim indulgences. As Michael Kirwin, author of a fine (if occasionally repetitious) monograph, Discovering Girard , says: When we see the scapegoating mechanism at work, this “makes us instinctive partisans for the victim. This history is the product not of an Enlightenment rationality, banishing the darkness of religious superstition, but of the evangelical impulse itself.” Even as early as Desire, Deceit, and the Novel, Girard was on to this liberal ruse:

Promethean philosophy sees in the Christian religion only a humanism which is still too timid for complete self-assertion. The novelist, regardless of whether he is a Christian, sees in the so-called modern humanism a subterranean metaphysics which is incapable of recognizing its own nature.

In another book, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World , Girard drives home this point even more polemically, when he points out that utopianism (that ultimate project of imaginative mimetic desire, now become a full-blown monstrous Leviathan) issues directly out of modern humanism and is its true “subterranean metaphysic”:

The more people think they are realizing the utopias dreamed up by their desire — in other words, the more they embrace ideologies of liberation — the more they will in fact be working to reinforce the competitive world that is stifling them. . . . All modern thought is falsified by a mystique of transgression, which it falls back into even when it is trying to escape.

Again, if you want to know why contemporary art keeps preening itself on its “daring transgressions,” you’ll find the answer in Girard. Also, if you’re a puzzled secularist, wondering why religion is making such a comeback in the headlines, you need only go to Girard for the answer. As Kirwin rightly notes: “Girard has explicitly distanced himself from Marcel Gauchet’s claim that Christianity has brought about the end of religion in the world. Rather, he suggests our current humanism will be perceived as merely a short interval between two forms of religion.” (I don’t think Girard has been at all taken off-guard by the resurgence of militant Islam.)

Of course, that still leaves open the question of what that “second form” of religion will look like in the future, to which Girard has only this quintessentially Christian answer to give: “What makes our hearts turn to stone is the discovery that, in one sense or another, we are all butchers pretending to be sacrificers. . . . One thing alone can put an end to this infernal ordeal, the certainty of being forgiven.”

So What Is God Doing In All This?

All well and good. I hope readers of this short panegyric will find Girard as helpful in their Holy Week meditations as I have. But I can’t help but feel that he has left one question hovering unaddressed: theology. As he said in a passing remark in the introduction to I See Satan Fall Like Lightning, “[This] present book means to be a defense of our Judaic and Christian tradition, an apology of Christianity rooted in what amounts to a Gospel-inspired breakthrough in the field of social science, not of theology.”

Perhaps I say this because I’m a theologian by craft, but that concession seems to leave a lot of questions hanging — above all this one: What is God doing in all this? After all, the Bible says that “God so loved the world that he sent his only Son” and that Christ “did not regard equality with God something to be grasped but emptied himself of his divinity, taking on the form of a man, indeed of a slave, being obedient unto death, even death on a cross.” Both these verses use active verbs and thereby assert a direct divine involvement in the cross. Indeed, this is what the doctrine of the Atonement as understood by all the ancient fathers and medieval theologians means. (Anselm is especially clear on this point.)

Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Criticism
Not surprisingly, that most Anselmian of contemporary theologians, the Swiss Catholic theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar, took issue with Girard on just this point — most directly in the fourth volume of his Theo-Drama , subtitled The Action (or “plot”). There he points out, tellingly, that in Violence and the Sacred the words God and Christ never appear (although Balthasar concedes God and Christ are present throughout the book implicitly). But, more to the point, Girard adopts a position on the Atonement, Balthasar claims, that is oddly redolent of the early Karl Barth:

Girard’s synthesis is a closed system, since it wants to be “purely scientific,” jettisoning all “moribund metaphysics.” All philosophy is secularized religion, and religion owes its existence to the covert scapegoat mechanism. There is therefore no such thing as a “natural” concept of God. This brings us back to the “theology” of the young Barth (and also to Barth’s later theology insofar as he regards the analogy of being “as the invention of the Anti-Christ”); for Girard, religion is the invention of Satan.

Yes, Girard is surely Catholic in his deepest instincts. He accepts Christ’s divinity and his birth from the Virgin, for example. But by accepting these doctrines, Balthasar points out, Girard has “explode[d] his allegedly pure scientism.” Perhaps this is why we always hear the words power and violence in Girard but rarely the word justice. “Can it be proved scientifically,” Balthasar asks, “that the justice for which men long is nothing but power in disguise?” (Odd how Girard echoes here not just the early Barth but also the mature Nietzsche.)

Here’s the real problem: By completely bracketing out the question of divine involvement in the event of the cross, Girard cannot make clear how Christ can bear the world’s sin “unless we suppose that men themselves load this sin onto him.” But, for Girard, what are these “sins” that men pile on him? Without an adequate concept of justice, whether philosophical or theological, Girard cannot even speak of sin, properly defined:

Girard maintains a complete hiatus between naturalism and theology; they are not even linked by an ethics. In his view, the “omnipresence of violence” means that distinction between “good” and “evil” is illusory [another Nietzschean motif!]. Accordingly, he does not speak of “sin” but of “hostility.”

All that said (and I think Balthasar’s objections hit their target), Girard is no doubt an immensely fertile thinker, even — and perhaps especially — for the theologian. A careful study of this prodigious mind opens up vistas that are hard to gainsay. Not least, he shows how superficial are those liberal objections to the Atonement, now heard so often, that the New Testament’s doctrine of the Atonement is but a Jewish or pagan projection of patriarchal child abuse onto the godhead. (Not for nothing do many feminists object to Girard, prompting one dissenter in their ranks, Jennifer L. Rike, to wonder aloud if their criticisms might not indicate a reluctance to confront the issue of violence in women as well as in men, as Kirwin rightly notes.)

The issue of sacrifice, no matter how primitive it might seem to us in our sanitized culture — where we studiously ignore even so obvious a fact as how meat reaches our tables — just won’t go away; in fact, it comes close to reaching the very core of the gospel. For making that clear in our obtuse age, we owe a debt of gratitude to Girard. As Balthasar says, “Girard’s system, with its clear, inherent contradictions, has brought us face to face with this very concrete question [of God's involvement in the Atonement], and to that extent it has rendered us a service.”

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Faith and Revelation: A Primer

February 26, 2010
Caravaggio, The Crowning With Thorns

Caravaggio, The Crowning With Thorns

Fr. Larry Young of Our Lady’s Church at Medley’s Neck in Maryland put this together. Puts the cart and horse together rather nicely.

 Man can have true knowledge of his Creator through his experience of creation, apart from supernatural revelation.

  • “The same holy Mother Church holds and teaches that God, the origin and end of all things, can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason from the things that he created”
    (Vatican I, Dei Filius, 58)
  • “Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made.”
    (Romans 1:20)
  • “From the greatness and beauty of created things comes a corresponding perception of their Creator.”
    (Wisdom 13:5)
  • “The heavens are telling the glory of God; and the firmament proclaims his handiwork… There is no speech, nor are there words; their voice is not heard; yet their voice goes out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world.”
    (Psalm 19:1-4)

Man is severely limited in his capacity to know God without the help of supernatural revelation.

  • “Only God possesses a comprehensive knowledge of God; for the infinite Being can be completely comprehended by an Infinite Intellect only.”
    (Dr. Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 1,2,3)
  • “Our intellect is related to the prime beings, which are most evident in their nature, as the eye of an owl is related to the sun.”
    (Aristotle, Metaphysics, Ia, 1)
  • “Can you find out the deep things of God? Can you find out the limit of the Almighty? It is higher than heaven— what can you do?… Behold, God is great, and we know him not”
    (Job 11:7; 36:26)
  • “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, says the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.”
    (Isaiah 55:8-9)
  • “O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?”
    (Romans 11:33-34)
  • “If this truth were left solely as a matter of inquiry for the human reason, three awkward consequences would follow. The first is that few men would possess the knowledge of God… Some do not have the physical disposition for such work… Some men must devote themselves to taking care of temporal matters… Finally, there are some who are cut off by sloth… The second awkward effect is that those who would come to discover the abovementioned truth would barely reach it after a great deal of time… If the only way open to us for the knowledge of God were solely that of reason, the human race would remain in the blackest shadows of ignorance. For the knowledge of God, which especially renders men perfect and good, would come to be possessed only by a few, and these few would require a great deal of time in order to reach it… The third awkward effect is this. The investigation of the human reason for the most part has falsity present within it, and this is partly due to the weakness of our intellect in judgment, and partly to the admixture of images. ”
    (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 4, 2-5)
  • “Our knowledge is imperfect… For now we see in a mirror dimly… Now I know in part”
    (1 Corinthians 13:9-12)

Man, as a fundamentally religious being, instinctively seeks revelation. In his acknowledgment of the deep mystery that encompasses him he looks for the will or the word of another to offer meaning, explanation, direction, help, assurance, salvation. This is evident in his endless and timeless pursuit of: fortune telling, horoscopes, channeling spirits, clairvoyance, magic, casting of lots, omens, oracles, signs, portents, interpretations of dreams. He seems to be aware at some base level of his limitations in and of himself, to understand the answers to the ultimate questions that haunt him.

  • “In many ways, throughout history down to the present day, men have given expression to their quest for God in their religious beliefs and behavior: in their prayers, sacrifices, rituals, meditations, and so forth. These forms of religious expression, despite the ambiguities they often bring with them, are so universal that one may very well call man a religious being.”
    (CCC, 28)
  • “From one ancestor [God] made all nations to inhabit the whole earth, and he allotted the times of their existence and the boundaries of the places where they would live, so that they would search for God and perhaps grope for him and find him— though indeed he is not far from each of us. For ‘in him we live and move and have our being.’ (Acts 17:26-28)”
    (CCC, 28)
  • “You have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.”
    (St. Augustine, The Confessions, I,1,1)

In His divine wisdom, God chose to reveal Himself in ways that far surpass man’s natural ability to know Him.

  • “Man experiences many difficulties in coming to know God by the light of reason alone… This is why man stands in need of being enlightened by God’s revelation”
    (CCC, 37-38)
  • “It was necessary for man’s salvation that there should by a knowledge revealed by God, besides philosophical science built up by human reason… Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and then after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might by brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation.
    (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I,1,1)
  • “By natural reason man can know God with certainty, on the basis of his works. But there is another order of knowledge, which man cannot possibly arrive at by his own powers: the order of divine Revelation.”
    (CCC, 50)
  • “Man’s faculties make him capable of coming to a knowledge of the existence of a personal God. But for man to be able to enter into real intimacy with him, God willed both to reveal himself to man and to give him the grace of being able to welcome this revelation in faith.”
    (CCC, 35)

God teaches and leads the human race back to Himself patiently and mercifully like a Father training up child.

