Archive for the ‘Simone Weil’ Category

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Simone Weil and Wallace Stevens: The Notion of De-creation as Subtext in “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” — JAMES R. LINDROTH

June 18, 2010
 
 

Wallace Stevens

 

I was amazed to read this essay. For the longest time I had associated Stevens with my new-age past. After my conversion to Catholicism I became drawn to the mystical writings of Simone Weil (several posts here). Until Professor Lindroth made the connection I had never imagined that Stevens had also been drawn to her and that his poem “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” could be seen as a response to many of the writings in Gravity and Grace which he had been influenced by. This is a complex essay and a difficult read. Probably only of interest to those of you who share my fascination with Weil and Stevens. Stevens’ “strong religious concern[s]” are still batted about in the secular university. Needless to say while I was growing up, this was never considered. I had always considered him a factor in my conversion and have been cheered by others seeing the religious significance of his poetry.

Wallace Stevens’ deathbed conversion to an orthodox Christian faith, reported by Peter Brazeau in Parts of a World: Wallace Stevens Remembered: An Oral Biography (1983), has been met with cynicism by James K. Guimond, among others, who speaks of it as a “final insurance policy” and with outright denial by his daughter Holly. Yet Stevens’ correspondence with Sister M. Bernetta Quinn, (See particularly the letters dated 7 April 1948 and 21 Dec. 1951; in the first, Stevens remarks on the striking similarity of their minds, after which he asserts that he does “seek a center” and expects “to go on seeking it”; in the second, he expressly states his belief in God, although not “the same God in whom” he believed as “a boy.” Wallace Stevens, Letters of Wallace Stevens, selected and edited by Holly Stevens (NY: Knopf, 1977) 584, 735.)

His reading of Simone Weil toward the end of his life, (Stevens, who died in 1955, was 68 when Weil’s La Pesanteur et La Grace was published; he draws upon this 1947 edition for his essay “The Relations between Poetry and Painting,” originally read at the Museum of Modem Art in 1951 and subsequently published in his The Necessary Angel: Essays on Reality and the Imagination (NY:Knopf, 1951) 159-76) and the corpus of Stevens’ poetry, particularly the late poems, bears witness to a strong religious concern often commented upon by his critics.

Although most, like Milton J. Bates in his authoritative new biography, find it subordinate to and ultimately subsumed by his poetic theory. In Bates’ final judgment that “Stevens effaced himself before the Supreme Imagination” in the way that “Eliot effaced himself before the Supreme Being,” Bates is representative of those critics who reject the notion that what ultimately became most important for Stevens was the quest for Weil’s uncreated reality, although the emphasis on the effacement of self is very close to Weil’s notion of de-creation. However, unlike “The Man with the Blue Guitar” and “Notes toward a Supreme Fiction,” earlier poems to which it is frequently compared, “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” composed in 1949 just prior to Stevens’ seventieth birthday, contains a subtext echoing Simone Weil’s religious meditations and displaying a spiritual ascesis in accord with the poet’s final religious act.

It is not only fitting that Wallace Stevens should be drawn to Simone Weil, a figure whose belief presents a religious paradox as problematic as his own, but that Weil’s mystical notion of de-creation should provide a key to the understanding of one of Stevens’ most difficult and, at the same time, most religious poems. Weil’s meditations on de-creation appear in her notebooks and were included in Gustave Thibon’s selections from these notebooks, published under the title La Pesanteur et La Grace (Gravity and Grace) 1947, two years before the composition of the Stevens poem. It is to the selection that Stevens refers in The Necessary Angel, and it is from this selection that he draws the notion of de-creation to emphasize the absolute value of artistic effort in his consideration of poetry’s relationship with painting.

“Simone Weil in La Pesanteur et La Grace,” says Stevens, citing the edition by its complete French title, “has a chapter on what she calls de-creation. She says that de-creation is making pass from the created to the uncreated, but that destruction is making pass from the created to nothingness. In this essay, “The Relations between Poetry and Painting,” Stevens only appropriates Weil’s notion of de-creation for the purposes of his familiar aesthetic argument that in the modern world the poet functions as a substitute for God. Still, from the standpoint of his late poetry in general and more particularly as it applies to “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” Stevens’ acknowledgment of a full familiarity with the Weil text becomes critically significant, as does the undeniable sympathy between the two as religious thinkers. If Weil’s mystical notion of the de-creation of self is a pertinent idea for Stevens in his later years, so are the correlative notions of spiritual gravity, a hidden God, affliction, and the renunciation of time.

De-creation, as postulated by Weil in Gravity and Grace, is making “something created pass into the uncreated,” and to this she opposes the notion of destruction, making “something created pass into nothingness,” which she calls a “blameworthy substitute for de-creation” (Gravity and Grace 28). For Weil, the uncreated, another term for reality, is identified with God, and the passage from the created to the uncreated is not a fall into nothingness but the attainment of God. Yet this attainment of God, through de-creation, depends on the individual’s willingness to become nothing, to detach himself from sense life, and ultimately even from a “belief in the prolongation of life,” robbing “death of its purpose” of allowing the individual to attain divine being (Gravity and Grace 33).

Within this mystical formulation, one’s greatest enemy is the world of appearances to which one clings in a desperate effort to prolong life. “Appearance clings to being,” asserts Weil, “and pain alone can tear them from each other. For whoever is in possession of being there can be no appearance. Appearance chains being down” (Gravity and Grace, 34). Here, Weil’s chain metaphor emphatically evokes her notion of spiritual gravity, the force that binds one to the created world of appearance and time. Creation says Weil is composed of the descending movement of gravity to escape gravity’s pull the individual ‘must necessarily turn to something other than himself, since it is a question of being delivered from self’ (Gravity and Grace, 3) Paradoxically, and it is a paradox fully explored by Stevens in “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven”; time, our enemy in the conventional sense, becomes our salvation, since time “in its course tears appearance from being and being from appearance, by violence. Time makes it manifest that it is not eternity” (Gravity and Grace 34).

Weil’s notions of de-creation and spiritual gravity manifest themselves in the Stevens poem through two informing impulses. The first of these is the poet’s stated intention the need to strip created reality of all illusion ‘Here,” declares Stevens of An Ordinary Evening in New Haven:

“My interest is to try to get as close to the ordinary, the commonplace and the ugly as it is possible for a poet to get. It is not a question of grim reality but plain reality.” The poem’s second informing impulse is the desire to embrace uncreated reality. This double movement produces a subtle text continually questioning the poet’s relationship to the phenomenal world of appearances, and an even subtler subtext presenting our relationship to the noumenal (vocab: In the philosophy of Kant, an object as it is in itself independent of the mind, as opposed to a phenomenon), to uncreated spiritual reality — to God.

Attending to the first movement alone has invariably led critics to reductive interpretations some dismissing the poem as an aging poet’s cry of despair over the loss of imagination; others finding a saving ballast in what they mistakenly judge to be the old Stevens’ renewed affirmation of the sense world Helen Vendler, for instance, invoking “Dejection An Ode,” sees the Stevens poem as a “long expansion of Coleridge’s disjunction before the moon and the stars,” the depression of the poet experiencing the “metabolic depletion” of age.  In a similar fashion, Harold Bloom, although rejecting Vendler’s interpretation of the poem as a “portrayal of dessication,” is equally reductive in his insistence that the poem is a Whitmanian celebration of sense life and that the final canto presents reality as “the solipsistic recognition of privileged moments, sudden perfections of sense, flakes of fire, fluttering things having distinct shapes.”[Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976) 336]

At the heart of “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” is neither “metabolic depletion” nor celebratory “solipsism” but, as is the case with Weil’s meditations, the notion of ascetic denial leading to spiritual life, to being, to God. Like Weil, Stevens raises the ordinary to a mystical level where the drama of de-creation is presented in terms of the shedding of appearances, the renunciation of the created in time, the acceptance of nothingness: “The dilapidation of dilapidations” (16.3), “total leafless-ness” (16.18), “The dominant blank” (17.7).

As a major obstacle to de-creation, Weil postulates spiritual gravity, the pull exerted by the world of appearances (Gravity and Grace 45-48). “Weil,” says Eric O. Springsted, commenting on this aspect of de-creation, “contended that our natural attachment to our terrestrial existence is weighty and constitutes a sort of spiritual gravity to which we are constantly subject. Consequently, she argued that as long as we remain subject to this gravity there is no way from man to God” (Springsted, Christus Mediator, 117).and it is in the exact middle of the poem, Cantos XV, XVI, and XVII, that Stevens gives his most compelling evidence of this spiritual gravity at work.

Canto XV, for example, places the drama of de-creation against a rain-drenched landscape where the rain heightens man’s awareness of the sense world, drawing him to it and away from the spiritual:

He preserves himself against the repugnant rain
By an instinct for a rainless land, the self
Of his self, come at upon wide delvings of wings.

The instinct for heaven had its counterpart:
The instinct for earth, for New Haven, for his room,
The gay tournamonde as of a single world

In which he is and as and is are one.
For its counterpart a kind of counterpoint
Irked the wet wallows of the water-spout.

The rain kept falling loudly in the trees
And on the ground. The hibernal dark that hung
In primavera, the shadow of bare rock,

Becomes the rock of autumn, glittering,
Ponderable source of each imponderable,
The weight we lift with the finger of a dream,

The heaviness we lighten by light will,
By the hand of desire, faint, sensitive, the soft
Touch and trouble of the touch of the actual hand.

Because of his “instinct for heaven,” the protagonist in this drama of de-creation finds the rain “repugnant” rather than refreshing, and he “preserves himself against” it by “an instinct for a rainless land.” Against the backdrop of this rainless land, the biblical desert of purification, Stevens situates the protagonist’s “self / Of his self:,” the hidden “I” spoken of by Weil (“My ‘I’ is hidden for me . . . it is on the side of God, it is in God, it is God” [Gravity And Grace 33]); and the discovery of this hidden “I” is accompanied by the traditional sign of contact with the holy, the “wide delving of wings. But this is poetic drama, not platitude, and set against the man’s “Instinct for heaven” is an equally powerful “Instinct for earth, for New Haven, for his room, / The gay tournamonde as of a single world / In which he is and as and is are one.”

“Tournamonde,” providing as it does a strong echo of Weil’s notion of spiritual gravity, is central here, and in a letter to Herbert Weinstock, his editor at Knopf, Stevens gives the following explanation of the word. “Tournamonde,” Stevens says, “is a neologism. For me it creates an image of a world in which things revolve and the word is therefore appropriate in the collocation of is and as. . . I think the word justifies itself in the sense of conveying an immediate, even though rather vague, meaning.” If the movement to God’s spiritual reality is outward, away from the apparent self and the created world, the movement here is centripetal and inward, in which the man revolves in tighter and tighter circles of the illusory self. It is not the joy of God that attracts but the gaiety of appearances, the world whose constant movement creates the illusion of being where “is” and “as” are the same.

Canto XVI heightens the drama of de-creation with further evidence of the pull of gravity emanating from creation and time:

Among time’s images, there is not one
Of this present, the venerable mask above
The dilapidation of dilapidations.

The oldest-newest day is the newest alone.
The oldest-newest night does not creak by,
With lanterns, like a celestial ancientness.

Silently it heaves its youthful sleep from the sea
The Oklahoman—the Italian blue
Beyond the horizon with its masculine,

Their eyes closed, in a young palaver of lips.
And yet the wind whimpers oldly of old age
In the western night. The venerable mask,

In this perfection, occasionally speaks
And something of death’s poverty is heard.
This should be tragedy’s most moving face.

It is a bough in the electric light
And exhalations in the eaves, so little
To indicate the total leaflessness.

The opening of this canto presents one of time’s most powerfully attractive images in the spectacle of the natural world continually renewing itself, but it is the figures of youth and old age, renewal and exhaustion, birth and death that give it its dramatic structure. Moreover, subtending the canto’s entire drama is the notion of nudity, the total purity achieved, according to Weil, at only two points of existence: birth and death (Gravity and Grace 32),

Death, an emphatic point of nudity for Weil and Stevens alike, is suggested by the “dilapidation of dilapidations” and by the late-autumn tree bereft of its leaves, reduced from the image of fecundity to the bare line of “a bough in the electric light,” to “total leaflessness.” The second point of nudity, birth, is suggested by the two paradoxes of the “oldest-newest day” and the “oldest-newest night”; or rather the two points intersect, since as the day dies the night is born as “Silently it heaves its youthful sleep from the sea” and encroaches on “The Ok1ahoman — the Italian blue” disappearing beyond the mind’s horizon. This symbolic intersection of birth and death resonates with and reinforces a similar intersection in canto XV where Stevens juxtaposes winter, the season of death, with spring, the season of new life, through “The hibernal dark that” hangs “In primavera.”

Moreover, in both cantos XV and XVI, the opposites of youth and age, renewal and exhaustion, birth and death combine in a metamorphic process resulting in a denudation of existence synonymous with Weil’s notion of de-creation. In canto XV, the darkness of winter already present in the spring landscape in the “shadow of rock” is transformed into the “rock of autumn”; in canto XVI, the “masculine” light of the “oldest-newest day” retreating from the implicitly feminine darkness of the “oldest-newest night” is metamorphosed into the asexual, barren “electric light” illuminating the once youthful lips and eyes (“Their eyes closed, in a young palaver of lips”) now shrunk into “The venerable mask” of age. Finally, both cantos conclude with emphatic symbols of existence stripped bare: the “rock of autumn” and “total leaflessness.”

A major part of the drama of de-creation derives from Weil’s postulating a God who “could create only by hiding himself’ (GG 33) with the consequence that “God and the supernatural are hidden and formless in the universe” (Gravity and Grace 49: As Gustave Thibon points out in a comment on a related text, “contact with supernatural reality is first felt as an experience of nothingness” since “God does not exist in the same way as created things which form the only object of experience for our natural faculties” (Gravity and Grace 19n) Stevens meditates on the hiddeness of uncreated reality throughout “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” but a particularly clear example of such meditation presents itself in canto XVII where Weil’s absent God, the hidden holiness, is poetically evoked as “The dominant blank, the unapproachable:

The color is almost the color of comedy,
Not quite. It comes to the point and at the point,
It falls. The strength at the centre is serious.

Perhaps instead of failing it reflects
As a serious strength rejects pin-idleness.
A blank underlies the trials of device,

The dominant blank, the unapproachable.
This is the mirror of the high serious:
Blue verdured into a damask’s lofty symbol,

Gold easings and ouncings and fluctuations of thread
And beetling of belts and lights of general stones,
Like blessed beams from out a blessed bush

Or the wasted figurations of the wastes
Of night, time and the imagination,
Saved and beholden, in a robe of rays.

These fitful sayings are, also, of tragedy:
The serious reflection is composed
Neither of comic nor tragic but of commonplace.

In discussing Weil’s argument that perfect love of God is possible “only in actual affliction” and His “total absence,” Eric O. Springsted, in Christus Mediator: Platonic Mediation in the Thought of Simone Weil, points to Weil’s emphasis on parallel notions in Saint John of the Cross and Plato. Springsted emphasizes Weil’s singling out of “two periods of void” described in Plato’s “Cave Analogy,” two periods, which in Well’s words, “correspond exactly to the two dark nights described by Saint John of the Cross.” The first of these occurs “when one is unchained and walks out of the cave without being able to use his customary, but illusory, bearings”; the second occurs “when one emerges from the cave and is blinded by the light”

If Stevens evokes the hidden God through “The dominant blank” and the problematic of affliction through his opening rejection of comedy, he also, like Weil, reinforces these notions with imagery drawn from the Bible, the literature of mysticism, and Plato. For example, Stevens’ “wasted figurations of the wastes / Of night” evokes not only the Old Testament prophet’s desert of purification and Christ’s agony in the garden but the mystic’s dark night of the soul. Moreover, drawing upon the imagery of Plato’s cave and upon the Old Testament figure of the Burning Bush, Stevens renders the relation between uncreated and created reality as light reflected in darkness, and at the same time hints at the hidden God suddenly revealed in a “robe of rays.”

These major themes of Weil — de-creation of self in and through time, the pull of gravity exerted on the spirit by the world of appearances, affliction that leads to a freeing of the spirit, and a God who is hidden—resonate throughout “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” with the world of appearances receiving particularly strong emphasis in its opening cantos. Canto I, a meditation on spiritual gravity, first postulates a Platonic world of appearances and then suggests the way in which man under the force of this gravity produces an illusory God fashioned on the model of self:

The eye’s plain version is a thing apart,
The vulgate of experience.
Of this, A few words, an and yet, and yet, and yet –

As part of the never-ending meditation,
Part of the question that is a giant himself:
Of what is this house composed if not of the sun,

These houses, these difficult objects, dilapidate
Appearances of what appearances,
Words, lines, not meanings, not communications,

Dark things without a double, after all,
Unless a second giant kills the first–
A recent imagining of reality,

Much like a new resemblance of the sun,
Down-pouring; up-springing and inevitable,
A large poem for a larger audience,

As if the crude collops came together as one,
A mythological form, a festival sphere,
A great bosom, beard and being, alive with age.

Starting with the “eye’s plain version” dramatically contrasted to the “experience” of transcendence, then focusing his attention on the first of these, Stevens ponders the material world as manifested in the houses and streets of New Haven and offers the possibility that these creations of light are illusions lacking substance, “Dark things without a double.” This pessimistic questioning of created reality leads to a second question that, displacing the first, relates the material site of existence to the “crude collops” coming together in the imagination as an androgynous “mythological form” with “great bosom, beard, and being.”

The figure of the giant, with his great height but also his great weight, dramatically displays man operating under the force of gravity, first dismissing plain reality because he is not the uncreated self supporting it and then filling the “dominant blank” of the absent God with one of his own making. In each case, the figure of the giant, Polyphemus translated to Plato’s cave, emphasizes the obscured vision of the questioner and implies an ultimately unsatisfactory answer to the question of being. Stevens demonstrates his emphatic rejection of this second “giant,” the anthropomorphic god of mythology, in canto XXIV where this god in the guise of “The statue of Jove” is blown up “among the boomy clouds.” This can be construed as a de-creative act in that it conforms to Weil’s notion that we must empty ourselves of “false divinity” (Gravity and Grace, 30); Jove as an anthropomorphic divinity modeled on self is an emphatic example of such falseness. Leonora Woodman sees this as a “token of Stevens’ repeated effort to banish mistaken forms of the divine” (Woodman, Stanza My Stone, 109)

“The reality of the world,” Weil asserts, is “the reality of the self which we transfer to things. It has nothing to do with independent reality. That is only perceptible through total detachment.” Having examined New Haven, the material site of existence, as appearance and reflection, Stevens in canto II meditates on Weil’s notion of the world as an extension of self

Suppose these houses are composed of ourselves,
So that they become an impalpable town, full of
Impalpable bells, transparencies of sound,

Sounding in transparent dwellings of the self,
Impalpable habitations that seem to move
In the movement of the colors of the mind,

The far-fire flowing and the dim-coned bells
Coming together in a sense in which we are poised,
Without regard to time or where we are,

In the perpetual reference, object
Of the perpetual meditation, point
Of the enduring, visionary Jove,

Obscure, in colors whether of the sun
Or mind, uncertain in the clearest bells,
The spirit’s speeches, the indefinite,

Confused illuminations and sonorities,
So much ourselves, we cannot tell apart
The idea and the bearer-being of the idea.

If one answer to the question of being lies in the direction of Plato’s shadow-world of appearances, and another in the direction of the god of mythology, still a third looks to external reality as spiritualized self. On one hand, this version of reality has the advantage of freeing the self from limitations of “time” and space; it has a second advantage of situating the self at the metaphysical center. From this central point of intersection issue the “transparencies of sound” and the “colors of the mind” that come “together” as the impalpable town the way the “crude collops” came together as “mythological form.” The disadvantages are that although situated at the metaphysical center and poised between created reality and the “visionary love” of the uncreated, the self has in Weil’s sense transferred its reality to the reality of the created world with the effect of confusion. Subject-object distinctions vanish; and in “the indefinite, I Confused illuminations and sonorities” that result “The idea,” the “Impalpable town,” the “transparent dwellings of self” can no longer be distinguished from “the bearer-being of the idea.”

Turning from the versions of created reality postulated in the first two cantos, Stevens, in canto III, further heightens the drama of de-creation by directing his attention to the hidden holiness to be discovered through affliction and selfless love:

The point of vision and desire arc the same.
It is to the hero Qf midnight that we pray
On a hill of stones to make beau mont thereof.

If it is misery that infuriates our love,
If the black of night stands glistening on beau mont,
Then, ancientest saint ablaze with ancientest truth,

Say next to holiness is the will thereto,
And next to love is the desire for love,
The desire for its celestial ease in the heart,

Which nothing can frustrate, that most secure,
Unlike love in possession of that which was
To be possessed and is, But this cannot

Possess. It is desire, set deep in the eye,
Behind all actual seeing, in the actual scene,
In the street, in a room, on a carpet or a wall,

Always in emptiness that would be filled,
In denial that cannot contain its blood,
A porcelain, as yet in the bats thereof

In drawing a distinction between the actualities of holiness and love and their potentialities, Stevens places the same weight as Weil on possession and the need to relinquish possession if divine holiness and divine love are to be attained.

Weil’s paradoxical distinction between being and having is echoed in Stevens’s distinction, which in its elaboration situates desire “Behind all actual seeing” and raises its value above that of actual possession. For Weil, only “having,” Stevens’s “possession,” belongs to man situated in the ordinary world; or as Weil puts it: “Being does not belong to man, only having. The being of man is situated behind the curtain, on the supernatural side…The curtain is human misery: there was a curtain even for Christ” (GG 33-34). For Stevens and Weil alike, the divine, true holiness and true love, lie behind the curtain. Stevens alternately examines and embraces, wraps himself in, and steps through this curtain of the ordinary. Or as Stevens expresses it in the last two triads of canto III, behind the “actual scene,” the “street,” the “room,” the “carpet,” the “wall,” there is always the “emptiness that would be filled” and that can only be filled by being.

As the drama of de-creation unfolds in canto III, the afflicted Christ, “the hero of midnight…On a hill of stones,” displaces the self at the point of intersection between “vision and desire,” between the created and uncreated. The imagery conflates two figures central to the notion of the afflicted Christ: the figure of Christ as “the hero of midnight” undergoing the nightlong agony in the garden of Gethsemane; and the crucified Christ “On a hill of stones,” on Calvary. In his suffering, the afflicted Christ is the avatar of holiness and sainthood and in this sense becomes “ancientest saint ablaze with ancientest truth” whose holiness not only transforms the “hill of stones” into the “beau mont” but who embodies in his humanity the desire for the “celestial ease” of God’s love, “which nothing can frustrate.”

Stevens returns to Weil’s notion of affliction in canto XIX with the introduction of”A figure like Ecclesiast” (19.16). In this Old Testament guise, the afflicted Christ functions as a bridge to uncreated reality, although the imagery providing the backdrop against which the figure appears is more emphatically that of Plato’s cave rather than Calvary. A dominant figure of affliction emerges in two images: things not only shrouded in darkness but lying “Prostrate” (19.3) in the reflected light of the moon; and the transformation of daylight splendor into the privately sterile, the “public green turned private gray” (19.4).