  • “The divine plan of Revelation… involves a specific divine pedagogy: God communicates himself to man gradually. He prepares him to welcome by stages the supernatural Revelation that is to culminate in the person and mission of the Incarnate Word, Jesus Christ.”
    (CCC, 53)
  • “Know then in your heart that, as a man disciplines his son, the Lord your God disciplines you.”
    (Deuteronomy 8:5)

God humbles himself to speak to us in our own human language.

  • “In order to reveal himself to men, in the condescension of his goodness God speaks to them in human words: ‘Indeed the words of God, expressed in the words of men, are in every way like human language, just as the Word of the eternal Father, when he took on himself the flesh of human weakness, became like men.”
    (Vatican II, Dei Verbum, 13; CCC, 101)

God speaks to us through both word and deed.

  • “This economy of Revelation is realized by deeds and words, which are intrinsically bound up with each other. As a result, the works performed by God in the history of salvation show forth and bear out the doctrine and realities signified by the words; the words, for their part, proclaim the works, and bring to light the mystery they contain.” (Vatican II, Dei Verbum, 2)
  • “The economy of the Old Testament was deliberately so orientated that it should prepare for and declare in prophecy the coming of Christ, redeemer of all men, and of the messianic kingdom, and should indicate it by means of different types.”
    (Vatican I, Dei Verbum, 15)
  • “The ancient Jews discerned deeper currents of divine purpose and action in history. And tracing such currents calls for faith in God’s providential governance of nature and the events of history… the prophetic nature of the biblical narrative of salvation history must be understood… In other words, God ‘writes’ the world like men write words, to convey truth and love. So nature and history are more than just created things— God fashions them as visible signs of other things… This is the purpose and value of typology, which studies how Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Testament (Adam, Abraham, Isaac, Melchizedek, Passover Lamb, temple), thereby revealing the profound unity of the Old and New Covenants. Thus, typology is what enables us to discern ‘in God’s works of the Old Covenant prefigurations of what he accomplished in the fullness of time in the person of his incarnate Son.’”
    (Dr. Scott Hahn, A Father Who Keeps His Promises, 21-23)
  • “This catechesis unveils what lay hidden under the letter of the Old Testament: the mystery of Christ. It is called ‘typological’ because it reveals the newness of Christ on the basis of the ‘figures’ (types) which announce him in the deeds, words, and symbols of the first covenant. By this re-reading in the Spirit of Truth, starting from Christ, the figures are unveiled. Thus the flood and Noah’s ark prefigured salvation by Baptism, as did the cloud and the crossing of the Red Sea. Water from the rock was the figure of the spiritual gifts of Christ, and manna in the desert prefigured the Eucharist, ‘the true bread from heaven’.”
    (CCC, 1094)

Faith is required of us to embrace this Divine Revelation, but this faith rests on the absolute authority of God as the One who is revealing.

  • “What moves us to believe is not the fact that revealed truths appear as true and intelligible in the light of our natural reason: we believe ‘because of the authority of God himself who reveals them, who can neither deceive or be deceived.’”
    (CCC, 156)
  • “Faith is certain. It is more certain than all human knowledge because it is founded on the very word of God who cannot lie. To be sure, revealed truths can seem obscure to human reason and experience, but ‘the certainty that the divine light gives is greater than that which the light of natural reason gives.’”
    (CCC, 157)
  • “That your faith might not rest in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God… we impart a secret and hidden wisdom of God, which God decreed before the ages for our glorification… God has revealed to us through the Spirit. For the Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For what person knows a man’s thoughts except the spirit of the man which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is from God, that we might understand the gifts bestowed on us by God. And we impart this in words not taught by human wisdom but taught by the Spirit, interpreting spiritual truths to those who possess the Spirit. The unspiritual man does not receive the gifts of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned… But we have the mind of Christ.”
    (1 Corinthians 2:5-16)

The Characteristics of faith:

  • “Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen”.
    (Hebrews 11:1)
  • “Faith is first of all a personal adherence of man to God. At the same time, and inseparably, it is a free assent to the whole truth that God has revealed.”
    (CCC, 150)
  • “Faith is a gift of God, a supernatural virtue infused by him.”
    (CCC, 153)
  • “Believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the divine truth by command of the will moved by God through grace.”
    (St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, II-II,2,9)
  • “Man’s response to God by faith must be free, and… therefore nobody is to be forced to embrace the faith against his will. The act of faith is of its very nature a free act.”
    (Dignitatis Humanae, 10)
  • “Faith is man’s response to God, who reveals himself and gives himself to man, at the same time bringing man a superabundant light as he searches for the ultimate meaning of his life.”
    (CCC, 26)
  • “To live, grow, and persevere in the faith until the end we must nourish it with the word of God; we must beg the Lord to increase our faith; it must be ‘working through charity’ (Galatians 5:6), abounding in hope, and rooted in the faith of the Church.”
    (CCC, 162)

Faith and reason are complimentary and mutually beneficial in coming to knowledge of God. They both ultimately arrive at the same truth, but one through the supernatural help of grace and the other through our own natural efforts.

  • “The proofs of God’s existence, however, can predispose one to faith and help one to see that faith is not opposed to reason.”
    (CCC, 35)
  • “Faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected.”
    (St. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I,2,2)
  • “Though faith is above reason, there can never be any real discrepancy between faith and reason. Since the same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith has bestowed the light of reason on the human mind, God cannot deny himself, nor can truth ever contradict truth.”
    (Vatican Council, Dei Filius, 4)
  • “For although faith is above reason, still there can never be found a real opposition or disagreement between them, since both take their origin from one and the same source of unchangeable and eternal truth, the great and good God; and thus they are mutually helpful. As a result, right reason demonstrates, safeguards, and defends the truth of faith, while faith frees reason from all errors and wonderfully enlightens it, strengthens it, and perfects it with a knowledge of divine things.”
    (Pope Pius IX, Qui Pluribus, 1635)
  • “’Faith seeks understanding’: it is intrinsic to faith that a believer desires to know better the One in whom he has put his faith and to understand better what He has revealed; a more penetrating knowledge will in turn call forth a greater faith, increasingly set afire by love. The grace of faith opens ‘the eyes of your hearts’ to a lively understanding of the contents of Revelation… In the words of St. Augustine, ‘I believe in order to understand; and I understand, the better to believe.’”
    (CCC, 158)
  • “And Trypho said, ‘Look, my friend, you made yourself master of these truths with much labor and toil. And we accordingly must diligently scrutinize all that we meet with, in order to give our assent to those things which the Scriptures compel us to believe”
    (St. Justin Martyr, The Dialogue with Trypho, 68)

In Gods plan of Revelation he willed that there be aspects that remain accessible to our natural power of reason in order to confirm us in our faith.

  • “So that the submission of our faith might nevertheless be in accordance with reason, God willed that external proofs of his Revelation should be joined to the internal helps of the Holy Spirit. Thus the miracles of Christ and the saints, prophecies, the Church’s growth and holiness, and her fruitfulness and stability are the most certain signs of divine Revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all; they are ‘motives of credibility’, which show that the assent of faith is by no means a blind impulse of the mind.”
    (CCC, 156)
  • “The signs worked by Jesus attest that the Father has sent him. They invite belief in him. To those who turn to him in faith, he grants what they ask. So miracles strengthen faith in the One who does his Father’s works; they bear witness that he is the Son of God.”
    (CCC, 548)
  • “That very day two of them were going to a village named Emmaus, about seven miles from Jerusalem, and talking with each other about the things that had happened. While they were talking and discussing together, Jesus himself drew near and went with them. But their eyes were kept from recognizing him… And he said to them, ‘O foolish men, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken!…’ And beginning with Moses and all the prophets, he interpreted to them in all the scriptures the things concerning himself… They said to each other, ‘Did not our hearts burn within us while he talked to us on the road, while he opened to us the scriptures?’”
    (Luke 24:13-35)
  • “There existed, long before this time, certain men more ancient than all those who are esteemed philosophers, both righteous and beloved by God, who spoke by the Divine Spirit, and foretold events which would take place, and which are now taking place. They are called prophets. These alone both saw and announced the truth to men, neither reverencing nor fearing any man, not influenced by a desire for glory, but speaking those things alone which they saw and which they heard, being filled with the Holy Spirit. Their writings are still extent, and he who has read them is very much helped in his knowledge of the beginning and end of things, and of those matters which the philosopher ought to know, provided he has believed them. For they did not use demonstration in their treatises, seeing that they were witnesses to the truth above all demonstration, and worthy of belief; and those events which have happened, and those which are happening, compel you to assent to the utterances made by them, although, indeed, they were entitled to credit on account of the miracles which they performed, since they both glorified the Creator, the God and Father of all things, and proclaimed His Son, the Christ [sent] by Him: which, indeed, the false prophets, who are filled with the lying unclean spirit, neither have done nor do, but venture to work certain wonderful deeds for the purpose of astonishing men, and glorify the spirits and demons of error.”
    (St. Justin Martyr, DT, 7)

Jesus Christ is the fullness of Revelation.

  • “The Christian faith is not a ‘religion of the book,’ Christianity is the religion of the ‘Word’ of God, not a written and mute word, but incarnate and living.”
    (CCC, 108)
  • “Through all the words of Sacred Scripture, God speaks only one single Word, his one Utterance in whom he expresses himself completely.”
    (CCC, 102)
  • “Christ’s whole earthly life— his words and deeds, his silences and sufferings, indeed his manner of being and speaking— is Revelation of the Father.”
    (CCC, 516)
  • “No one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him.”
    (Matthew 11:27)
  • “No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.”
    (John 1:18)
  • “Jesus said to him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me. If you had known me, you would have known my Father also; henceforth you know him and have seen him.”
    (John 14:6-7)
  • “For it is the God who said, ‘Let light shine out of darkness,’ who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ.”
    (2 Corinthians 4:6)
  • “For he has made known to us in all wisdom and insight the mystery of his will, according to his purpose which he set forth in Christ as a plan for the fullness of time, to unite all things in him, things in heaven and things on earth.”
    Ephesians 1:9-10)
  • “In giving us his Son, his only Word (for he possesses no other), he spoke everything all at once in this sole Word— and he has no more to say… because what he spoke before to the prophets in parts, he has now spoken all at once by giving us the All Who is His Son. Any person questioning God or desiring some vision or revelation would be guilty not only of foolish behavior, but also of offending him, by not fixing his eyes entirely upon Christ and by living with the desire for some other novelty.”
    (St. John of the Cross, The Ascent of Mount Carmel, 2,22,3-5)
  • “God, infinitely perfect and blessed in himself, in a plan of sheer goodness freely created man to make him share in his own blessed life. For this reason, at every time and in every place, God draws close to man. He calls man to seek him, to know him, to love him with all his strength. He calls together all men, scattered and divided by sin, into the unity of his family, the Church. To accomplish this, when the fullness of time had come, God sent his Son as Redeemer and Savior. In his Son and through him, he invites men to become, in the Holy spirit, his adopted children and thus heirs of his blessed life.”
    (CCC, 1)
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Readings on the topic of TRADITION

February 22, 2010
 
 

The Madonna in Majesty (Maestà), Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence

A Definition
Literally a “handing on,” referring to the passing down of God’s revealed word. As such it has two closely related but distinct meanings. Tradition first means all of divine revelation, from the dawn of human history to the end of the apostolic age, as passed on from one generation of believers to the next, and as preserved under divine guidance by the Church established by Christ. Sacred Tradition more technically also means, within this transmitted revelation, that part of God’s revealed word which is not contained in Sacred Scripture. Referring specifically to how Christian tradition was handed on, the Second Vatican Council says: “It was done by the apostles who handed on, by the spoken word of their preaching, by the example they gave, by the institutions they established, what they themselves had received–whether from the lips of Christ, from His way of life and His works, or whether they had learned it by the prompting of the Holy Spirit” (Constitution on Divine Revelation, II, 7).

Reading Selections From The Complex Relationship between Scripture and Tradition by James Akin (Jimmy Akin is Catholic Answers’ director of apologetics and evangelization and a contributing editor to This Rock) 

The Two Source Model
The relationship between Scripture and Tradition comes up regularly in contemporary Catholic apologetics. According to one Catholic view, Scripture and Tradition are two sources of revelation. Some divine truths are found in the Bible, while others are found in Tradition. This “two source” model has a long history, but it also has some difficulties. One is that there is considerable overlap between the two sources.

For example, the Bible clearly contains a command that Christians be baptized (Matthew 28:19). But doesn’t Tradition contain that, too? Wasn’t the command to be baptized passed on orally in the early Church as well as being written down in Scripture? Wasn’t the requirement of baptism already firmly fixed in the life and belief of the churches before the New Testament was written?

Isn’t the same true of the command to celebrate the Eucharist? To worship only one God? To regard Jesus as God? In fact, weren’t most teachings of the Christian faith handed on orally and only later in writing?

Sola scriptura
Speaking of Scripture and Tradition as two sources could lead one to overlook this overlap, which is so considerable that some Catholics have pondered how much of the Protestant idea of sola scriptura a Catholic can agree with. Sola scriptura is understood in different ways among Protestants, but it is commonly taken to mean that the Bible contains all of the material needed to do theology. According to this theory, a theologian does not need to look to Tradition — or at least does not need to give Tradition an authoritative role.

This view is not acceptable to Catholics. As the Second Vatican Council stressed in its constitution Dei Verbum, “It is not from Sacred Scripture alone that the Church draws its certainty about everything that has been revealed. Therefore both Sacred Tradition and Sacred Scripture are to be accepted and venerated with the same sense of loyalty and reverence” (DV 9).

Yves Congar’s Opinion
One of the principal architects of Dei Verbum was the French theologian Yves Congar, who thought Catholics could acknowledge a substantial element of truth in sola scriptura.

He wrote that “we can admit sola scriptura in the sense of a material sufficiency of canonical Scripture. This means that Scripture contains, in one way or another, all truths necessary for salvation” (Tradition and Traditions, 410).

He encapsulated this idea with the slogan Totum in scriptura, totum in traditione (“All is in Scripture, all is in Tradition”), which he attributes to Cardinal Newman. According to this theory, Scripture and Tradition would not be two sources containing different material but two modes of transmitting the same deposit of faith. We might call it the “two modes” view as opposed to the “two source” view.

The decrees of Trent and Vatican II allow Catholics to hold the two-mode idea, but they do not require it. A Catholic is still free to hold the two-source view.

Practical Use Of The Two-Mode Approach
Some apologists working with Protestants have adopted the two-mode position, which may help certain Protestants in the process of becoming Catholic. It also may help deflect certain objections that are met in debate. Such an apologist might say:

It is not necessary for a Catholic to claim that the Bible is materially insufficient — that it fails to teach some truths needed for salvation. Scripture contains all that material, and we can agree with our Protestant brethren on this point. But the Bible does not contain this material in a form that makes it easy to derive these truths without risk of error. You need the help of Tradition to do that. Scripture is thus materially sufficient but not formally sufficient.

If he uses this argument, an apologist needs to be careful of several things. Most importantly, he should not speak of this view as if it is a certainty or as if it is the official Catholic position. It is not. It is one possible position that Catholics may hold, but it would misrepresent the teaching of the Church to speak as if all Catholics hold or are expected to hold this view.

He also needs to be careful about what he says regarding the material sufficiency of Scripture. For example, Congar spoke only in terms of the Bible containing “all truths necessary for salvation.” He did not speak of it containing all theological truths. This is an important distinction that comes up in discussions of sola scriptura.

Protestants often define sola scriptura by appealing to the idea that Scripture contains all truths needed for salvation. In practice, though, they often apply the term much more expansively, as if the Bible should be expected to contain all truths of Christian theology.

This is why many Protestants demand, “Where is that in the Bible?” even if the subject is a Catholic belief that has no direct connection to salvation. This means that, although adopting a two-mode theory may provide a measure of convergence in how sola scriptura is commonly defined, it may not help in practice.

Broad and Narrow Paths
Moreover, while it is legitimate in apologetic discussions to point out permitted Catholic views, that does not mean we should adopt a view just because it might be apologetically useful. We need to consider whether Totum in scriptura, totum in traditione holds true. If applied narrowly to truths necessary for salvation in the sense described above, I think that it does. I certainly can’t think of any truths directly connected with salvation that aren’t at least alluded to in Scripture.

But if we apply it more broadly, problems emerge. There seem to be theological truths that are not mentioned in Scripture. For example, the Bible does not state that public revelation is closed. As far as I can tell, it is neither stated nor clearly implied. Nor does the Bible say that God will not inspire any more books of Scripture or that there will be no more apostles. One needed to be a witness of the ministry of Christ to be a member of the Twelve (Acts 1:21-22), but Christ appeared in a vision to name Paul an apostle, even though he was not an eyewitness. If he wanted, Jesus could have kept appearing to people throughout history and appointing them apostles. We know from Tradition that this didn’t happen — that the apostles died out and handed the Church over to their successors, the bishops — but the Bible doesn’t tell us this.

The Immaculate Conception and Assumption of Mary are often cited as truths not taught in the Bible, although many have thought that there are passages that reflect these truths in some way (e.g., Luke 1:28, Rev. 12:1-14). This raises the question of how a truth that can be known by Tradition may be related to Scripture. It isn’t as simple as a truth being “in Scripture” or “not in Scripture.” There are more possible relationships than that.

A Complex Relationship

  1. Some truths of Tradition are directly stated in Scripture, such as God’s creation of the world. The Bible comes right out and says, “In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth” (Genesis 1:1).
  2. Other truths of Tradition are not stated directly in Scripture but are implied clearly by the biblical author. For example, while the Bible doesn’t come out and say that the Holy Spirit is a person rather than a force, it is implied in numerous passages, such as those in which the Spirit is depicted as speaking to people (e.g., Acts 13:2), and the biblical authors meant us to understand this.
  3. Some truths of Tradition can be inferred from Scripture even though the biblical authors did not clearly imply them. For example, Christ having both a human will and a divine will can be inferred from his being “true God and true man” (CCC 464). Various biblical passages state or imply that he is true God and true man, but in none does the biblical author state or imply that he had two wills. We have to figure that out by inference.
  4. A truth is sometimes alluded to or reflected in the text even though it can’t be proved from the text alone. The Immaculate Conception may be reflected in what Gabriel says to Mary in Luke 1:28, and the Assumption may be reflected in the wings the woman is given in Revelation 12:14, but you couldn’t prove these truths from the text alone.
  5. Some truths are presupposed by Scripture, such as many of the particulars of how the sacraments are celebrated — their proper form, matter, ministers, and recipients. The sacraments are mentioned in the Bible, but the biblical authors didn’t give many details about their administration. They assumed that the reader would look to the practice of the Church for the answers to these questions. For example, the sacrament of reconciliation is discussed, but the words that need to be used to make an absolution valid are not.
  6. Some truths are not in Scripture at all; not even a piece of the truth in question is indicated. As we saw earlier, the truths that public revelation is ended and that there will be no more apostles fall into this category.

Often it isn’t easy to decide which of these categories a truth falls into, but it is beneficial to think the question through, consider whether the Scriptural basis for a truth is found in the literal or the spiritual sense of the text, and consider how much confidence in the truth can be drawn from the Bible compared to how much must be drawn from Tradition.

While these considerations may be useful as an apologist explores the relationship between Scripture and Tradition, he ultimately will have to decide how he thinks they fit together. So far, the Church has left him considerable latitude.

Reading Selections From The Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation (Dei Verbum) by Vatican II

CHAPTER II – HANDING ON DIVINE REVELATION
7. In His gracious goodness, God has seen to it that what He had revealed for the salvation of all nations would abide perpetually in its full integrity and be handed on to all generations. Therefore Christ the Lord in whom the full revelation of the supreme God is brought to completion (see Corinthians 1:20; 3:13; 4:6), commissioned the Apostles to preach to all men that Gospel which is the source of all saving truth and moral teaching, (1) and to impart to them heavenly gifts. This Gospel had been promised in former times through the prophets, and Christ Himself had fulfilled it and promulgated it with His lips. This commission was faithfully fulfilled by the Apostles who, by their oral preaching, by example, and by observances handed on what they had received from the lips of Christ, from living with Him, and from what He did, or what they had learned through the prompting of the Holy Spirit. The commission was fulfilled, too, by those Apostles and apostolic men who under the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit committed the message of salvation to writing. (2)

But in order to keep the Gospel forever whole and alive within the Church, the Apostles left bishops as their successors, “handing over” to them “the authority to teach in their own place.”(3) This sacred tradition, therefore, and Sacred Scripture of both the Old and New Testaments are like a mirror in which the pilgrim Church on earth looks at God, from whom she has received everything, until she is brought finally to see Him as He is, face to face (see 1 John 3:2).