Negative changes wrought by time reinforce the sense of affliction, as the “man who was the axis of his time” (19.9) is reduced to the “infantines” of the original “Image” (19.10). “What is the radial aspect of this place,” asks the afflicted speaker, “This present colony of a colony / Of colonies, a sense in the changing sense / Of things?” (19.13-16). In his affliction, the speaker looks to a “figure like Ecclesiast,” the embodiment of Old Testament wisdom in regard to suffering resulting from the depredations of time and the insubstantiality of created reality: “A figure Like Ecclesiast, / Rugged and luminous, chants in the dark / A text that is an I answer, although obscure” (19.16-18).

If the hero of midnight and a figure like Ecclesiast point toward Weil’s notions of the uncreated and of affliction that leads to a freeing of the spirit, two other of Stevens’s chief dramatis personae, Professor Eucalyptus and the black shepherd, restage Weil’s drama of de-creation with renewed vigor, as they show the self torn from gravity’s pull by the assault of time and death. Through Professor Eucalyptus, Stevens refocuses attention on the world of appearances, and in canto XIV where Stevens first introduces him and canto XXII where he returns, Professor Eucalyptus provides another powerful example of man operating under the force of Weil’s spiritual gravity

In the first of these two cantos, Professor Eucalyptus seeks God not in the realm of the transcendent but “In New Haven with an eye that does not look / Beyond the object” (14.3-4); more particularly “He seeks / God in the object itself, without much choice” (14.6-7). Caught by this powerful attraction to the created yet longing to discover the uncreated, professor Eucalyptus presents a theological paradox echoing those of Weil. On one hand, filled with self he freely proclaims his own divinity in the “commodious adjective” (14 8), the paradisal parlance” (14 13) that substitutes god-like word for plain thing. On the other hand, he achieves partial de-creation, release from gravity’s pull, through an “Indifference of the eye” that remains “Indifferent to what it sees.” (14.15-16) This neutrality of vision, if not of speech, sets up the possibility of a bridge to the uncreated through the unsparing presentation of its opposite, not “grim / Reality but reality grimly seen” (14.11-12).

With the return of Professor Eucalyptus in canto XXII, the philosopher and the poet conduct parallel searches “For reality” (22 2), in the philosopher’s case the “search / For an interior made exterior” and in the poet’s the search “for the same exterior made / Interior” (22.4-6). Like Professor Eucalyptus in canto XIV, the poet presents a paradox in that he demonstrates the powerful force of spiritual gravity through his emphasis on recreation of the here-and-now and at the same time discovers through this recreation a bridge to the uncreated. Intimated in “breathless things broodingly a breath / With the inhalations of original cold / And of original earliness” (22 6-8), the uncreated prompts the poet “To re-create” (22 12), to search” (22 14) a possible for its possibilities” (22 18).

Just as in canto XIV, where “The tink-tonk / Of the rain” serves as a bridge to an ‘essence not yet well perceived (14 16-18), here it is “the evening star, /The most ancient light in the most ancient sky” (22 14-15) that serves as such a bridge. In a similar manner, Professor Eucalyptus, the philosopher operating under the force of gravity and self, is like his natural namesake “The dry eucalyptus” that seeks “god in the rainy r cloud” (14.1). Moreover, as symbolic comment on the Professor’s search  for God, the eucalyptus suggests the hidden flower of spirit still enclosed within its base material covering, and paradoxically this spirit will emerge g not with spring rain as is the case in the natural world but only when / total leaflessness, Weil’s de-creation of self, has been achieved

The introduction of the black shepherd in canto XXI further  intensifies the drama of de-creation, since through his meditation on the black shepherd’s approach, Stevens, like Weil, stresses the painful rending of self from the world of appearance and necessity through the twin assaults of time and death “Necessity,” for Weil, “is the screen set between God and us so that we can be,” and she declares that it “Is for us to pierce through the screen so that we can cease to be” (Gravity and Grace 28). Stevens turns his attention to this “will of necessity, the will of wills” (21.3) with the appearance of the black shepherd, but as a prelude canto XX evokes New Haven and the individual self assaulted by what Weil calls “Time’s violence” (Gravity and Grace 134):

The imaginative transcripts were like clouds,
Today; and the transcripts of feeling, impossible
To distinguish. The town was a residuum,

A neuter shedding shapes in an absolute.
Yet the transcripts of it when it was blue remain,
And the shapes that it took in feeling, the persons that

It became, the nameless, flitting characters –
These actors still walk in a twilight muttering lines.
It may be that they mingle, clouds and men, in the air

Or street or about the corners of a man,
Who sits thinking in the corners of a room.
In this chamber the pure sphere escapes the impure

Because the thinker himself escapes. And yet
To have evaded clouds and men leaves him
A naked being with a naked will

And everything to make. He may evade
Even his own will and in his nakedness
Inhabit the hypnosis of that sphere.

Under the force of necessity’s will, the apparently solid forms constituting New Haven vanish until the town becomes “a residuum, / A neuter shedding shapes in an absolute” and its even more substantial inhabitants partially dematerialize into “nameless, flitting characters” dimly seen and faintly heard as they “walk in a twilight muttering lines.”

In response to time’s assault, the man withdraws from the world into his “chamber,” into the “corners of a room,” into the self where “the pure sphere escapes the impure / Because the thinker himself escapes.” Transformed through partial de-creation into “A naked being with a naked will,” the protagonist through his emphasis on the imagination shows himself to be still under the influence of gravity. “The imagination,” says Weil, “is continually at work filling up all the fissures through which grace might pass,” and this is the role of the imagination here (Gravity and Grace, 16). Instead of inciting the protagonist to acts of further de-creation, the void (because it leaves “everything to make”) becomes a test for the imagination, gravity’s call for recreation in resistance to de-creation. The canto con-eludes by reemphasizing, as a possible alternative to the self drawn by gravity into time’s process of recreation, the earlier escape of self into the Platonic ideality of “the pure sphere”: “He may evade / Even his own will and in his nakedness / Inhabit the hypnosis of that sphere” (20.16-18).

Now, as the black shepherd looms up at the edges of the dominant blank, Stevens, in canto XXI, considers still another possibility:

But he may not.
He may not evade his will,
Nor the wills of other men; and he cannot evade
The will of necessity, the will of wills –

Romanza out of the black shepherd’s isle,
Like the constant sound of the water of the sea
In the hearing of the shepherd and his black forms,

Out of the isle, but not of any isle.
Close to the senses there lies another isle
And there the senses give and nothing take,

The opposite of Cythére, an isolation
At the center, the object of the will, this place,
The things around — the alternative romanza

Out of the surfaces, the windows, the walls,
The bricks grown brittle in time’s poverty,
The clear. A celestial mode is paramount,

If only in the branches sweeping in the rain:
The two romanzas, the distant and the near,
Arc a single voice in the boo-ha of the wind.

Emanating from the black shepherd’s isle and “In the hearing of the shepherd and his black forms,” the sound of necessity is the sound di death’s approach. This sound strips away the illusory pleasures of Cythére, and draws attention to a contrapuntal sound, “an alternate romanza,” emanating from “an isolation at the center.” An end result of a decreative process spurred by “time’s poverty,” this “isolation at the center” affirms Weil’s paradox that time aids de-creation by “tearing appearance from being and being from appearance” (Gravity and Grace, 34). If the black shepherd defines one limit of creation and naked being another, the sounds of death and isolation marking these limits are contrapuntal; but paradoxically, like the decreative process in which the self gains the uncreated through annihilation, these opposites merge into the single voice” of “A celestial mode” that “is paramount.”

In their turn, Professor Eucalyptus, the hero of midnight, and the black shepherd evoke Weil’s notions of spiritual gravity, salvational affliction, and time’s violent rending of the self from the world of appearance and necessity. They also make it possible to discern Weil’s drama of de-creation in the otherwise perplexing roles of Alpha and Omega, the “Immaculate interpreters” of canto VI:

Reality is the beginning not the end,
Naked Alpha, not the hierophant Omega,
Of dense investiture, with luminous vassals.

It is the infant A standing on infant legs,
Not twisted, stooping, polymathic Z,
He that kneels always on the edge of space

In the pallid perceptions of its distances.
Alpha fears men or else Omega’s men
Or else his prolongations of the human.

These characters are around us in the scene.
For one it is enough; for one it is not;
For neither is it profound absentia,

Since both alike appoint themselves the choice
Custodians of the glory of the scene,
The immaculate interpreters of life.

But that’s the difference: in the end and the way
To the end. Alpha continues to begin.
Omega is refreshed at every end.

Omega, whose “dense investiture” suggests the weight of the human and whose “twisted” shape testifies to the force of gravity’s pull, is, like Professor Eucalyptus, tied to the thingness of things. As “Custodians of the glory of the scene” and the “Immaculate interpreters of life” both characters, despite their apparent differences in that Alpha is “the infant A standing on infant legs” and Omega the “stooping, polymathic Z,” demonstrate a similar inability to become disentangled from the created.

However, considered in another way, Alpha and Omega present a demonstration of Weil’s distinction between the different modes of God’s presence. “The presence of God,” says Weil, “should be understood in two ways. As Creator, God is present in everything that exists as soon as it exists. The presence for which God needs the cooperation of the creature is the presence of God, not as Creator but as Spirit. The first presence is the presence of creation. The second is the presence of de-creation” (Gravity and Grace, 33). Stevens, through his personification of Alpha and Omega, Greek letters traditionally understood as signifying God, offers a strong echo of Weil. Not only does he evoke the created world through symbolic types, he also presents a poetic figure of God’s presence.in the created and subtending it. The figure is that of created reality as a circle closed at the point where Alpha and Omega meet: “But that’s the difference: in the end and the way / To the end. Alpha continues to begin. / Omega is refreshed at every end.”

From the standpoint of God’s support of it, created reality, as is suggested in Alpha’s continuing “to begin” and Omega’s being “refreshed at every end,” is continuously created, and in this sense “Reality is a beginning not the end, / Naked Alpha, not the hierophant Omega.” But for Stevens, as for Weil, this manifestation of God’s presence is not to be confused with God as Spirit, the Spirit behind the dominant blank, the “profound absentia” to which creation points.

“Time,” says Weil, “is an image of eternity, but it is also a substitute for eternity” (Gravity and Grace, 18); and for Weil and Stevens alike, the Spirit behind the dominant blank can be attained only through the renunciation of time. In the final cantos of “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” Stevens presents the most emphatic example of Weil’s link between the renunciation of time and spiritual ascesis. The penultimate canto, canto XXX, in preparation for this final renunciation, opens with a scene whose barrenness powerfully echoes that of “The dilapidation of dilapidations,” “total leaflessness,” “The dominant blank”:

The last leaf that is going to fall has fallen.
The robins are là-bas, the squirrels, in tree-caves,
Huddle together in the knowledge of squirrels.

The wind has blown the silence of summer away.
It buzzes beyond the horizon or in the ground:
In mud under ponds, where the sky used to be reflected.

The barrenness that appears is exposing.
It is not part of what is absent, a halt
For farewells, a sad hanging on for remembrances.

It is a coming on and a coming forth.
The pines that were fans and fragrances emerge,
Staked solidly in a gusty grappling with rocks.

The glass of the air becomes an element – 
It was something imagined that has been washed away.
A clearness has returned. It stands restored.

It is not an empty clearness, a bottomless sight.
It is a visibility of thought,
In which hundreds of eyes, in one mind, see at once.

Unlike Omega’s men who attach themselves to the past with their prolongations of the human, the protagonist rejects any such “sad hanging on for remembrances,” any “halt / For farewells.” Rather the “barrenness” of the present moment readies the de-created self for a final renunciation of time and for the approach of the uncreated: “The barrenness that appears is exposing”; “It is a coming on and a coming forth.” Within the context of barrenness the de-creation of self hurries toward completion as it finds its own relation to the uncreated repeated in the upward movement of the pines in their “grappling with the rocks” and in the transparency replacing the darkness of the cave with its flickering reflections:

“The glass of the air becomes an element — / It was something imagined that has been washed away. / A clearness has returned.” What is exposed is an Argus-eyed reality: “It is a visibility of thought, / In which hundreds of eyes, in one mind, see at once.” At the conclusion of this penultimate canto, then, the hidden God stands revealed and the passage from the created to the un-created, Weil’s de-creation, is all but finished.

The powerful final triad of the poem’s final canto brings Stevens’ drama of de-creation to an emphatic close through a second extraordinary evocation of Weil’s hidden God:

It is not in the premise that reality
Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses
A dust, a force that traverses a shade.

In this canto, as in the poem as a whole, Stevens employs figures of incompletion and emptiness, “dead candles at the window” (31.5), “Mr. Blank” (31.9), a woman’s canceled note (31.15), to mark the world of time and prepare for its renunciation. And if the black shepherd’s approach can be discerned in the evening’s “spectrum of violet” (31.14), so too does the earlier figure of the “fire-forms” (316), like that of the “blessed beams from out a blessed bush” of canto XVII, announce the uncreated and prepare for the final triad’s disclosure of God. In these last lines, not only does Stevens invoke Weil’s God as Creator, her “presence of creation” (UG 33), through the Biblical figure of Adam’s creation inhering in the “shade that traverses / A dust”; he also invokes Weil’s hidden God, God as Spirit, God as the “presence of de-creation” (Gravity and Grace 33), in the paradoxical figure of the force behind creation, the “force that traverses a shade.” For Stevens, as for Weil, reality and God are one, and with these mystical hints of the spiritual fullness awaiting the de-created self the poem ends.

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Reading Selections from An Introduction to the Life and Thought of Simone Weil by Eric O. Springsted

June 10, 2010

"Slowly and with suffering, I have reconquered through slavery my feeling of the dignity of being human, a feeling that this time did not reside in anything external, and was always accompanied by the consciousness that I had no right to anything, that each instant free from suffering and humiliations was to be received as a grace, as the simple result of favorable luck. This slavery is defined by two factors: speed and orders." Simone Weil

A splendid read. Dr. Springsted’s analysis of Weil’s The Love of God and Affliction at the end here makes this an unforgettable article. I found it genuinely transformative.

One Of History’s Clearest Witnesses To A Life Of Light And Grace
The twentieth century has not lacked seriousness. That very seriousness, however, has not always provided very well for either the human spirit or body. Instead, we have been in the midst of a lightening storm of moral, social and religious clashes. The very things that we need to save us seem the very things that would destroy us. As a result we often wonder if there is any real spiritual bread when having sought for it we have gotten only stones and serpents instead; we withdraw then into our own private reveries, threatened by and suspicious of that which ought to draw us together. Yet the century’s seriousness has also produced some wonderful examples of genuine inspiration; we have not been without some of history’s clearest witnesses to a life of light and grace, and genuine compassion for others.

Simone Weil was one of those witnesses. Possessed of a rare and pure intensity of spirit, and an unusual combination of personal commitment and a high and clear intelligence, she has spoken clearly to those who have sought both justice in human affairs and light in matters of the spirit. Yet in a time of clashing moral commitments and spiritual ideals, it is not surprising to find that less than a beacon in the storm, she has functioned something more like a lightening rod attracting both positive and negative charges, attracting and focusing them.

The way she has done so, though, is highly unusual. The reactions to what she did in her life and what she wrote do not fall along a dividing line among already clearly demarcated positions, say between the religious and non-religious, or between liberal and conservative. In thinking on her life and thought, positive and negative come within those categories. For she has attracted the deep appreciation of many whose lives are lived outside the Christian church, and has divided that of those within it. T.S. Eliot described her as “at the same time more truly a lover of order and hierarchy than most who call themselves Conservative, and more truly a lover of the people than most those who call themselves Socialist.”

A Sense Of Moral Self
The radically different valences assigned to Simone Weil have to many thinkers touched by her bespoken a pure spirit, perhaps one of genius and insight, but one which is also sometimes confused and contradictory. There may be some of that, but, I think, it is much less than would serve to make us comfortable. She herself in the last months of her life seemed to be surprised at how coherent the various traces of her thought really were.

Writing to her parents, she claimed that she had discovered something solid and dense, something of pure gold, in her thinking. She worried deeply that it would be obscured because people would look at her, and not at that deposit of gold, somewhat like St. Augustine who complained of those students who when he pointed to the sky would look at his finger instead. If Weil was right, and I am more than inclined to think that she was, then the positive and negative charges that she has attracted may well be reflections of our confusions. That she has acted like a lightening rod may well be because she has put in balance the opposing valences that have made our moral and spiritual seriousness such a storm, and it is we who strike at it to restore our preferred imbalance. Because we are so serious, we assume that it she who has only half the truth.

That is to put it in such a way that borders nearly on the hagiographic, and Weil would have detested that. Therefore let me say somewhat more specifically and quickly just what it is that is important in her thought, and that, because it does run against the grain of much of the century’s orthodoxy, both attracts people to her and repels them at the same time. It is, I believe, the sense she has of what the moral self is. How we are accustomed to thinking of ourselves as moral and spiritual beings lies so close to us that it is as nearly unrecognizable to us as water must be to the fish. That is, until we are faced with alternatives. It is at that point that we are often stunned and react sharply, as well we might; our very selves are at stake. Simone Weil’s distinctive contribution to religious, social and moral thought lies, I believe, in her sharp insights into what we take ourselves to be and the confusions and blindnesses and limitation therein. Her contribution also lies in the alternative she offers.

Her Family
Simone Weil was born February 3, 1909. Her older brother, André, was destined to become one of the world’s greatest mathematicians of his generation. Her father, Bernard, was a physician and his profession put the Weil family in solid upper middle class comfort and respectability. Selma, her mother put her own considerable abilities untiringly in the service of the advancement of her children’s lives. The family background was Jewish, but as with so many Jewish families of the generation that lived between the time of the Dreyfus affair and the discovery of the Holocaust, it felt free to little notice of the fact, being as fully assimilated as one could be in French society. Weil herself never felt any particular kinship to her ancestry; indeed, she felt some hostility towards it, and is almost never generous when discussing Judaism or the Old Testament, excepting some books such as Genesis, Isaiah, and Job. She certainly felt that it did not define her, and reacted sharply whenever it was suggested that it did. Nobody but Simone Weil could tell Simone Weil who she was.

Her Brother And Adolescent Crisis
Simone was, I think, no less brilliant that her brother. But her genius was very different. André’s intelligence as a mathematician, as with most great mathematicians, manifested itself early and in the most apparent ways. In a family where intelligence was terrifically important, this caused Simone no small amount of anxiety. How that “inferiority” was felt by her, however, is actually an important clue to where her own capacities lay. For she says in a letter that is one of the rare places in all her writings where she talks extensively about herself that it was not the lack of visible successes that bothered her, “but what did grieve me was the idea of being excluded from that transcendent kingdom to which only the truly great have access and wherein truth abides.”

What brought her out of what appears to be a serious adolescent crisis of identity was the thought that that kingdom was accessible not only by pure intelligence but could be entered also if one desires truth and concentrates one’s whole being on it. Under the name of truth. she adds, “I also included beauty, virtue, and every kind of goodness, so that for me it was a question of the relationship between grace and desire. The conviction that had come to me was that when one hungers for bread one does not receive stones.” That idea of moral concentration, the idea of “attention,” is central to her genius. For her it is what distinguishes the truly great from the merely talented; throughout her writings she applies it severely. Although at this point such a notion held no religious connotations for her — she said she saw the problem of God as insoluble and therefore left it alone — it would bloom in her religious thought.

Her Education
To say, however, that she had no visible intellectual successes would be wrong. She was educated in the elite schools of the best French intellectual tradition. She studied at the Lycée Henri IV under the philosopher Alain, who gave her his deepest respect, and in his own emphasis on human action, the earliest shape to her own thinking. She was one of the first women to graduate from the prestigious École Normale Supériore, with the degree of agregée de philosophie, which was reserved for the top few graduates. But even there and in subsequent teaching positions in the French lycée system, to which her degree gave her access, it was her moral commitment that is remembered. Her moral intensity and active involvement in leftist causes earned her the nicknames of “The Red Virgin” and “The Categorical Imperative in Skirts.”

Simone de Beauvoir recounts her one meeting with Weil during their university days. De Beauvoir recounts that already at that time Weil had established a somewhat intimidating reputation. Coming upon Weil in a courtyard of the Sorbonne while Weil was holding forth on the need for revolution in order to feed the masses, de Beauvoir recalls that her own offering to the conversation was the philosopher’s opinion that what the people really needed was meaning in their lives. Weil frostily replied, quickly looking her over, that it was clear that she had not ever gone hungry, a remark that de Beauvoir recognized as putting her and her philosophy in its place as belonging to the petty bourgeoisie. (Yet, de Beauvoir adds, what was most impressive to her about Weil was not the intimidating moral severity, it was the story recounted of how when Weil read of an earthquake in China she had wept openly at the thought of the destruction. Here was a heart that beat across the world.) Weil was no less accommodating to those in authority such as the director of the Ecole and her thesis advisor, Leon Brunschivg, the great Pascal scholar, constantly posing challenges to their authority.

That sort of personality, of course, has consequences. She never did get along with Brunschivg and he did not appreciate much her diploma thesis on Descartes. It is perhaps because of this mutual antipathy that Weil never saw much on Pascal, although philosophically they seem to have much in common. When it came time to assign her to a teaching position the authorities deliberately put her in small provincial towns away from the great centers of the workers’ movements in which she was so deeply involved. But even there she could not be kept quiet. Living as thriftily as possible, she donated the additional pay to which her agregée entitled her to workers’ movements. When not in class, she taught night classes to workers, and associated freely with them, something that scandalized the bourgeois parents of her students whose educational ambitions for their children were clearly more aimed at social advancement than the “kingdom of truth.” In one of her more scandalous moves in the town of Le Puy, she even managed to lead a strike of the unemployed, a feat whose paradoxicalness seems not to have fazed her in the least.

Factory Work And Marx
But these are simply anecdotes, enlightening as they might be. Far more important to understanding her is the year she spent working in three factories in Paris in the year 1934-35. At that point Weil had written what she then considered a sort of masterpiece titled “Reflections concerning the Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression.” It was a masterful, yet sympathetic critique of Marx and an attempt to understand how dignity could be found in human labor.

Marx had given an analysis of the relations between human thought and dignity and the larger economic enterprise, she argued, that was truly formidable. Rather than individual thought shaping and controlling such an enterprise, he recognized that it was the other way around. Thought came out of and was conditioned by the “material conditions of existence.” In this sense, human thought was not free, and human beings were cogs in the larger economic enterprise. This insight Weil extended to modern technology, arguing that it was no longer capitalists that ran the economy, but technocrats. But even they were not really in charge. They, too, were simply part of the larger whole, a point that is hardly exhausted sixty years later.

But therein is a problem. If we are so determined by the material conditions of existence, how then could there be human dignity? How could humans have some charge of their destiny? Marx, she thought, gave no satisfactory solution; his analysis was so good it seemed that his own solutions ran contrary to what he had already established. Where there were possibilities, Weil contended, was in the recognition that human labor was always subject to necessity. If we cannot escape necessity human dignity can nevertheless be achieved if the human mind can come to recognize this necessity and can freely give itself to it, making the necessity its own, something not simply external. Practically this meant structuring labor so that workers could get some sense of the larger project, both within the factory and in the larger social whole. The project could then be morally theirs. The essay is insightful and particularly mature. But it was typical of Weil that she was not entirely satisfied with it. As a result, faithful to what Alain had taught her, she therefore sought to revise her thinking by actually coming into contact with the object of thought. Thus she entered the factories, to feel in her own being the structures that others only talked about.