8. And so the apostolic preaching, which is expressed in a special way in the inspired books, was to be preserved by an unending succession of preachers until the end of time. Therefore the Apostles, handing on what they themselves had received, warn the faithful to hold fast to the traditions which they have learned either by word of mouth or by letter (see 2 Thessalonians 2:15), and to fight in defense of the faith handed on once and for all (see Jude 1:3) (4) Now what was handed on by the Apostles includes everything which contributes toward the holiness of life and increase in faith of the peoples of God; and so the Church, in her teaching, life and worship, perpetuates and hands on to all generations all that she herself is, all that she believes.

This tradition which comes from the Apostles develop in the Church with the help of the Holy Spirit. (5) For there is a growth in the understanding of the realities and the words which have been handed down. This happens through the contemplation and study made by believers, who treasure these things in their hearts (see Luke, 2:19, 51) through a penetrating understanding of the spiritual realities which they experience, and through the preaching of those who have received through episcopal succession the sure gift of truth. For as the centuries succeed one another, the Church constantly moves forward toward the fullness of divine truth until the words of God reach their complete fulfillment in her.

The words of the holy fathers witness to the presence of this living tradition, whose wealth is poured into the practice and life of the believing and praying Church. Through the same tradition the Church’s full canon of the sacred books is known, and the sacred writings themselves are more profoundly understood and unceasingly made active in her; and thus God, who spoke of old, uninterruptedly converses with the bride of His beloved Son; and the Holy Spirit, through whom the living voice of the Gospel resounds in the Church, and through her, in the world, leads unto all truth those who believe and makes the word of Christ dwell abundantly in them (see Col. 3:16).

9. Hence there exists a close connection and communication between sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture. For both of them, flowing from the same divine wellspring, in a certain way merge into a unity and tend toward the same end. For Sacred Scripture is the word of God inasmuch as it is consigned to writing under the inspiration of the divine Spirit, while sacred tradition takes the word of God entrusted by Christ the Lord and the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, and hands it on to their successors in its full purity, so that led by the light of the Spirit of truth, they may in proclaiming it preserve this word of God faithfully, explain it, and make it more widely known. Consequently it is not from Sacred Scripture alone that the Church draws her certainty about everything which has been revealed. Therefore both sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture are to be accepted and venerated with the same sense of loyalty and reverence.(6)

10. Sacred tradition and Sacred Scripture form one sacred deposit of the word of God, committed to the Church. Holding fast to this deposit the entire holy people united with their shepherds remain always steadfast in the teaching of the Apostles, in the common life, in the breaking of the bread and in prayers (see Acts 2, 42, Greek text), so that holding to, practicing and professing the heritage of the faith, it becomes on the part of the bishops and faithful a single common effort. (7)

But the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether written or handed on, (8) has been entrusted exclusively to the living teaching office of the Church, (9) whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ. This teaching office is not above the word of God, but serves it, teaching only what has been handed on, listening to it devoutly, guarding it scrupulously and explaining it faithfully in accord with a divine commission and with the help of the Holy Spirit, it draws from this one deposit of faith everything which it presents for belief as divinely revealed.

It is clear, therefore, that sacred tradition, Sacred Scripture and the teaching authority of the Church, in accord with God’s most wise design, are so linked and joined together that one cannot stand without the others, and that all together and each in its own way under the action of the one Holy Spirit contribute effectively to the salvation of souls.

Selections from the GENERAL AUDIENCE Wednesday, 3 May 2006 Pope Benedict XVI speaks to the topic of Apostolic Tradition

The Apostolic Tradition of the Church  
The last time we meditated on the theme of Apostolic Tradition. We saw that it is not a collection of things or words, like a box of dead things. Tradition is the river of new life that flows from the origins, from Christ down to us, and makes us participate in God’s history with humanity.

This topic of Tradition is so important that I would like to reflect upon it again today:  indeed, it is of great importance for the life of the Church.

The Second Vatican Council pointed out in this regard that Tradition is primarily apostolic in its origins:  “God graciously arranged that the things he had once revealed for the salvation of all peoples should remain in their entirety, throughout the ages, and be transmitted to all generations.

Therefore, Christ the Lord, in whom the entire Revelation of the Most High God is summed up (cf. II Corinthians 1: 20; and 3: 16-4, 6), commanded the Apostles to preach the Gospel… and communicate the gifts of God to all men. This Gospel was to be the source of all saving truth and moral discipline.”

Communicated By The Apostolic Community
This is clearly highlighted and visible in certain passages of the Pauline Letters:  “I delivered to you… what I also received” (1Corinthians15: 3). And this is important. St Paul, it is well-known, originally called by Christ with a personal vocation, was a real Apostle, yet for him too, fidelity to what he received was fundamentally important. He did not want “to invent” a new, so-to-speak, “Pauline” Christianity. Therefore, he insisted, “I have passed on to you what I too received”. He passed on the initial gift that comes from the Lord and the truth that saves.

Then, towards the end of his life, he wrote to Timothy:  “Guard this rich trust with the help of the Holy Spirit that dwells within us (2 Timothy 1: 14).

It is also effectively demonstrated by this ancient testimony of the Christian faith written by Tertullian in about the year 200:  “(The Apostles) after first bearing witness to the faith in Jesus Christ throughout Judea and founding Churches (there), they next went forth into the world and preached the same doctrine of the same faith to the nations. They then in like manner founded Churches in every city, from which all the other Churches, one after another, derived the tradition of the faith and the seeds of doctrine, and are every day deriving them, that they may become Churches. Indeed, it is on this account only that they will be able to deem themselves apostolic, as being the offspring of apostolic Churches” (Tertullian, De Praescriptione Haereticorum, 20:  PL 2, 32)….

The Church transmits all that she is and believes, she hands it down through worship, life and doctrine.

So it is that Tradition is the living Gospel, proclaimed by the Apostles in its integrity on the basis of the fullness of their unique and unrepeatable experience:  through their activity the faith is communicated to others, even down to us, until the end of the world. Tradition, therefore, is the history of the Spirit who acts in the Church’s history through the mediation of the Apostles and their successors, in faithful continuity with the experience of the origins.

This is what St Clement of Rome said towards the end of the first century: “The Apostles”, he wrote, ”have preached the Gospel to us from the Lord Jesus Christ; Jesus Christ was sent by God. Christ, therefore, was sent forth by God, and the Apostles by Christ.

A Chain Of Service
“Both these appointments, then, were made in an orderly way, according to the will of God…. Our Apostles also knew, through Our Lord Jesus Christ, that there would be strife on account of the episcopal office.

“For this reason, therefore, inasmuch as they had obtained a perfect foreknowledge of this, they appointed those [ministers] already mentioned, and afterwards gave instructions that when these should fall asleep, other approved men should succeed them in their ministry” (Ad Corinthios, 42, 44:  PG 1, 292, 296).

This chain of service has continued until today; it will continue to the end of the world. Indeed, the mandate that Jesus conferred upon the Apostles was passed on by them to their successors. Going beyond the experience of personal contact with Christ, unique and unrepeatable, the Apostles passed on to their successors the solemn mandate that they had received from the Master to go out into the world. “Apostle” comes precisely from the Greek term, “apostéllein”, which means “to send forth”.

The apostolic mandate – as the text of Matthew shows (Matthew 28: 19ff.) – implies a service that is pastoral (“Go therefore and make disciples of all the nations…”), liturgical (“baptizing them”), and prophetic (“teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you”), guaranteed by the Lord’s closeness, until the end of time (“and lo, I am with you always, to the close of the age”).

Thus, but differently from the Apostles, we too have a true, personal experience of the presence of the Risen Lord.

Therefore, through the apostolic ministry it is Christ himself who reaches those who are called to the faith. The distance of the centuries is overcome and the Risen One offers himself alive and active for our sake, in the Church and in the world today.

This is our great joy. In the living river of Tradition, Christ is not 2,000 years away but is really present among us and gives us the Truth, he gives us the light that makes us live and find the way towards the future.

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All Have Sinned: The Mystery of Impiety by Fr. Raniero Cantalamessa

February 11, 2010

The Anastasis of Christ, symbolizes the promise of resurrection in the Eastern Church. Christ, returning from the underworld, pulls Adam and Eve from their graves to their resurrection.

The following reflection on sin by Fr. Cantalamessa is drawn from the second chapter of his book Life In Christ which is about the spiritual messages contained in Paul’s letter to the Romans. In a series of homiletic meditations, Fr. Raniero Cantalamessa, the preacher to the papal household, explores the main themes of St. Paul’s famous epistle in a manner that draws us closer to a more mature relationship with Jesus Christ. The reading selection that follows will show you what I mean.

Only Divine Revelation Knows What Sin Is
Only divine revelation really knows what sin is and neither human ethics nor philosophy can tell us anything about it. No man can say by himself what sin is, for the simple reason that he himself is in sin. All that he says about sin can, in the end, only be a palliative and an understatement of sin. “To have a weak understanding of sin is part of our being sinners.” Scripture says: “Transgression speaks to the wicked deep in his heart. . . for he flatters himself in his own eyes that his iniquity cannot be found out and hated” (Psalms 36:2-3). Sin also “speaks” just as God does; it too delivers oracles and its place of teaching is man’s heart. Sin speaks in man’s heart and that is why it is absurd to expect man to speak “against” it. Although I am here writing about sin, I too am a sinner and I should therefore tell you not to rely too much on me and on what I write! Sin is a much more serious thing — infinitely more serious — than I shall ever be able to explain. At the most, man can reach an understanding of sin against himself or against other men, but not sin against God; the violation of human rights, but not the violation of divine rights. In fact, if we take a close look around us we can see that this is what is happening in present-day culture.

Therefore only divine revelation knows what sin is. Jesus explains all this more closely by saying that only the Holy Spirit can “convince the world of sin” (cf. John 16:8). I have mentioned that God must be the one to talk to us of sin. When, in fact, God and not man talks against sin it is not easy to remain impassive; his voice is like thunder that “crushes the cedars of Lebanon” (cf. Psalms 29:5). Our meditation will have fulfilled its aim if it manages even to challenge our unshakable basic self-assurance and make us feel a wholesome fear in front of the terrible danger that not only sin but the very possibility of sinning holds for us. With the help of God we want to reach the point of being prepared to shed our blood in the struggle against sin (“In your struggle against sin you have not yet resisted to the point of shedding your blood.” Hebrews 12:4).

Sin, A Refusal To Acknowledge God
The basic sin and primary object of God’s wrath has been singled out by St. Paul as asebein, that is impiety or ungodliness. And he immediately explains what this impiety exactly consists of, saying that it is the refusal to g1orify and thank God. In other words, the refusal to acknowledge God as God and not rendering him the respect that is his. It consists, we could say, in “ignoring” God, not however in the sense of “not knowing he exists”, but, in the sense of “behaving as if he didn’t exist.” In the Old Testament Moses shouts to the people, “Know that the Lord your God is God!” (cf. Deuteronomy  7:9) and a psalmist takes up the same cry: “Know that the Lord is God! It is he that made us, and we are his” (Psalms 100:3). Sin is basically the denial of this “acknowledgement”; it is the attempt, on the part of the creature to cancel out on his own initiative and almost with arrogance, the infinite difference that exists between himself and God. Thus sin infects the very root of things; it is “a stifling of the truth,” an attempt to keep truth the prisoner of injustice. It is something much more sinister and terrible than can be imagined or expressed. If the world knew what sin really is, it would die of terror.

This refusal took shape in idolatry in which the creature is worshipped rather than the Creator (cf. Romans 1:25). In idolatry man doesn’t “accept” God but rather “makes” a god; it is he who decides about God and not God about him. The roles are reversed; man becomes the potter and God the clay which man moulds to his pleasure (cf. Romans 9:20 ff.).

The Moral Fruits Of A Fundamental Choice Against God
So far St. Paul has shown us the withdrawal that took place in man’s heart, his fundamental choice against God, Now he goes on to show the moral fruits of this withdrawal. All of this gave rise to a general dissolution in behavior, a real and true “torrent of perdition” dragging humanity unconsciously to ruin. At this point St. Paul outlines the appalling picture of the vices of the pagan society: male and female homosexuality, injustice, wickedness, covetousness, envy, deceit, malignity, haughtiness, arrogance, disobedience to parents, faithlessness. . . The list of vices is taken from the pagan moralists, but the whole picture that results from it is that of the “wicked one” so often spoken of in the Bible. The disconcerting thing at first glance is that St. Paul sees all this disorder as a consequence of divine wrath. In fact, he affirms this unequivocally three times: “God gave them up to impurity.  For this reason God gave them up to dishonorable passions. . . And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a base mind” (Romans 1:24, 26, 28). God certainly does not “want” these things, but he “permits” them to make man understand where his refusal of God leads. St. Augustine wrote that “these things, although they are punishments, are also sins because the punishment for iniquity is that of being, itself, iniquity. God intervenes to punish evil and from his punishment other sins come.”  Sin is the punishment for sin. In fact Scripture says: “One is punished by the very things by which he sins “(Wisdom 11:16). God is “obliged” to abandon people to themselves so as not to have to uphold their injustice and in the hope that they will retrace their steps.

Refusal Of God In Modern Times
Let us listen to a few of those who expressed refusal of God in modern times, keeping in mind, however, that we are judging the words and not the intentions or moral responsibility of the individuals which are known only to God and which might be very different to what they seem to us. Karl Marx gave this reason for his refusal of the idea of a “creator”: “A person” –  he wrote –  “is an independent being only. insofar as he is his own master, and he is his own master only in so far as he is master of his existence. He who lives through the grace of another sees himself as a dependent being. . . But I would live entirely for the sake of another if he had created me, if he were the source of my life and my life was not my own creation”. “Man’s conscience” — he wrote in his youth — is “the highest divinity”; “the origin of man is man himself.” (K. Marx, Manuscript.of 1844) In this same spirit, J.P. Sartre had one of his characters say: “Today I accuse myself and only I, man, can absolve myself. If God exists man is nothing.. . God doesn’t exist! Happiness, tears of joy! Alleluia! No more heaven. No more hell! Nothing else but the earth.” (J.P. Sartre, The Devil and the Good God X, 4)

Another way of arrogantly eliminating the difference between Creator and creature, between God and the “self,” is to confuse them, which is the form that impiety sometimes takes on today in depth psychology. Paul’s reproach against the “wise men” of his times was not for exploring nature and admiring its beauty, but for not going beyond this. In the same way the word of God does not criticize certain trends in depth psychology for having discovered a new area of the human mind, the unconscious, and for trying to throw light on this, but for having made of this discovery yet another occasion for getting rid of God. Thus, the Word of God renders a service to psychology, purifying it of what threatens it, just as psychology in its turn, can be of use — and has effectively been so in many cases — in purifying our understanding of the Word of God.

The Suppression Of The Distinction Between Good And Evil.
The impiety harbored in some of the recent trends of this science is the suppression of the distinction between good and evil. Following a procedure that closely recalls that of ancient, heretical gnosis, the limits move dangerously: the limit of the divine lowers and the demonic limit rises to the point of meeting and even of, being superimposed. Then, in evil, nothing else is seen except “the other side of reality” and in the devil nothing else but the “shadow of God.” There are some who have even gone so far as to accuse Christianity of having introduced the “ill-omened opposition between good and evil” into the world. The following words of Isaiah could have been written today for just such a situation: “Woe to those who call what is bad, good, and what is good, bad, who substitute darkness for light and light for darkness” (Isaiah 5:20).

Psychologists of this trend give no importance to “saving the soul” (which is even considered ridiculous) or even to “analyzing the soul,” but to “helping the soul fulfill itself,” that is, to making it possible for the human soul — which is like saying natural man — to express itself in all ways, repressing nothing. Salvation lies in self-revelation, in man making himself and his psyche known for what they are; salvation lies in self-realization. Salvation — it is thought — is within, immanent in man. It does not come from history but from the archetype manifested in myth and symbol. In a certain sense, it comes from the unconscious. The unconscious, which at the beginning was considered to be the natural place of evil where neurosis and illusions are rooted (including the “illusion” of God) is now seen as the seat of good, as a mine of hidden treasures for man. One day, after reading some works full of the ideas just mentioned, shocked and quite terrified, I was wondering what God’s judgment on all this could possibly be when I happened to read what Jesus says in St. John’s Gospel: “Though the light has come into the world, people have preferred darkness to the light” (John 3:19).

An Extreme Form Of Sin
However, we have not yet reached the heart of the matter. Alongside the intellectual denial of God by people convinced that God does not exist, we have the voluntary denial of those who refuse God, even though they know that God exists. This extreme form of sin, which is hatred of God and blasphemy, is expressed in an open and threatening insult to God, in the loud proclamation of the superiority of evil over good, of darkness over light, of hatred over love, of Satan over God. This is all directly maneuvered by the evil one. Who else, in fact, would be able to harbor the thought that “good is a deviation of evil and, like all deviations, is of secondary importance and destined to disappear one day,” or that “evil, in fact, is nothing but good ill-interpreted”?

The most evident signs of this form of impiety are: the profanation of the Eucharist (the excessive and inhuman hatred towards the consecrated host is a terrible, negative proof of the “real presence” of Christ in the Eucharist); the obscene and sarcastic parody of the stories and words of the Bible; the staging of the figure of Jesus in films and spectacles which are willfully blasphemous and offensive. To send a soul to their infernal lord, these persons are capable of such constancy as only the holiest of missionaries would employ to lead a soul to Christ.

Magic
On the other hand, this situation is not as remote as many Christians might think; it is, rather, an open abyss only a stone’s throw away from the indifference and “neutrality” in which they live. One starts with abandoning all religious practice and ends up, one sad day, among the openly declared enemies of God either by adhering to organizations whose aim (mostly kept secret at the beginning) is to make war against God and cause an upheaval in moral values, or through sexual aberrations or use of pornography, or following contacts with magicians, spiritists, esoteric societies, occult practices or other such things. Magic is, in fact, another way and the most blatant, of succumbing to the old temptation of wanting to be “like God.” “The hidden force which guides magic — as is written in one of their manuals — is the thirst for power. The magicians’ aims are defined quite appropriately for the first time by the serpent in the garden of Eden. . . The eternal ambition of the follower of the black arts consists in gaining power over the whole universe and making a god of himself.” The fact that in most cases we are dealing with charlatans and nothing more is of no importance. The irreverent intention behind its practice or with which one turns to it is sufficient to place one in Satan’s power. Satan works through lies and bluffing but the effects are anything but imaginary. In the Bible God says: “There must never be anyone among you. . . who practices divination, who is soothsayer, augur or sorcerer, weaver of spells, consulter of ghosts or mediums, or necromancer. For anyone who does those things is detestable to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy  18:10-12). In the prophet Isaiah we find this severe admonishment: The Lord will strike the country because it is “full of sorcerers from the East and of soothsayers” (cf. Isaiah 2:6).

Claiming To Be Wise, They Became Fools
Man has only the two licit means of nature and grace for gaining power over himself, over sickness, over events and business. “Nature” indicates intelligence, the sciences, medicine, technology and all the resources that man has received from God in creation to dominate the earth in obedience to him. “Grace” indicates faith and prayer through which cures and miracles are sometimes obtained, but always from God, because “power belongs to God” (Psalms 62:12). When a third way is taken, that of the search for occult power, almost hiding from God, without needing his approval or indeed abusing his name and signs, then in one way or another the master and pioneer of this way comes on to the scene. I mean the devil who one day said all the power of the earth had been handed over to him, for him to give to anyone he chose if they would worship him (cf Luke 4:6). In these cases ruin is assured. The fly has been caught in the web of the “big spider” and will not easily manage to get out alive. Exactly what Paul pointed out is happening in our technological and secularized society: “Claiming to be wise, they became fools” (Rornans 1:22): they have abandoned faith to embrace every kind of superstition, even the most childish.