Factory Work and Affliction
Her experience was not that of a spectator. Despite the family cushion readily available to her ( which her mother was ever ready to provide — sometimes even without Simone being aware of it ), she chose to live in a small flat in a working class section of Paris and only on the wages she had earned. She fully expected that this project would not be easy; she was not after all very sanguine about the conditions workers were subjected to in the depression of the 1930s. It does seem, though, that she initially believed that she would discover something of human dignity in a sort of workers’ stoicism and in their own inter-personal relations. The expectation was brutally destroyed. Now there is certainly a sense in which the experience was harder on her than it would be for most people. Weil was maladroit, and had a hard time keeping up with the piece work rate that was commonplace in factories of the time. ( Paying laborers by the number of pieces they produce — a unfair practice that is also obviously open to abuse by setting unrealistic expectations — is illegal in western nations today. [No one told me this and have worked for piece rate many times. DJ] ).

Physically it wreaked havoc on her health, which, since she also suffered from severe migraines, was not strong. More importantly, she came to recognize that labor in those conditions was universally humiliating, that it destroyed all sense of human dignity. She recognized that in the factory system the worker counted for nothing. Given her earlier analysis, that was not entirely surprising. What was surprising was the discovery that in the course of time, the worker came to count for nothing in his or her own eyes or anybody else’s for that matter. The humiliation went to the depths of the soul. So Weil discovered “affliction” (malheur), a condition to which one could not consent, a condition that in its very nature could never be ennobling. Affliction had the literal ability to kill the soul and everything that makes us human, even though the body continued on. This included any sense of rights, of initiative, of expectation of respect from others, of hope itself. This discovery shattered all her earlier optimism.

Farmwork and the Spanish Civil War
Weil, of course, was able to leave the factory and did so at the end of August, 1935. Brutalizing as the experience had been, it did not keep her from further attempts to learn by actual contact. She could never be content with watching from afar. Interspersed with teaching and sick leaves over the next three years, she also worked on a farm and, although a pacifist at the time, joined the anarchist-syndicalist elements in the Spanish Civil War. Again, she found even good causes tainted, as she learned not only of fascist butchery but that of her own comrades who executed a priest, as well as a fifteen year boy who refused to join them. A clumsy accident — she stepped into a pot of cooking oil — soon forced her back home, and probably saved her life, for shortly afterwards the militiamen with whom she served were decimated in battle. In a letter to Georges Bernanos, who also had written of the Spanish Civil War, she noted the results of her experience: “one sets out as a volunteer, with the idea of sacrifice, and finds oneself in a war which resembles a war of mercenaries, only with much more cruelty and with less human respect for the enemy.”

A Spiritual Turn
It was in the midst of these unsettling years that Weil’s life took a profound spiritual turn. That turn, and this is particularly important to understanding her, is not away from what she had already learned. It took place within it.

In the letter known as her “spiritual autobiography” Weil describes three “contacts” with Christianity that “really counted.” The first took place shortly after the factory experience. Taken by her parents to Portugal to recover, she recounts that one night while alone in a small, “wretched” fishing village she watched a procession take place among the villagers in honor of their patron saint. She, too, felt wretched, the discovery of affliction having burned itself into her, like the brand on the head of a slave.

It was evening and there was a full moon over the sea. The wives of the fishermen were, in procession, making a tour of all the ships, carrying candles and singing what must certainly be very ancient hymns of heart-rending sadness. Nothing can give any idea of it…There the conviction was suddenly borne in upon me that Christianity is pre-eminently the religion of slaves, that slaves cannot help belonging to it, and I among others.

The second she more briefly describes when she tells of how in 1937 while at Assisi, “I was compelled for the first time in my life to go down on my knees.” The third is more extensive, and the account is deeply related to the way that she would subsequently articulate Christian spirituality.

Solesmes
In 1938, Weil and her mother attended Holy Week services at Solesmes, a monastery known for a distinctive form of chant. At the outset, the intention seems to be primarily aesthetic. In the course of the week, she met a “young English Catholic” ( although it may have been actually an American Rhodes Scholar, Charles Bell ) who introduced her to the English metaphysical poets, especially George Herbert. She quickly memorized Herbert’s poem “Love” and recited it to herself regularly, particularly in the midst of a headache. “It was during one of these recitations that…Christ himself came down and took possession of me.”

When dealing with Simone Weil, there is too often a tendency to peek at her life behind what she says, as if she were simply writing in code of her own life. She rarely is. What she says of this experience, however, is vitally important to understanding the nature of her spiritual writings in at least two ways. First, it says something about the nature of faith and the supernatural in Weil’s thinking. She makes it quite clear that she did not reason herself into faith. Indeed, she says that afterwards that “I still half refused, not my love but my intelligence.” But she was no less certain for that. For what she felt in the midst of her suffering was “the presence of a love, like that which one can read in the smile on a beloved face.” Faith was not an intellectual position for her, although it clearly had profound intellectual consequences. It responded to something that intellect had only glimmers of, and which shapes in time how we use our intellect. It was a capacity given by grace, given by God’s own possession, to read goodness and love, and to respond to it, just as we read the smile on a beloved face.

Second, affliction now appeared in a much different light. She suddenly recognized that love and goodness did not have to be defeated even by affliction, that even in the midst of soul destroying suffering God could be present. Indeed, as she came to outline in “The Love of God and Affliction,” in affliction God could be perfectly present, just as he was to the afflicted Christ on the Cross. If the discovery of affliction marked the end of a belief that humans by understanding the structure of necessity could consent to it and be ennobled, in the experience of Christ, Weil’s thinking about affliction was given a new cast. It could be a way of giving one’s total consent to God who never refuses his love to those who wait for it. Affliction could serve to erase the screen of the self that we erect, and cannot tear down by ourselves, between us and God. She notes: “The supernatural greatness of Christianity lies in the fact that it does not seek a supernatural remedy for suffering but a supernatural use for it.”

The Solesmes experience marks a clear transformation in Weil’s thinking. From here on she begins to produce, in addition to her social and political works, a vast corpus of spiritual and philosophical writings whose Christian emphasis is explicit. But in many ways it is also at that point that Weil’s own thinking and person becomes more recalcitrant to easy discussion. The conversion takes place at a time that she is already beginning to withdraw from much direct and organized political involvement. At the same time, her attempts at putting herself in contact with the world actually intensifies, but often in a way that puzzles us.

Hitler
Soon after Hitler invaded Prague, Weil gave up the pacifism that she held with so many intellectuals of the decade. Soon after, disappointed that Paris was not defended, she was forced to flee (quite reluctantly) with her parents to Marseilles when the Nazis marched into the capital.  It was in Marseilles that a whole series of new projects came to occupy her. She, like others, did what she could to undermine the Nazi effort, including distributing anti-Nazi literature and visiting the prison camps. She managed to get herself arrested, and quite typically gave no ground to the judge. It was also during this period that she again spent time working on a farm, this time that of the philosopher, Gustav Thibon. And again, she eschewed any comfort, choosing not to live with the family but in an old hut. But most important was a plan that she began to develop at this point for a corps of front-line nurses. Apparently inspired by old germanic sagas which told of young maidens who at the front of battle inspired the troops and gave them a visible reminder of the land and people for which they were fighting, Weil hoped to establish a corps of young women who would be parachuted into the front lines to care for the wounded in the midst of battle. Because it was so dangerous ( death was nearly inevitable ), but so freely done and solely for reasons of compassion, she believed that it would serve as a witness to what the Allies were fighting for. War, she knew, even when entered into for the best of motives, soon came to possess men’s souls making them blind. Such an action she hoped would tip the balance back again. And, of course, she meant to be one of those who put herself in harm’s way.

New York and London
It was in hope of putting this plan into action that Weil allowed herself to join her parents in leaving Marseilles for New York, for she hoped that from there she could get back to the war zone in France. After a brief period in New York, she managed through contacts with the Free French in London to get as far as London. There she was set to work on writing a number of analyses and reports that would address the problems that needed to be dealt with when a legitimate government was returned to France after the war.

Her output was tremendous, including the book, The Need for Roots, and involves a truly distinctive and new approach to political and social problems. Crucial to this approach were two elements. First was her insistence that social life be oriented around the moral category of obligations rather than rights as it had been since the French revolution. Second, was the idea that social life be rooted, rooted both in a past, but just as vitally, through labor, in the natural world of necessity itself. Her thought had come full circle, returning to the same issues that had occupied her at the beginning of her career. They were, however, now transformed in the light of faith. Yet, it was still action that preoccupied her, and all this work meant little to her without the nurses project.

Tuberculosis
But the project was not to be. DeGaulle thought it mad. Weil herself collapsed in the spring of 1943, suffering from tuberculosis, exacerbated by overwork. The prognosis for recovery was not dim, but in an era without penicillin and when tuberculosis was treated by rest and overeating, Weil proved an intractable patient. A person who had always seen in food something belonging to the moral order and who therefore had regularly and consciously eaten slightly, she simply refused to eat more than she thought people in occupied France were getting. (This was a fast, if we may use that word, she had begun before her collapse, although in all likelihood she knew before arriving in London that she had tuberculosis.) As a result her condition worsened, and she died on August 23, 1943 at Ashford, Kent.

Here we begin to see a sort of eccentricity — a life lived outside the center to which we are accustomed — that does attract and repel at the same time. It is underlined by her personal religious life after her conversion. On the one hand, it is highly attractive, beautiful in its attention and clarity. We see this not only in her writings, but in her practices.

While working on Gustave Thibon’s farm she says that she developed the practice of reciting the Lord’s Prayer each morning in Greek, with “absolute attention.” The effect, she says, is extraordinary: “The infinity of the ordinary expanses of perception is replaced by an infinity to the second or sometimes the third degree. At the same time, filling every part of this infinity of infinity, there is silence, a silence which is not the absence of sound but which is the object of a positive sensation, more positive than that of sound.”

Moreover, she adds: “Sometimes during this recitation or at other moments, Christ is really present with me in person…” In New York, she regularly attended not only Mass but black churches in Harlem, finding both the people, the ones not in power, and their freedom quite to her taste. Yet, on the other hand, her faith was anything but exultant. She steadfastly refused baptism until on her death bed when it was performed by an unordained friend, and never even then actually participated in the eucharist that she had so steadfastly contemplated in Catholic churches. Her “spiritual autobiography” is actually written to explain why she could not enter the church.

Spiritual Autobiography
The “spiritual autobiography” is one of a series of letters that Weil wrote to Father Perrin, a blind Dominican priest who became who close friend and confidant in Marseilles. Impressed by her incredible understanding of the universality of grace, it was under his pressing that she wrote the series of essays on the ancient Greeks that is so central to her thought. As she explains it to him, she is particularly fearful of the “social nature” of the church, a sort of group think that all too often substitutes for genuine focus on God. More exactly, she feels so attracted to it that it is a temptation she feels she has to resist, for it will alter her. How? She gives a number of reasons, including a sense that she would betray those outside the church (such as the ancient Greeks) from she had gained so much. The church’s refusal to accept such outsiders smacked of totalitarianism. But the crucial reason as she tells it is the feeling that God did not want her in the church. And for her obedience to God is the heart of the matter. She notes that even if her salvation were lying on the table, she would not pick it up unless commanded.

It is at this point that the unsettling parts of Weil’s person come through most clearly. There is at once a sort of pride combined with great diffidence, and, indeed, a certain sort of brutality towards the self. When thinking of Christ’s affliction on the Cross, she admits to “the sin of envy.” (But she knows it is a sin.) She refuses to do anything for herself. And for many of her readers this makes her more of a danger than a guide to be trusted. Her insistence in her writings that our selves need to be “decreated” in order to fully love God and neighbor seems not only perilous, but even, according to some, Manichaean and inhuman.

A Lightening Rod
What are we to make of this? There may well be a sense in which Weil may have been unhealthy, and in which her own experiments in life were less than sensible. Dwelling on that, however, can be terrifically shallow and miss her real importance, especially as that of a guide. Weil never recommended herself as a paradigm for others. Her refusal to join the church was not the result of an argument; it was a vocation to which she felt called and which she could not betray.

In her writings, she almost never uses “I” for the “I” has no place in spirituality. But that is a clue to where she is helpful. If she was sometimes less than careful about her own person, she was interested in truth and she was fully convinced that truth is not an abstraction but something that exists only in life itself. If “the problem of God” could not be solved by cool, distanced, speculation, it could bear fruit, she discovered, by committing one’s self to God.

Just as the truth about the factory could only be gained by contact, so the truth of life and God can only be gained by contact. And contact only comes when one does not keep herself at a safe distance, surveying the possibilities and deciding ahead of time whether they will be good for us or not. We have to be willing to be transformed by the truth of what we encounter; we cannot seek to control it to our own ends.

That is why Weil becomes a lightening rod attracting all the charges attaching to our notion of the human self. The modern sense of the self is something constituted by the notion of rights and personal development. Morally, we thus often see ourselves in terms of what we should expect from others, and of what we can and ought to do for ourselves. That, at its worst puts us awash in idolatrous religions of self-affirmation. Those are obvious and shallow. But even at our most refined our sense of human justice tends to be controlled by a metaphor of power development that leads us to believe that by increasing power and sharing it around we will find the human good, a sort of capitalist economy designed for the moral and spiritual self.

Just as we think we can help the poor by increasing the economy through additional material production and competition, by increasing wealth, so, too, we often believe that everyone can be morally prosperous by increasing the personal power of individuals. The empowered self is the one that has freedom and autonomy. And that is what it means to us to be fully human. That metaphor is not one of narrow selfishness, for justice is achieved when there is universal empowerment and self determination. When Weil refuses to use her powers and talents to maintain freedom and autonomy, when she refuses to develop them, it is clear why we begin to regard her as self-destructive. Her death seems a waste, not only of herself to herself, but of somebody who had so much to offer to the moral economy had she lived longer.

Affliction
Why she thought differently, though, can be understood if we consider what the discovery of affliction revealed to her. Affliction was not simply a problem with a system, although the factory system of her time and many of the systems of the century are particularly effective at producing affliction. It was a universal possibility for the human soul. The human soul is fragile and can be destroyed. Oppression — the stifling of empowerment –and unfairness can leave us intact and noble; the problem in those cases is, a Weil thought in her earlier work, a matter of reforming the system. But affliction can seize the soul and undo it. How? As she makes clear in “The Love of God and Affliction” affliction, while including physical suffering, is chiefly a matter of social humiliation, a ceasing to count in anyone’s eyes, including one’s own. At that point, giving power to the powerless is not possible; there is nobody left inside to wield effective human power in the human world.

Power simply burns itself into the soul, making the soul more and more an object of other people’s actions, no longer the subject of one’s own. Our self is a self that acts among others and requires that they respect our actions; for the afflicted, they no longer direct their own actions. There is nothing to them that can focus human power into a coherent project. They do not affect us any longer. And since affliction has also an essential accidental quality to it (malheur is literally “bad fortune”) one who is afflicted can find no reason for this being so. The mind cannot understand and thus cannot find any way to accept this condition. The world then seems chaotic, purposeless and poisonous. Hope disappears and the afflicted inevitably begin to hate themselves. Thus even well meaning “empowerment” simply makes matters worse. The afflicted become tools of our pity and our own self image, our exercises of our own moral empowerment, and they recognize it.

The possibility of affliction and the impossibility of “empowerment” as a way of saving the soul from destruction thus signaled for Weil not only a practical problem with modern understandings of the person and of justice, they also signaled that the sense of well being and goodness we derive from empowerment is conceptually other than that of perfect goodness. It is an ersatz kingdom. In her notebooks, she claims that if it were not for affliction, we might believe ourselves in paradise. That she thought was a horrid possibility, for it was the possibility that we would continue to live for a goodness that was no more than the projection of the relief of our anxieties. But where is the alternative? Where is perfect love and justice?

The Afflicted Christ
It is God’s own love in the Cross of Christ. In “The Love of God and Affliction” Weil insists that we see the crucified Christ not as a martyr for truth, or even the king of glory executed out of jealous resentment. For her, Christ is purely and simply afflicted. But Christ does not let his condition change his love for the Father and the world he has created, even though it contains affliction. Even though abandoned, he accepts this as the Father’s will and loves even when there seems nothing to love. He is not filled with resentment. And in that, Weil suggests, is ultimately established a bond of perfect love between the abandoned Christ and the Father in heaven, between emptiness and fullness. In Christ’s love, God’s love is present in the world. That at least means that affliction is not an ultimate evil. But Christ is not simply an example of how we might get through suffering. By accepting emptiness he redeems affliction; by accepting the nothingness of our condition he gives life to a world. His self emptying is for life, not his own, but others. When love triumphs over power, and selflessness over autonomy, it is Christ’s love in us that is our soul.

Christ’s Crucifixion As Paradigm
If there is a single key to understanding Weil it is recognizing that Christ’s crucifixion provides the paradigm of perfect love and justice, and as such a very different sense of what it means to be human and to act as a human subject.
Throughout her writings an analogy to Christ’s self emptying for the life of others needs always to be sought. These are some important, repeated examples: In creating a world, God renounces being all, in order that a world might exist. Similarly God’s love becomes incarnate in us when we pay “attention” to others, putting aside our interests and projections and letting them reveal themselves to us. That is the sole way of giving life back to the afflicted, for we in giving up our autonomy let them have life again. In waiting on them, we create room for them to act, a space that does not exist when human relations are those of power, even benign power. [Magnificent! DJ]

Additionally, the beauty of the world is revealed to us when technology is replaced by a science that pays attention to the order of the world governed by goodness. The paradigm even carries through to Weil’s later political thought. Replacing the concept of “rights” as the chief political category of justice with that of obligations — the duties we owe others — she seeks to make political justice a matter not of rationally balancing concentrations of power, whether personal or institutional, but of balancing them by direct human interaction. That interaction is a matter of seeking the consent of others, and never violating it. When she calls this sort of justice “impersonal” it is not because it is abstract, but because of what we take the “personal” normally to be. We therefore need to act “impersonally” in order to take person seriously. And she means us to take individual humans very seriously indeed.

That self emptying is what she means by “decreation.” Hopefully enough has been said to this point that the reader can gain some sense of what role those ideas play in her thought. But it may be helpful to add two biblical parallels. In the Gospel of Luke, Jesus tells his disciples that unless they hate their own father and mother, even his own life, who does not bear his own cross, they cannot be his disciples. But as he makes clear doing so is like making the calculations for erecting a building. Unless you do so, you are likely not to have the wherewithal to finish the project.

In that sense, self emptying is not an end in itself. It is the condition for some further work. And what is that work? In Colossians 3:10-11, St. Paul talks about “stripping off the old self” and “clothing yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator.” The new self, the self “hid in Christ in God” is that work.

Similarly “decreation” in Weil is not self destruction; it is the putting off an old self in order to be open to becoming a new one. In this she has certain parallels to other spiritual masters of the twentieth century such as Thomas Merton, although she is far less gentle with the old self. There have been few of any time who better understood than Weil its self deceptions and attempts to call the old “new” with little substantial change. But in Weil, like Paul and others, what is important is that the new self be in the image of its creator. For Weil that image is the image of the Christ who gave up his power to give life to others.

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Contradiction, Mystery, and The Use of Words in Simone Weil – ERIC O. SPRINGSTED

June 9, 2010
 

Rene Magritte (1898-1967), Les deux mystres (The two mysteries) 1966, oil on canvas, 60 80 cm, private collection, London. With his incredible skill at painting realistic objects and figures Magritte decided to make each of his painting a visual poem. He said: “My painting is visible images which conceal nothing; they evoke mystery and, indeed, when one sees one of my pictures, one asks oneself this simple question, 'What does that mean?'. It does not mean anything, because mystery means nothing either, it is unknowable.” This is not a pipe, but which one?

I can still recall my first encounter with Christian mystery. Finally being able to express a long-held doubt or spiritual confusion in a question: How does God’s sacrifice on the Cross come to mean my redemption? And then watching my Christian mentor pause, reflect and answer: “That’s all part of the paschal mystery…” Always the “mystery.” Look, I wanted to say, if you have no answers but only “mysteries” how does this come to mean religion. No, no, I don’t want to hear that answer.

Anyways as one who embraced the notion of mystery, the following is as near to an answer I have ever encountered – once again I am indebted to this little French girl a few generations back who seems to be able to speak to me and others. Sometimes just a line in one of her notebooks, but my God, such lines. Everything about her is endlessly fascinating to me. Even my favorite poet, Wallace Stevens, seemed to be held in thrall by her.

Here Dr. Springsted reflecting on Simone Weil’s understanding of “mystery:”

I.

When St. Paul employs the term “mystery” in his writings he generally does so in order to discuss what is revealed in Christ. Common parlance, however, often inverts Paul’s sense of the term by making the mystery refer to what is opaque and yet to be revealed and understood. The twentieth century, though, has seen important work designed to recapture the original religious sense of mystery. Rudolf Otto, for example, in The Idea of the Holy, has argued that mysterium is “the wholly other, that which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible and the familiar… filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment.” (Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, London: Oxford University Press, 1970 p.26) It is thus an essential part of religion and not something to be eradicated by additional light at some later date.

Gabriel Marcel has further noted that a mystery needs to be distinguished from a problem. Problems, he says, are “subject to an appropriate technique…whereas a mystery by definition transcends every conceivable technique.” Mysteries are not an obstacle to thought, but are apprehended by “an essentially positive act of the mind.” (Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being South Bend: Gateway, 1978 p. 211)

Finally, Karl Rahner has also noted that mystery is not a lack of knowledge that will be solved in the beatific vision, but “rather [is] one of the positive attributes of such intuitive knowledge [of God].” (G.A. McCool, ed., A Rahner Reader, New York: Seabury, 1975 p.118) Mystery thus for all these writers is not a blank unknown, nor a puzzle to be solved, but is an enlightening and essential part of our knowledge of God.

Simone Weil is another writer who was also concerned with mystery and who refused to understand it as something unclear and problematic. Like these writers, she saw mystery as essential to religion. Weil’s contributions toward understanding the religious use of mystery, however, have not been noticed. This is largely because most of her references to mystery are buried in her notebooks. Yet if one searches these notebooks carefully, one will discover a well-defined sense of mystery. I will argue that once we uncover what mystery means for Weil we will see not only an additional contributor to the recovery of mystery, but will also be better able to understand Weil’s own use of mystery in her writing and her ideas on its application.

II.

In order to come to an understanding of Weil’s notion of mystery we must begin by considering her use of the more common philosophical term “contradiction.” Now what philosophers mean by contradiction is rather straightforward; they mean that any statement that can be put in the form “s is p & not-p” is a contradiction. Any statement that can be put thus is meaningless for it asserts at the same time two opposite predicates of one subject. Although Weil uses the term “contradiction” in this way, as we all do, she never spends time discussing it, with the exception of this comment in The Lectures on Philosophy: “At bottom, the principle of non-contradiction is a principle of grammar” (Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, 78).

Since Weil did not believe that grammar is an infallible guide to reality, she clearly puts this philosophical use of “contradiction” to one side as something that will not provide any ultimate clue to reality. We, of course, wish at this point that she would explain exactly why contradiction does not provide this clue, but unfortunately she does not. Instead we find her using the term in such ways that it includes virtually any sort of opposition between two thoughts. In this regard “contradiction” for Weil signals not only our inability to think that “s is p” and “s is not-p” at the same time when “s” must logically be one or the other; it also includes opposing thoughts that are only a matter of being contraries, or incommensurates, or finally the elements of religious mystery such as the belief that God is One yet Three.