The Wages Of Sin
But let us also examine the consequences of impiety, so that not even the slightest shadow of doubt remains in our minds that no one can prevail against God. In the prophet Jeremiah we read these words addressed to God: “All who abandon you will be put to shame” (Jeremiah 17:13). The abandonment of God leads to personal confusion and the feeling of having gone astray. “Lost” and “gone astray” are the words most frequently used in the Bible when sin is spoken of: the lost sheep, the lost son. – . The very word to translate the biblical concept of sin in Greek, hamartia, contains the idea of being lost and having failed. The same term was used when speaking of a river that flows away from its original course and is lost in the marshes, and of an arrow which misses its aim and is lost. Sin is therefore radical failure. A man can fail in many ways: as a husband, as a father or as a businessman. A woman can fail as a wife or as a mother; a priest can fail as a pastor, as a superior or as a spiritual director. But these are all relative failures; there is always the possibility of compensation; one may fail in all these ways and still be a most respectable person, even a saint. But it is not so with sin; through sin one fails as a creature, that is fundamentally, in what one “is” and not in what one “does.” This is the only case where the words of Jesus about Judas apply to a person: “It would have been better for that man if he had never been born” (Matthew 26:24). Man, in sinning, believes he is offending God, whereas, in fact, he is “offending” and mortifying only himself, to his own shame: “Is it really me they spite”, God says, “is it not in fact themselves, to their own confusion”? (Jeremiah 7:19). By refusing to glorify God, man himself becomes “deprived of the glory of God.” Sin offends God, that is, it saddens him greatly, but only in so far as it brings death to man whom he loves; it wounds his love.

The Existential Consequences Of Sin
But let us take a closer look at the existential consequences of sin. St. Paul affirms that “the wages of sin is death” (Romans 6:23). Sin leads to death; not so much to the “act” of dying –  which lasts only a moment — as to the “state” of death, that is precisely to what has been called “mortal illness,” a state of chronic death. In this state the creature desperately tends to return to being nothing but without succeeding and lives therefore as if in an eternal agony. From this state comes damnation and the pains of hell; the creature is obliged by One stronger than himself to be what he does not consent to be, that is dependent on God, and his eternal torment is that he cannot get rid of either God or of himself. Kierkegaard rightly said that “the formula for all desperation is to desperately refuse to be what one is.” (S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death I, A)

Satan embodies this state. In him sin has run its entire course and is shown in its extreme consequences. He is the prototype of those “who do know God (and how he knew him!) but do not give him the glory and thanks that belong to God.” It is not necessary to fall back on the imagination or on theological speculation to learn Satan’s feelings on this point because he himself shouts them into the hearts of those whom God still allows him to tempt today, as Jesus was tempted in the wilderness: “We are not free”, he shouts, “we are not free! Even if you kill yourself, your soul lives on, you cannot kill it, we cannot say no. We are obliged to exist forever. It’s all deceit! It’s not true that God created us free!” Such thoughts make us shudder as it would seem that we are directly listening to the eternal argument between Satan and God. He, in fact, would wish to be left free to return to nothingness. Not because he doesn’t want to exist or to be God’s antagonist, but because he does not want to be what he is, dependent on God. He wants to exist, but not “through the grace of another.” As the Power above him is stronger than he is and obliges him to exist, this is the way to pure desperation

In choosing absolute autonomy from God, the creature is aware of the unhappiness and darkness involved but he is willing to pay this price. As St. Bernard said, “he prefers to he unhappy in his own sovereignty rather than be happy in submission.” The much talked about eternity of hell does not depend on God, who is always ready to forgive, but on the person who refuses to be forgiven and would accuse God of lacking respect for his freedom if God were to do so.

We have, today, the chance to actually verify through our own experience the results of sin by observing what is happening in our present society after the extreme consequences the refusal of God has led to in certain places. Nietzsche, for whom sin was nothing other than an ignoble “Jewish invention” and good and evil just simple “prejudices of God” (once again we are judging words and not intentions) said: “We have killed him; we are God’s assassins!” But then, having perceived or personally experienced the evil results of this, the philosopher added: “What have we done by unlinking this earth of ours from the chain that links it to its sun? Where is it going now? Where are we going? Isn’t ours an eternal descent? Backwards, sideways, forward, from all sides? Aren’t we perhaps wandering as if through an infinite nothingness?” (F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, nr. 125)To kill God is really the most horrific suicide. Death is really the wages of sin and the proof lies in present-day nihilism.

“You Are The Man!”
The Bible narrates this story. King David had committed adultery and to cover it up he had the woman’s husband killed in war. In this way, to make this woman his wife, could even have seemed an act of generosity on the king’s part towards the man who had died fighting for him — a real chain of sins. The Lord then sent the prophet Nathan to him who told him a parable, although the king did not know it was a parable. There were, he said, two men in a certain city, one rich and the other poor. The rich man had very many flocks and herds and the poor man had nothing but one little ewe lamb and it grew up with him and used to lie in his bosom. Now there came a traveler to the rich man, and instead of taking one of his own flock, he took the poor man’s lamb and prepared it for the man who had come to him. On hearing this story David’s anger was greatly kindled against the man and he said to Nathan: “The man who has done this deserves to die!” Then Nathan, pointing his finger, said to David: “You are the man!” (cf. 2 Samuel 12:1 ff.).

This is what the Apostle Paul is doing with us. After making us feel a righteous indignation and horror for the impiety of the world, as we pass from the first to the second chapter of his Letter, as if suddenly addressing us, he repeats: “You are the man!” “Therefore you have no excuse, Oh Man, whoever you are, when you judge another; for in passing judgment upon him you condemn yourself, because you, the judge, are doing the very same things. We know that the judgment of God rightly falls upon those who do such things. Do you suppose, Oh Man, that when you judge those who do such things and yet do them yourself, you will escape the judgment of God?” (Romans 2:1-3). The recurrence, at this point, of the word “inexcusable”, which was used earlier for the pagans, leaves us in no doubt as to St. Paul’s intentions. While you were judging others, he says, you were bringing about your own condemnation. It is time now to turn the horror you feel for sin against yourself.

Safe From God’s Anger Just Because They Can Distinguish Between Good And Evil?
The “person judging” in the second chapter, turns out to be a Jew who, however, is seen here as a kind of stereotype. The “Jew” is a non-Greek, or a non-pagan; he is the pious believer who, with his strong principles and revealed morality, judges the rest of the world and feels safe in doing so. In this sense each one of us is the “Jew.” Origen actually said that in the Church the Apostle’s words were intended for bishops, presbyters and deacons, that is, for the guides and teachers. (Origen, Commentary on the Letter to the Romans II, 2; PG 14 873)Paul himself experienced it when, from being a Pharisee he became a Christian and can therefore confidently indicate to believers the way to abandon Pharisaism. He unmasks the strange and frequent illusions of pious and religious people who consider themselves safe from God’s anger just because they can clearly distinguish between good and evil. They know the law and, when necessary, they know how to apply it to others, whereas, as far as they themselves are concerned, they think that the privilege of being on God’s side or, at least, God’s goodness and patience with which they are very familiar, makes an exception for them.

“Or do you presume”, says the Apostle to us, “upon the riches of his kindness and forbearance and patience? Do you not know that God’s kindness is meant to lead you to repentance? But by your hard and unrepentant heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath when God’s righteous judgment will be revealed” (Romans 2:4-5). What a shock it will be the day when you realize that these words of God are actually directed at you and that you are really the “you” mentioned! It’s like a jurist who is totally absorbed in analyzing a past sentence which is standard. On taking a Closer look he suddenly realizes that the sentence also applies to himself and is still effective. His state of mind undergoes a sudden change and he ceases to be so sure of himself. The Word of God is engaged here in a real and true “tour de force.” It must reverse the situation of the person dealing with it. There’s no escape. It’s necessary to surrender and repeat with David: “I have sinned!” (2 Samuel 12:13), otherwise the heart is hardened again and impenitence reinforced.

A Masked Form Of Idolatry
The specific accusation the Apostle makes against the “pious” is that “they themselves are doing the exact same things” they judge others for. But in what sense? Is it that they materially do the exact same things? This is also sometimes true (cf. Romans 2:21-24); but he is especially talking about the essence which is impiety and idolatry. There is a masked form of idolatry at work in our present world. If it is idolatry “to bow down to the work of our hands” (cf. Isaiah 2:8; Hosea 14:4), if it is idolatry “to put the creature in the place of the Creator,” then I am idolatrous whenever I put the creature — my creature, the work of my hands — in the Creator’s place. My creature could be the home or the church I have built, the family I have formed, the child I have given life to (how many mothers, even Christian mothers, unconsciously make a god out of their children, especially an only child!); it could be the work I do, the school I direct, the book I write. Then there is my “self,” the prince of idols. In fact, idolatry is always based on autolatry, self-worship, self-love, placing oneself first at the center of the world sacrificing everything else to this. The “substance” is always impiety, the non-glorification of God, but always and only one’s self. It is even making use of God for our own success and personal affirmation. The sin St. Paul denounced in the “Jews” throughout the whole Letter was that they sought self-justice and self-glory and they did this even in their observance of God’s law.

Perhaps, deep within myself, I am ready at this point to acknowledge the truth, to admit that so far I have lived “for myself,” that I am also involved in the mystery of impiety. The Holy Spirit has “convinced me of sin.” The ever-new miracle of conversion is beginning for me. What should I do in such a delicate situation? Let us open the Bible and intone the “De profundis”: “Out of the depths I cry to thee, Oh Lord” (Psalms 130). The “De Profundis” wasn’t written for the dead but for the living: the “depths” from which the psalmist cries is not a reference to Purgatory but to sin: “If thou, Oh Lord, shouldst mark iniquities, Lord who could stand”? It is written that Christ “in the Spirit went and preached to the spirits in prison” (cf. 1 Peter 3:19). Commenting on this, one of the Fathers of the Church said: “When you hear that Christ, going down to Hades, freed the souls who were prisoners there, do not think that these things are far removed from what is being done now. Believe me, the heart is a tomb.”(Macanus of Egypt, On the Freedom of Mind 116; PG 34, 936). We are now spiritually in the position of the “spirits in prison” in Hades, awaiting the coming of the Savior. The traditional icon of the Resurrection shows Adam and Eve desperately outstretching their hands to grasp the right hand of Christ who is coming with his cross to snatch them from prison. Let us also raise a cry from the deep prison of our sinful “self” in which we are kept prisoners. The psalm we are saying is full of confident trust and expectation: “In his word I hope. . . My soul waits for the Lord more than watchmen for the morning . . . He will redeem Israel from all his iniquities.” We already know that help exists, that there is a remedy for our ills, because “God loves us.” So while we are shaken by God’s Word, let us confidently say to God: “For you do not give me up to sheol, or let your godly one see the pit” (Psalms 16:10).