At first this use of terms seems careless. We are struck, nevertheless, by the frequency with which Weil uses “contradiction” and in ways that are equivalent with other terms such as “contrary,” “incommensurate,” and “mystery.” The insistence seems to token some more ultimate point. In fact it does, for we can discern three basic ways in which thoughts for Weil can be in opposition to each other. These are as paradox, as incommensuration, and finally as mystery.

Weil’s first sense of contradiction is a simple one. it is an opposition between perceptions, thoughts, ideas or the predication of terms that we need to solve in order to contemplate their truth. It is with this sense in mind that Weil says “every truth contains a contradiction” (Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, 410). The formulation is clearly intended to be paradoxical but it is not nonsense. Rather what Weil means here is that “contradiction” occurs whenever our intellect comes up against an unforeseen obstacle that forces us to recast our thoughts in order to accommodate it. In this sense, “contradiction” is the sort of thing we set in front of our students’ minds in order to get them to think on their own by considering problems they have not previously seen.

Weil’s use of “contradiction” in this sense is revealed by her remark:

“Method of investigation: as soon as we have thought something, try to see in what way the contrary is true” (Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, 93). The fact that this is a method of investigation for Weil is at least helpful in explaining why she deliberately wrote in such a paradoxical style. “Contradiction” is therefore for her a valuable heuristic device for “emerging from the point of view” (Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, 46). In light of this understanding of contradiction we can also see that Weil intends “contradiction” as a means to a more inclusive and insightful way of conceiving our existence and its conditions. Contradiction can also be, in this special sense, a sign of our having met reality, for as Weil puts it in the Lectures on Philosophy, reality “is what method does not allow us to foresee” (Weil, Lectures on Philosophy, 73).

We can order the world to our size, but we only understand its existence as independent of our thoughts when we find that it somehow manages to go its own way, despite our expectations. The mind that can accommodate shocks to its self-imposed order is therefore one that has emerged from a solipsistic dream and has begun to think in truth. Noting the opposition of “contradiction” between our mental order of the world and the way the world goes on its own can therefore be a gateway to a fuller encounter with reality.

In the final analysis, however, this sense of contradiction, no matter how helpful pedagogically, means no more by itself than “paradox” or “problem.” By itself it perhaps embodies no more than a truism or a philosophical triviality. The sorts of opposition that Weil intends by “contradiction” do not stop here, however; instead there are two increasingly stronger meanings, namely, incommensuration and mystery.

In Weil’s writings the philosophical meat of “contradiction” is essentially what we would normally call “incommensuration,” that is to say, the comparison of two things that have no common intellectual measure. In fact, that Weil usually means incommensuration when she speaks of contradiction is seen in that she often uses the two terms interchangeably. Here it is important to see the difference between incommensuration and apparent contradictions, for apparent contradictions can be resolved by analysis and proper predication of the opposing terms involved, whereas in incommensuration the terms cannot be so resolved.

For example, there is an apparent contradiction between our perceptions of the earth’s place in space and a heliocentric theory of the earth’s movement. That contradiction is resolved, however, by the heliocentric theory’s ability to explain both the anomalies of planetary motion presented by a theory developed solely in accordance with our perceptions and why we would have those perceptions in the first place. In incommensuration, however, the two incommensurate elements are both adequately conceived and understood. There simply appears to be no way to compare them, as we say of apples and oranges. Now we can do one of three things when faced with incommensurates: we can leave them uncompared; we can in a confused way try to compare them and then beg philosophy to help us, in Wittgenstein’s phrase, to show the fly the way out of the bottle and revert to the first option; or we can try to find some real unity to the set.

If we choose the last option, however, Weil points out, what we need to do is to discover the unity of the set on a “higher plane” than the one on which the elements are incommensurate. This can, in fact, be done and can be seen by help from an illustration from mathematics, one that Weil herself found enlightening. In early Greek mathematics, when numbers were represented by lines, each line could be expressed as a natural number by virtue of the ratio (logos) it has to another line when both have a common measure, no matter how small. This expressible logos was in fact for the Greeks the very definition of number and its applicability embraces all the natural numbers. However, it was discovered that not all lines do have a common measure, such as the sides of an isosceles right triangle and its hypotenuse. They therefore have no logos. These lines are incommensurate (alogos) and no amount of manipulating can discover a logos in the prescribed sense.

The consequence of having no logos threatens the rationality of the most rational science. But Eudoxus found that by extending the sense of logos to cover the relative magnitude of lines one could include the natural numbers and the irrationals in the one real number system. A logos/alogos (a ratio involving incommensurates) is not definitely expressible as we can see when we try to write the exact value of, say, the square root of two, but it is a perfectly rigorous relation between incommensurate numbers. The new theory of numbers does not in the least change the incommensuration between two numbers having no common measure, for they still have no common measure. What it does do, however, is transcend the limitations of the natural and irrational numbers by conceiving an order of numbers that incorporates both, but is not reducible to the definitions of either.

The applicability of this way of reasoning goes further than just the proportion between lines. It can also be extended to other incommensurate elements such as weight, time, and distance to yield important formulas in physics. Weight, time, and distance are all distinct things, but once we introduce an overriding concept of number they can be combined to yield equations in physics. Weil understood this, and introduced it as a principle of reasoning in many realms:

The system of Eudoxus, by which a ratio between weights can be equaled to a ratio between times, etc. — How is it we allow ourselves not to refer to it in education? If it is a case of rational ratios — 3 hours are to 2 hours as are 3 kilos to 2 kilos — at bottom the notion is the same but concealed by the numbers. . . . Since it is possible in this way to equalize the notions in the case of two completely different pairs of magnitudes one could hope to be able also to apply the notion of ratio to psychological and spiritual matters.
(The Notebooks of Simone Weil, 162)

When incommensurates are reconciled their unity can be a witness to aspects and dimensions of our existence of which we may not have been previously aware, or at least were confused about. We regard all sorts of entities as real, not because we see them but because they give a solution to problems we cannot solve otherwise. Weil believed this sort of understanding was also possible in psychological and spiritual matters wherein surd (vocab: A surd is a number or quantity that cannot be expressed as the ratio of two integers.) elements of our experience could bespeak a need for unity on a higher plane, a need that, if met, could give us a clearer understanding of our lives and thus a firmer grasp on them. It was on the basis of reasoning such as this, I believe, that Weil found incommensuration such a valuable tool. It led her to assert: “All veritable good involves contradictory conditions, and is therefore impossible. He who keeps his attention really and truly fixed on this impossibility, and acts accordingly, will carry out good” (The Notebooks of Simone Weil, 410).

There is a further sense of incommensuration that cannot be covered by the Eudoxean system and that is where two incommensurates are not only not of the same kind and are not possibly describable as being of the same kind. (Time and distance are obviously not of the same kind, but both can be described numerically, which for purposes of the equation does make them of the same kind.) This sort of incommensuration Weil thought can only be unified in infinity. Weil does not specifically note this kind of incommensuration, but indicates something of the sort when she says: “What is contradictory to natural reason is not so for supernatural reason, but the latter can only use the language of the former” (First and Last Notebooks, 109). Here is where Weil brings in the notion of mystery as the most absolute sense of what she means by contradiction. Mystery involves this final sense of incommensuration. It is not a notion, Weil thinks, that can be used for any and every opposition the mind encounters in thinking; instead, it is to be used only for incommensurates that seem inextricably linked, yet without our being able to comprehend that in which their unity lies.

Weil has definite criteria for legitimate and illegitimate uses of mystery. The use of mystery is legitimate when it involves three things:

  1. when there are two clearly conceived terms that are in contradiction (incommensuration) with each other and are not resolvable into a unified system by the finite intelligence;
  2. when suppression of either of these terms renders the other meaningless;
  3. when suppression of the mystery that arises from taking the two terms together results in a loss of light shed upon the intelligence. The first criterion is essentially negative and defines mystery as something that is not merely another attempt of the intelligence to find unity. The last two criteria are more positive, for they indicate that the opposition in thought we encounter in mysteries is essential to the mystery.

Further, despite their opposition, those things we find opposed we are also obliged to hold as unified since the meaning of each element seems to depend on the other, as “contradictory” as the two may seem to each other. It is only together that the opposing elements give light. The apprehension of the supernatural is thus essentially a mystery, not its dissolution. Weil writes:

The notion of mystery is legitimate when the most logical and rigorous use of the intelligence leads to an impasse, to a contradiction which is inescapable in this sense: that the suppression of one term makes the other meaningless and that to pose one term necessarily involves posing the other. Then, like a lever, the notion of mystery carries thought beyond the impasse, to the other side of the un-openable door, beyond the domain of intelligence and above it. But to arrive beyond the domain of the intelligence one must have travelled all through it, to the end, and by a path traced with unimpeachable rigor…Another criterion is that when the mind has nourished itself with mystery, by a long and loving contemplation, it finds that by suppressing and denying the mystery it is at the same time depriving the intelligence of treasures which are comprehensible to it, which dwell in its domain and which belong to it.
 (First and Last Notebooks, 181)

An important example of how Weil applies this notion of mystery is her treatment of the “problem” of evil. The philosophical problem of evil concentrates on the supposed contradiction between asserting that evil exists and asserting that an omnipotent and wholly good God creates the world. Logically it appears that a good and omnipotent God either would not allow evil to exist in his creation, or would suppress it immediately should it arise. The fact that evil exists therefore calls into question either God’s goodness or omnipotence or both. We could deny that evil exists, of course, but that is strongly contrary to our intuitions. Thus there is a contradiction.

Weil, however, rather than trying to solve this as a problem, instead thinks the truth can only be found by accepting both God’s goodness and the existence of evil. In her analysis of affliction, for example, she uncovers an ultimate form of evil in which any thought or even dream of being ennobled by the experience is precluded. She refuses to assume that this counts against God’s existence, however, and instead seeks to see how an understanding of God’s love can help us to understand what affliction is and how an understanding of affliction can lead us to understand God’s goodness better.

Now if contradiction were taken in its formal logical sense, affliction would be sound evidence for God’s nonexistence. If, however, mystery is invoked, although the tension between God’s goodness and affliction is not weakened, the two may co-enlighten each other, as Weil thought they do on the cross, even if the finite intelligence cannot in fact or principle bridge the gap. Not to hold the mystery may therefore cause one either to deny the evil of affliction, which is real, or to deny God, in which case the evil of affliction is a permanent and unredeemable matter.

III.

When we have examined Weil’s various uses of “contradiction” we can see that her use of the term is not careless and equivocal but signals an important element in her thought. Contradiction in the way Weil uses it is important for at least three reasons.

  1. First, insofar as it stands for something opposed to the way we would tailor the world to our size, it signals to us that there is, indeed, much more of the world we need to take into account,
  2. Second, it beckons us to seek a higher and more complete unity to our understanding of the world.
  3. Finally, it leads us to understand that the ultimate unity of all things in God is a mystery, not in the sense that the unity is opaque and obscure, but in the sense that that unity transcends our thoughts.

Weil’s understanding of contradiction and mystery is interesting enough on its own and is important as a further contribution to investigations into the concept of mystery. The context of Weil’s discussion of contradiction and mystery, however, indicates that she intended her ideas to be much more than a conceptual analysis. Instead of simply providing such, an analysis, she clearly wants to press these ideas into the service of spirituality in such a way that they can be understood as effective tools for our coming to understand the world and to apprehend the mystery which is its source. In this regard contradiction is an important device within spirituality, and, as she suggests when she notes that a method of investigation ought to discover contradiction, should be used in presenting any idea to our minds.

The application of such a method can quite clearly be far-ranging, for it can include our perceptions, thoughts, ideas and especially the way we use words to think. Weil herself does not shrink from such applications and, in fact, uses this method in an original way to describe what we would call the role of the imagination in both religion and literature. But before we reach that point it is necessary to consider a related idea that is a crucial bridge. The notion is that of “reading” (lecture).

Reading for Weil is in the first instance similar to what we mean when we use a phrase such as “How do you read it?” Reading is thus essentially an interpretation of what our senses present to us; we not only perceive but see. It is a phenomenon entirely natural to every thinking being. Weil, however, does not think that this reading is entirely arbitrary, nor is it casual. Instead, what we read is something suggested to us not only by our perceptions, but also by our conditioning. Further, for her, reading is a total interpretation engaging the whole person, and usually includes an impetus for action. As an example of reading, Weil cites the instance of a defeated king being led through the streets of Rome by the conquering Romans. His followers read in the sight their king; the Romans, a conquered man. Each reading, we understand, causes one to react in a different way to the sight, but it is clearly not arbitrary how each reading comes about (cf The Notebooks of Simone Weil, 39).

Despite the fact that readings are suggested by sensations and conditioning, they nevertheless can be more or less inclusive of reality, less or more self-centered and therefore better or worse. Throughout her notebooks when she is discussing reading, Weil constantly ponders the problem of how to avoid a false reading since there is a good deal of choice in our readings. Ultimately she sees that we need to read God’s hand behind all existence and also sees that this reading must include in a hierarchy all other good readings, even if they are limited. As she writes: “Superposed readings: To read necessity behind sensations, to read order behind necessity, to read God behind order” (Gravity and Grace 123). The questions that need to be answered, however, are how one transcends a limited reading and how one escapes a false reading. The answer for Weil lies in the process by which we come to understand that we are in fact reading, and then alter our readings.

At first we do not understand that we are reading. The Roman captives and the Roman conquerors hardly need to be supposed to be thinking they are “reading” the procession as anything — they are simply seeing it as it is, or so it seems to them. Yet the situation has also spawned two quite different readings; one group sees a king, the other sees a slave. There does not seem to be any meeting ground. Yet Weil suggests that a joint effort can allow both groups to arrive at a third reading that is the same for all. Clearly this third reading is one that is more inclusive than either of the two earlier readings and allows us to see the situation most clearly.

In her essay on the Iliad Weil praises Homer for being able to write with this sort of clear vision. It is a vision that allows him to side neither with the Greeks nor with the Trojans. Rather what he sees in that war is what is most pitiable in any war, the human soul subjugated by a blind and impartial force. In order to arrive at such a third reading, however, one must be able to take seriously somebody else’s reading. It is clear that Weil’s first two senses of contradiction are important for being able to do this, for somebody else’s reading is often in opposition to our own. But it is also clear from the Notebooks that Weil does not think it a bare intellectual exercise to take into consideration another person’s reading in order to arrive at a new one. Simply to entertain another perspective is rarely to give up your own, and unless one gives up one’s own limited reading, one cannot arrive at the unifying third reading.

It is often true that we believe we have arrived at a unifying third reading because we have considered other viewpoints and have synthesized them with our own. But such a synthesis can be flawed and a mere expansion of our own perspective. For example, it is relatively easy for an anthropologist to go into the field to observe a “primitive” tribe and even live with it closely and yet return to write a report that does little more than supply “data” that support the dominant intellectual view of the anthropologist. Such is not a good reading.

For Weil, a good reading occurs only when we realize that we are reading and when we realize the limited nature of our reading. In this sense the truth of a third reading comes about just as much by giving up our grasp on an earlier reading as it does by our arriving at a synthetic unity of opposed readings. As one commentator has put it: “The unity of several readings is not a juxtaposition of readings, it is a non-reading which transcends particular reading… It is the non-reading in which the particulars of the reading subject are denied.” (Farron-Landry, “Lecture et non-lecture chez Simone Weil,” csw 17/2 (Dec. 1980): 230.) In this sense, the unity of several readings cannot be forced or invented, but must be an apprehension of their own unity.

It is in apprehending the unity of several readings that Weil’s notion of mystery is most appropriate. Just as mystery involves two or more incommensurate thoughts that cannot be unified by the finite intellect, but cannot be separated either without losing an important light shed on the spirit, so too the ultimate reading cannot reduce what it reads to only a part of what is read. But mystery in its fullest theological sense is also appropriate here for another reason. The ultimate reading, which eschews reduction to limited readings, is in the final analysis, Weil thinks, a gift of grace essential to faith itself, for it is universal yet incarnate in a person.

The faith Weil is considering here, however, is not simple belief, but discernment in the spiritual realm, which she says is analogous to taste in the aesthetic realm. This faith is an ability to read not from one’s self-perspective, but from a universal perspective that encompasses even one’s own self-perspective and the reason for it. It is the mystery of love and being just and caring for all creation equally and without prejudice. It is “to read God in every manifestation, without exception, but according to the true manifestation relationship [sic] proper to each appearance. To know in what way each appearance is not God. Faith is a gift of reading” (The Notebooks of Simone Weil, 220).

IV.

There are two important results when we connect the notions of contradiction, mystery, and reading as Weil uses them. The first is a confirmation of Weil’s metaphysical doctrines wherein she sees a manifold diversity to the world that is unified and harmonized in the transcendent and divine. Rather than being a metaphysical dualist as some commentators have claimed, Weil instead holds to a “monistic mystery.” Mystery here stands as the locus of the harmony of the world and is an appropriate term to use for that harmony that must transcend any finite conception of it. It must transcend any and all finite conceptions for the simple reason that every finite conception is included in it.( This topic is treated more fully in my Christus Mediator: Platonic Mediation in the Thought of Simone Weil (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983).

The second result is that we must also see the connection of these notions as issuing in a method of spiritual development that faithfully reflects Weil’s metaphysical understandings. Contradiction is thus not only a sign of reality, it is also useful “for emerging from the point of view” and thus reading better. Ultimately, this method leads to a best reading that proceeds from apprehending the mysterious unity of all created being. The mystery encompasses the very density of life; the method is designed to discover

It is readily apparent that this method is something to which Weil adheres closely, especially when she is at her paradoxical and oracular best. But she is trying to be something other than clever when she does so, for she honestly thinks that this method does bring us closer to an apprehension of the mystery that holds the world together. Here we can give two major examples of how she thought this method could be applied. The first is one noted above, whereby Weil looks at the difficulties we encounter in thinking of affliction as being in any way connected to God’s love. There we suggested she finds the two to be co-enlightening of each other and rooted in the mystery of redemption. The second example is perhaps less grandiose, but is equally instructive because it shows the various levels at which Weil thought the method of contradiction could be applied. This is the example of Zen koans, to which Weil returns numerous times in the Notebooks and by which she was obviously fascinated.

Strictly speaking, koans do not conform to the definition Weil has of mysteries, i.e., two strictly conceived but finitely irreconcilable lines of thought. The koan of “What is the sound of one hand clapping?”, for example, does not conform since it is not the result of two opposed lines of thought; rather it is an incoherent question — clapping means two hands. Yet to force the koan into this strict form is to misunderstand both the koan and Weil’s ultimate point. The koan is useful for freeing us from a limited reading. In a certain sense, if it is not the clash of two opposed lines of analytic thought, it is nevertheless something that represents the clash of how we conceive the world to move and how it might be conceived on another plane. This is essentially a spiritual point and indicates how Weil’s ideas on contradiction, mystery, and reading cannot be reduced to solving an intellectual problem, though they do have intellectual ramifications in forcing us to see and reconstruct intellectual problems in a larger perspective.

There is also a certain value to understanding koans this way beyond exemplifying Weil’s method. They also illustrate the larger need to escape from a limited reading, and show our means of escape, namely, by revealing how we can be forced to entertain what seems to be impossible to our normal ways of thinking. Further, the light gained from pondering them and the contradictory form of questioning they employ together also reflect our ultimate goal, i.e., a mystery. But there is also a certain problem here: though koans might appear useful as a practical application of the method of contradiction, they remain embedded within the culture of the East. As such it is not really possible to think seriously that they could be imported — and Well did not think they could be. The shallow appreciation of Eastern religions in which the counterculture of the 1960s was awash is evidence of this difficulty. The problem is then whether we can find anything in Western culture that lends itself to this sort of spiritual use of words.

There are, in fact, two prime areas that might. The first is philosophy and theology. Insofar as they have a distinct spiritual element to them and deal with a unique object, God, they have always had an element of mystery to them. The second, however, is an area that is far more immediate in its import, and that is literature. Literature, as should be readily obvious, is not simply entertaining stories; it is at least an invitation to entertain possibilities and worlds we might never have envisioned had literature not enticed us into doing so. In this regard, it is often literature and not theology that first allows us to believe in a truly spiritual sense As John Coulson writes, following Newman’s Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, “Religious belief originates in that activity we call imagination, and its verification thus depends now, as in the past, upon its first being made credible to imagination” [John Coulson, Religion and Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 46].

Put in Weil’s terms, this is to say we do not simply decide to move to another reading — how could we, since the decision is the fruit of an earlier reading? — but embrace it because in some sense it has captured us. Religiously, however, what first captures our imagination is rarely analytic clarity; rather it is a mystery that Newman himself defines as “a statement uniting incompatible notions.” Thus Newman writes: “It is a property of depth to lead a writer into verbal contradiction; and it is a property of simplicity not to care to avoid them.” [John Coulson, Religion and Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) 46].

It is not difficult to find examples of how this sense of mystery can penetrate literature in metaphors that are striking, enticing, and reflective of the mystery that is their focus. T. S. Eliot provides a major example, as when he writes in “East Coker”:

The wounded surgeon plies the steel
That questions the distempered part;
Beneath the bleeding hands we feel
The sharp compassion of the healer’s art
Resolving the enigma of the fever chart.

Eliot continues this further by similar “contradictory” metaphors designed to awaken us and to show us the depth of the healing of redemption:

The whole earth is our hospital
Endowed by the ruined millionaire,
Wherein, if we do well, we shall
Die of the absolute paternal care
That will not leave us, but prevents us everywhere.
[T.S. Eliot, Collected Poems, 1909-1962 (New York: Harcourt, 1963) l87-88]

It may be too much to say that what Eliot has done is to give the imagination the literary equivalent of a koan. What he has done, however, seen in the light of Weil’s understanding of contradiction and mystery, is to focus our attention on the mysterious quality of the redemption by painting it in “contradictory” terms that show its depth and uniqueness. And, as Coulson argues, he has done this not simply by preaching theological platitudes in a “worn-out poetical fashion,” but has actually engaged the imagination that it may entertain what it otherwise might not even consider. One can also see in prose similar metaphors of contradiction designed to awaken us, as when Flannery O’Connor uses violence to portray grace.

It is undoubtedly the recognition of the link between the religious imagination and the literary imagination that has led to the flourishing of a new field of studies relating religion and literature. With writers such as Eliot, O’Connor, and others, it would be remiss not to study these relations. But one must also be aware of a problem as well. The time is long past when, as Eliot noted of the Metaphysical poets, religious and literary sensibilities fit together in a “constant amalgamation of disparate experience.” Indeed, as he notes, “we have tacitly assumed for some centuries past, that there is no relation between literature and theology.”[T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays of T S Eliot (New York: Harcourt, 1950) 343] If this is true then we cannot assume automatically either that any and every bit of literary imagination opens onto a mystery. This was a problem of which Weil herself was well aware. Her comments are useful as a further specification of exactly how she thought contradiction and mystery ought to be applied.

V.

It may seem surprising to suggest that Weil would have linked the appropriation of mysteries with the literary imagination. In numerous places she not only vehemently attacks literary figures as diverse as Wilde, Hugo, Gide, and the Surrealists for being “in bondage to public taste” and thus keeping souls in the cave rather than freeing them, but she also inveighs heavily against “imagination” itself In her early philosophical works, she usually refers to the imagination as the “folle imagination” and in later works indicates that it leads us to live a “waking dream peopled by our fictions” (On Science, Necessity and the Love of God, 162). She even goes so far as to connect knowledge of our limited and contingent nature in relation to nature as a whole.

Despite this problem with fiction, however, Weil nevertheless sees that literature can awaken us to reality. Rather than calling such fiction imaginative, however, she thinks it is the fruit of having paid attention to the world. Attention for her is a sacrificial suspension of the ego that allows us to see the world as it is and not as we would like to see it. Good art is therefore something that reproduces this vision. Weil writes:

There is something else which has the power to awaken us to the truth. It is the works of writers of genius, or at least those with genius of the very first order and when it has reached its full maturity. They are outside the realm of fiction and they release us from it. They give us, in the guise of fiction, something equivalent to the actual density of the real, that density which life offers us every day but which we are unable to grasp because we are amusing ourselves with lies (On Science, Necessity and the Love of God, 162).

Literature of a certain kind, therefore, can open us to reality. It may be only a matter of terminological preference whether we call good literature the result of the literary imagination or of attention. However, in order for literature to open us to reality and to the mystery that creates and redeems, it is not a matter of preference what we mean by the literary imagination. We can mean only that rare power to give us not a partial and incomplete “reading,” but the fullness of reality itself

VI.

Weil’s understanding of contradiction and mystery is capable of far-reaching application, for it is not only the result of her religious metaphysics, it is also a way of apprehending mystery. In this sense, understanding the proper use of mystery for Weil is not simply a bit of philosophical arcana; rather, it is a living option that Well bids us to act upon in thinking of either the world or God. This is well illustrated in some of her otherwise cryptic remarks in the essay “Human Personality” about the use of words in common parlance.

Weil argues in that essay that to use legitimately words such as “God,” “justice,” “love,” and “good,” “one must avoid referring them to anything humanly conceivable” (Selected Essays 33). This, she claims, is because “the proper use of these words involves not trying to make them fit any conception, [for] it is in the words themselves, as words, that the power to enlighten and draw upward resides” (Selected Essays 1933-34, 33). Weil does not naively assume here that such words have this power “ex opere operato.” Rather, they only have this power because they refer to the foci of mysteries that transcend our thought, and for them to have this power for us, we must maintain the sense of mystery that lies behind them.

It is not the words that save, but the mystery to which they refer. In this case, then, the illegitimate use of these words consists in the attempt to make them fit us when in reality love, justice, and goodness transcend us. It is fiction in the negative sense when we reduce them to our size. But does this mean we are not to have any conception of such words? Weil does not think so, and points out that if such words do not have some conception attached to them, “everyone quickly recognizes them for lies.” Indeed, we are “to associate with them ideas and actions which are derived solely and directly from the light which they shed” (Selected Essays 1933-34, 33).

What she means is that we learn to read mysteries by learning to read the mysterious qualities such as good with which we are actually confronted in the world. Just as Jesus tells the Pharisees to “call no one good except the Father,” so he also tells them: “If I am not doing the works of my Father, then do not believe me; but if I do them, even though you do not believe me, believe the works, that you may know and understand that the Father is in me and I am in the Father” (John 10:37-38). Mysteries are not obscure; rather, when they are incarnate they show us reality. It is here that Weil gives a spiritual program for grasping mysteries by the use of words — they are to be attached to the good we do understand and are to open us to the good we do not understand.

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Simone Weil’s Aesthetic Vision: A Composition On Several Planes — Eric O. Springsted

June 8, 2010

Simone with brother Andre who was destined to be one of the greatest mathematicians of his generation. 1922

 

Eric O. Springsted teaches theology at Princeton and is formerly Professor of Religion, and Chaplain at Illinois College in Jacksonville, Illinois. After doing his undergraduate work at St. John’s College, he received his divinity degree and doctorate in philosophy and theology from Princeton Theological Seminary.

He is the author and editor of six books, including four on the French philosopher, Simone Weil. Co-founder of the American Weil Society, he has served as its President since 1981. He has written on education, theology, culture, and the philosophy of religion. This essay comes from The Beauty That Saves, a collection of essays on the aesthetics of Simone Weil that he co-authored with John Dunaway (a great book BTW).

I’ve often been attracted to a Christian aesthetics and have been reading around the edges of von Balthazar, David Bentley Hart and others. Weil brings us to the heart of the matter in many ways and repeats some things I found in Fr. Robert Barron’s work: the notion of God as artist.

In the previous post Vladimir Volkoff highlighted the central importance of mediation in the thought of Simone Weil. In doing so, he points out that in Weil’s universe, while there is one supreme value – God — there also are other values that are arranged a little like a Russian doll: “you know, one value inside another value and so on.” The image is striking; it is also appropriate, conveying very well what Weil sees in looking at the universe. She herself openly and earnestly talks about creation being “a composition on several planes.”

Now, to talk about the world being a composition on several planes is not just to talk in a fancy way about how one might construe values, or to construct a metaphysics. It is also to introduce deliberately aesthetic categories into one’s talk about the world from the very beginning. This is obvious enough in calling the world a “composition,” for compositions are intentional and usually done in such a way that the characteristics of beauty are important criteria for discussing them.

Weil herself was well aware of this when she talked about the world being a “composition.” Indeed, she undertakes her most extended discussion of the creation of the world in terms of what she called “an artistic model.” For Weil, creation is not a matter of a deity establishing a set of facts, of things that are; it is something God was inspired to do and that God deliberately set out to make beautiful and good in the highest possible way.

Aesthetic categories are also called for in suggesting that this composition takes place on several planes, for what Weil clearly intends in using this imagery is that we see the various plural beauties and values we encounter in the world as somehow harmonized, as pointing in their different ways and yet together to a single author, who — we are led to believe by the world’s beauty — is also beautiful.

This is wonderful talk (contained in Weil’s essay “Divine Love in Creation”). Philosophers and critical theorists might well ask, however, what the meaning of such talk might be. Well, at least one way of putting the issue is that what we are being asked to do in thinking about the world and what is in it is to use aesthetic categories, to think about it and about values in terms of beauty. Just as a pedant who writes a research paper but does so without style misses something of his subject, so, too, do we fail, Weil thinks, in thinking very well about the world if we do not think explicitly about its beauty, if we do not consciously use aesthetic categories. This includes — especially includes — Weil thought, science.

For beauty not only is a matter of harmony and of a certain intellectual pleasure and delight in order, it is also a sign, a suggestion of an end that our mind believes itself promised, but which can never quite be grasped fully and completely by the intellect. For modern science to give itself over to issues of technology and control but not to producing an adequate object of contemplation as the Greeks had tried to do was to belie the very nature of human thought of the universe. And that is to fail in understanding how humans find themselves situated in

In this sense beauty is not only an appropriate way by which to think of the world. It is also necessary for thinking of it very well at all. For whereas historically our very important attempts at conceptual clarity have tended to result in reductionism and attempts to control the world, beauty alone allows us to leave the mystery of the world as it is and yet to contemplate it, not to control it and cut it down to size. To talk about the world well at all we need to talk in some very different ways at the same time, and to recognize that each of those ways is limited, but also crucial and complementary. Although Weil believed that clarity and the scientific project of description is both crucial and possible, she also understood that it was only one of those little Russian dolls, and perhaps the least comprehensive of those dolls. It was itself nested within something larger, something that itself can often be put only paradoxically and poetically.

This last point — that the larger values we are after can only be put paradoxically and poetically — is important for two reasons. The first is that it gives a proper sense of the world in which we live. For many years we have schizophrenically tried to live in “two cultures” as C. P. Snow put it. Weil would have been appalled at the designation. She freely admitted the world of science and the world of humanities look very different, and woe to the person who confuses them. But that does not mean that there are two sets of values; there is only one, Weil thought, and each of those so-called cultures speaks in its own way to it. Each one is its own window and reading of those values. The only way, however, that we could ever understand that is if we use the language of each to describe, somehow, the other. Such use would obviously be metaphorical and analogical, but in a world that is a mystery such is appropriate. But it is not a matter of losing clarity when we use words in such a way. Clarity gives way to beauty.

The second reason that that point is important is because it helps us understand Weil’s own philosophical writing better. Although much of what she wrote, say, in her notebooks, was experimental and subject to revision and to being discarded, her control over her own thought and its expression was remarkable. Her manuscripts show few erasures. Rare is the occasion that she did not mean what she said and the way she said it. Ironically, that has often gotten her readers and commentators in trouble. For while her powers of description and analysis were finely honed she is also given to what appears to be wild excesses in expression and she oftens borders on the oracular. Now, she usually does mean what she says.

The problem is to recognize that what she says is often itself a composition on several planes. For not only does she try to describe accurately, she is very concerned, as were other writers such as Plato, Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, with her readers and trying to get the reader to emerge from “the point of view.” In this case, her own use of language is important to understand and also serves as an example of the attempt to witness to a single supreme value that gives rise to a world of interlocked intermediary values. For she not only describes, she does shock, and she also talks very tenderly.

It is crucial to distinguish these uses of language in Weil herself, and to recognize their unity. And it is not just an invented aesthetic and use of language, it is a use of language where she is fully aware of the history and communal structure of the language she uses (This is to talk primarily about her philosophical writing. The reader should be aware, however, that Weil actually wrote a number of poems, and left an unfinished play, Venise sauvée, at her death. Her poetical works are clearly not in the same class as her philosophical works. Nevertheless, that she so actively explored firsthand the process of artistic creation in obvious forms as well as in the less obvious ones of, say, her notebooks, is important to understand.)

It is at this point that another image needs to be invoked to understand Weil fully. Volkoff is right in suggesting that Weil’s world of values is like a Russian doll. But let us also recall another nesting image, the image Alcibiades used of Socrates. In the beginning of his eulogy of Socrates in the Symposium, Alcibiades tells his audience that Socrates reminds him of one of those little sileni that can be bought in the statuary stalls in the marketplace. To outward appearances they are silly little statues of pipers or flautists. Yet, when one opens them up they have little figures of gods inside. The point we are meant to take away from this, of course, is one about the beauty and quality of Socrates’s inner life. And in a dialogue on love that point is made to underline Socrates’s own earlier point that it is the soul we need to love and not the outer appearances.

Now, the point that needs to be made here with respect to Weil’s understanding of beauty is that while it is, like a Russian doll, the result of a series of values nestled within each other, it is not just something out there. One certainly could not point to it, as many in the eighteenth century pointed to the order of the world, and form an argument to convince somebody, anybody, that there had to be a Maker, a Divine Artist. It is not simply an “objective” fact about the universe, although Weil did think the beauty of the world was not dependent on us. She was what we might call a realist in aesthetic matters. But understanding how she was depends upon thinking about an intimate connection between the beauty of the world, all intermediate beauties, and the soul. For beauty and value are not just nested within each other waiting to be uncovered by the right method; their very nature and existence is connected to human inner life, even if it is not dependent on it. One way of putting this point is to say that it is the nature of beauty to reveal our soul. It would be helpful here, therefore, to spell out briefly some of the aspects of that connection, for by doing so we should also get a clearer idea of Weil’s understanding of beauty itself as well as its importance in human moral life and thought.

The first aspect is that, mysteriously, beauty seems to be tailored to our size. This is a thought that Weil pondered often in her early works. Citing the example of Voltaire’s Micromegas, an inhabitant of the star Sirius who was 24,000 leagues in stature, she notes how what seems beautiful to us, because it is on our scale, will not be so to Micromegas. Now, Micromegas might well find beauty, too, and if he did, it would be another example of how the world is a composition on several planes. But the point here is, at least, that there is some sort of mysterious complicity between our minds, bodies, and the universe. Beauty is at the heart of that complicity.

But, again, this is not something we merely observe or feel. Instead Well uses the highly realist language of “being grasped” or “gripped.” Rather than being something that is entirely dependent on our sensitivity and mental make-up, or our desires, beauty is the very thing that makes us aware of a world outside us. Throughout all her writings Weil was very concerned with encountering a world beyond what is captured in our methods or envisioned in our fantasies and dreams. In short, she was concerned to encounter a world outside human thought so that human thought could think something other than itself In all cases, she believed, we are awakened to this world by encountering “necessity,” the warp and woof of the order of the created world.

Necessity presents itself to us under at least two faces. On the one hand, at times we are awakened by a certain harshness that causes us to suffer and lets us know in no uncertain terms that we may not always get something simply because we dream it. Indeed, we rarely get it. But just as important for that awakening is the other side of necessity, namely, beauty. It is beauty, as one of the faces of necessity, that grasps us and makes us pay attention to the other and to the world. Beauty, like suffering, is crucial for moving us out of ourselves and for beginning reflectiveness. Insofar as moving beyond self-absorption is the beginning of a certain life of the spirit, it is small wonder that Weil calls beauty a “trap” that God sets. In this she is in full accord with Dostoyevski’s dictum that “beauty will save the world.” It is opening up in us something like the inner gods that Alcibiades mentioned.

Weil, however, is no gnostic, although she frequently used gnostic-like language. Beauty does not simply reveal a hidden inner self that was there all along and merely needed liberating. Rather, as a trap, beauty signals a sort of birth of the soul, a creation of the inner life. In order to say what goes on here we need to reintroduce the Russian doll image. For Weil, beauty is not all of a piece; rather, it has a hierarchy. One is reminded that the word “hierarchy” has nothing to do with vertical dimensions. Its roots are hieros (holy) and arche (principle, or beginning). In this sense, while it may well be some particular small beautiful thing that first awakens us, we are at that point only at a beginning. We ultimately need to take in all of reality, and to consent to it and find it beautiful, Weil thought. In that sense Weil herself was no Annie Dillard, one who takes delight in the striking minutiae of a world that goes on under our noses and that we never see. Or, more accurately, she does not delight in dwelling on it. All that is small and valuable is valuable within a much larger universe, and in the end it is the beauty of the world as a whole that Weil is most interested in.

What one thinks of when he or she thinks of Weil herself contemplating beauty is her sitting high above the Rhóne valley at Gustave Thibon’s farm, wondering at the complexity and order of the whole. But let us be careful to understand why and to understand that that order does not ignore or negate small beautiful things. Indeed, it sustains them and gives them room. The universe as a whole has the beauty it has precisely because it is a composition on several planes; its beauty and value are that its order supports and sustains all other particular beauties and values, and lets them coexist. Its order is the coexistence of plural values that yet speak of one end.

What this means for the soul is that although a particular beauty may awaken us, our love is not perfected, our soul is not fully developed, until we can love the universe fully in every part and every way. At this terminus of love, suffering and beauty coincide for Weil. So it is not a question of the beauty of the universe as contrasted with particular beauties; the two concepts are mutually interdependent, and both are dependent on the spiritual journey of the soul. It is also for this reason that the beauty of the world could never for Weil provide an argument for the existence of God, although for the one who has learned how to read it, it is a proof, a witness.

It ought to be noted at this point just how Weil thought of this beauty of the world, this order of the world, for over the course of her brief life she came to think of it in increasingly sophisticated ways. Initially, she conceived it along the lines of a mathematical order. Where she came to differ from the mathematical physicists of the Enlightenment was that in time her sense of that order became more and more Pythagorean. Indeed, her most extensive treatment of it is in an essay simply titled “The Pythagorean Doctrine.” What it means to say in this instance that she became more and more Pythagorean is this: to a great extent the mathematical sense always remained with her. She was able to use it to great advantage when critiquing modern science. But what is also important to realize is that much of what held her attention in the Pythagoreans was not just the mathematical order they saw in the world, but a way of thinking that order through the relations of dissimilar, of incommensurate things. The Pythagoreans, of course, talked about this dissimilarity in terms of numbers — rational vs. irrational numbers. Weil, however, thought the idea of a unity of dissimilar things could be extended to everything else. Thus she came to think, for example, of social life as having a distinct sort of order that is irreducible to anything else, one that is fundamentally narrative and historical. But rather than believing that that order indicates a second culture opposed to scientific culture, she tried to get herself and her readers to imagine a world order that combined smaller orders that are as disparate as mathematics and history. Now, what that order is cannot be ultimately spelled out in any particular terms — in either historical or mathematical terms — for particular terms belong to particular orders. But here is where the notion of beauty is so crucial. That we find the world that contains all those particular orders beautiful is the sign that there is an overarching order.

We are now in a position to say something more about the mysterious relation between the beauty of the world and the soul. Beauty for Weil is what it is about the world that awakens our moral and spiritual life and presses us on to a fuller encounter with reality. Beauty in that sense is sacramental, and it is ultimately a moral and spiritual matter. But this is not to take a utilitarian or instrumental view of beauty, ever a high view. For beauty effects change in us precisely at the point that we learn to respect it for what it is by itself, without regard to what it can do for us or how it affects us. Beauty’s help to us is when it causes us precisely to forget ourselves and pay attention to what is valuable apart from us.

There is another way of putting this that hopefully not only illumines Weil’s concept of beauty but shows in the clearest possible terms one of its key sources. In the sixth book of the Republic, Socrates is trying desperately hard to explain to Glaucon the nature of the Good. In his first attempt to do so he likens the Good to the sun, for just as the sun’s light is the source of all organic life, of all that exists, as well as its being seen, so too in the realm of the intellect, the Good is the source of being and knowledge. Thus, Socrates says, the Good is the source of all, exceeding even Being in truth and dignity. Its first offspring are Truth and Beauty. For Weil, too, beauty is the offshoot of the Good. Not only is there no real truth without it, for truth and beauty are the daughters of the Good, it itself must be reckoned in moral terms, and is relevant for thinking through goodness.

To say this is to say without reserve that Weil’s aesthetic vision is very much at odds with most modern understandings of beauty. On the one hand she is a realist, while fully admitting a certain ineradicable subjective, and even cultural nature of beauty. She thus distances herself from many contemporary critical theorists, even while sharing certain of their insights. On the other hand, she also refuses to take the other modern option of treating aesthetics as a separate area of human understanding and experience, divorced from other areas, particularly moral ones. To say that the reason she takes neither of these paths is because she is a Platonist is, of course, true, but not entirely helpful. For if she is, it is by being inspired by that vision, and not by the very unplatonic means of imitating somebody else’s vision. Like most Platonists of the first rank, she is most traditional by being original.

Weil’s aesthetic vision is deeply suggestive, and at times not entirely worked out, at least as a theory. It is contained in explicit reflections on beauty and traditional aesthetic themes. But it is also contained in indirect ways in what has been loosely called her “religious metaphysics,” in her moral and spiritual insights and extended reflections, as well as in her use of sources and her own way of writing.

We are convinced that! Simone Weil’s aesthetic vision is deeply worthy of attention, for in a world that is so “post-” — so knowing of what it no longer is, but hard pressed to say what it now is, that vision is boldly integrative — while still pluralist, critical, and even tragic — while still morally hopeful and liberating — while yet deeply rooted in the ongoing traditions of value.

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What Simone Weil Has Meant to Me by VLADIMIR VOLKOFF

June 7, 2010

The following is a transcription of a talk given by Vladimir Volkoff at St. Joseph’s Catholic Church on 13 January 1981. Mr Volkoff, who passed away in 2005, was a French writer of Russian extraction. He produced both literary works for adults and spy novels for young readers under the pseudonym Lieutenant X. Volkoff is sometimes considered the French Cold War writer par excellence. His works were characterized by themes of the Cold War, intelligence and manipulation, but also by metaphysical and spiritual elements.

These comments show the profound effect Simone Weil has on her readers. Although “attracted” to Catholicism, she was never baptized. A summary of her thought notes: “T. S. Eliot’s preface to her book, The Need for Roots, suggests that she might be regarded as a modern-day Marcionite, due to her virtually wholesale rejection of the Old Testament and her overall distaste for the Judaism which was technically hers by birth; others have identified her as a gnostic for similar reasons, as well as for her mystical theologization of geometry and Platonist philosophy. However, it has been pointed out  that this analysis falls apart when it comes to the creation of the world, for Weil does not regard the world as a debased creation of a demiurge, but as a direct expression of God’s love — despite the fact that she also recognizes it as a place of evil, affliction, and the brutal mixture of chance and necessity. This juxtaposition leads her to produce an unusual form of Christian theodicy.

It is difficult to speak conclusively of Weil’s theology, since it exists only in the form of scattered aphorisms in her notebooks, and in a handful of letters. Neither of these formats provides a very direct path to understanding or evaluating her beliefs, nevertheless, it is possible to make certain generalizations.”

What she does, as you will see in the following and in other posts, is PROVOKE and for that we are deeply grateful to her. Her whole notion of attention is something this blog is predicated upon. I instantly saw in Vladimir Volkoff’s comments here the kind of effect she has had on me.

I am not a Simone Weil scholar by any means and I am completely unprepared. So I think the best that I can do is to tell you about Simone Weil and me, how I met her and what she has meant to me. I met her — not in the flesh — but I met her in thought about thirty years ago when I was a student at the Sorbonne and a professor asked me to write a paper about a thought that Simone Weil had expressed in La Connaissance surnaturelle. My first reaction to her was that for some reason I could tolerate her talking about God. I was rather shy at that time about people talking about God. I was annoyed by the kind of sweetness that generally creeps up in people’s voices when they begin mentioning God. And God knows that many of our churches — Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, or otherwise — have deeply sinned in the direction of this excessive sweetness.

Well, there’s nothing sweet in Simone Weil’s reflections about God and this somehow won me over to begin with. So I began reading her. The next thing I read, I think, was her Lettre a un religieux (Letter to a Priest) where she asks all the wrong questions, which means all the right questions — all the questions that a young person who begins having his or her doubts about the church, about God, and so on, asks. And she was asking them in a tremendously intelligent way, not a disparaging way at all. In fact, she was expressing her faith in the form of a question. That faith could be expressed in the form of a question impressed me very much. Some of the questions she asked, of course, did not apply to me at all, because I had not been brought up in a Roman Catholic tradition but an Orthodox tradition. And I hope the father will forgive me, but sometimes I have thought it would have been easier for Simone Weil to have been a Christian if she had chosen to get instructed in the Orthodox faith rather than the Roman Catholic one.

But anyway, this somehow intensified my interest in her and I went on to read La Pesanteur et la grâce (Gravity and Grace) and practically all her books. What struck me most in all this reading was what I think I will call the three paradoxes of Simone Weil. And this is what I am trying to talk to you about. All three paradoxes have to deal with what I call the sense of mediation, the concept of mediation. The first paradox has to deal with what she calls by the Greek word metaxu, which means “in between,”  “what is in between.” And it is rather paradoxical that she — a girl definitely leftist in her political inclinations, definitely in fact a revolutionary at heart, spending all her time among working people, who were not patriotic in the twenties and the thirties — but that she, in her book L ‘Enracinetnent, should on the contrary talk about the sacred­ness of nations.

When she says “in between,” she means that there is one supreme value, which is God, but that there are other values that are somehow arranged a little like a Russian doll. You know, one value inside another value and so on. There’s a hierarchy of different values that are in between man and God. She insists on that to the point of saying that, for instance, dying for your fatherland is maybe not quite as good as dying for your faith, but nearly as good, because your fatherland is also a sacred value. The fact that she — having been brought up in a rather cosmopolitan milieu without any kind of deep attachment to any country, to any nation — that she should have discovered, through her inquiry into faith, this rather old-fashioned value of patriotism, struck me as rather paradoxical.