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Reading Selections from Critical Thinking for Christians by Peter Kreeft

February 9, 2010

Dr. Peter Kreeft is the author of nearly 50 books. Critical Thinking is a short essay he wrote for a Christian magazine. I’ve made selections, assigned topics and highlighted the important. I love his thought on reason being narrowed to calculation and the scientific method during the Enlightenment. This is a shot across the bow of our Atheist friends who sometimes don’t realize the roots of their Atheism.

What Is Critical Thinking
Critical thinking is more than just thinking critically in the sense of criticizing others’ thoughts, or our own, by finding one or more of the three things that can go wrong with thoughts: ambiguities, falsehoods, or fallacies. Critical thinking means judgment and evaluation but it does not mean only negative evaluation.

Another word for “critical thinking” is “logical thinking.” This is a high and holy thing, in fact a very Christian thing because the ultimate foundation of logic is the Logos, the eternal Mind or Reason or Inner Word of God, which John’s Gospel identifies as the pre-incarnate Christ. The human art and science of logic is the instrument that teaches us to rightly order and structure our thoughts, as a means to the end of thought, which is truth.

One of the most useful aspects of that ordering and structuring is the realization that all the things that can ever go wrong with any thoughts come under just these three headings: ambiguous terms, false premises, or logical fallacies. And this is a wonderful simplifying and clarifying of the process of criticizing any thoughts, written or spoken, by any person, yourself or another, about any topic, human or divine.

Three Standards Of Critical Thinking
“Critical thinking” is simply the currently fashionable term for what used to be called “human reason.” It means judging thoughts, negatively or positively, by these three standards, but it also includes at least four more things:

(1)     First, it includes generating thoughts, or creating thoughts. Man cannot create matter, like God, but he can create thoughts. What is usually called “creative thinking” in schools today is unjustifiably limited to creating new and original thoughts, which are usually shallow and foolish thoughts because most of us are shallow and foolish thinkers. In fact we are so shallow and foolish that we think that we are deep and wise, and we think that the new and original thoughts we have are better than the old and traditional thoughts of the past, which are the “tried and true” “cream of the crop” of thoughts from thousands of deeper and wiser minds than ours, thoughts that have been tested by time and by millions of other human beings, and which have survived the tsunami of forgetfulness that obliterates most of the memories of each generation, thoughts that have been judged precious and preserved by tradition. As Dorothy Sayers brilliantly pointed out long ago in Creed or Chaos, echoing G.K. Chesterton’s Orthodoxy, Christian orthodoxy is the most truly creative and dramatic thought in the world, while every heresy comes from a lack of creativity. Hell has a very limited imagination. Contrast the limited imagination of the demon who tempts you to tediously repeat your besetting sin with the creative imagination of the Creator of the Big Bang, the quark, the Venus flytrap, the ostrich, and Monty Python.
But all this is, alas, incomprehensible to the National Teachers Association, which is one of the two infallible magisteria we have on earth, and every Catholic educator should be grateful to God for them, for they have a 100% error rate, as Rome has a 100% truth rate.

(2)     The second thing that critical thinking also includes is continuing thoughts rightly once they are created, following a thought as you would follow a deer through a forest. It takes much more moral virtue to follow a thought, virtues like courage and patience and persistence, than merely to generate a thought in the first place, because generating a thought is largely passive, easy, and delightful while pursuing a thought is active, hard, and onerous. The first is inspiration, the second is perspiration.
Socrates was a great example of these virtues of courage, patience, and persistence in following a thought. He never abandoned his quest for the answer to the Delphic oracle’s impossible puzzle of “know thyself,” and even though he made some crucial errors in his solution to it, such as reincarnation, which he called “a likely story,” and the ignoring of the body. Yet his persistence on this quest was the primary origin of Western philosophy, which is perhaps the second most beautiful flower that has ever grown in the soil of Western civilization, after Christianity.
Great philosophers are persistent, or in plainer language, stubborn. Augustine was stubborn, and ruthlessly honest, and fanatically intolerant of logical and personal error, and therefore he succeeded in breaking through a thousand intellectual and moral obstacles to become the second most influential Christian of all time, after St. Paul. Aquinas was stubborn. At age 4 he asked his teacher “What is God?” and because his teacher could not answer him, he eventually wrote the Summa Theologica. If you want to read a good book, sometimes you first have to write it yourself.
Even good atheists and agnostics can be great philosophers if they are stubborn. Camus was stubbornly honest, and had he lived, he might have become another Dostoyevski or Tolstoi. Heidegger was stubborn. All his long life and throughout his long winding trail of thinking and writing, he thought about nothing except being – he would not let the question go – and that is why he became, not the best, but probably the most important, philosopher of the 20th century.

(3)     Third, critical thinking also includes insisting on thinking consistently, which means daring to think two premises together and draw the logically necessary conclusion. This is the fundamental form of logical thinking, the syllogism. There is nothing uncreative about a syllogism. It is so creative, in fact, that it is very much like sexual intercourse, in that it produces a product, a thought-child, if we do not artificially contracept it by erecting a barrier between the premises and their conclusion, which we usually do, especially when we fear that the conclusion, like a baby, would be inconvenient to us.
For instance, it is almost universally admitted that these two premises are true but the conclusion is usually resisted: first, that there is a psycho-somatic unity to the human essence and, secondly, that our bodies, which are half of our essence, are masculine or feminine innately, not just by social convention. But rarely is the conclusion drawn that the other half of our essence, our souls, are therefore also innately, and not just conventionally, masculine or feminine. But it is logical. If body and soul are related as matter and form, it is no more possible to change one without changing the other than it is to change the words of a book without changing the meaning, or to change the meaning without changing the words. For they are also related as matter and form.
Here is another, closely related example: if this conclusion about innate masculinity or femininity of souls, in turn, is joined with the additional premise that our whole human identity will be preserved rather than lost in Heaven, that grace perfects nature rather than bypassing it, then I think we will derive some very daring but interesting conclusions about sexuality in Heaven, or at least we will dare to ask the question, dare to think about our two greatest passions together – sex and sanctity – which is something few modern theologians do. (John Paul II is the shining exception with his “theology of the body.”). But to do this involves following the path of logical thinking to its end, not just beginning to follow it. It means letting the river of logic take the raft of your thoughts wherever it will take them rather than where you will take them (which is usually only where the Zeitgeist will take them, the social fashions and ideologies that have unconsciously formed your thoughts).
This aspect of critical thinking, drawing conclusions logically from your thoughts, involves not only seeing these logical consequences with the intellect but also acknowledging them with the will. And that requires moral as well as intellectual virtue, for it requires slaying the attractively disguised dragons of sloth which lurk next to each hard and unexpected turn taken by the path of thought. Sloth means not just any kind of laziness but the refusal to exert oneself when in the presence of a spiritual good; and it is a spiritual good to seek and find the truth, to follow the path of thinking, even when it is dark, to the light at the end of that tunnel; to think through a thought thoroughly; to do as good a job and build as sound a building with thoughts as we do with bricks or steel.

(4)     A fourth element of critical thinking is applying conclusions rightly in the practical order, letting our thought make a difference to our life, translating principles into practice. The single most crucial instance of this is one that is embarrassing to all of us, and worse than embarrassing. If we are Christians we all admit that the only way to true happiness is sanctity, not sin. We know this truth not only by faith but also by reason and by repeated experience. Everyone seeks deep, true, lasting happiness, and only the saints find it. Yet we are not saints. Every time we sin, we suffer, yet we keep sinning. Every time we overcome sin, we have deep joy, yet we keep refusing joy. God keeps offering us joy in His right hand and misery in His left, and we keep saying, “Duh, I think I’ll try the left hand.” We are, in other words, quite simply, insane. That’s one of the meanings of Original Sin. If we only lived logically, we would all be saints. Instead, we think illogically and uncritically. We keep uncritically falling for the Devil’s advertisements, eating the worms on his fish hooks. We desperately hope that there is some other way to happiness than God’s way, even though no one has ever found it. That is not critical thinking
For instance, every morning we are faced with our first choice of the day: do we give our first thoughts to God, do we take that first thought captive and bring it to the feet of our Lord, or do we claim it for ourselves and use it to gratify our own way to happiness, whatever we think that is? Do we yield our brain to the thousand tiny soldiers that run at it across the battlefields of waking consciousness, who threaten it with their tiny swords of worry thoughts and planning thoughts and “my will be done” thoughts? Or do we mercilessly murder those little bastards from Hell by the authority and power of the God who is a consuming fire, and trust ourselves and our day to Him? Do we think: I am going to be so busy today that I have no time to pray? Or do we think: I am going to be so busy today that I must begin my day with prayer, because if I do not give Christ the meager loaves and fishes of my time, they will not be multiplied and at the end of the day I will be frazzled and frizzled like hair in a hurricane? Usually, we selfishly eat these loaves and fishes ourselves, fearing any diminution of them if we give them to the One who alone can multiply them and always does, if we give them up – which we well know from repeated experience. We all know the results of these two experiments: every single day of our lives we have performed one or the other of them, and the results have never varied. Yet we insist on singing Sinatra’s song “I Did It My Way” instead of “God’s Way is the Best Way” day after day, even though Sinatra’s song is the song they all sing as they enter Hell, while the other one is the one they all sing on the way to Heaven.
This fourth aspect of critical thinking – its practical application – is of course the most important one of all because it makes the biggest difference to our lives. In fact “important” may fairly be defined as “making a difference to your life.” Buddha knew the life-changing importance of critical thinking better than most of us do. The very first and best known line of the best known and best loved Buddhist book, the Dhammapada, says:

“All that we are is determined by our thoughts;
it begins where our thoughts begin,
it moves where our thoughts move,
it ends where our thoughts end.”