She went further than that. In L ‘Enracinement she also deplores the fact that the monarchy is no longer possible in France, and she says that really the ideal regime would be a Christian monarchy. That comes very strange from the kind of girl that she was. A second paradox, which struck me as also strange — and by strange I mean interesting, curious — the second paradox was that she was of Jewish extraction, but she was so fascinated by Greek thought. One of her most interesting books, and I think some of her most interesting thoughts in this Letter to a Priest that I referred to, had to deal with the Greek intuition (and when I say Greek I mean pagan Greek, of course) of Christianity. There’s a wonderful passage in Intuitions préchrétiennes where she shows that the conversation between Electra and Orestes when Orestes comes back to find his sister practically enslaved in her mother’s lover’s family, has the same ring, in fact, as the meeting between Jesus Christ and Mary Magdalene in the garden. There is this same sense that he has come to tell me a secret. He has come to reveal something to me. He’s the one for whom I have been waiting. He is this brother.

I could go on talking about that for a long time, because she finds intuitions of Christianity not only in Greek philosophers such as Plato, not only in Greek moralists, especially the Stoicists (she was very fond of the Stoicists, more than I am, I must say); she also found intuitions of Christianity in other religions, but mainly in this Greek world that was so close to her mind and to her heart. Of course, she saw very clearly that the Greeks did not believe in many gods, as we think and say they did. In fact, all educated Greeks believed in one God, which we see very clearly in Plato and in other philosophers. And all this led her — and the paradox is that she was Jewish and that many of us refer to our religion as the Judaeo-Christian religion — it led her to show, to see first, and to show later, that really “Judaeo-Christian” is not a good expression. It is redundant. Being Christian we are Jews up to a point, but we are also Greeks up to a point. The relevant expression would be “Judaeo-Greek.” We could say that Judaism plus Greek philosophy equals Christianity. That would make some kind of sense. She was definitely very rebellious against the Jewish part of the Christian tradition and tried to emphasize the Greek aspect.

This leads us into the third paradox, maybe the most important one. I remember reading in the first book that I read by Simone Weil, this rather strange sentence, in which she says that Christian charity springs from the same source as Greek geometry. And that set me thinking for a long time, and I’m still meditating this idea, although I think I have more or less understood what she meant by that. There are different aspects to this, and we don’t have time to delve into all of them, but let me give you just a few ideas about what she could have meant by that. One thing she refers to very often is the mean proportional. You know what the mean proportional is. It is when you have a mathematical relationship like “A divided by B equals B divided by C.” So the mean proportional is this B that relates to A as C relates to B. Simone Weil quotes lots of passages from Scripture that are built exactly along those lines. “Do unto other people as you want other people to do unto you.” “As my Father loved me, I love you.” And so on. We could go on find­ing many, many passages.

So her (to me) extremely deep intuition is that truth really has a shape, it has a form, and that you can get at the same form, at the same shape, at the same truth, (when I’m talking about form, I’m thinking about Plato of course), the same archetype either from this feeling of love that we find in the Christian religion or this contemplation of the beauty of the universe that we find in Greek philosophy. Of course, let’s not forget that other great Christian thinker Dostoyevsky who said: “Beauty will save the world.”

This last paradox has maybe meant more to me than any other. And please forgive me for quoting from myself, which is rather rude and ridiculous, but once again, I’m not a Simone Weil scholar, and the only thing I can talk about is what she has meant to me. Some time ago I was writing an article about Russian icons, and in this article I said something that will probably startle some of you and then shock some of you, but I don’t mean it as a shocking expression. I said that to me it was not so much that icons were sacred because they represented saints or the Savior or whomever. It is that I believed in Christianity because it was a religion of icons. Because the whole concept that we can represent, that we can have a metaxu, an “in-between,” something that gives the idea of some­thing else, that we can have this mean proportional, that we can have this relationship, to me this is, I wouldn’t call it the proof, but a definite Intuition of the truth of Christianity. Some theologian, or rather I don’t remember who, said that a saint was an image of an image, meaning that Jesus Christ is already an image of God and that a saint is a lower image of that image and that somebody who tries to resemble the saint is maybe an image of an image of an image. Or you could say that an icon is an image of an image, the saint being an image. And this hierarchy of images to me means a lot. To me it means my whole concept of the world.

You remember the book that we all read when we were children, called Robinson Crusoe? Well, it was in that book that I found something that to me was extremely interesting. It was the situation of a man who had to measure a tree, which was very, very high, or maybe it was a cliff, I don’t know, something very high. And he couldn’t climb the tree and how would he measure it? And so he devised something very simple, mathematically very simple, a game of triangles. I don’t know enough about geometry in English to give you the right terms. But anyway, you have two triangles which are not equal, but which have the same angles. If you know the dimensions of the small triangle, you can deduce the dimensions of the larger triangle. This business of triangles, this ability to measure the world, cliffs — and, in fact, that’s I believe how astrono­mers measure distances from the earth to the stars — this ability to judge, to measure the universe, all this we have thanks to such simple things as triangles, triangles born of Greek geometry.

To me this is also part of the same concept of the beauty of the uni­verse, and, to quote myself again, one of my books begins by exactly that same situation taken out of Robinson Crusoe. A man needs to measure a windmill, and to measure the windmill, he uses those triangles. He measures the ground, and he measures the height of the reed that he plants in the earth. And in measuring this reed, and in measuring the length of the ground, the distance between the reed and the mill, he finally gets the height of the mill. To me, this is really what philosophers, what thinkers can do. They can measure their own little triangles, and from their own little triangles, deduce maybe the great triangles that the universe is made of.

You see why I was talking about mediation. The fatherland, for instance, is mediation between man and something much larger. And the Greek philosophies also can be mediation, intellectual mediation between us and the truth. And, finally, we have this concept that there is a ratio to the world. That the world is built — and in fact scientists confirm this — ­that the world is built according to some formula, that there is a secret to the world. That there is a golden number, if you will, to the world.

Now ratio in Greek, of course, is logos. And logos is what we trans­late, maybe somewhat clumsily, as “the Word.” Of course, theologians explain that logos is also “the Word,” and that Jesus Christ is also the Word. But maybe in a deeper or at least a different sense, we could say: What is the world about? The world is about love, I think. And what is love? Love is a relationship, just like a mathematical relationship. And it has a formula to it. It has a ratio. It has a logos. And this logos of course is the Son. It is Christ. So this is what I found in Simone Weil.

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A Simone Weil Collection

April 15, 2010
 
 

Album Cover Photo, "The Death of Simone Weil"

Simone Weil by Susan Hanson
Considered by Nobel laureate André Gide and others to be “the most truly spiritual writer” of the 20th century, Simone Weil would no doubt be confounded by all the fuss. “I never read the story of the barren fig tree without trembling,” she confessed in a letter to her friend and mentor Father Joseph-Marie Perrin in 1942. “I think that is a portrait of me.”

Indeed, Weil wanted nothing so much as to lose her self altogether. “May God grant that I become nothing,” she wrote in a notebook entry that would later be included in Gravity and Grace. “We must become nothing, we must go down to the vegetative level; it is then that God becomes bread.”

An unlikely candidate for sainthood by anyone’s standards, Simone Weil was paradox embodied: she considered herself a Christian — a Catholic, to be more precise  — she came from a secular Jewish home and was never baptized; she was a pacifist but fought in the Spanish Civil War; she was a brilliant intellectual known for her anti-intellectualism, a member of the bourgeoisie who worked on a French assembly line for a year, a person who loved life and yet longed for– some would say hastened — her own death.

Born in Paris in 1909, Simone Weil was “peculiar,” to use biographer David McLellan’s term, almost from birth. At the age of three, for example, she supposedly refused a cousin’s gift of an expensive ring by saying, “I do not like luxury.” And just two years later, with the outbreak of the war in 1914, she gave up sugar and other hard-to-find foods as an act of solidarity with the soldiers.

As Weil would later admit, her belief in the value of sacrifice was shaped in great part by a story she heard as a child. Sitting at the bedside of her three-and-a-half-year old daughter, who was in the hospital recovering from surgery for appendicitis, Selma Weil entertained Simone with the tale “Marie in gold and Marie in tar.” As Weil friend and biographer Simone Pétrement explains,

The heroine of this fairy tale, who was sent by her stepmother into the forest, reaches a house where she is asked whether she wants to enter by the door in gold or the door in tar. ‘For me,’ she replies, ‘tar is quite good enough.’ This was the right answer and a shower of gold fell on her. When her stepmother saw her bring back gold, she then sent her own daughter into the forest. But when asked the same question, her daughter chose the golden door and was deluged with tar.”

For Weil, “tar” — whether in the form of physical suffering or intellectual obscurity — was always “quite good enough.”

A precocious child who was memorizing passages from Cyrano de Bergerac at the age of five and calling herself a Bolshevik by age ten, Simone Weil nevertheless saw her own abilities as mediocre compared to those of her mathematically gifted brother, André, who was older by almost three years. “The exceptional gifts of my brother, who had a childhood and youth comparable to those of Pascal, brought my own inferiority home to me,” she wrote in a letter to Father Perrin shortly before leaving France in 1942. “I did not mind having no visible successes, but what did grieve me was the idea of being excluded from that transcendent kingdom to which only the truly great have access and wherein truth abides.”

This lack of self-esteem notwithstanding, Weil was a brilliant student of philosophy, becoming an academic legend even before completing her work at the École Normale Supérieure in 1931. It was also during her years at the university that Weil became politically active, particularly on issues of peace and economic justice. So intense was her commitment, in fact, that many of her classmates found her “extremely off-putting.” As an illustration, David McLellan cites the following comment from a fellow student: “We tried to avoid her in the corridors because of the blunt way she had of confronting you with your responsibilities by asking for your signature on a petition . . . or a contribution for some trade union strike fund.” Though remembered by many for her humor and kindness, Simone Weil was nonetheless seen as a misfit—socially inept, physically awkward, and given to a style of dress that confirmed this negative image.

Following her graduation, Weil worked sporadically as a teacher of philosophy at a series of girls’ lycées. Her career was short-lived, however, not only because of her unorthodox—and largely unsuccessful—teaching methods, but also because of her passion for workers’ rights; between 1933-1937, she took an extended leave of absence, first to experience life as a factory worker and then to join a group of anarchists fighting in the Spanish Civil War. In Aragon, too, her ungainliness quickly became an issue. Because of her poor marksmanship, she was assigned to the camp cook, with whom she served until accidentally stepping into a pot of hot grease and being sent away from the front for treatment.

It was during the following year, which she spent on sick leave, that Weil traveled to Italy, a country whose art and music brought her great joy. Spiritually, too, she was feeling a new sense of life. As she put it to Father Perrin following her visit to a chapel in Assisi, “Something stronger than I has compelled me for the first time in my life to go down on my knees.” Equally powerful was her chance meeting in Solesmes, France, with a young English Catholic who introduced her to 17th century metaphysical poetry, most specifically George Herbert’s poem “Love.” Memorizing the lines, she would recite them again and again as a prayer. “It was during one of these recitations,” she later wrote to Perrin, “that, as I told you, Christ himself came down and took possession of me.”

LOVE by George Herbert (1593-1632)

LOVE bade me welcome; yet my soul drew back,
Guilty of dust and sin.
But quick-eyed Love, observing me grow slack
From my first entrance in,
Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning
If I lack’d anything.

‘A guest,’ I answer’d, ‘worthy to be here:’
Love said, ‘You shall be he.’
‘I, the unkind, ungrateful? Ah, my dear,
I cannot look on Thee.’
Love took my hand and smiling did reply,
‘Who made the eyes but I?’

‘Truth, Lord; but I have marr’d them: let my shame
Go where it doth deserve.’
‘And know you not,’ says Love, ‘Who bore the blame?’
‘My dear, then I will serve.’
‘You must sit down,’ says Love, ‘and taste my meat.’
So I did sit and eat.

Meanwhile, Weil’s health, fragile since childhood, continued to deteriorate. Years of self-deprivation, her chief means of identifying with the poor, had left her weak and increasingly vulnerable to illness. Rather than lamenting her condition, however, she considered her suffering to be a necessary step in her quest for truth. By renouncing the “I,” she believed, she was making room in her soul for God, the ultimate truth.

With the German occupation of France, and the mounting pressure on the Jews, Weil and her family immigrated to New York in 1942. As Leslie Fiedler put it, though, “America proved intolerable to her; simply to be in so secure a land was, no matter how one tried to live, to enjoy what most men could not attain.” Longing to serve with the French Resistance, Weil finally succeeded in being assigned to the office of the Free French in London, where once again she showed her compassion for the suffering of Europe by refusing to eat. Collapsing in April 1943, Weil was diagnosed with tuberculosis and sent to a sanatorium to recuperate. Though doctors were confident that she could recover, Weil ignored their recommendations of food and rest, essentially dying of starvation that August.

In the last years of her life in particular, Simone Weil increasingly found comfort in a God whom she described as “absent,” and in a consolation that wore the guise of suffering. “God gave me being in order that I should give it back to him,” she wrote in Gravity and Grace. “[H]e who gives us our being loves in us the acceptance of not being.” Like John the Baptist before her, Weil believed that “[h]e must increase, but I must decrease.”

Spiritual pilgrim though she was, Simone Weil remained outside the church to the end. Even in her attraction to Catholicism, she could not limit God to any dogma or creed; the very certainty of faith was for her a luxury to be shunned. For Weil, it was enough to gaze toward the empty place left by a God who was always just out of sight. “Attention animated by desire is the whole foundation of religious practices,” she wrote in “Forms of the Implicit Love of God.” “[L]ooking is what saves us.” Not possessing, not consuming, not controlling, but simply watching and waiting, expecting nothing, surrendering all.

What may be most admirable — and challenging — about Simone Weil is the ability she had to forego many of the assurances most of us demand. Content to live without certainty, she sought God in the darkness of faith, claiming nothing for herself. To Weil, what mattered was not finding or even seeking God, but simply waiting with open eyes, “looking” into the void.

I have no doubt that were she alive today, Simone Weil would be considered emotionally disturbed. Highly gifted, yet insecure, she often acted compulsively — and seldom in her own best interest. Rather than enjoying the life of privilege to which she was born, she chose to live in the midst of poverty and war; instead of fleeing from danger, she let herself be drawn into its heart, into a place where she could know the suffering wrought by injustice, violence, and hate.

Was she anorexic? By today’s standards, that would seem to be the case. Did she hasten her own death? To think otherwise would be to discount the facts. Psychologically healthy or not, however, Simone Weil also knew in some organic way that to desire God without the safety of dogma was to be possessed by God in return. Suffering for its own sake was debasing and cruel, but suffering with others was a means of encountering the divine.

John Marson Dunaway on Simone Weil
From all accounts, Weil was not an easy person to live with. And she is a decidedly difficult writer, in that she demands so much of her readers. One of the principle reasons for this rigid, inflexible, demanding character in both her writings and her interpersonal relationships is that she was so intolerant–toward herself as well as others–of any discrepancy between one’s beliefs and one’s way of life. Above all else she hated compromise, and her devotion to truth and obedience were significant contributing elements of her philosophy of vocation.

From Casablanca in 1942 she wrote to Father Jean-Marie Perrin: “My vocation imposes upon me the necessity of remaining outside the Church, without so much as engaging myself in any way, even implicitly, to her or to the dogmas of Christianity, in any case for as long as I am not quite incapable of intellectual work. And that is in order that I may serve God and the Christian faith in the realm of the intelligence.” (WG 40) There is an unusual clarity of vision that shines through these letters. This, of course, was well after the watershed moment when “Christ himself came down and took her” in the autumn of 1938 while she was reciting George Herbert’s poem “Love.” But I think we may trace an unusual clarity of calling growing in Simone Weil, even from quite early in her youth.

The immediately following passage from the letter to Father Perrin would apply almost equally well to the sense of calling evident even in her Marxist student days: “The degree of intellectual honesty that is obligatory for me, by reason of my particular vocation, demands that my thought should be indifferent to all ideas without exception, including for instance materialism and atheism; it must be equally welcoming and equally reserved with regard to every one of them.” 

Now one could easily question how well Weil lived out that intellectual honesty in regard to her own Jewish heritage or the legitimate contributions of the Roman Empire to world civilization. There she was certainly guilty of a certain prejudice or closed-mindedness. Yet even as she studied with Alain, she was already dedicated to achieving the kind of intellectual honesty that would be required for becoming the exemplary witness to the truth that she remains for us today. Alain’s Cartesian skepticism as a fundamental method of philosophical inquiry provided a check on Weil’s youthful impulsiveness and led her to discipline her thinking with much the same kind of rigid stoicism that characterized her physical regimen. Hence her strong emphasis on the purifying effect of atheism on the soul of the searcher for truth.

Here, as in all areas of life, Simone Weil adhered to obedience as the supreme virtue. “The carrying out of a vocation,” she writes to Father Perrin, “differed from the actions dictated by reason or inclination. … The most beautiful life possible has always seemed to me to be one where everything is determined, either by the pressure of circumstances or by impulses such as I have just mentioned, and where there is never any room for choice.”  No room for choice, actions being pre-determined. One gets here the impression of the beauty of the inevitability of suffering that shines through Greek tragedy, the heroic serenity of martyrdom. No wonder she envied the cross of Christ.

She explained her painful decision to leave occupied France in these terms. “It seems as though the decision to stay would be an act of personal will on my part. And my greatest desire is to lose not only all will but all personal being. It seems to me as though something were telling me to go. As I am perfectly sure that this is not just emotion, I am abandoning myself to it.” 

Her radical need to obey makes it easier for us to understand why she began to feel such torment and despair in 1943 when it became increasingly clear that she would never get back to her homeland to take part in the resistance effort. Francine du Plessix Gray writes that Weil “felt misunderstood and totally rejected, and had great doubts as to whether her writings were being heeded by anyone in London.” She wrote to Maurice Schumann that her work for the Free French movement would most certainly be ended soon not only by her physical fatigue, but also by “a moral limit … the ever-increasing sorrow caused by the sense that I’m not in the right place.” 

Her writings were not being widely circulated, and now her attempts to obtain a sacrificial mission in the resistance were falling on deaf ears. Her need for heroic action was being utterly frustrated.

Weil’s strong emphasis upon obedience provides a healthy counterweight to the tendency among some contemporary writers on vocation, who might lead us to understand it as an issue only for the privileged elite. After all, most people in the world even today quite clearly do not enjoy the luxury of contemplating which career path might fulfill their deep gladness. Instead, they desperately hope for whatever menial job that might come available as a means to put bread on the table. And later in this paper we shall look at how her unique vision of the mystique of labor seeks to suffuse all levels of work–from manual labor to corporate management–with meaning and fulfillment.

As in all good vocation literature, Weil talks about two different kinds of callings. If her specific purpose in life was to serve God with pure honesty in the intellect, such a goal was seen in the larger context of a general or universal call to perfection. What is unique in her description of this general vocation is that she takes great pains to divorce it from the concept of belonging to the mystical Body of Christ, the importance of which is in her eyes “one of the most serious signs of our degeneration. For our true dignity is not to be parts of a body, even though it be a mystical one, even though it be that of Christ. It consists in this, that in the state of perfection, which is the vocation of each one of us, we no longer live in ourselves, but Christ lives in us; so that through our perfection Christ, in his integrity and in his indivisible unity, becomes in a sense each one of us, as he is completely in each host. The hosts are not a part of his body.”

This state of perfection to which we all are to aspire would result in “une nouvelle sainteté,” a phrase that, while she did not borrow it from Maritain, she acknowledged him as having called for before her. Like the older Thomist philosopher for whom she had little sympathy, Weil saw that the moral complexities of the twentieth century called for a new kind of saintliness. And even though she used the word “exiger” (or “demand”), it was clearly a calling, a vocation.

Maritain’s originality had been to show that the call to saintliness was not limited to specially favored heroic exceptionality; it was a universal call, somewhat in the sense of the priesthood of all believers. But for Simone Weil, the new saintliness was not just on a different scale, but also of a different order. It was to involve a miraculous dose of genius.

A new type of sanctity is indeed a fresh spring, an invention. … It is almost equivalent to a new revelation of the universe and of human destiny. It is the exposure of a large portion of truth and beauty hitherto concealed under a thick layer of dust. More genius is needed than was needed by Archimedes to invent mechanics and physics. A new saintliness is a still more marvelous invention. … The world needs saints who have genius, just as a plague-stricken town needs doctors. 

One is reminded here of Weil’s insistence that all true artistic genius necessarily entails sainthood. Wherever there is celestial beauty she believed it was produced in saintliness. At first blush one might wonder how the necessity of genius for this new saintliness can square with the notion of its universality. Not all of us are called to be geniuses, one might object. However, we must also recall her conviction that genius is a realm where absolutely any one may have access simply by dint of genuine desire. So in that sense, we might say that Weil’s philosophy of vocation is universally applicable.

In many ways, The Need for Roots can be said to represent the most mature thinking of Simone Weil’s short life, having been written, as it was, in the final days in England that led up to her singularly stoic death in Ashford, Kent. It is there, at the conclusion of that book, that she gives her mystique of labor one of its most articulate forms. “Physical labour willingly consented to is, after death willingly consented to, the most perfect form of obedience,” she writes.  She assails the interpretations of Genesis 2 in which labor is seen as a curse, a punishment for Adam’s sin, insisting that the passage implies no disdain for work. Instead, she says “the belief in direct instruction in the various trades by God implies the memory of a time when the exercise of these trades was above all a sacred activity.”

“Labor,” she writes at the conclusion of The Need for Roots, (and she had physical labor particularly in mind) “should be the spiritual core of a well-ordered society.” And in her meditation upon Christianity and agricultural life she elaborated some details of how she envisioned such a society. “Manual labor is either a degrading servitude for the soul or a sacrifice. In the case of working in the fields, the link with the Eucharist, if only it is felt, is sufficient to make of it a sacrifice.” She recalls the innumerable comparisons in Jesus’ teachings between the life of the spirit and the daily life of the planter. The comparisons are extended to all professions and trades in her philosophy, but particularly to manual labor. The manual laborer, whether on a farm or in a factory, burns or consumes his or her flesh and transforms it into energy as a machine burns fuel, thus giving one’s body and blood to be transformed into the fruits of one’s labor (crops, livestock, manufactured goods).

In each trade, Weil identifies the relation to the Gospel in this rich biblical anagoge of work. “What is needed is … to find and define for each aspect of social life its specific link with Christ. … Thus, as religious life is distributed in orders corresponding to vocations, so in like manner would social life appear as an edifice of distinct vocations converging in Christ. … It is a question of transforming, in the largest possible measure, daily life itself into a metaphor with a divine significance, a parable.” Those of us who are teachers should remember that Jesus was the master teacher and read the Gospels from that perspective as a guide. Doctors can model their careers after the Great Physician. Builders can see him as the carpenter’s apprentice. Others can look for the many lessons in the Gospels concerning business, finance, the military, and so on. “Christianity should contain all vocations without exception since it is catholic.”

Simone Weil’s vision of a just society, then, was fundamentally structured upon this mystique of work, of labor, and of vocation. A significant influence in this regard was Alain, who had an unusually strong belief in the spiritual power of labor. Near the end of her life, she was seeking the most effective ways of causing the inner core of the Gospel to suffuse her world. Again in “Christianity and Agricultural Life,” she writes: “In a general manner, Christianity will only impregnate society if each social category has its specific, unique, inimitable link with the Christ.” 

Her own unique individual calling, she believed, was to intellectual life, to a perfect, unswerving devotion to truth. Yet her witness entailed brutal manual labor in factories, in the fields, and in non-combatant military service. Given her delicate health and physical weakness, these forays into manual labor could only hasten the coming of her premature demise. “Physical labour is a daily death,” she wrote in The Need for Roots, and how prophetic that comment became!

And her famous prayer of self- immolation (recorded in La Connaissance surnaturelle, 204-205) was even more excruciatingly and ironically prophetic when it painted the vision of utter decreation which she resembled at the hour of her passing: “that I may be a paralytic, blind, deaf, a senile idiot.” This woman whose ultimate calling was to the intellectual life prayed to be bereft of her intellect. It was the closest she could come to experiencing the cross of Jesus, for which she so often expressed a deep envy.

The deepest significance of Simone Weil’s philosophy of vocation, ultimately, shines forth in the organic unity of her thought and her life. In one who prized obedience above all and for whom there could be no more dreadful failing than not to live according to one’s convictions, this should hardly be a surprising discovery. “The universe, compact mass of obedience with luminous points. Everything is beautiful,” she writes in La Connaissance surnaturelle.  From this understanding of the world in terms of amor fati, which characterized her life and thought up to the moment of her encounter with Christ, she moved in her last four years ever more deeply into the way of mediation, of logos, of work as sacrament.

“That which in man is the very image of God is something that in us is attached to the fact of being a person but is not the person. It is the faculty of renunciation of personhood. It is obedience.”  She goes on to explain that in human relationships, the obedience of a slave does not make him resemble his master. Rather, it makes him all the more unlike the one who commands him. Yet in one’s relationship with God, the more perfectly obedient one becomes, the more one resembles the Almighty, like a son resembles a father or an image resembles a model.

“This knowledge,” she affirms, “is supernatural (Cette connaissance est surnaturelle).”  Weil must have been particularly attached to the great Kenosis passage in the second chapter of Paul’s letter to the Philippians, as well as verses such as Hebrews 5:8, in which Jesus, even though he was the Son of God, is said to have “learned obedience from the things which He suffered.” So for us, to expend our energy in labor with a view toward transforming our efforts into the fruit of the vine and the staff of life, the blood and body of Jesus, is the model of obedience in this sacramental understanding, not just of manual labor in the fields, but of all human work, thanks to the insights of supernatural knowledge.

It also subsumes affliction along with work in this all-encompassing theological vision of calling. “Supreme mediation, harmony between the why of Christ (repeated ceaselessly by all souls in affliction) and the silence of the Father. The universe (including us) is the vibration of that harmony.” 

In her “Letter to Joë Bousquet,” which was written in May of 1942 in London and was first published in Pensées sans ordre concernant l’amour de Dieu, Simone Weil explores the mystery of affliction in particularly luminous terms. For her, Bousquet was not just an unusually dear friend, he was also an extraordinarily powerful example of living redemptively with affliction. In her letter she writes that because of his paralysis, produced by wounds inflicted in war, he has the privilege of being very close to a breakthrough in supernatural knowledge. This breakthrough she describes in parabolic language with the myth of the chick hatching from inside its egg.

“The egg is the visible world,” she writes. “The chick is Love, the Love which is God Himself and lives deep inside all men, first as invisible germ. When the shell is pierced, when the being is outside, it still has this same world as its object, but it is no longer inside. Space has been torn open. The spirit, leaving the miserable body abandoned in a corner, is transported to a point outside space, which is not a point of view, from which there is no perspective, from which this visible world is seen in its reality, without perspective. Space has become — in relation to what it was in the egg — an infinity to the second or rather third power. The instant is immobile. All of space is filled — even if there are sounds being heard — by a dense silence, which is not an absence of sound, which is a positive object of sensation, more positive than a sound, which is the secret word, the word of Love that since the beginning has held us in his arms.” (Pensées 74-75)

Later in this same letter, Weil notes that it is only through affliction — or sometimes through beauty — that one is enabled to pierce through the egg into this kind of perspectiveless outer space where one sees the visible world in a way somewhat analogous to that in which an astronaut views it from the spacecraft. The suffering of affliction makes one cry out “Why?” just as the Christ did from the cross. Beauty can also elicit a “Why?” … “Why is this beautiful?”

“But rare are those who are capable of pronouncing within themselves this why for several straight hours. The why of affliction lasts for hours, days, years; it only ceases with exhaustion. He who is capable not only of crying out but also of listening hears the response. That response is silence. It is the eternal silence for which Vigny bitterly reproached God. But he did not have the right to say what is the response of the just to that silence, for he was not one of the just. The just love. He who is capable not only of listening but also of loving hears this silence as the word of God.” (Pensées 128-129)

The Romantic poet Alfred de Vigny — who fancied himself isolated by tragic exceptionality like Moses on Mount Pisgah and denied entrance into the Land of Promise — was indeed not one of the just. To Vigny, God’s silence was evidence of his absence, an absence which the poet was simply obliged to bear stoically in his own particular incarnation of the Romantic hero. The refrain of Vigny’s poem about Moses’s conversation with God on Mt. Pisgah reads: “Laissez-moi m’endormir du sommeil de la terre (Let me sleep the sleep of the earth).” God’s silence leads for Vigny to death — and not the death of the Hebrew leader who will rest in the bosom of Abraham, but only the extinction of rotting in the cold, hard earth.

For Simone Weil, the call of God was at least in some measure a silent call. But that silence spoke a rich world of wisdom. Obedience required the patience of living over an extended period of time with the why of affliction, as well as listening to the silence of God’s response. So her philosophy of vocation leads us ultimately to the sound of silence, and that silence requires supernatural knowledge for those who would hear it with understanding. “Necessity here below is the vibration of the silence of God.” (Pensées 129)

The Quoted Weil

By Fr. Edward Oakes
“Imaginary evil is romantic and varied, full of charm, while imaginary good is tiresome and flat. Real evil, however, is dreary, monotonous, barren. But real good is always new, marvelous, intoxicating.”

By Fr. Neuhaus
Everything was going just right for Christian Wiman.  He writes in American Scholar that he had found a reliable publisher for his poetry, moved into a good teaching position, and then moved on from that to assume the prestigious post of editor of Poetry. “But there wasn’t a scrap of excitement in any of this for me. It felt like I was watching a movie of my life rather than living it, an old silent movie, no color, no sound, no one in the audience but me.” For reasons he did not understand, he had given up the writing of poetry, or maybe, as he says, it had been taken from him. And with that loss was a loss of being alive. “I think most writers live at some strange adjacency to experience, that they feel life most intensely in their reaction to it.”

He recalls Simone Weil’s description of two prisoners in solitary confinement, separated by a stone wall. In time they found a way to communicate using taps and scratches. The wall separates and unites them. “It is the same with us and God,” writes Weil. “Every separation is a link.” But Christian Wiman was quite unlinked. Then he fell in love. Then he was married. And then he found out he had a mysterious cancer of the blood for which there was neither cure nor certain prognosis. “In those early days after the diagnosis, when we mostly just sat on the couch and cried, I alone was dying, but we were mourning very much together. And what we were mourning was not my death, exactly, but the death of the life we had imagined with each other.” “Then one morning we found ourselves going to church. Found ourselves. That’s exactly what it felt like, in both senses of the phrase, as if some impulse in each of us had finally been catalyzed into action, so that we were casting aside the Sunday paper and moving toward the door with barely a word between us; and as if, once inside the church, we were discovering exactly where and who we were meant to be.”

What began that Sunday morning continues: “So now I bow my head and try to pray in the mornings, not because I don’t doubt the reality of what I have experienced, but because I do, and with an intensity that, because to once feel the presence of God is to feel His absence all the more acutely, is actually more anguishing and difficult than any ‘existential anxiety’ I have ever known. I go to church on Sundays, not to dispel this doubt but to expend its energy, because faith is not a state of mind but an action in the world, a movement toward the world. How charged this one hour of the week is for me, and how I cherish it, though not one whit more than the hours I have with my wife, with friends, or in solitude, trying to learn how to inhabit time so completely that there might be no distinction between life and belief, attention and devotion. And out of all these efforts at faith and love, out of my own inevitable failures at both, I have begun to write poems again.

But the language I have now to call on God is not only language, and the wall on which I make my taps and scratches is no longer a cell but this whole prodigal and all too perishable world in which I find myself, very much alive, and not at all alone. As I approach the first anniversary of my diagnosis, as I approach whatever pain is ahead of me, I am trying to get as close to this wall as possible. And I am listening with all I am.”

We are all uncertain about what God wants us to do. That is to say, we do not know for sure. Of course it seems silly, when you’re well past middle age and have spent your life doing what you believe you’ve been given to do, to always be getting up in the morning or suddenly stopping in the middle of the day’s work to ask, “Is this what I’m supposed to be doing?” I mentioned this to a young man who is discerning whether he has a call to the priesthood, and he was shocked, perhaps scandalized. He said, in effect, “You mean after all these years of being a priest, of writing books, of editing and lecturing, of organizing so many projects, you still aren’t sure you’re doing what God called you to do? How am I ever to know that God is calling me to the priesthood?”

The answer is that we act in the courage of our uncertainties. I am fond of pointing out that the word decide comes from the Latin decidere, “to cut off.” You face choices — whether to be a priest, whether to go to this school or that, whether to marry a certain person, whether to pursue this line of work or another — and then you decide. And, in deciding, you have cut off the alternatives and pray you have decided rightly. But you do not know for sure. Or else you are trapped in the tangled web of indecision.

In this connection, I have had frequent recourse, both homiletically and personally, to one of the most liberating passages from Saint Paul — 1 Corinthians 4. He has been trying to explain himself and his apostolate to the Christians in Corinth. He doesn’t know whether he has succeeded, and then he says this: “But with me it is a very small thing that I should be judged by you or by any human court. I do not even judge myself. . . .

Therefore do not pronounce judgment before the time, before the Lord comes, who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart.” Do not judge before the time! I do not even judge myself! These are the words of a life set free from the tangled web of introspection and indecision.

I was thinking about the above while reading a recent and splendid book by John Peter Kenney on Augustine’s Confessions. The book is The Mysticism of Saint Augustine, and, in Kenney’s “rereading” of Augustine’s classic text, the emphasis is on the inescapably Christocentric character of Augustine’s experience. This is against the frequent reading of the Confessions as a psychological thriller, which downplays the specifically Christian and theological in Augustine’s story.

Augustine was, as everybody knows, a Neoplatonist, but a Neoplatonist with very important differences. In Neoplatonism, the ascending soul discovers its intelligible and “undescended” self in the eternal world of being as it moves from dialectical reasoning in time into pure intellect. Kenney writes: “After this transformative discovery, embodiment has no charm [for Plotinus]. But Augustine countenances no such direct access to an unfallen self. His helplessness, his habituation to sins, his tears of self-betrayal have taught him otherwise. And so have the importunity of divine grace and the providential emergence of Christ in his life, whose power effects the conversion of his wholly fallen soul.

Thus the contemplative soul cannot discover its real self within eternal wisdom, for there is no eternal self there to be recovered. Contemplation can only be an exercise in hope, the discernment of where the self may one day rest, if it should achieve its salvation. Thus, for Augustine, contemplation is inherently eschatological and, unlike in Plotinus, that eschatological hope is never realized by the embodied soul. It can only be actualized after death.” Precisely. Let no one judge before the time!

And Finally…
At the bottom of the heart of every human being, from earliest infancy until the tomb, there is something that goes on indomitably expecting, in the teeth of all experience of crimes committed, suffered, and witnessed, that good and not evil will be done to him. It is this above all that is sacred in every human being.

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The Introduction to Gravity and Grace — A View of Simone Weil

April 14, 2010

While Gravity and Grace is one of the books most associated with Simone Weil, the work as such was not one she wrote to be published as a book. Rather, the work consists of various passages selected from Weil’s notebooks and arranged topically by Gustav Thibon, who knew and befriended her. Weil had in fact given some of her notebooks, written before May 1942, to Thibon, but not with any idea or request to publish them. Hence, the resulting work, in its selections, organization and editing, is much influenced by Mr. Thibon, a devoted Catholic. His introduction to Gravity and Grace also serves as a good introduction to Simone Weil, a Christian mystic whose epigrammatic style has made her highly quotable. The quirky title of this blog is derived from her idea of paying attention. You might want to print some of this out and stick it on the front of your refrigerator…

Introduction by Gustave Thibon
Simone Weil’s writings belong to the category of very great writings which can only be weakened and spoiled by a commentary. My sole reason for introducing these texts is that my friendship with the author and the long conversations we had together clear away my difficulties in entering into her thought, and make it easier for me to replace in their exact setting and their organic context certain formulae which are too bald or need to be elaborated. We must, in fact, remember that we are here concerned, as in Pascal’s case, with simple waiting stones set out day by day, often hurriedly, with a view to a more complete building, which alas! never came into being.

The texts are bare and simple (This is the explanation of certain repetitions and negligences of style which we have scrupulously respected throughout) like the inner experience which they express. No padding is interposed between the life and the word; soul, thought, and expression form one block with no joins in it. Even if I had not known Simone Weil personally, her style alone would in my opinion guarantee the authenticity of her testimony. What is most striking in these thoughts is the comprehensiveness of their possible applications; their simplicity simplifies everything they touch; they transport us onto those summits of being from which the eye embraces in one glance an infinity of horizons one above the other. “We must welcome all opinions,” she used to say, “but they must be arranged vertically and kept on suitable levels.” Again, ‘“Whatever is real enough to allow of superposed interpretations is innocent and good.” This sign of greatness and purity is found on every page of her work.

Here, for instance, is a thought which wipes out the ancient quarrel between optimism and pessimism — that quarrel which Leibnitz could not settle: “There is every degree of distance between the creature and God. A distance in which the love of God is impossible: matter, plants, animals. Evil is so complete there that it destroys itself: there is no longer any evil: mirror of divine innocence. We are at the point where love is just possible. It is a great privilege since the love which unites is in proportion to the distance. God has created a world which is not the best possible but which contains the whole range of good and evil. We are at the point where it is as bad as possible because beyond is the stage where evil becomes innocence.”

Or there is this other thought, which throws light onto the problem of evil and reaches to the very secrets of divine love: “All created things refuse to satisfy me as ends. Such is the extreme mercy of God toward me. And that very thing constitutes evil. Evil is the form which the mercy of God takes in this world.” And. then there is this abrupt and final refutation of all such philosophers as Schopenhauer or Sartre who argue that the presence of evil in the world justifies a fundamental pessimism: “To say that the world is not worth anything, that this life is of no value, and to give evil as the proof is absurd, for if these things are worthless what does evil take from us”’

Or again, we find the law of the insertion of the higher into the lower formulated thus: “Every order which transcends another can only be introduced into it under the form of something infinitely small.” This completes and deepens the law of the three orders of Pascal. The world of life does indeed appear to be infinitely small in the midst of the material world: What do living beings represent when compared to the huge mass of the planet and perhaps of the cosmos? It is the same with the spiritual world in relation to the world of life: There are at least 500,000 living species on the earth of which only one possesses “il ben dell intelleto.” And as for the world of grace, it, in turn, appears infinitely small against the mass of our secular thoughts and affections: the Gospel illustrations of the leaven and the grain of mustard seed are clear enough evidence of this “characteristic of being infinitesimal which belongs to pure goodness.”

Impregnating the whole of Simone Weil’s work is the driving force of an intense desire for inward purification which comes out even in her metaphysics and her theology. Stretching out with all her soul toward a pure and absolute goodness of which nothing here below provides her with a proof, but which she feels to be more real than anything existing in and around her, she seeks to establish her faith in this perfect being upon a base which no strokes of fortune, no affliction, no surging waves either of mind or matter can shake. For that, it is important before all things to eliminate from the inner life all forms of illusion and compensation (imaginative piety, the “consolations” of religion, a crude faith in the immortality of the self, etc.) which too often usurp the name of God, and which are really no more than shelters for our weakness or our pride: “We have to be careful about the level on which we place the infinite. If we put it on the level which is only suitable for the finite it does not much matter what name we give it.”

Creation reflects God by its beauty and harmony, but through the evil and death which abide in it, and the blind necessity by which it is governed, it also reflects the absence of God. We have issued from God: That means that we bear his imprint and it means also that we are separated from him. The etymology of the word “exist” (to be placed outside) is very illuminating in this respect: We can say we exist; we cannot say we are. God who is Being has in a sense effaced himself so that we can exist; he has given up being everything in order that we might exist; he has dispossessed himself in our favor of his own necessity, which is identical with goodness, to allow another necessity to reign, which is alien and indifferent to good.

The central law of this world, from which God has withdrawn by his very act of creation, is the law of gravity, which is to be found analogously in every stage of existence. Gravity is the force which above all others draws us from God. It impels each creature to seek everything which can preserve or enlarge it and, as Thucydides says, to exercise all the power of which it is capable. Psychologically it is shown by all those motives which are directed toward asserting or reinstating the self, by all those secret subterfuges (lies of the inner life, escape in dreams or false ideals, imaginary encroachments on the past and the future, etc.) which we make use of to bolster up from inside our tottering existence, that is to say, to remain apart from and opposed to God.

Simone Weil presents the problem of evil as follows: “How can we escape from that which corresponds to gravity in ourselves ?”  By grace alone. In order to come to us, God passes through the infinite thickness of time and space; his grace changes nothing in the play of those blind forces of necessity and chance which guide the world; it penetrates into our souls as a drop of water makes its way through geological strata without affecting their structure, and there it waits in silence until we consent to become God again. Whereas gravity is the work of creation, the work of grace consists of “de-creating” us. God consented through love to cease to be everything so that we might be something; we must consent through love to cease to be anything so that God may become everything again. It is therefore a question of abolishing the self within us, “that shadow thrown by sin and error which stops the light of God and which we take for a being.” Without this utter humility, this unconditional consent to be nothing, all forms of heroism and immolation are still subject to the law of gravity and falsehood:

“We can offer nothing short of ourselves. Otherwise, what we term our offering is merely a label under which the ‘I’ is compensated.”

In order to kill the self we must be ready to endure all the wounds of life, exposing ourselves naked and defenseless to its fangs; we must accept emptiness, an unequal balance; we must never seek compensations, and above all we must suspend the work of our imagination, “which perpetually tends to stop up the cracks through which grace flows.” Every sin is an attempt to fly from emptiness. We must also renounce the past and future, for the self is nothing but a coagulation of past and future around a present which is always falling away. Memory and hope destroy the wholesome effect of affliction by providing an unlimited field where we can be lifted up in imagination (I used to be, I shall be…), but faithfulness to the passing moment reduces man truly to nothing and thus opens to him the gates of eternity.

The self should be destroyed in us from within, by love. But its destruction can also be brought about from without by extreme suffering and degradation. There are vagrants and prostitutes who have no more self-esteem than the saints, and whose life is confined to the passing moment. Therein lies the tragedy of degradation. It is irreparable, not because the self which it destroys is precious, for the self is made to be destroyed, but because it prevents God from effecting the destruction himself and robs eternalizing love of its prey.

Simone Weil makes a sharp distinction between this supernatural immolation and all forms of human grandeur and heroism. Here below, God is the feeblest and most destitute of beings; his love, unlike that of idols, does not fill the carnal part of the soul; to go to him we have to labor in the void, to refuse every intoxication of passion or pride which veils the horrible mystery of death, and to allow ourselves to be guided only by the “still small voice” of the Bible, which in the flesh we cannot hear and which goes unnoticed by the self. “To say to Christ as St. Peter did, ‘I will always be faithful to thee,’ is to deny him already, for it is to suppose that the source of fidelity is in ourselves and not in grace. As he was chosen, this denial was made known to all men and to himself. How many others boast in the same way — and never understand.”

It is easy to die for something forceful because participation in force produces an intoxication which stupifies us. But it is supernatural to die for something weak: Thousands of men were able to die heroically for Napoleon, while Christ in his agony was deserted by his disciples (the sacrifice was easier later on for the martyrs, for they were already upheld by the social force of the Church). “Supernatural love has no contact with force, moreover it does not protect the soul against the coldness of force, the coldness of steel. Only an earthly attachment, if it has in it enough energy, can afford protection against the coldness of steel. Armor is made of metal in the same way as the sword. If we want a love which will protect the soul from wounds we must love something other than God.”

The hero wears armor, the saint is naked. Now armor, while keeping off blows, prevents any direct contact with reality and above all makes it impossible to enter the third dimension which is that of supernatural love. If things are really to exist for us they have to penetrate within us. Hence the necessity for being naked: nothing can enter into us while armor protects us both from wounds and from the depths which they open up. All sin is an attack against the third dimension, an attempt to bring back onto the plane of unreality and painlessness an emotion which seeks to penetrate to the depths. This law is inexorable: We lessen our own suffering to the extent that we weaken our inner and direct communion with reality.

At the extreme limit of this process, life is entirely stretched out on the surface: We suffer no more except in a dream, for existence, reduced to two dimensions, becomes flat like a dream. This holds good for consolations, illusions, boasting, and all the compensatory reactions by which we try to fill up the hollows bitten into us by reality. Every empty place or hollow does in fact imply the presence of the third dimension; it is not possible to enter into a surface, and to fill up a hole is equivalent to taking refuge in isolation on the surface. The adage of ancient physics, “Nature abhors a vacuum,” is strictly true in psychology. But this vacuum is precisely what grace needs in order to come into us.

This process of “decreation,” which is the only way of salvation, is the work of grace and not of the will. Man does not pull himself up to heaven by the hair. The will is only useful for servile tasks; it controls the right use of natural virtues which are prerequisites of the work of grace in the same way as the plowman’s effort must precede the sowing. But the divine seed comes from elsewhere. . . . In this realm Simone Weil, like Plato and Malebranche, considers attention to be of far more importance than will. “We must be indifferent to good and evil, really indifferent, that is to say we must turn the light of attention equally on each of them. Then the good will triumph by an automatic phenomenon.” It is precisely this superior automatism which has to be created; it is not obtained by tightening up the self and “going beyond one’s capacity” (forçant son talent) for doing good (nothing is more degrading than a noble action performed in an unworthy spirit), but by arriving through self-effacement and love at that state of perfect docility to grace whence goodness spontaneously emanates. “Action is the needle that shows the balance. We must not touch the needle but the weight.” Unfortunately it is easier to tamper with the needle than to alter our own weight in these “golden scales of Zeus.”

So then, religious attention raises us above the “aberration of opposites” and the choice between good and evil – “Choice, a notion belonging to a low level.” So long as I hesitate between doing or not doing a bad action (for instance, possessing or not such and such a woman who offers herself to me, betraying or not betraying some friend), even if I choose the good I scarcely rise above the evil I reject. In order for my “good” action to be really pure I must dominate this miserable oscillation so that the righteous of my outward behavior is the exact expression of my inward necessity.