This is even more crucial to a Christian, who knows that the end of the road is not just temporal but eternal happiness or misery. As one obscure writer has reminded us:

“Sow a thought, reap an act;
Sow an act, reap a habit;
Sow a habit, reap a character;
Sow a character, reap a destiny.”

Buddha was right: “all that we are is determined by our thoughts.”

So for a Christian, critical thinking means not only thinking that has been purged of illogic but also of sin; not only thinking that has been subjected to the honest judgment of the theoretical reason, but also to the honest judgment of the practical reason, or reason about practice, i.e. moral reason.

The judgment of the theoretical reason consists in these three logical questions:

(1)     what does it mean?
(2)     is it true? and
(3)     what is the evidence or proof?

In other words, are there any ambiguous terms, are there any false premises, and are there any logical fallacies? If not, the conclusion is true.

The judgment of the practical, moral reason consists in a single question: is this good or evil? A crucial difference between the judgment of the theoretical reason and the judgment of the practical reason is that the judgment of the practical reason is almost always clear, and immediate, and certain. We know what is good and what is evil far more clearly than we know what is true and false. Our conscience is louder than our logic. Most problems of discerning God’s will are moral, not intellectual. Jesus Himself said, when asked by the Pharisees how they could understand His teaching, “If your will were to do the will of my Father, you would understand my teaching.” That is the most important principle of critical thinking about morality.

Reason, Or Critical Thinking, Comes From God. It Is God’s Gift
But how can that be true if it is something we do and something we are responsible for? God does not do our critical thinking for us.

It is God’s gift for two reasons.

(1)     First, because it is the exercise of an essential part of the image of God in us. God does not think our thoughts for us, yet our minds are dependent on God’s mind just as totally as the existence of  the physical universe is dependent on God’s will to “let it be” and on God’s power to do all that He wills. Our minds are mirrors, and God is the sun, and all the light we generate is reflected light from Him; yet it is our choice to turn our mirrors to the sun or not, and to keep them clean or not, and to keep them unbroken or to break them into fragments. Every time we think wrongly, we misuse a divine gift, just as whenever we misuse our free will we misuse a divine gift. Both wrong thinking and wrong choosing are sacrileges, because they desecrate a holy thing. What we pervert in wrong thinking is the mirrored powers of God’s own mind that He gave us in giving us His own image. We pervert this image whenever we move our minds into the dark and away from the light, just as we pervert the mirrored powers of God’s will which He gave us in giving us free will as part of His image in us, whenever we move our wills to evil and away from good. God continues to uphold in existence His spiritual gifts, the two powers of His image in us, even when we pervert them, just as He continues to uphold the physical universe even when we misuse it. At the moment when He said “Be” in creating the universe, he said “continue to be” to Cain’s rock even as it split Abel’s head, and to the nails we used to pierce His own Son’s flesh on the Cross.

(2)     The second reason critical thinking is God’s gift is because grace perfects nature, and this is an essential part of human nature, the ability and the desire to think logically as a means to thinking truly. The fact that grace perfects nature means that the very same things that are truly ours, and come from our own human nature and activity, can be truly God’s, and from the actions of His grace. (This principle, by the way, is the central and simple key to reconciling free will and predestination: what is divinely predestined is precisely our truly free choices.)

My third, fourth, and fifth points will be very short because we all know the answer to them pretty well.

How Should Critical Thinking Order Our Thoughts?
The third question is: How should critical thinking order our thoughts? And my answer is: Unconscious  time but by conscious decision sometimes, especially those times when it is hardest and we are most tempted to laziness.

There are many other good ways of thinking than thinking logically –thinking intuitively or mystically or imaginatively or romantically or even sometimes randomly – and there are many occasions when we should think non-logically, but there are never times when we should think illogically, except when we are deliberately making a joke, laughing at laughable follies. But our lives should not be laughable follies.

Thus the answer to this third question, how critical thinking should order our thoughts, is also the answer to the fourth question, how it should order our actions. For “Sow a thought, reap an act.” It takes the will, not the mind, to carry out the thought into the act, and between the thought and the act lies many a shadow. But that is a topic for another day, when we talk about moral vices and virtues.

We should “live according to reason,” said the ancient Greeks, meaning not that we should be computers rather than human beings, but that we should be human beings rather than animals. Reason is not limited to logic, though logic is one of the things that sharply distinguish human reason from animal consciousness. The meaning of that great old word “Reason” was arbitrarily narrowed to “calculation” beginning with Descartes and the Enlightenment (which I prefer to call the Endarkenment) and with the restriction of all approved thinking to what can be proved by the scientific method – which, of course, is self-contradictory since that very principle cannot be proved by the scientific method! Confusing life with a laboratory is not what it means to live according to reason. Moral conscience, aesthetic appreciation, intelligent, responsible religious faith, intuitive wisdom, and even mystical experience are all part of the powers of human reason in the broad old honorable Greek sense of the word. Sometimes I think half the world’s problems would be solved if the whole world had to speak ancient Greek. It would be like Pentecost: an undoing of the Tower of Babel.

How Should Critical Thinking Order Our Individual Lives and Secular World
And the fifth question, how critical thinking should order our secular world, is simply an extension of the fourth question, how it should order our individual lives, for the life of the world is simply the coming together of all our individual lives.

Just think for a moment what a radical revolution it would be if the whole world practiced just one basic virtue of thought, the virtue of honesty – not just honesty with each other but honesty with yourself and with the truth.

The world does not lack the knowledge of solutions to its problems; almost any one of the basic virtues –justice, charity, gratitude, compassion, wisdom, honesty – if practiced, would transform the world from a vale of tears to a palace of joys. How to attain this Utopian dream? There is a very simple way: one person at a time. You have only an appallingly tiny control over whether others join this radical revolution, but you have an appallingly large control, and responsibility, over whether you do. Start working for world peace and justice and understanding. Start inside the walls of your house.

How Should Critical Thinking Order Our Spiritual Warfare
The sixth question is: How should critical thinking order our jihad, our spiritual warfare? We are soldiers of the King, and the purpose of our life on earth is to work and fight for His kingdom. We are at war with the enemies of peace, because He is. He told us that: “I came not to bring peace but a sword.” His kingdom is a Kingdom of peace. He wants us to make peace with the three parties we are at war with: neighbor and self and God; and therefore His Kingdom is at war with the world, the flesh, and the devil, who are at war with neighbor, self, and God. If we are Christians, we fight; but if we are Christians we fight with weapons like poverty and chastity and obedience, for we fight against enemies like greed and lust and pride. Now how is critical thinking a weapon in this war?

The enemy in this war is Satan and his fallen angels, of course – unless our Lord, His Church, and His Book are all fools or liars. As you know if you have read C.S. Lewis’s masterful expose of the enemy’s strategy called The Screwtape Letters, the enemy’s two strongest strategies are: Dim the Lights and Divide and Conquer. “Dim the Lights” means “Don’t let them think clearly and honestly.” “Divide and Conquer” means “Make them hate and resent and mistrust each other and wrestle against each other rather than against the principalities and powers of darkness in high places.” Thus “Divide and conquer” also depends on “Dim the lights” for it means “Confuse them about who their enemy really is.” No medical operation can be carried out without light, and no military operation can either. No matter how powerful an army is, if it is blind, it will lose. A blind Cyclops will lose to a clever Ulysses. A blind Christian will lose to a clever devil.

One form of blindness that is very hard for us to detect in ourselves is a skewered perspective, majoring in minors, missing forests for trees. A shining example of a man who is trying to restore a right perspective today is Pope Benedict, especially in his recent Regensburg address, which from the perspective of the destiny of Western civilization is perhaps the most important speech since Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s 1978 Harvard Commencement Address. Benedict does not see Islamic terrorists as the primary problem in today’s world. They are only a symptom of a deeper issue in the Islamic world: is Allah a God of reason or of force? Is He to be worshipped because He is powerful or because He is good? Christianity gave a sharp and unmistakable answer to that question, on Calvary. If Islam gives the same answer, or something like the same answer, something close to the same answer, then we invite them to join us in an ecumenical jihad, a common spiritual warfare in the name of our common God against our common enemy, which is modern Western atheism, secularism, and relativism, the apostasy and rebellion against that God on the part of the nations of the West that made up the civilization that used to be called Christendom.

To have that kind of clear perspective is like being a lookout on the “Titanic,” or the little boy in “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” It certainly deserves the title “critical thinking” because it is thinking rightly about crisis.

Many more things could be said, but I will end soon, with my last point, the eschatological or Heavenly dimension of critical thinking, because I want to give you time to digest this. For it seems to me that that is the highest purpose of communication: to stimulate thought, which naturally expresses itself in questions and dialog. Talks are monologs. Dialogs are better. In fact, monologs exist for the sake of dialogs. The nature of ultimate reality is not monolog but dialog: it is called the Trinity. I have always thought of talks as something like diving boards and dialog afterward as something like swimming pools, and I am impatient with speakers who act like they have squatter’s rights on diving boards. As you are probably now impatient with this article that is taking many minutes to end, rather than just ending!

What will critical thinking be in Heaven? Will it be part of the Beatific Vision? Or will it be a kind of comic relief from the Beatific Vision? I really don’t know, but here is my guess. I think the Beatific Vision is much more ordinary-looking than we think. I think Jesus had it all the time, until it was taken away in that moment of Hell on the Cross when He said, “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” I think the saints in Heaven have the Beatific Vision all the time yet nevertheless can converse with us without haloes, without fits of distraction, and without losing the ability to make a joke. I think that, because that’s what Jesus was like. He was fully human, remember, as well as fully divine at the same time: “like us in all things save sin.” Jesus was not a mystic; or, if He was, He was a mystic and a perfectly ordinary man at the same time, so ordinary that most men missed His divinity. The greatest saint of the worst century in history, Mother Teresa, was totally ordinary: earthy as the earth, humble as humus, grounded as a grandmother. And her mind was like a small, sharp kitchen knife. It cut instantly through layers of baloney.

Do you want to see what critical thinking looks like? Read everything Mother Teresa ever said. And read John Paul the Great. And Augustine, and Aquinas. Complete, Heavenly critical thinking, the thing we are training for here, has all four of those dimensions at once, Like Jesus Himself. It is as profoundly logical as Aquinas, and as profoundly practical as Mother Teresa, and as profoundly visionary as John Paul II. I suggest these four models for your imitation and as your training for critical thinking on earth and in Heaven.