Holiness is like degradation in this respect This is the postulate of Hermes: the highest resembles the lowest — a central law of being of which Simone Weil gives infinite illustrations in her work. Thus the nonresistance of the saints is outwardly indistinguishable from cowardice; supreme wisdom ends in a sense of ignorance, the motions of grace have the inevitability of animal instincts. [“I have become as a beast of burden before thy face]; detachment is like indifference, etc. just as an utterly despicable man does not hesitate to possess himself of a woman if his passion demands it, or to betray a friend if it is in his interest to do so, a saint has no choice to make about remaining pure and faithful: he cannot do anything else; he goes toward goodness like the bee toward a flower.

Goodness which we choose by balancing it against evil has scarcely anything but social value; to the eyes of him who seeth in secret it proceeds from the same motives and is marked by the same vulgarity as evil. Hence the kinship often observed between certain forms of “virtue” and the corresponding sin: their and the bourgeois respect for property, adultery and a “respectable woman,” the savings bank and waste, etc. Real goodness is not opposed to evil (in order to oppose something directly it is necessary to be on the same level); it transcends and effaces it. “What evil violates is not goodness, for goodness is inviolate; only a degraded good can be violated.”

The soul engaged in the pursuit of pure goodness comes up against irreducible contradictions. Contradiction is the criterion of reality. “Our life is impossibility, absurdity. Everything that we want is in contradiction with the conditions or consequences which are attached to it. It is because we ourselves are a contradiction, being creatures, being God and infinitely other than God.” Have countless children, for instance, and you are bringing about overpopulation and war (Japan is a typical case of this); improve the material conditions of a nation and you are in danger of impairing its soul; devote yourself entirely to someone and you will cease to exist for them, etc.

Only imaginary good things have no contradiction in them: the girl who wants to have numerous offspring, the social reformer who dreams of the people’s well-being, etc., meet with no obstacles so long as they do not pass on to action; they sail gaily forward in a sea of pure but fictitious goodness; the shock of hitting the rocks is the signal which wakens them. We must accept this contradiction — the sign of our misery and our greatness — in all its bitterness. It is through fully experiencing and suffering from the absurdity as such of this universe where good and evil are mixed that we attain to the pure goodness whose kingdom is not of this world. “That action is pure which we can accomplish by keeping our intention totally directed toward pure and impossible goodness, without disguising from ourselves by any lie either the attraction or the impossibility of pure goodness.”

Instead of filling the space, which stretches between necessity and goodness, with dreams (faith in God as a temporal father, science, progress…) we must receive the two branches of contradiction just as they are and allow ourselves to be torn asunder by their distance. And it is in this tearing, which is as it were a reflection in man of the creative act which rends God, that we rediscover the original identity of necessity and goodness: “This world, in so far as it is quite empty of God, is God himself. Necessity, in so far as it is absolutely distinct from goodness, is goodness itself. That is why all consolation in affliction separates us from love and from truth. Therein lies the mystery of mysteries. When we touch it we are secure.”

He, therefore, who refuses to accept confusion is marked for suffering. From Antigone, whom the guardian of the temporal city called upon to go and love among the shades, down to Simone Weil herself, whom human injustice crucified until she was in her grave, affliction is the lot of all those lovers of the absolute who are astray in this world of relative things: “If we want only goodness we are opposed to the law which links good to evil as the illuminated object to the shadow, and, being opposed to the universal law of the world, it is inevitable that we should fall into affliction.” In so far as the soul is not completely emptied of itself, this thirst for pure goodness leads to the suffering of expiation; in a perfectly innocent soul it produces redemptive suffering: “To be innocent is to bear the weight of the whole universe. It is to throw in the counterweight to restore the balance.” Thus purity does not abolish suffering; on the contrary it deepens it to infinity while giving it an eternal meaning: “The extreme greatness of Christianity lies in the fact that it does not seek a supernatural cure for suffering, but a supernatural use of it.”

This mystery of suffering which “decreates” man and gives him back to God finds its center in the mystery of the Incarnation. If God had not been incarnate, man who suffers and dies would have become, in a sense, greater than God. But God made himself man and died on the Cross. “God abandoned God. God emptied himself: These words enfold the meaning both of the Creation and of the Incarnation with the Passion. . . . To teach us that we are nothing [non être] God made himself nothing.”

In other words God became a creature in order to teach us how to undo the creature in ourselves, and the act of love by which he was separated from himself brings us back to him. Simone Weil sees the essence of the mediatorial function of Jesus Christ in his assumption of the human condition with all that is most miserable and tragic in it: the signs and miracles constitute the human and relatively low part of his mission; the supernatural part consists of the agony, the sweat of blood, the cross, and his vain calls to an un-answering heaven. The words of the Redeemer: “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” which sum up all the agony of the creature thrown into the midst of time and evil, and to which the Father replies only with silence — these words alone are enough proof for her of the divinity of Christianity.

Man only finds salvation by living in the bare instant, renouncing the past and future. That rules out the modern myth of the indefinite progress of humanity, even when it is presented under the form of a divine education. There are few ideas which are as impious as this one, for it tends to make us seek in the future what eternity alone can give, that is to say to turn away from God. “Nothing can have a destination which is not its origin. The contrary idea, the idea of progress — poison. The plant which bears such fruit should be torn up by the roots.” This does not mean to say that humanity cannot acquire anything in the course of time but such progress, in so far as it is temporal, can never be indefinite; for duration always ends by devouring what it has brought to birth. Time, accepted as irremediably different from eternity, is for us the door opening onto the eternal: we must not make of it a substitute for eternity.

From this essential condition of salvation, the necessity of living in the pure, instantaneous present and of toiling regardless of results, Simone Weil draws a magnificent spirituality of manual work. Such work puts man into direct contact with the inherent absurdity and contradiction of earthly life and thus, if the worker does not lie, it enables him to touch heaven. “Work makes us experience in an exhausting manner the phenomenon of finality rebounding like a ball; to work in order to eat, to eat in order to work.

If we regard one of the two as an end, or the pair of them taken in isolation, we are lost. Only the cycle contains the truth.” But in order to compass this cycle we must turn from the future and rise up to the eternal. “It is not religion but revolution which is the opium of the people.”

Here below a thousand relative objects bearing the label of absolute come between the soul and God. So long as man does not consent to become nothing in order to be everything he needs idols. “Idolatry is a vital necessity in the cave.” And among these idols the social one of the collective soul is the most powerful and dangerous. Most sins can be traced back to the social element. They spring from a thirst to appear and to dominate. It is not that Simone Weil rejects the social clement as such; she knows that our environment, roots, and traditions form bridges, metaxu between earth and heaven; what she repudiates is the totalitarian city — symbolized by the “Great Beast” of Plato and.the Beast of the Apocalypse — whose power and prestige usurp God’s place in the soul.

Whether it shows itself under a conservative or a revolutionary aspect, whether it consists of adoring the present or the future city, social idolatry always tends to stifle and to replace the true mystic tradition. All the persecutions of prophets and saints are due to it; through it Antigone and Joan of Arc were condemned and Jesus Christ crucified. The social Beast offers man a substitute for religion which allows him to transcend his individuality without surrendering his self, and so, at small cost, to dispense with God; a social imitation of the highest virtues is possible by which they are immediately degraded into Pharisaism: “The Pharisee is he who is virtuous out of obedience to the Great Beast.”

Two nations of antiquity illustrate this idolatry of the collective soul: Israel and Rome. “Rome is the Great Beast of atheism and materialism adoring nothing but itself. Israel is the Great Beast of religion. Neither the one nor the other is likable. The Great Beast is always repulsive.” The conflict between Israel and Rome, in which Nietzsche saw the dual of two irreconcilable conceptions of life, was reduced for Simone Weil to a struggle between two totalitarianisms of the same nature. It must, however, be emphasized that her anti-Semitism, which was so violent that the continuity established by the Church between the Old and New Testaments was one of the chief obstacles to her becoming a Catholic, was of a purely spiritual order and consequently had nothing in common with what goes by that name today.

She had, for example, the same aversion for Hitlerian anti-Semitism as for the Jewish idea of a temporal Messianic rule. How many times did she not speak to me of the Jewish roots of anti-Semitism! She was fond of saying that Hitler hunted on the same ground as the Jews and only persecuted them in order to resuscitate under another name and to his own advantage their tribal god, terrestrial, cruel and exclusive. Her horror of the social idol was of course extended to all other forms of totalitarian mysticism and in particular to Marxism.

Even the Catholic Church, which, moreover, she admired in many of its aspects, did not escape her criticism as a social body. Its Jewish and Roman sources, its connection with temporal things, its organization and hierarchy, its councils, certain formulae such as “no salvation outside the Church” or anathema sit, and some of its historical records such as the Inquisition, etc., appeared to her to be forms (of a higher order, but nevertheless infinitely to be feared) of social idolatry. Yet she never ceased to believe in the divine presence and inspiration within the Church. “Happily, the gates of hell will not prevail,” she wrote toward the end of her life. “There remains an incorruptible core of truth.”

Such are the main lines of Simone Weil’s thought. The schematic nature of this exposition necessarily leaves on one side a thousand touches which give precision, strength, and balance to her doctrine. But an introduction, as its name suggests, can be no more than an invitation to cross the threshold.

I may say that my friendship and veneration for Simone Weil, the pain of losing her and the joy of finding her again each day above and beyond death, the fact that I constantly feed upon her thought, and, above all, the insuperable reserve with which all true intimacy is accompanied, combine to make the effort of detachment required of me in undertaking an objective and critical analysis of her work almost impossible.

I am a Catholic, Simone Weil was not. I have never doubted for a second that she was infinitely more advanced than I am in the experimental knowledge of supernatural truths, but outwardly she always remained on the borders of the Church and was never baptized. One of the last letters she wrote me shows very clearly her attitude with regard to Catholicism: “At this moment I should be more ready to die for the Church, if one day before long it should need anyone to die for it, than I should be to enter it. To die does not commit one to anything, if one can say such a thing; it does not contain anything in the nature of a lie…At present I have the impression that I am lying, whatever I do, whether it be by remaining outside the Church or by entering it. The question is to know where there is less of a lie…”

As to whether Simone Weil was a heroic lover of Jesus Christ, my conviction has never changed; all the same her doctrine, though it is within the orbit of the great Christian truths, contains nothing specifically Catholic and she never accepted the universal authority of the Church. Now a Catholic who has to assess the thought of a non-Catholic has difficulty in avoiding two opposite extremes. The first consists of applying the principles of speculative theology to the thought in question and mercilessly condemning everything which, seen from outside, does not appear to be strictly orthodox. This method has the advantage of railings, which are always necessary on the bridges leading to God, but used without understanding or love, it is in danger of degenerating into an abuse of the evangelical precept: “If thine eye offend thee…”

For my part, as I am neither a theologian nor specially entrusted with the defense of the deposit of Christian faith, I do not feel myself in any way qualified for such an undertaking. The last thing I want to do is to set myself up as an official theologian who, armed with a sort of Baedeker of divine things, presumes to pronounce final judgment on the report, even incomplete, of a heroic explorer. .. .

The second danger consists of trying, at whatever cost, to bend the thought one is studying into conformity with Catholic truth. That is a manifest abuse of the text, “Compel them to come in.” We think that whatever is true or pure in a human life or work finds its place naturally in the Catholic synthesis without being forced or twisted in order to do so. We have no need to grasp everything for ourselves like a miser trying to increase his treasure, for everything already belongs to us who belong to Christ.

It is not for me to decide how far the ideas of Simone Well are or are not orthodox. I will confine myself to showing — on purely personal evidence — how far a Christian can interpret these ideas in order to find nourishment for his spiritual life.

I shall be particularly careful not to pick a quarrel with Sirnone Weil about words. Her vocabulary is that of the mystics and not of the speculative theologians: it does not seek to express the eternal order of being but the actual journey of the soul in search of God. This is the case with all spiritual writers. When in the Dialogue of St. Catherine of Siena Christ says to her, “I am that which is, thou art that which is not,” this formula which reduces the creature to pure nothingness cannot be accepted on the plane of ontological knowledge. It is the same with the expressions used by so many mystics who speak of the poverty of God, of his dependence in relation to the creature, etc.: they are true in the order of love, and false in the order of being. Jacques Maritain was the first to show, with perfect metaphysical precision, that these two vocabularies do not contradict each other, for one is related to speculative and the other to practical and affective knowledge.

Two things in particular in Simone Weil’s work have shocked the few friends to whom we have shown her manuscripts. First, the absolute division which she seems to establish between the created world and a transcendent God, who has tied his own hands in the presence of evil and who abandons the universe to the sport of chance and absurdity: there is a danger lest this clean cut should lead to the elimination of the idea of Providence in history and of the notion of progress, and as a result to a misunderstanding of the values and duties of this present world. In the second place, her fear of the social element is likely to lead to the isolation of the individual in a proud self-sufficiency.

We repeat that Simone Weil speaks as a mystic and not as a metaphysician. We are prepared to admit, and we do so readily, that the tendency of her genius, which inclines her constantly to stress the irreducible nature of supernatural reality, often leads her to overlook the meeting places and transitional stages between nature and grace. Nothing is more certain than that she has misunderstood certain aspects of Christian piety. But that does not authorize us to assert that the aspect she describes is not Christian. No human experierice—if we except that of Christ—has ever embraced supernatural truth in its totality. St. John of the Cross, for instance, does not emphasize the same divine realities as St. Bonaventura. There are several schools of spirituality, and if we substitute the word “God” for “world,” we can say of the mystics what the poet said of men in general:

Dan jeder sieht die Welt in seinem Sinn

Und jeder siehet recht, so viel ist Sinn darin!

If, as the Gospel says, there are many mansions in heaven, there are also many roads which lead to heaven.

Simone Weil chose the negative road: “There are people for whom everything is salutary here below, which brings God nearer; for me it is everything that keeps him at a distance.” Is not this royal road of salvation, which consists of finding and loving God in what is absolutely other than God (the blind necessity of nothingness and evil…), strangely like the bare mountain of Carmel where man has as his guide just one single word: nothing? And does St. John of the Cross speak in less absolute terms of the nothingness of created things and of the love which binds us to them? “The entire being of the creatures compared with the infinite being of God is nothing, and thus the soul, which is a prisoner of what is created, is nothing. All the beauty of creatures is supreme ugliness before the infinite beauty of God. All the grace, all the charm of creatures is insipid and repulsive before the divine beauty. All the goodness the creatures contain is only the height of malice when it is in the presence of divine goodness. Only God is good. ..

Moreover, though the theology of Simone Weil rejects the idea of popular imagination, of a God who governs the world like the father of a family or a temporal sovereign, it does not in any way exclude the action of Providence in the higher sense of the word. There is no doubt that here below matter and evil exercise “all the causality which belongs to them”; the spectacle of the innumerable horrors of history is enough to prove that the kingdom of God is not of this world. (Does not Scripture describe the devil as the prince of this world?) Nevertheless, God remains mysteriously present in creation: without in any way changing the calamities which weigh upon us, his grace plays upon the laws of gravity like the sun’s rays in the clouds. This God “who is silent in his love” is not indifferent to human misery after the manner of the God of Aristotle or Spinoza. It is out of love for his creature that he appears to efface himself from creation; it is in order to lead him on to the supreme purity that he leaves him to cross the whole expanse of suffering and darkness, abandoned and alone. In tying his own hands in the presence of evil, in stripping himself of everything which resembles earthly power and prestige, God invites men to love nothing but love in him. “He gives himself to men either as powerful or as perfect—it is for them to choose.” But here below infinite perfection is infinite weakness: God, in so far as he is love, hangs wholly and entirely on the Cross.

Simone Weil is not in any way mistaken about the dignity and necessity of temporal values. She sees them as intermediaries — metaxu — between the soul and God. “What is it a sacrilege to destroy? Not that which is base, for that is of no importance. Not that which is high, for we cannot touch that. The metaxu. The metaxu form the region of good and evil. .. No human being should be deprived of these metaxu, that is to say of those relative and mixed good things (home, country, traditions, culture, etc.) which warm and nourish the soul and without which, short of sainthood, a human life is not possible.” But these relative and mixed good things can only be treated as such by those who, out of love for God, have passed through the total stripping; all others make them more or less into idols: “Only he who loves God with a supernatural love can see means simply as means.”

Whatever she may have said about “choice, a notion of a low level” and about the absolute fruitlessness of voluntary action in the spiritual domain, Simone Weil does not, for all that, fall into quietism. On the contrary she constantly recalls that without strict diligence in our practice of the natural virtues, mystical life can be nothing but an illusion. The cause of grace dwells outside man, but its condition is within him. Simone Weil’s hatred for illusion, above all when it takes the form of sensible devotion and a kind of religious “Schwärmerei,” counterbalances everything which in so purified a spirituality might flatter the imagination or the pride. She liked to repeat, after St. John of the Cross, that inspiration which leads us to neglect the accomplishment of simple and lowly obligations does not come from God. “Duty is given us in order to kill the self…We only attain to real prayer after we have worn down our own will by keeping rules.”

She regarded with such suspicion any religious exaltation unsupported by a strict fidelity to the daily task, that the infrequent negligences of which she was guilty in the accomplishment of her duties—largely as a result of her delicate health—caused her to have bitter doubts about the truth of her spiritual vocation. “All these mystical phenomena,” she wrote at the end of her life, with heart-rending humility, “are absolutely beyond me. I do not understand them. They are meant for beings who, to start with, possess the elementary moral virtues. I speak of them at random. And I am not even capable of telling myself sincerely that I speak of them at random.”

Fully sharing the political ideas of Simone Weil as I do, I think it more becoming that I should not dwell on them at great length. Any other person but myself might make something very moving out of the story of this life in which, through the influence of reflection and faith, an essentially revolutionary temperament was gradually impregnated with the cult of tradition and the past. For Simone Weil never ceased to be a revolutionary. She was not, however, pledged to a chimerical future leading men away from reality, but devoted herself more and more to revolution in the name of an unchanging and eternal principle — a principle which has to be constantly re-established because it constantly tends to be degraded by time.

Simone Weil did not believe in an indefinite perfecting of humanity: she even thought that the unfolding of history gave proof of the law of entropy rather than that of unlimited progress after the style of Condorcet. There is no need to defend her on this point. I do not see how it can be heretical to hold (in conformity with the great Greek tradition) that “change cannot be anything but limited and cyclic.” As for her invectives against the “social Beast,” however excessive a form they may sometimes take, we only have to put them back into their context in order to be assured that they do not in any way constitute an apology for anarchy. “The social order,” she writes, “is irreducibly that of the prince of this world. Our only duty with regard to the social is to try to limit the evil of it. – .. Something of the social labeled divine; an intoxicating mixture which brings about every sort of license—the evil disguised.” But she adds immediately: “And yet what about a city? But that is not of the social order — it is a human environment of which we are no more conscious than of the air we breathe — a contact with nature, the past, tradition. A man’s roots are not of the social order.” In other words, social influence is both food and poison. It is food in so far as it provides the individual with the inner equipment necessary for living as a man and for approaching God; poison, in so far as it tends to rob him of his liberty and to take God’s place. The perpetual encroachments of the social order upon the divine — that incessant degradation of mystical conceptions into politics — afford strong enough evidence, today more than ever, of the seriousness of this last danger.

Mutatis mutandis, the same remarks are applicable to the Church. Obviously a spirit so hungering for the absolute as was that of Simone Weil would necessarily be somewhat lacking in a sense of historical relativity: the words nolite conformari huic a seculo (Be not conformed to this world.) were for her a commandment allowing of no reservations. She found it very hard to understand that certain concessions of the Church to temporal exigencies did not in any way involve its eternal soul: The beatification of Charlemagne, for instance, seemed to her a scandalous compromise with the social idol. Somewhere she speaks of the Church as “a great totalitarian beast.” What does that signify? Totalitarianism is characterized at the same time by a refusal of the all and by the claim to be all. As the Catholic Church is the messenger of the All here below it does not need to be totalitarian.

The accusation made by Simone Weil, in so far as it is well founded, can therefore only be applicable to certain members of the body of the Church who arbitrarily bolt the doors of love and truth, thus failing to understand the universal vocation of Catholicism. There is no question of reopening here — especially at a time when so many Catholics do not hesitate to provide whips with which to beat their Master — the discussions formerly caused by the idea of “the Church as a body marked by sin.” We will only state that when Christ said that “the gates of hell should not prevail,” he did not promise that everything in the Church would remain eternally pure, but that the essential deposit of faith would be saved, come what might. The Church is rooted in God: that does not exclude the possibility that the tree may bear dried up or worm-eaten branches. To have faith is to believe that the divine sap will never fail. The preservation of this “incorruptible core of truth,” to use the actual expression of Simone Weil, in the midst of all the impurities mixed into the body of the Church, constitutes, moreover, one of the strongest proofs of the divinity of Catholicism. The Church could only become a “great totalitarian beast” in so far as its human body were totally separated from its divine soul. This is an impossible hypothesis for the gates of hell shall never prevail. . . . Today it is seen as the last refuge of the universal faced with rampant totalitarianisms.

Thus with Simone Weil the expulsion of the social idol does not lead to religious individualism. “The self and the social are the two great idols.” Grace saves from the one as from the other. That is doubtless what Célestin Bouglé was trying to express in his own manner when he saw in Simone Weil while she was still a student “a mixture of anarchist and cleric…

Simone Weil can only be understood on the level from which she speaks. Her work is addressed to souls who, if they are not stripped as naked as her own, have at least kept deep within them an aspiration for that pure goodness to which she devoted her life and her death. I am not unaware of the dangers of a spirituality such as hers. The worst forms of giddiness are caused by the highest summits. But the fact that light may burn us is not a valid reason for leaving it under a bushel. It is not a question of philosophy here but of life. Far from claiming to set up a personal system, Simone Weil strove with all her power to keep herself out of her work. Her one wish was to avoid getting in the way between God and men — to disappear “so that the Creator and the creature could exchange their secrets.” She cared nothing for her genius, knowing only too well that true greatness consists in learning to be nothing. “What does it matter what energy or gifts there may be in me? I have always enough to disappear. .

She had her way: Some of the text attains to that impersonal resonance which is the sign of the highest inspiration: “It is impossible to forgive whoever does us harm if this harm lowers us. We have to think that it does not lower us but that it shows our true level.” Or again: “If someone does me harm I must want this harm not to degrade me — this out of love for him who inflicted it upon me and so that he shall not really have done harm.” It is in such ejaculations of humility and love, rather than on the systematic side of her work, that Simone Weil appears as a pure messenger. I have never ceased to believe in her. In publishing the following pages I extend this confidence to all the souls who shall come to her.

All the writings contained in this book have been taken from the manuscripts which Simone Weil confided to us personally. They were therefore all written before May 1942.  More recent work, which her parents have been kind enough to show us, has not been included here. We have ourselves chosen the extracts from the notebooks, in which they were interspersed with innumerable quotations as well as philological and scientific studies. We hesitated between two ways of presentation: either to give the thoughts of Simone Weil one after the other in the order of their composition, or to classify them. The second method seemed preferable to us. We are anxious to express our thanks to all who have helped and encouraged us in our work: the Reverend Father Perrin, Lanza del Vasto, M. and Mme. Honnorat (who were personal friends of Simone Weil), Gabriel Marcel, and Jean de Fabrêgues. In the checking and transcription of the texts

M. V.-H. Debidour, who kindly helped to translate the Greek quotations incorporated in the aphorisms, and our devoted colleague, Mlle. Odile Keller, have both given us an infinite amount of valuable help.

Gustave Thibon
February, 1947.

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